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The epistemological inheritance of economics is 'rooted' in the enlightenment tensions over 
knowledge, thus demonstrating how the endeavour of economics is not a universal timeless 
objective science but a 'routed' body of knowledge whose underlying foundations are 
structured by the contingent emergence of ideas in a geohistorical-temporal-ideological 
context in line with a wider discursive fixing of objectivity and representation in knowledge. 
This modernist rendition of knowledge relies upon - an elision of difference; a separated view 
of the domains of the economic, political, social; a particular version of subjectivity which is 
narrowly obtained but unjustifiably universalised. A postcolonial moment in epistemology is 
needed to place difference at the heart of self and identity in order to disrupt knowledge based 
upon manufacturing conceptual abstractions and universalising their essence. 
One such intervention is the juxtaposition of identity with the economic. The problematics of 
identity in economics are discussed and the wider ways of attempting a reconciliation of the 
diversity of subjects with the desire for systematic knowledge are evaluated. A detailed critical 
assessment of economists' rare discourse on identity is followed by a differentiation of the 
concentric and the translational views on identity. Addressing the separation of culture and 
economy involves attending to the slippage between economics, economy, economic; 
rethinking the link between the value and values; and considering identity as a translation. 
Finally, writing economic theory anOther way is presented as a rewriting the conditions of 
theory itself. Implications of economic theories as textual productions are analysed and the 
complexities of emancipation and epistemology are explored. The dominant methods of 
economics do not have a universal purchase on understanding the economic aspects of human 
life. Overcoming the economic logic that permeates all aspects of existence and yet remains 
unquestioned in the terrains of knowledge production is essential. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Does writing mean deliberating upon and concentrating one's energies on a single 
theme from beginning to end? Does a 'monograph' foreclose the possibility of writing 
on multiple themes, and employing multiple modes of writing such as the usual prose 
of the essay style, the narratives, poems, fragments, etc? How does the monograph 
respond itself to the 'exigency of writing' or the surging forth of all that is suppressed 
(repressed) under an assumed, full-rounded subjectivity, either of the Cartesian kind 
or of the mediatized kind in our own times? (Franson Manjali 2001: 117) 
1.1 Introduction 
The first thing to point out about this thesis is that it is not simply inter- or multi-disciplinary, 
but to an extent, it can be called, anti-disciplinary. The disciplinary divides in the form 
familiar to us today have not existed forever, but it is still striking to see the difficulty of 
complicating the boundaries which often act as borders, with much border patrolling. This 
border patrolling is especially significant in a social science like economics, but in a more 
general sense, disciplinarity serves an important function in the modernist specialisation, 
taxonomisation and professionalisation of knowledge. It allows compartmentalised knowing 
to be tailored to the specific needs of administration. This is not in itself problematic as long 
as the contingent and arbitrary nature of the compartmentalisation is constantly foregrounded. 
However, this often tends not to be the case, and the service of knowledge to the purposes of 
administration, implies that one is looking for answers, the simpler the better. This preference 
for simple answers is not always admitted, and the result is - a disciplinary thrust to produce 
simple answers to complex questions, which is at the same time validated as possibly the only 
way of generating knowledge. This is only too visible especially in social sciences like 
economics which have a long tradition of being twinned to the concerns of power and 
administration in society. 
Against this background, this thesis does not squarely locate itself in pre-given field which can 
be understood as 'economics'. Rather, it constantly seeks to question and challenge how we 
come to see something as belonging to economics, how this has been constructed as 
seemingly invariant but actually varies over time and across place, how a belief in the 
invariance of what economics is in relation to a wider terrain of knowledge actually serves to 
depoliticise the economic context, and how this seemingly invariant depoliticised economic 
context is rendered substantively unengageable by any means other than those recognised as 
1 
legitimate and valid by those who have a monopoly on favourably defming the economic 
context. 
Questioning the economic context is therefore an important part of my motivation for this 
work. But, I also believe that this is not simply a necessary but an urgent task, since, 
increasingly at various levels of social discourse (from popular culture to academics)' the 
appeal toth~yconomic context is seen as beyond question. It is not surprising to fmd the 
opposing parties to any debate (for instance, citizenship, 'free' trade, aid/debt, asylum) 
appealing to the 'economic' case for their argument. This is not accompanied by any argument 
as to either how what is seen as being 'economic' is itself constructed, so that this construction 
is open to challenge, or, if the economic might not be the case-clinching magic word, so that 
there might be the possibility of something as being desirable even if it is not economic. 
Thus, the economic context is not something that should be settled too soon. Recently, the 
media reported the following statement, "[w]ith parties on both left and right debating a new 
political climate, former Labour cabinet minister Peter Mandelson has also said that in purely 
economic terms 'we are all Thatcherite now'" ("Right and Left Blaze Thatcherite Trail" 
2002). The link between the popular perception that the markets have won, the appeal to the 
economic as something which is fmal, and the role of economics in depoliticising the 
economic context deserves serious attention. A social science like economics - which is 
organised around dealing with manufactured abstractions such as the market or the economy, 
which are the basis for modelling the interactions of generic individuals - is consciously 
patterned after universalistic aspirations of extracting scientific facts from messy sociality. 
And this depoliticised economic context latches on to the privilege that is accorded to 
scientistic patterning, and appears to be unassailable. 
I am therefore starting from the position of trying to question the presupposed universality of 
economic knowledge, and trying to ex-pose it as contingent not only methodologically and 
epistemologically, but also argue that its creation and perpetuation is more generally 
ideological and interested. Any story of interested particulars passing off for disinterested 
I I should point out that I am not arguing for a separation between the various levels of social discourse, 
and, neither do I believe such a separation to be tenable. In fact, in the third part of this thesis, I 
challenge precisely the separation between the economic and cultural which is available to us in relation 
to separating the so-called 'levels of discourse' in society. For an interesting piece of work which 
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universals draws attention therefore to both the structuring of knowledge in terms of an 
inadequately conceived relation between the part and the whole, and to the submerging of 
difference in this endeavour. The first inaugurates the question of the dynamics of theory, and 
the second points to the Others of knowledge. These will accordingly be my threads of 
concentration in this endeavour. 
Given the anti-disciplinary nature of this'the~!? 1 wish to set out at the outset the title and 
summary, followed by a discussion of the -way theory is written in economics and its 
implications for pedagogy, and my motivation in undertaking this work. At this point, 1 should 
just like to blend into the text for flavour the following words of Gayatri Spivak (1999: xiii), 
"I am not erudite enough to be interdisciplinary, but 1 can break rules". 
1.2 The Title And Summary 
This thesis is an unintended consequence of my training in economics and accordingly it 
reveals a desire to come to terms with its limitations by articulating them. Perhaps, 
disciplinary under erasure (the word 'disciplinary' written with a line through it) is more 
appropriate for it than anti-disciplinary, because it simultaneously draws attention to both the 
need and the inadequacy of the designation. 1 wish to clarify the title of the thesis since it 
straddles the conventional disciplinary terrains of economics and philosophy - 'Interrogating 
The Subject-World Of Economic Epistemology: Re-Imagining Theory And Difference'. The 
phrase 'subject-world of economic epistemology' is meant to connote both theories of 
knowledge underlying economics as a subject of investigation, and also the notions of 
'subject' and 'world' that hold together the dominant account of knowledge in social sciences 
of the economic. The re-imagining of 'theory' is to draw attention to the possibility of putting 
into question the consensus on what we do when we theorise in economics. Similarly, the 
question of difference is about pointing out how modernist knowledge has always functioned 
by designating its Others, and the implications of this submerging of difference which 
becomes apparent in the inability to think of identity and the economic as terms together. 
challenges the representations of the marketplace in popular culture and relates them to academic 
discourse, see Rajani Sudan (1999). 
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The main concern of this thesis is the relation between the issues of knowledge and those of 
society, and the importance of difference in writing the economic. A brief chapter by chapter 
summary of the thesis is as follows. 
In this introductory chapter, I provide the context and motivation for the questions that I am 
raising in the discipline of economics. I illustrate and critique the way in which theory is 
conventionally written in economics. This is followed by a discussion of the J~¢agogy of 
economICS. 
Chapter two is a detailed stand-alone section of my argument. In this chapter, I examine how 
economic knowledge came to be associated with contemporary axiomatic theories with 
deductive nomological accounts of explanation. I discuss the many ways in which economics 
as a body of knowledge bears the imprints of its intellectual heritage in the tussles over 
science and power. In fact, the rise of economics as a discipline cannot be understood in 
isolation from the rise of disciplinarity and scient ism itself. The structuring of knowledge in 
economics is an outcome of the inherent tensions in enlightenment epistemology. In modernist 
social science, theories are seen as a means of providing explanation of a pre-existing reality. 
But, far from being a timeless and universal construct, explanation is a historical and 
contingent political exercise which ftxes the role of theory and the position of the theorist in 
economICS m line with a wider discursive ftxing of objectivity and representation in 
knowledge. 
Chapter three is motivated by the limitations of undertaking an epistemological interrogation 
of economics as a body of knowledge which does not afford the going beyond into the 
questions of difference. In this sense, chapter two was a vital exhaustion of the line of inquiry 
that remains within the ambit of considering economics as a science. As a result, chapter three 
raises the wider questions of how the modernist rendition of knowledge relies upon an elision 
of difference and desires the separation of the domains of the economic, political, moral, 
social, ethical, and so on. At the heart of this lies a particular version of subjectivity which is 
itself narrowly obtained but unjustiftably universalised. Looking at the way in which concepts 
such as Reason and history were reconciled in influential accounts such as the Hegelian 
dialectic, we fmd that they too ftxed their Others. These Others of modernist renditions of 
knowledge in general, were also the Others of the discourse of economics as it was beginning 
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to take shape. The Other only functioned as a limit-phenomenon and a serious intervention of 
difference into economic knowledge would require us to think new taxonomies of critique. 
Chapters four, five and six take on the task of one such critical exploration, that of juxtaposing 
questions of identity with those of the economic. In chapter four, I discuss the problematics of 
identity in economics and more generally. A critique of the abstract individual model of 
identity underlying economics leads to an evaluation of the wider ways in which theorists 
have attempted to reconcile the diversity of subjects with the desire for systematic knowledge. 
The eventual limitations of standpoint theory and its political correlate of identity politics are 
discussed, and 'politics of identity' is put forward as way of rethinking difference in relation 
to knowledge. Politics of identity is a method of interrogating any coherence, whether 
conceptual or experiential, for the way in which it fixes difference as its Other. Rather than 
take identity as the starting point for thinking about difference, politics of identity requires an 
interrogation of texts for their construction of identity categorisations in ways that are linked 
to power and privilege. Chapter five turns to an in-depth critical assessment of the two 
relatively rare instances where economists have spoken of identity. Chapter six moves forward 
by differentiating two ways of thinking about identity, the concentric view which is based 
upon the self, and the translational view which arises from an encountering of difference that 
takes on a complexity which is not open to easy spatio-temporal determination or assimilation. 
While the concentric view can give rise to 'benevolent' projects of cosmopolitan liberal 
humanism, taking the example of Martha Nussbaum, this is critiqued. Instead, a translational 
politics of identity is proposed as a way of 'thinking out' the relation between subjects and 
knowledge. The ethics of translation is what makes it possible to see what is at stake in the 
constructions of identity that we then want to deconstruct. Surveying the separation of identity 
and the economic, we find that this is also the separation of culture and economy, and 
addressing this involves attending to the slippage between economics, economy, and the 
economic; rethinking the fixing of values in rational economic Value (so that one cannot be 
irrational without also being uneconomic). 
The concluding chapter examines how writing economic theory anOther way will also be a 
rewriting the conditions of theory itself. The role of economic theories as textual productions 
is highlighted, and its consequences in terms of the function of critique and the theory-praxis 
problematique is analysed. The complexities of emancipation and epistemology are invoked, 
and the relation between travel and theory is outlined. Finally, the need is stressed for moving 
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pryond a modernist conceptualisation of knowledge by q~rstioning the dominant methods of 
economics as having a universal purchase on access to U11-derstanding the economic aspects of 
I I 
human life. An essential task today is to overcome the economic logic that permeates all 
aspects of existence and yet remains unquestioned in tff~ fFrrains of knowledge production. 
1.3 The Writing Of Theory In Economics 
A network of sociopolitical relationships and intellectual assumptions creates an 
invisible system of acceptance and rejection, discourse and silence, ascendancy and 
SUbjugation within and around disciplines. Implicit cultural presuppositions work with 
the personal idiosyncrasies of intellectual authorities to keep certain issues from 
placing high on research agendas. Critics have to learn how to notice their absence .... 
A discipline defines itself both by what it excludes (repulses) and by what it includes. 
But the self-definition process removes what is excluded (repulsed) from view so that 
it is not straightforwardly available for assessment, criticism, and analysis (Lorraine 
Code 1991: 25-26). 
Before putting forward my arguments in the thesis, let me set the scene with ex amp les of the 
existing practice of writing economic theory which will provide a useful handle to appreciate 
the need for change. In March 1999, the Journal of Economic Literature published an article 
titled "The Young Person's Guide to Writing Economic Theory" (William Thomson 1999: 
157 -183). The reason I choose to point out this article is the extremely good illustration it 
provides of what economists mean by "theory" and how it should be "done". It is also 
significant that the article appears in a key journal which serves as a place for defining what 
economics literature is all about. In addition, the mock humorous tone of the article contains a 
nudge and wink at the peculiarities of writing economics. It aims to allay anxieties for those 
who haven't figured out how to get "inside" this high discourse, but in the process, it also 
exposes the numerous implicit value judgements that guide theorising. Let me now discuss 
this text and interrogate what it takes for granted. 
The article provides "recommendations for writing economic theory" (157, emphasis added) 
to an intended audience of young economists. But this is immediately followed up with the 
statement that, "this essay is mainly concerned in its details with formal models" and "does not 
cover the writing up of empirical work" (ibid., emphases added). Here, economic theory is 
seen as the ability to create and present a mathematical model. The author goes on to state that 
since most work anyway begins with the introduction and analysis of a model, the 
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recommendations can be seen as quite wide-ranging. The principles of good writing 
simplicity, clarity, unity - are stated at the outset as universal? 
In a good piece of work done by a young economist, the reader "should be able to easily spot 
the main results, figure out most of the notation and locate the crucial definitions needed to 
understand the statement of each theorem" (158). It is a serious business to train and expect 
such theorisation as valid economics-;-as_5Sitimate social science. Let me give you a few more 
examples from the text. 
When advising young theorists to "choose notation that is easily recognisable", Thomson says 
the following (160, emphases added): 
The best notation is notation that can be guessed. When you see a man walking down 
the street with a baguette under his arm and a beret on his head, you do not need to be 
told he is a Frenchman. You know he is. You can immediately and legitimately invest 
him with all the attributes ofFrenchness, and this greatly facilitates the way you think 
and talk about him. You can guess his children's names - Renee or Edmond - and 
chuckle at his supposed admiration for Jerry Lewis. 
And he continues "[s]imilarly, if Z designates a set, call its members z and z', perhaps x,y, and 
z, but certainly not b, or i". Here, despite the self-ironic chuckle implied in the example, the 
point is a wink and a nod aimed at those who laugh precisely because they are 'in' on the 
discourse, and have accepted the discourse's parameters. Maybe the actual logic of parallel 
here is not from stereotyping Frenchness to symbols, but it is the acceptability and 
intelligibility of stereotyping people that allows comprehending the thread of his comparison 
when he gets to mathematical notation. The parameter contained in the joke is that of 
essentialism. Contained in the jokes about the choice of notation, abbreviations, assumptions, 
and the naming of agents, is, effectively, the fairly serious matter of theorisation as a process 
that begins with formalisation, moves on to universalisation, and when confronted with 
difference, resorts to stereotyping. 
2 As an antidote, consider the following (Judith Butler 1999: xix, emphases added): 
The demand for lucidity forgets the ruses that motor the ostensibly 'clear' view. Avital Ronell 
recalls the moment in which Nixon looked into the eyes of the nation and said, 'let me make 
one thing perfectly clear' and then proceeded to lie. What travels under the sign of 'clarity, , 
and what would be the price of failing to deploy a certain critical suspicion when the arrival of 
lucidity is announced? Who devises the protocols of 'clarity' and whose interests do they 
serve? What is foreclosed by the insistence on parochial standards of transparency as requisite 
for all communication? What does 'transparency' keep obscure? 
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But then again, attempts to characterise human behaviour and interactions in terms of 'ideal 
objects' will not proceed unless one is fIrmly grounded within the abstract essentialist 
individual version of identity where everyone is basically the same. This takes us to the 
enlightenment interest in the 'general man', the average being who can be represented 
systematically, without any interference of the theorist, in the practice of positivist and 
potentially universal modernist disciplinary knowledge. 
_/ 
So that, we have this instruction, "Call your generic individual i, his [sic] preference relation 
Rj , his utility function Uj, and his endowment vector CtJi. The production set is Y. Prices are p, 
quantities q" (160-161, emphases added). The underlying faith in the usefulness of 
axiomatisation is directly correlated with a desire for objective, general, and pure universal 
knowledge in symbolic terms which can be manipulated to handle particular contextual 
complications. This ostensibly 'higher' form of knowing is seen to be achieved when the 'self 
is erased from the discourse, leaving the distilled essence of the generalised abstract individual 
i. This can be seen in Theodore Litt's remarks on the desirability of such knowing (1957: 141, 
emphases added): 
It is the science of objects which cannot be found readymade, and subsequently 
understood through the working of human reason, but which are themselves created 
by an independent act of reason .. .In order to create this world of conceptual objects, it 
is essential that the thinking being must raise itself onto the level of 'pure' and 
entirely general thinking. This means, in effect, that all considerations which restrict 
the thinking individual to his [sic] particular context in time and space and which 
distinguish him in a qualitative sense from other individual beings must be eliminated 
in this sphere of thought. In this sense, the elevation of one's thinking faculty to the 
sphere of mathematical ideas implies an act of self-elimination; of the conquest of 
one's own personality. 
Accordingly, the view is that scientificity about the discourse on the social demands the 
sacrifice of one's self, seen as the situatedness of one's context. The best knowledge is that 
which is universally applicable but what passes for universal knowledge is actually profoundly 
parochial and provincial (see especially chapter three of the thesis). Moreover, this view of 
knowledge is intimately tied to the tensions in enlightenment epistemology, and the role for 
theory envisaged following on from such a view of knowledge is equally problematic. 
It is clear from Thomson's advice throughout this piece that writing economic theory is the 
same thing as presenting a well-written formal model. And even then, we are warned "[d]o not 
populate your paper with individuals, agents, persons, consumers, and players. One species is 
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enough. Universal quantifications can be written as 'for all,' 'for any,' and 'for every' ... " (168, 
emphases added). One is enough in the hall of many mirrors. 
Further, this pretence to scientificity does not prevent the theorist from carving out ideological 
niches under the guise of non-interfering abstract representation. For instance, Thomson at 
several places draws the distinction between what terms mean in ordinary language, and what 
sense they have in "our dialect" (or "economese" as he puts it on p.168). Why should we use 
the adjective 'fair' to designate allocations that are both equitable and efficient? He asks (169, 
emphasis original). After all, in common language fairness does not have efficiency 
connotations, so "[r]efer to 'equitable and efficient allocations"', he advises (ibid.). It could be 
argued that one is being ideological in delineating 'efficiency' as something which does not 
have to be 'fair', just as much as one is ideological when one argues for undesirability of 
characterising a trade-off between equity and efficiency. But, in scientific posturing, 
efficiency is supposedly a positive realm, while being 'fair' or equitable is a normative issue. 
Drucilla Barker (1995) reviews the historical development of the concept of economic 
efficienc/ as "a response to the methodological tensions between the clearly political nature 
of economics and the scientific aspirations of economists". Her opening quote from John 
Hicks illustrates this well (ibid., emphasis added): "The investigator himself decides what he 
thinks to be good for society, and praises or condemns the system he is studying by that test. 
This is the method which is rightly condemned as unscientific. It is the way of the prophet and 
the social reformer, not of the economist". 
As Barker points out, the propositions of economic science, were - in the eyes of its important 
precursors such as Lionel Robbins - composed of postulates which are neither empirical 
generalisations nor mere tautologies, rather they are universal truths known through 
introspection.4 Thomson's suggestions are in keeping with such a spirit of supposed 
scientificity which sees fairness as a normative term that needs replacing with a combination 
of the normative 'equitable' plus the positive 'efficient'. None of this draws attention to the 
interestedly constructed and value-laden nature of the concept of 'efficiency' itself which is 
regularly used in media representations of the appeals to a so-called universal and 
3 Especially the development of Pareto optimality as a scientific criterion of economic welfare. 
4 Thus, for Robbins, "[w]hy the human animal attaches particular values in this sense to particular 
things is a question we will not discuss" (in Barker 1995). I agree with Barker when she follows it up 
thus, "[w]hy not, one might ask? Because to discuss these issues would place them in historical and 
cultural context and thus detract from what Robbins saw as their universal nature". 
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uninterrogable 'economic logic,.5 The idea seems to be that there is no argumg with 
'economic science', and yet when we interrogate what this characterisation of economic 
science takes for granted in terms of what counts as desirable knowledge and how it is to be 
represented theoretically, we begin to see that economic science does not represent the 
economic realm scientifically, but is a politically motivated belief in the desirability of 
general, universal, and axiomatic representations as science, and this 'science', when it is 
yoked With ~apriori fixing of particular values as the general value in the 'economic', passes 
for a social science. The writing of such social science will then inevitably require the shelter 
of appeals to 'axiomatic rigour' in order to establish its scientific (and thus disinterested, but 
actually ideologically conservative and status quoist) credentials. 
Writing in 'economese' also means writing in (good, standard) English. Thomson has the 
following to say (1999: 170, emphasis original): "Get a good dictionary, and, if English is not 
your first language, ask for assistance. To weed out from your text gallicisms, nipponisms, 
sinicisms, and so on, get the help of a native gardener". Indeed, English as a language and 
Mathematics as its partner have a long history together, and Thomson further urges striking 
the optimal balance in the writing of proofs (ibid.: 170, emphasis original), 
[tJhe optimal ratio of mathematics to English in a proof varies from reader to 
reader .... A proof written entirely in English is often not precise enough and is too 
long; a proof written entirely in mathematics is impossible to understand, unless you 
are a digital computer of course. Modern estimation techniques have shown that the 
optimal ratio of mathematics to English in a proof lies in the interval (52%, 63.5%). 
This is followed by an example of a proof that is 'just right' (171): "Proof: this fo llows from 
the inclusion q> c P, Part (i) Proposition 1, and Lemma 1 applied to cp. QED". Writes 
Thomson, "It is indeed pleasantly short and clean. Wouldn't you like to know what theorem it 
proves?" Well, wouldn't you? 
The writing of economic theory on these terms is not so much a theorising of the 'economic' 
in its content and evaluations, but rather a second order apriori formalised exercise where the 
method serves as a grid onto which any content can be mapped. Following on from this, the 
comprehension of subjectivity implied by such analysis is notoriously impoverished. The 
'subject' of analysis is a 'universal' figure whose identity is not a function of its situatedness. 
5 For example, when a firm makes thousands of workers redundant in the name of 'efficiency', 
mainstream media frames this as the 'inevitable' outcome of an 'inexorable economic logic'. But while 
all the sides in any argument are busy appealing to the 'economic' considerations, there is no ground 
left to challenge the primacy of the appeal to the economic, or to point out that there is no objective 
consensus on what can be seen as being economic, since it is always values that are fixed in value. 
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An example of the extent to which naming is seen as being unrelated to the content of 
theorisation is as follows. Giving advice on the attribution of gender identity to the 'agents', 
Thomson writes (ibid.: 180-181), 
Choose the sex of your agents once and for all. Flip a coin. If it is a boy, rejoice! If it 
is a girl, rejoice![6] And don't subject them to sex change operations from paragraph 
to paragraph .... Two-person gan;tes are great for sexual equality. Make one player 
male and the other female .... It will a_l~ save you from the awkward 'he or she,' 'him 
or her,', 'his or her'! Alternatively, you may be able to refer to your agents in the 
plural, or choose one of them to be a firm, and refer to it as 'it'. 
Like everything else, identity is also simply an uncomplicated choice. Regardless of the 
scenario one is 'theorising', the agents remain abstract neutral essences who can be invested 
with any kind of identity. 
The point fmally is this. The writing of economic theory is seen as the construction of formal 
models, which are legitimate because they are seen as attempts to generate knowledge of a 
general and universal kind which is unembodied and unembedded in any specific context. The 
appeal to the signifier 'science' performs the important function of stabilising the writing of-~ 
such economic theory. And yet, this supposed generality and universality is actually a cover 
for uncritically invoking concepts such as the individual, firms, efficiency, scarcity, 
production and consumption, and so on, as universal constructs available to be studied by the 
universal method of the economic model. That mathematics is crucial to maintaining this 
facade of axiomatic rigour is obvious from the parallel Thomson draws at the very end of his 
piece. There he writes that as he started circulating this paper, "several readers gave [him] 
references to similar pedagogical essays written by mathematicians" (182). He then 
approvingly quotes several such manuals for mathematicians, and concludes thus, "[a]n 
example ofa beautifully written text is the monograph by Gerard Debreu (1959)". 
This apotheosis of good economIC theorising refers to Monograph 17 of the Cowles 
Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, by economist/mathematician 
Debreu, titled "Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis Of Economic Equilibrium". In the 
preface to this, the author states (1959: viii, emphasis added), 
[tJhe theory of value is treated here with the standards of rigor of the contemporary 
formalist school of mathematics. The effort towards rigor substitutes correct 
6 It is indeed a strange coincidence that in the light of what he says, Thomson must have come up with 
the same side of the tossed coin (!) throughout his article, the generic individual is always referred to as 
a 'he'. See above. 
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reasonings and results for incorrect ones, but it offers other rewards too .... Allegiance 
to rigor dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis where the theory, in the strict 
sense, is logically entirely disconnected from its interpretations. 
If Robbins believed "[w]hy the human animal attaches particular values in this sense to 
particular things is a question we will not discuss" (see fn. 4 above), Debreu's theory of 
'value' does not even have a sub-section on the term. The opening chapter is titled 
'mathematics', and subsequent ones - commodities and prices, producers, consumers, 
equilibrium, optimum, and uncertainty. 
./ 
The 'economic' in Thomson's guide is an absence, what matters is the narrow method. 
Thomson is not unique in this interpretation of what we mean by economic theory, for the 
mainstream profession stands by him. It is a science (never mind all the numerous arguments 
to the contrary) like physics, like mathematics (Mirowski 1989, 1991a). 
This focus on formalisation as the core of economic theory leaves unchallenged the underlying 
issues of universalism and modernist stereotypy that form the operational basis of mainstream 
economic method. And it is not only formalism which requires that identity be a matter of 
universal essences. The particularities of inalienably situated historical contexts within which 
the 'economic' is experienced are simplified into the general and universal denominations. For 
instance, Deirdre McCloskey, a theorist associated with recognising the limits of formalism 
and arguing for an acknowledgement of the way in which economics as a discipline is 
discursively constructed, is at the same time unwilling to contest the discourse of growth as an 
economic phenomenon unencumbered by questions of history, agency, and identity. She 
argues (2000: 33) that "the problems of poor countries have little to do with the experience of 
imperialism", saying, 
It seems strange to go on blaming imperialism for the woes of a Third World whose 
growth rate has accelerated steadily in the past fifty years. India, the most confidently 
anti-imperialist and anticapitalist former colony, has had the lowest growth rate in 
Asia - mainly, I would say, not because it was once Victoria's jewel, but because it 
has followed Harold Laski's policies of keeping the market out .... You could only 
recently buy American breakfast cereal in India. The former colonies that have 
embraced capitalism - [ ... ] - have done well. You can buy anything in Hong Kong. 
Even parts of Africa seem to be emerging from their self-inflicted wounds since 
independence. ... [t]he impact of imperialism on the imperial powers has been 
trivial... 
McCloskey slips into making a particular comprehension of the empirical into 'the' empirical 
- giving a status of Fact to that (Le., to growth) which is theoretically constituted as a 'fact'. 
Growth is not a neutral phenomenon - leaving aside the thorny issues of trade, income-
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distribution and the environment, the process of growth has often meant the imposition of 
"European ideas, values and institutions - largely wrecked [these] cultural systems, 
undermining [African] ways of life and subsistence" (William Pfaff 2001). Further, how did 
we get to this place where we can unquestioningly designate, for everyone to understand, the 
'Third World' and the 'poor nations'? As Michael Shapiro writes, we need to practice 
insurrectional textuality, "to use a particular grammar that helps to historicize phenomena that 
are ordinarily accepted as unproblematic .... shift from atemporal noun like criminal to one 
conveying temporality like 'criminalization'" (l989a: 71). For, "to textualize a domain of 
analysis is to recognize that 'any reality' is mediated by a mode of representation and that 
representations are not a description of a world of facticity." (l989b: l3-14). The nations are 
impoverished and were colonised rather than poor former colonies - if only they would 
'grow' ! 
Finally, it is important to note that the 'scientific status' of economics as a discipline (that 
which disciplines knowledge claims) is cemented by its unprecedented homage at the altar of 
mathematics in the twentieth century. The epistemic violence of modernist universalism can 
be seen in the primacy of numbers within the conception of what 'counts' - either as theory 
(in formalist methods) or as evidence (as with the McCloskean use of growth as empirical 
'fact' that settles all questions). Mary Poovey (1998) describes how numbers have a history of 
being seen as pre- and yet non-interpretive, and the crucial role that they have played in the 
construction of what she calls the "modem fact". Rajani Kanth (1997 a: 4) in his critique of the 
eurocentrism of economics writes "mathematics, in effect, serves the same ideological 
function, in economics, that masses in Latin served the priesthood of the Church" - namely, to 
provide a misleading semblance of dignity to an otherwise "self-referential language game 
with zero representational efficacy". And this is paralleled by a yearning for "objectivity" 
within modernism.7 General and universal knowledge is best explored in symbols that exclude 
the complexity and ambiguity of human contexts. 
1.4 The Pedagogical Scene 
7 In addition, the role of mathematics is especially important to unpack from its connections as a partner 
to Occidental science (compass-globe-map quests). Mathematics and science are seen as primarily 
European ventures (notwithstanding Aryabhatta, Bhaskaracharya, Hypatia, Susruta, Charak and so on). 
On the non-European traditions, see George Joseph (2000); Alan Bishop (1995). 
13 
The world has been remade in the economist's image. The ascendancy of economic 
theory has not made the world a better place. Instead, it has made an already troubled 
society worse; more unequal, more unstable, and less 'efficient'. Why has economics 
persisted with a theory which has been comprehensively shown to be unsound? Why, 
despite the destructive impact of economic policies, does economics continue to be 
the toolkit which politicians and bureaucrats apply to almost all social and economic 
issues? The answer lies in the way economics is taught in the world's universities 
(Steve Keen 2001: xiii-xiv). 
Now I will CIiscuss the pedagogical scene in Economics - this is not meant to be an in-depth 
./ 
evaluation of the-state of the discipline, but a sketching of some consequences of continuing to 
write economic theory in the ways suggested by Thomson. 
In his conclusion, Thomson proposes the following (1999: 182), "If you follow all of the 
above recommendations, not only will you be pleased with yourself, your seminar audiences 
enlightened, your classmates impressed, your parents proud of you, and you will land a job in 
a top-five department, the most importantly, your adviser will be happy". He may be 
overstating the case, but the mainstream disciplinary consensus is fIrmly on his side, and 
especially when it comes to jobs in top-fIve departments.8 Not only is this the way to write 
good economic theory (to 'do' formal models), in fact, there is no other way of 'doing' 
economic theory! 
As Ben Fine (1999) points out, the many weaknesses of mainstream economics (particular 
form of methodological individualism, empirical evidence as neutral and external data, 
unacceptably crude status of falsifiability, behavioural assumption of utility maximisation to 
the exclusion of all other motives) do not make a difference to its status. This apparent 
anomaly is unsurprising if we consider the following (405, emphases added): 
Heterodox economists who are prepared to see this are increasingly thin on the ground 
and risk professional suicide to the extent that their scholarship seeks alternatives .... 
mainstream economics ... is currently characterized by a lack of dialogue with 
alternative approaches as never before. These are dismissed by the mainstream as 
woolly or non-rigorous if they do not draw heavily upon mathematical modelling 
and/or statistical estimation. Indeed, a key feature of economics as a discipline at the 
moment is that it has become systematically more entrenched in its intolerance of 
alternative approaches. This is true of analytical substance as well as in professional 
practice. It is extremely difficult for any heterodox economists to survive, and even 
8 A cursory glance at the curricula of any economics programme or at the research area requirements in 
economics job advertisements would confirm this assertion. Roy Weintraub posed an interesting 
question to Sheila Dow in a review, the exchange is recalled in Dow (1995: 719) - "Mainstream theory 
is not the only option facing economists. So: [Weintraub asks] 'Why are there, in the United States at 
least 98% Mainstream and 2% of all other kinds of economists "'. 
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harder for a new generation to emerge through academic appointments, teaching and 
research.[~ 
Beth Allen (2000) in her attempts to predict the future of microeconomic theory, illustrates 
some typical disciplinary attitudes. lo To begin with, she wishes "to avoid attempting to defme 
economic theory - perhaps it's like pornography, in that you know it when you see it" (143). 
Not only is economics best defmed as 'whaLeconomists do', with Allen's remarks it seems 
economic theory is also tautologically' what econ6mic theorists do'. She further chooses not 
to "rehash the positive/normative distinction or the debate about testability in economics" 
(144). Thus, in her view, much outstanding economic theory is inherently untestable but it can 
be validated by mathematics. And, "[o]n a similar note, [she is] pleased that the seemingly 
endless disputes on the role of mathematics in economics have largely ceased" (ibid.). 
The ceasing of these disputes may have been a function of conversation stopping responses 
that obtain from the mainstreamY Partha Dasgupta (1998: ii) somewhat regrettably attends to 
9 At this point, Fine mentions the impact of the recent Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in the UK 
on the discipline of economics. He cites Lee and Harley (1998) to suggest that "non-mainstream 
economics could be eliminated from British economics departments within ten years!" (1999: 405, 
420). 
IO Inasmuch as the question of economic theory is a question of method, the situation is not very 
different in macroeconomics. As an illustration, consider Robert Lucas Jr. (2000) who provides a model 
of growth for the twenty fIrst century which begins with a world of many countries with equal 
populations at some initial date prior to the onset of the Industrial Revolution. They all have the same 
constant income level. He writes (160), 
Now imagine all of these economies lined up in a row, each behind the kind of mechanical 
starting gate used at the race track. In the race to industrialise ... the gates do not open all at 
once ... at any date t a few of the gates that have not yet opened are selected by some random 
device. When the bell rings, these gates open and some of the economies that had been 
stagnant are released and begin to grow. The rest must wait their chances at the next date, t + 
1 .... 
He admits that "there is not much economics in the model", but later follows this up with (166, 
emphasis original), 
[b Jut for all these defIciencies, it is undeniably an economic model: no one but a theoretical 
economist would have written down. It is not a theory formed by statistical methods from the 
Penn World Table or any Other single data set. Despite its obvious limitations, the model has 
nontrivial implications about the behaviour of the world economy over the next century. It 
predicts that sooner or later everyone will join the Industrial Revolution, that all economies 
will grow at the rate common to the wealthiest economies, and that percentage differences in 
income levels will disappear (which is to say, returned to their preindustrial levels). 
However, his conjecture is that "these predictions are not due to the mechanical character of the modef', 
but that (166, emphases added), the "central presumption of the general equilibrium models that are in 
wide use in macroeconomics today is that people are pretty much alike, that the differences in their 
behaviour are due mainly to differences in the resources that history has placed at their disposaf'. For 
someone who both agrees and disagrees with Lucas, see Robert Solow (2000). 
11 An example is Paul Samuelson's response to the excesses of mathematics in economics. Rather than 
engaging with the idea that certain things may not lend themselves to axiomatisations, or that the 
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the critics saying thus: "My fellows economists choose simply to ignore these writings. 
Understandably, they think they have better things to do. Some have told me I waste my time 
worrying about such attacks". He writes (21-24): 
It is the fate of some disciplines to begin as a fit subject for educated gentlemen to 
advert upon, and to become technical, to the displeasure of educated gentlemen ... 
That a problem area is important has never been a clinching argument for rushing to 
work on it. Wisely, I think, contemporary economists study an important problem 
only when they think there is a chance that it will yield fruit ... [he gives-the example 
that until recently economists hadn't theorised inequality because] ... there~ere no 
promising analytical leads on the matter ... Economics is a quantitative subject [he 
adds that policy makers do not want expert advisors for philosophical discourse] ... So 
mathematical modeling is essential and is here to stay ... in order to make progress, we 
have to simplify in suitable ways. 
Allen fears that the 'hard-won silence on appropriateness of mathematics' is now in danger 
because 'younger members of our profession' are guilty of 'backtracking from rigor in their 
work'. She attributes this alarming trend to the publish or perish pressures in the academia, so 
that new entrants are tempted to be sloppy (strictly speaking, any article without a formal 
model is probably sloppy for her).12 Any work that does not conform to the orthodoxy is a 
worthy candidate for rejection. 
Thus, Allen writes (ibid.:145, emphases added), 
Yet another disturbing trend in economic theory is that many researchers are choosing 
to step back from genuine theory .... economics would be better served if theorists 
would more often deliberately move in the direction of abstraction and generality, 
which is where theory can most effectively contribute to economic science ... until 
adoption of mathematics in economics was an interested political and sociological endeavour (see 
chapter two), Samuelson seems to take for granted that those who raise these objections do so because 
they are not capable of understanding mathematics, and will eventually end up with an inferiority 
complex: "Moreover, without mathematics you run grave psychological risks. As you grow older, you 
are sure to resent the method increasingly. Either you will get an inferiority complex and retire from the 
field of theory or you will get an inferiority complex and become aggressive about your dislike of it" 
(1952: 65). Later on, in chapter six, it will be interesting to see that the reply of a political economist to 
a dissenter in 1826 was no less vitriolic. 
12 But what about the sloppiness of allegiance to rigour, and empirical deception? David Colander 
(2000: 127) mentions two cases. First, "[t]he editors of the Journal of Money, Banking and Credit found 
that even when they had requested the data from authors ... they could not replicate the results of the 
studies (Dewald et al ., 1986)". Second, "McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) found that statistical inference 
was incorrectly used in a large majority of articles in the American Economic Review, the premier 
research journal...". And as for axiomatic rigour, consider Paul Samuelson (1952: 64), "The 
convenience of mathematical symbolism for handling certain deductive inferences is, I think, 
indisputable. It is going too far to say that mathematicians never make mistakes. Like everybody else, 
they can pull some awful boners". But, of course, "it is surprising how rare pure mistakes in logic are .... 
I think it is one of the advantages of the mathematical medium ... - that we are forced to lay our cards on 
the table so that all can see our premises" (ibid.). 
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recently, I had not found interactions with most other social scientists to be 
particularly fruitful... 
For most economists, the irony of not being able to conclusively demonstrate what economic 
theory is or does while at the same time arguing for more abstraction and generality for 
genuine theory, does not register. The reason Allen changed her mind about interdiscip linarity 
is again something she has in common with the disciplinary consensus 13 - in addition to the 
fundamental tools from mathematics and statistics, the allure of fields such as fmance, 
operations research and computer science, biology and engineering ("more precisely, 
cognitive neuroscience - the link is the relation between biological bases of behaviour and 
rational choice") proves to be too much. In the current climate of hyperenthusiasm about 
4new' issues of information and technology, Allen further sees the potential to revise the 
economic treatment of technology (which for the most part still follows Debreu, 1959, see 
above), and in addressing this topic she sees 4'vast potential for economists to learn from 
engineers" (149).14 
Equally interesting is the making of the young economist who writes economic theory along 
the lines suggested by Thomson. For this an illustration is provided by David Colander and 
Arjo Klamer (1987) in their survey of graduate students at six top ranking graduate economic 
programmes. 15 I will only briefly make a few points. 44The typical graduate student in 
economics at these selected institutions is a 26-year-old, middle-class, nonreligious white male 
who is involved in a long-term relationship" .16 Contrast this with a recent discussion thread on 
13 Interdisciplinarity is welcome in some directions but not others. See Julie Nelson (1995: 134) who 
addresses disciplinary values which are linked to the idea that "a 4hard' economics is clearly preferable 
to a 'soft' economics". An interesting discussion in Nelson (ibid.: 136-l37) is as follows. For a Gary 
Becker (who has argued that the model of individual choice in markets is the distinguishing 
characteristic of economics) or a Robert Lucas (who has stated that the assumptions of rational choice 
modelling provide "the only 'engine of truth' we have in economics"), even the models of George 
Akerlof and Janet Yellen (who borrow from psychology) "fail to qualify, being too 'soft' or 'too 
messy,' or perhaps 'too sociological"'. Other models of human behaviour that Nelson mentions as not 
meeting the mainstream 'standards of rigor' are by economists such as Nancy Folbre, Amartya Sen, 
Robert Frank (see ibid.: 137). 
14 Plus C;a Change, Plus C'est La Meme Chose (the more things change, the more they remain the 
same). See chapter two for the discussion of a nineteenth century tussle between the rival ideals of 
'rigor' and 'practicality' as the basis for economic theory - the mathematician economists versus the 
engineer economists. 
15 The six universities are: University of Chicago, Columbia University, Harvard University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and Yale University. 
16 In their sample, 18.9 percent were female, one was Hispanic, and none Black. This is not exceptional 
in economics. For an oral history compilation of a sample of 11 women economists in the US who 
obtained their PhD's between 1950 in 1975 (the percentage of women doctorates in economics in the 
US continued to fall through most of this period, while those in other disciplines rose - from 1950 until 
late 1960s it remained below 5%), see Paulette Olson and Zohreh Emami (2002: especially 1-l3). For a 
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the history of economic thought (HES) email forum where an acknowledgement that "most 
economics education is chalk and talk by white, male middle-aged profs" (Bruce Caldwell 
2002), drew a response that went as follows (Chas Anderson, 2002): 
I think the frustration that some are experiencing with the method or style in which 
economics is taught has really more to do with the intransigence by which political 
correctness was greeted by the econ departments. While the other social sciences 
round with open arms to unquestionably embrace every and all new demands made, 
economies resisted. And, because economics is really a much older and more 
sophisticatecYSubject than many outside the field realize, it will continue to frustrate 
those with the 'new' agenda. 
The counter-question to this went, " ... perhaps it is that 'non-economic' theories are so much 
more older and sophisticated than economists realise? It may be that in this day and age, 
economics is much too important a subject to be left to the economists" (Spencer Pack 
2002).17 This exchange illustrates that not much has changed since Colander and Klamer 
wrote about the making of an economist in 1987. 
Therein, they find that the students felt - that graduates school gave them little opportunity for 
interdisciplinary discussions; knowledge of the economy and knowledge of economic 
literature do not make an economist successful (being smart in the sense of being good at 
problem solving was seen as being 'very important' by 65 percent, excellence in mathematics 
by 57 percent, knowledge of economic literature by 10 percent, having a thorough knowledge 
of the economy by 3 percent); a strong sense that economics was a game, and the facade, not 
the depth of knowledge, was important (ibid.: 98-100). 
Further, the authors found clear evidence of the existence of a 'Chicago school' with belief in 
the distinction between positive and nonnative economics, relevance of neoclassical 
economics, a significantly higher degree of confidence in the market, support for rational 
expectations hypothesis, relatively less interest in the assumptions of price rigidity, imperfect 
competition and cost mark-up pricing, and fmally, relatively less tension between their course 
work and policy interests. 
detailed discussion of why there are so few women visual artists, mathematicians, scientists, musicians, 
see Jane Piirto (2000). For a recent evaluation of how women economists in the USA have not 
advanced as readily as their male peers (despite share ofPhDs having risen to about 27% in 1999), see 
David Miller (2002). 
17 This seems to be a sentiment on the rise - Keen's text Debunking economics (2001) begins and ends 
with the same note, economics is too important to leave to the economists. For an optimistic assessment 
of strategy and tactics in the pedagogy of economics, see Grahame Thompson (1999). 
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Colander and Klamer summarise (109-11 0), "What students believe leads to success in 
graduates school is defmitely techniques; success has little to do with understanding the 
economy, nor does it have much to do with economic literature". As I will go on to explore, 
there are many disjunctures between economics, economy and the economic. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of writing economic theory the way it is written by 
the disciplinary consensus in economics is the possJ9ility of pretending that 'economic' 
concerns are somehow separate and separable from those of a political, cultural, social, moral, 
ethical and ecological nature, and can be addressed 'scientifically' within economics. 18 This 
does not allow any serious questioning of the economic logic to be taken with sincerity. In its 
many forms, the continued prevalence of economics as a social science derives and provides 
nourishment to neoliberal practice, neoclassical theory, and social Darwinist metaphysics. 19 
1.5 Signpost 
If we want to start something, we must ignore that our starting point is, all efforts 
taken, shaky. If we want to get something done, we must ignore that, all provisions 
made, the end will be inconclusive. This ignoring is not an active forgetfulness; it is, 
rather, an active marginalizing of the marshiness, the swampiness, the lack of firm 
grounding in the margins, at beginning and end (Spivak 1999: 175). 
You know this is not your story, but you must claim entrance into this story with a 
difference. Those two things together: strategic identity reactively claimed, negotiable 
for struggle ... , and a catachrestic relationship to the nation-state format ... These are 
things that can work but if the project succeeds, they work within the circuit of a 
telematic society where they can be, or there already, is access to political teaching of 
this kind ofstuff(Spivak 1991: 241, emphasis added). 
To invoke my own positionality overtly at this point - I have never experienced the story of 
economics as my story. As a woman from a 'Third World' country, studying economics both 
over 'there' and over 'here', I have experienced extreme dissonance with the truisms of the 
discipline. However, the act of faith demanded by my academic performance in economics, 
was also matched by an unsatisfaction with the wider 'disciplined' separation of the various 
18 An example of this practice can be seen in the following. A recent query on the HES list 
(http://www.eh.net) regarding the response of economists to inequality, was answered with a slightly 
puzzled response about why inequality per se would be a concern economically? (Patrick Gunning 
2002) Someone else pointed out that Vilfredo Pareto was an economist would strongly thought that 
inequality was something natural and therefore policy can do nothing for reducing it (Luigino Bruni 
2002). 
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contexts (economic, the political, the social, the moral, the legal and so on) in modernist 
knowledge. Thus, the fault lines that I turned to in order to explore my discontent were 
inevitably those that cut across and not simply within disciplines. I have in mind the impact of 
feminist theory, poststructuralist, postcolonial, ecological, deconstructive work which 
challenges not simply the organisation of disciplinary knowledge, but also its insularity, its 
ability to be adequate, its terms of access, and its inevitable involvement in the context of its 
generation. Accordingly, these were all important handles for my endeavour. Appropriating 
Jacques Derrida's words "in a certain spirit of Marx" (The Spectres of Marx 1994), my 
endeavour here is "in a certain spirit" of these ethical and political vocabularies. Within 
economics, these lines of thought are very much a promise of the future, but an urgent and 
ethical promise. Combining the many forces of disciplinary segregation, institutional pressures 
and ethical political imperatives has meant that heterodox scholars in economics have 
explored alternatives, but the conversations have along way to go, especially regarding 
genuine discipline challenging endeavours. 
Jack Amariglio (1988) once argued that an economics influenced by Michel Foucault would 
look to deconstruct economic discourse as a human science. This would mean that economic 
discourse would not crave scientistic unity following from application of methodological and 
epistemological principles. Instead, by rejecting the subject/object distinction and historicising 
the will to truth which is the source of this distinction, the claims of rationalism and 
empiricism to certain or even approximate knowledge would be rejected. Also, by adopting 
the archaeological approach rather than traditional histories of ideas, excavations would not 
treat economic knowledge as a progressive, continuous, unified strand consisting of common 
concepts, authorial intentions, accumulation of facts, and so on. There would be space for 
seeing dispersion and discontinuity, and an avoidance of teleology and essentialism. Finally, 
such an economics would be forced to admit its intersection by relations of power. As 
Foucault argues (1980: 291), identification of the knowledge-power (pouvoirlsavoir) nexus 
reveals the linkage of truth claims with systems of power: 
[T]ruth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and 
functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating 
themselves. Truth is a thing of the world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its 
19 In view of this, Arran Gare (2002) discusses the need to overcome the hegemony of economics in 
order to establish a human ecological basis for the formulation and implementation of reoriented public 
policy. 
20 
/ 
regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourses which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one 
to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
In such an interrogation of how discourses are harnessed to powerful social forces and in the 
name of scientific objectivity have come to constitute regimes of truth, we realise the urgency 
oflocating all knowledge of economic life in human history, culture and power relations. This 
present thesis is an attempt to actuate these principles. 
The attempt to examine the link between the preservation of structures and the structures of 
knowledge is also an invitation to think the violence of knowledge. One cannot represent all of 
one's concerns - the trouble with universalistic aspirations of (economic) knowledge, the 
lineage of modernist knowledge in enlightenment tensions, the paucity of axiomatic modelling 
that passes for most economic theory, the difficulty of even heterodox economics in coming to 
terms with the contextuality of all knowledge, the writing out of the subaltern and the 
submerging of difference in modernist narratives, the need to challenge the economism of 
contemporary life, the linking of questions of theory with questions of practice to demonstrate 
the theory/praxis divide as being unsustainable, to link the violence enacted by the dominance 
of concepts of the individual, the nation-state, the economy, liberal democracy when their 
interested alignment is not questioned, the need to think not only knowledge, but also thinking 
'Otherwise' - and also represent them adequately under the institutional constraints of present 
enactment. But, despite the shaky starting point and the inconclusive end that Spivak's words 
alert us to, the endeavour must be indispensable, even if problematic. As William Connolly 
puts it (1991: xi): "The will to system is a lack of experience, to say the least. To say more: 
within the academy it is a consummate form assumed by the will to dominate. A better 
alternative is to confirm simultaneously the indispensability of interpretation and the limited, 
porous, and problematic character of any particular effort". And further (39), 
[t]hese microstrategies of academic containment, like their world historical 
predecessors, revealed how fragile and the established structure of faith is, how 
compelling its maintenance is to the identities of the faithful, how difficult it is to keep 
defeat by demonstration, reason, and evidence alone, how indispensable a discursive 
field of contrasts, threats, and accusations is to its internal organisation. These 
strategies disclose, as does their reversal, some elements in the enigma of identity in 
its relation to the other. 
The idea that economics is what it is, and everything else is a reaction, needs subverting. 
Making strange the question of how we identify the economic, is also at the same time a 
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questioning of the nature of knowledge, the purpose of theory, and one's own status as 
supposedly foreclosed by the abstractly rational and essentially individual self. 
In today's presence, I find that a re-memorising of the economic is crucial. This is not simply 
a "CNNtelepoliticsGoldCardtransnationalfrequentlyflyerhomeshoppingworldbeatprogrammed 
tradingHungarianhiphopcrackinBenares" story (see Istvan Csicsery-Ronay 1997). The blippy 
digital circuits of transnationality and hyperreality have their counterparts in the innumerable 
_/ 
who die for want of water in the heat, starve because of policy-induced famine, struggle 
everyday simply in order to survive, lost in prisons, hospitals, in cities, by the wayside -
invisibilised. When I turned to economic theory, it was because I thought a study of the 
economic (those crucial terms of production, distribution, and consumption, structures of work 
and reward, an ethical obligation to the Other) would tell me more. I found empty diagrams, 
foolish assumptions, and painful generalisations (on unravelling this see C. T. Kurien 1996), 
passing as science - (the unstated completion) - of capitalism and neocolonial exploitation. 
Even more surprising was the widespread belief in the unquestionability of the economic 
logic, or alternatively, an exhausted despair at its unassailability. Economics haunts me, but I 
believe, "[a]gainst the grain of... [its] universalizing moment, however, is written the story of 
its own impossibility" (Janet Sorensen 1999: 91). 
Consider the following sentiment of Slavoj Zizek (2002: 15): 
On the one hand, politicians have abandoned the economy as the site of struggle and 
intervention; on the other, economists, fascinated by the functioning of today's global 
economy, preclude any possibility of political intervention ... yes, the economy is the 
key domain - the battle will be decided there; one has to break the spell of global 
capitalism - but the intervention should be properly political, not economic .... In the 
end, the universal appeal to 'freedom and democracy', the belief that they will save us 
from the abuses of capitalism, will have to be challenged. Liberal democracy, in truth 
is the political arrangement under which capital thrives best.20 
The intervention does need to be one which is properly political, a political that washes into 
the economic in every sense. This is far from what can be said for the attempt at hand. But all 
beginnings have to be made ... 
20 Zizek goes on to discuss an image of a solid gold hammer and sickle studded with diamonds, the 
advert for an internet broker called Self-trade. The caption underneath reads, "and what if the stock 
market profited everybody?" The strategy of portraying the stock market as the egalitarian communist 
agenda in which everybody can participate, works because "the hammer and sickle invokes the hope 
that 'history would eventually be on the side of those struggling for fraternal [sic] justice'" (2002: 15). 
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Chapter Two: Enlightenment Epistemology And The Subject-World 
Of Economics 
2.1 Introduction 
Commerce gives Arts, as well as gain: 
By Commerce wafted o'er the main, 
They barbarous climes enlighten as they run .... 
Planets are merchants; take, return, 
Lustre and heat; by traffic-burn: 
The whole creation is one vast Excfiange. 
(Edward Young, in Milton Myers 1983: 17) 
My main aim in this chapter is to 'root' the epistemological inheritance of economics in the 
enlightenment tensions over knowledge, thus demonstrating how the endeavour of economics 
is not a universal and timeless objective science but a 'routed' body of knowledge whose 
underlying foundations in theory and explanation are structured by the contingent emergence 
of ideas in a geohistorical-temporal-ideological context in line with a wider discursive fIxing 
of objectivity and representation in knowledge. 
Looking at economics as a social science immediately raises the question of what conception 
of knowledge and the justifIcation of knowledge claims, what conceptual apparatus or set of 
beliefs one needs to carry in order to see the endeavour of economics as legitimate. I will aim 
to show that economics as a body of knowledge is a 'kind' of discipline relying upon a 
'particular' version of what counts as knowledge, how one approaches it, and what procedures 
are involved in justifying knowledge claims of this sort. I will argue that this 'particular' 
version of knowledge owes substantially to the Enlightenment and subsequent negotiations (of 
both academic and non-academic nature) and is in fact inseparable from the episodes and 
narratives of Western enlightenment modernity. 
The epistemological status of contemporary mainstream economic thought cannot be 
considered in isolation from the context in which such knowledge foundations came to be. 
What come across as tensions in the epistemological fabric of contemporary mainstream 
economics as a social science, are symptomatic of the various diffIcult negotiations that have 
always been a part and parcel of any endeavour to create 'scientific' knowledge about the 
social world. This being the case, such tensions are especially accentuated in the case of 
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economics owing to its very peculiar traversing of the terrain between the desire for scientific 
objective knowledge like that (presumably) obtainable in the natural sciences, the shifting 
balances in the interests served by such knowledge (for example, at different times, the 
monarchy, the parliament, the colonial administrators, the new class of experts, the 
corporations and so on), and the inherent difficulty of carving out a suitable external 
unchanging realm of subject matter to be designated as 'economic'. 
_/ 
With this in mind, I aim to demonstrate that the endeavour of economics relies upon an 
enlightenment epistemology. I use the term 'enlightenment epistemologt to mean a set of 
themes around knowledge (I will elaborate these later) which began to be understood in a 
particular way following on from the European Enlightenment. Several key thinkers whose 
work was influential in what became known as the Enlightenment were also important in the 
newly coalescing field of classical political economy, and in the subsequent centuries, the 
critics of the Enlightenment also criticised the forms that economic organisation took (for 
example, industrialisation) and the role of political economists in this. Because the 
disciplinary divides in the last few centuries were not what they are now, the account in this 
chapter will interleave several branches of thought. 
Here, I will begin by making some general observations on the enterprise of economics and 
consider in detail the set of themes involving epistemological negotiations which became 
prominent in the structure of knowledge following on from the Enlightenment. Elaborating 
certain key features of this enlightenment epistemology, I will then trace this underlying 
conception of knowledge in the subject-world of economics. 
Therefore, instead of starting from the notion of a positive science based on analysing 
individual choice (which is the theoretical ground afforded by mainstream economics) and 
then seeking to interrogate its methodology and perhaps deliver an epistemological critiq ue of 
it, I will proceed by locating the situatedness of the enterprise of economics in the 
Enlightenment, and demonstrating how the negotiations writ into its constitution have 
necessarily meant that it be viewed as a positive science based on analysing individual choice. 
Attempting to trace such a genealogy (although fragmented and incomplete) of a set of 
disciplined knowledge claims allows asking not only the questions, why is economics the way 
it is? But also how did we come to recognise a set of claims as economics? And how can it be 
linked to other similarly negotiated abstractions and knowledge formations? 
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2.2 Enterprise Of Economics 
The phrase 'enterprise of is used to preface economics because the aim here is not to 
interrogate the disciplinary method of mainstream economics by pointing out either its 
absences or excesses. The methodological critiques often question the view of economics as a 
_/ systematic universal social science with a legitimacy based on factual truth status but this 
evaluation automatically imports unexamined notions of what counts as fact, science, and so 
on into one's account. Further, because the methodological critiques often start from an 
unquestioned separation between method and theory in social science, they are faced with the 
problem of remaining within the confines of mainstream method and thus cannot address 
questions not translatable into that format, and at the same time they are faced with the 
unanswerable charge of 'then what', for criticisms of method do not then make clear how to 
proceed from method to substantive theory. In contrast to this, my focus here is an 
epistemological interrogation of the institutionalised and situated enterprise of economics 
aiming to uncover the presumed picture of knowledge widely prevalent in structuring the 
discipline and/orming its practitioners. It would serve to demonstrate the contingencies of this 
picture, the things that need to be held in place for this picture to make sense. These things 
may be underlying, unstated and implicitly assumed. An epistemological interrogation can 
further elaborate the difficulties generated by conforming to such a picture of knowledge and 
can outline alternative frameworks of thinking about knowledge creation andjustification.1 
To mount an epistemological critique of economics, it is not necessary to characterise 
schematically "all" of the endeavour of economics across space and time. I do however need 
to clarify my terminology in relation to economics. 
By contemporary or mainstream economics I will denote principally the neoclassical school of 
thought and extensions and variations on similar themes (game theory, new classical 
economics, experimental economics). 2 Histories of economics trace the origins of neoclassical 
thought in what became known as the marginalist revolution in economics occurring towards 
I For example, by postulating that economic theory creates rather than reflects realities, one can arrive 
at radically different paths of inquiry. I will take up this theme later in the thesis. 
2 This is not an unprecedented classification. Sheila Dow (1995: 717-719) characterises mainstream 
economics to encompass pure general equilibrium theory, neoclassical economics, new classical 
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the end of the nineteenth century. The key figures recited in this regard are William Stanley 
Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras.3 Subsequently, such a neoclassical conception of 
economics became entrenched, a process in which Alfred Marshall played an important role at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.4 According to Michael Perelman (1996: 14-16), 
Marshall was influential in the changeover of terminology from 'political economy' to 
'economics,.5 In this he was motivated by the desire to affum the scientific status of political 
economy by droppingth~Jignifier 'political' (which had resonance with polis or community 
as a whole) and thus restricting its scope to a more scientific sounding econom-ics (like 
physics). In the period around the Second World War, a great influx of engineers into 
economics combined with the increased need for institutionalising economics in the face of 
the Cold War meant that neoclassical formalistic rig our gained firm ground (see Philip 
Mirowski 1991a). The Walrasian general equilibrium framework reformulated by Kenneth 
Arrow and Gerald Debreu (1954) became the cornerstone of theoretical analysis. In America, 
Paul Samuelson's rendering of economics became standard6, and even the intellectual 
challenges posed by John Maynard Keynes were first assimilated (although partially) and then 
'watered down' following the breakdown of the macroeconomic consensus in the 1960s.7 A 
economics, and game theory. Implicit in these different methods is mathematical formalism and 
detenninism. 
3 They are credited with simultaneously coming up with the basis of the neoclassical doctrine. The 
contributions most recited are levons' Theory of Political Economy (1871) , Walras' Elements 
d'economie politique pure, ou theorie de la richesse sociale (1874), Menger's Grnndsatze (1871) and 
Untersuchungen (1883). However, this was not a sudden ruptural event, as Mark Blaug (2001: 159) 
points out, the marginalist revo lution had a history in Coumot (1838), Dupuit (1844), von ThUnen 
(1852), Gossen (1855). 
4 Though it should be pointed out that Marshall's style of economics was very different from that of the 
later neoclassicals. See Mark Perlman (1996). 
5 Lionel Robbins differentiated economics from political economy thus, "Political Economy in my 
vocabulary is not scientific economics, a collection of value-free generalizations about the way in which 
economic systems work ... it consists of prescription rather than description" (in Ralph Sassower 1985: 
15). 
The story that Michael Perelman (1996) tells is as follows, "at the time, Sir 1.R. Seeley (a historian) was 
appointed by the then Prime Minister Gladstone (1869) to Regius Professorship in Cambridge and he 
considered political economy as within the scope of his subject owing to the policy role of his Chair. 
Marshall deeply resented that anyone could aspire to speak of 'political economy' and hoped that the 
newly christened 'economics' would deter any but the scientific experts to comment on it". According 
to Perelman, although writers like 1.M. Sturtevant (1877) and H.D. Macleod (1878) had used the term 
economics before, Marshall was important in reconstituting the discipline. 
6 His textbook Economics (1948) became a classic. For a recent rhetorical reading of this textbook, see 
AIjo Klamer (1990). 
7 It is widely agreed that the Micro-foundations of macroeconomics as presented in the neoclassical 
format are far from adequate. One interesting piece on the problems in the aggregation of representative 
individuals in the economy is Alan Kirman (1992). 
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certain amount of disciplinary soul-searching has always been intrinsic to the endeavour of 
economics, and thus there are many histories of dissent that remain to be written. 8 
By using the more general term economics, I will refer to the broader canvas which includes 
classical political economy. Standard accounts of development of the discipline sometimes 
locate a radical rupture in the transition from classical political economy to neoclassical 
economics ('the marginalist revolution'). There a'!y many good reasons to differentiate 
between these two paradigms. Classical political economy was characterised by concerns 
about the relationship between the state and the market, the ways and means to ensure survival 
for large sections of population, the manner in which commerce promoted well~being, these 
are 'big' concerns pertaining to material prosperity in a good society. These practical 
questions were often articulated not solely by an expert class of specialist knowers, but rather 
by 'men of the world' who were also often engaged in or connected to business and trade. By 
the last decades of the twentieth century, in a lot of ways, analytical rigour had become a 
supreme virtue, often leading to hyper specialisms in formally characterising the economy in 
mathematical terms. This situation remains so today. Undeniably, the change in emphasis and 
the choice of language that occurred with the shift to neoclassicism was significant, but my 
characterisation of economics as having an enlightenment epistemology is not altered in the 
light of this shift. 
For although the neoclassical phase was marked by a massive shift in its language of scientific 
representation, achieved in a large part by borrowing metaphors from mid-nineteenth century 
energetics9 (Mirowski 1989), the underlying model of knowledge was not radically affected. 
By this I mean that no doubt there were concerns relating to the distribution of well-being in 
society, concepts such as use-value, and extensive debates over the benefits of 
industrialisation, all of which gradually dropped out in the acceptance of the new neoclassical 
economics, but it should be stressed that there were also underlying similarities between these 
two research programmes. To mention a few such continuities, the way in which nature was 
incorporated into economic thought as an external provider was not challenged by the 
neoclassical framework where nature's bounty was still read as free goods. Similarly, the 
8 One such example is the current work of Frederic Lee (2002) who writes about the suppression of 
heterodox economics dissent in the US and UK. In this, he provides a telling account of the fate of non 
mainstream economists during the McCarthy era in the US. 
9 Mirowski's arguments cannot be summarised here. However, see table 5.1 (1989: 224) for 
comparisons between mechanics and economics, so that "energy" gets translated into "utility". 
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position of the social scientist in claims to obtaining privileged knowledge about an external 
world was not undermined by any serious interrogation. The status of science, if anything, 
becomes even more overvalorised. Likewise, the entrenchment of liberal democratic industrial 
capitalism is gradually near complete. In fact, the prominent figures of classical political 
economylO - Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo have remained influential and the 
particular intellectual agendas set by their work have not been diminished by the newer 
frameworks provided by neoclassical theory and its variations. It is thus the case t!J.at I will 
view the transition from classical political economy to neoclassical theory (and subsequent 
mainstream economics) as a mutation rather than a radical rupture. 
With this in mind, I will now proceed to discuss the themes structuring enlightenment 
epistemology. This will set the stage for the next section in which I will discuss explanation as 
an important element of the subject-world of economics and unpack the received 
understanding to demonstrate how this is firmly linked to the underlying epistemology. I will 
argue that the received manner of understanding notions such as explanation or formalism 
results from methodological compromises necessitated by the underlying enlightenment 
epistemology. The aim of discussing the enlightenment epistemology is to enable the 
characterisation of the social scientific endeavour of economics in such a way as to highlight a 
certain general way of understanding some key elements which hold together the disciplinary 
narrative. This understanding functions as the crucial joints in an installation without which it 
would not hold up at all (let alone hold up to scrutiny). 
2.3 Enlightenment And Epistemology 
The Enlightenment is a vast and complex canvas which does not lend itself to any easy 
categorisation. It can be and has been conceptualised in different ways, and two prominent 
ways of invoking the concept are - to designate a historical and chronological period primarily 
10 I have not mentioned Karl Marx here. To a great extent, Marxism has provided a viable way of 
opposing mainstream economics. Yet, belief in modernism and teleology remain central to the Marxist 
project in its unreconstructed forms (see David Caute 1973). Rajani Kanth (l997b: 82-93) provides an 
account of both capitalism and socialism as "having joint provenance, philosophically, in the dialectic 
of the European 'Enlightenment'''. He astutely points out that both Smith and Marx shared a "confident 
historical materialism, with its inevitable correlates of both determinism and reductionism" (91). He 
further mentions reductionism, linearity, and progress along with anthropocentrism as features of 
Marxist thought. On the other hand, Marx as an antidote to bourgeois political economists (see Robert 
Freedman 1961), was well aware of the interests that come into play behind what seems to be a 
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in Europe as a time which was marked by the rise of modernity and its visions of progress; or, 
the term enlightenment can be used to signify a set of ideas which in some important way 
marked a departure for ways of knowing the world (John Grier Hibben 1910; Isaiah Berlin 
1956; Stuart Hampshire 1956; Norman Hampson 1968; Thomas Hankins 1985; Peter Schouls 
1989; Roy Porter 1990,2000; Dorinda Outram 1995; John Yolton et al. 1995; Jonathan Israel 
2001). These two senses are interlinked, but I will refer main Jy to the epistemo logical sense of 
the enlightenment. 
The enlightenment dialectic is fascinating for although in some measure the tensions between 
affirming and rejecting, accepting and remaking ideological matrices have been (and are) a 
feature of every time and place, the environment in which such tensions were enacted in the 
period around eighteenth-century Europe were to be succeeded by numerous significant 
developments including colonialism, imperialism, slavery and racism 11 - which are often 
signalled as deviances from the promises of modernity. But this view is sustained only if one 
starts from the premise that the enlightenment inaugurated the exercise of Reason in a 
knowable world, so that episodes which did not reflect such universal Reason can be seen as 
anomalies. This unqualified sense of seeing the enlightenment as the exercise of Reason in a 
knowable world is not a starting premise if one recognises the particular environment of the 
enlightenment in which the tension-ridden blending of conflicting persuasions took place. As 
only a way of making sense of the world, the enlightenment ideology has no prior claim on 
being universally privileged to deliver what are often understood as 'the promises of 
modernity'. It may instead be especially susceptible to what are often understood as 'its 
contradictory and illegitimate offsprings' . 
2.3.1 The Work Of The Machine Metaphor12 
scientific economic model (Sassower 1985: 163). In this spirit, my argument would see Marxist work as 
friends and allies with whom I share some disagreements, which are not discussed here. 
11 It is often seen as a paradox that the period marking the official abolition of slavery also denoted 
widespread racism. See Jenny Sharpe (1993: 5-6) for a discussion of this. She notes (paraphrased) that 
'Nancy Stepan writes of the apparent paradox that just as the battle against slavery was being won by 
abolitionists, the war against racism in European thought was being lost in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In the second half, racial explanations were particularly forceful because they 
sanctioned both the management of the free slaves and the expansion of empire'. This is not surprising 
if one bears in mind that during the period of slave trade, the slaves were not seen as human beings but 
as commodities, and once the trade was abolished, the erstwhile commodities began to be seen as 
inferior human beings. 
12 See Max Black (1962) for a discussion of the functioning of metaphors and their relations to models. 
In economics, the influence of metaphors within the field is much debated on every side, see Donald 
McCloskey (1986); Arjo Klamer and Thomas Leonard (1994); Cristina Biccheri (1988); Willie 
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To the extent that we can reconstruct important themes of the enlightenment, it must be noted 
that to a significant degree there was a focus on knowing, on making sense of the world. 
Extreme importance was given to the possibility of understanding both the natural world and 
human nature by scientific methods. Underlying this belief in the ultimate knowability of the 
world if approached by proper scientific methods was an equally interesting notion of 
machines, a notion-that)Nas crucial for schematising comprehension. By using metaphors of 
machines, complex notiuns such as 'nature' or 'society' could be rendered comprehensible in 
an analogous format. Such a mechanistic rendering (crafting) of entities served many 
purposes. Consider the following quote on nature from Robert Boyle (in Hugh Dunthome 
1991: 9), " ... like a rare clock ... where all things are so skilfully contrived, that the engine 
being once set a-moving, all things proceed according to the artificers first design". There was 
a close correspondence between the notion of a system and that of a machine. Smith writes (in 
William Coleman 1995: 132, emphases added): 
Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to 
perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and 
effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented 
to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are 
already in reality performed. 
So, the notion of viewing something as a system is closely tied to comprehending the 
mechanistic nature of systems. When considered in relation to social science, this leaves open 
the possibility that the machine will eventually produce outcomes that are good and well and 
proper. Even if this is not the case immediately, there are the famous "unintended 
consequences" - that somehow (Deus Ex Machina) there is an invisible order which will 
produce beneficient outcomes (on this latter, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit 1978). This is also 
helpful if conscious efforts to create change are to be kept within limits or undesirable 
extensions of philosophical ideas are to be contained. An example of this is provided by Smith 
in his account of the impartiality of the impartial spectator. I3 Smith focuses on the relation 
Henderson et al (1993); David Ellerman (1991); M. Neil Browne and 1. Kevin Quinn (1999); Maurice 
Lagueux (1999). 
13 This refers to Smith's work in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. I do not feel that a discussion of 
Smith's ideas here should necessarily be restricted to his work in the Wealth of Nations simply because 
my object of investigation is economics as a social science. Smith's ideas in the Wealth o/Nations are 
part of his larger philosophical project and it is equally untenable that there was a radi~al split betw~n 
WON and TMS. I agree with Keith Tribe (1999) in his assessment of the Das Adam Smlth Problem (I.e., 
the supposed incompatibility of human psychology u~d~rlying Smith's two ~orks, see ~assower 1985 
for a survey), which is better understood as two dIstmct forms of rhetoncal strategIes rather than 
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between 'agent' and the 'spectator', such that moral evaluation is practically achieved by 
imagining an 'impartial spectator'. The relation between the agent and the spectator is 
asymmetrical but governed by a feeling-with which Smith terms 'sympathy'. The impartial 
spectator sympathises with the agent and the motivation for this sympathy is the pleasure that 
arises from the perfect coincidence or harmony of sentiments. Note that impartiality here is 
defined as, "to be prepared to act against that which we might unreflectively feel to be in our 
own private interest, unless on independent examination that in~est is justifiable" (Griswold 
1999: 140). Impartiality does not require "that as agents we treat ourselves as mere parts of the 
moral universe on an exact moral par with each of the other such parts" (ibid.), what Smith 
calls "universal benevolence". Thus, and this is crucial, it does not require that one's own 
interests be subsumed under some greater interest (like that of the state), impartiality here 
takes the path between selfishness and universal benevolence. For according to Smith (in ibid. 
141, emphases added), "the administration of the great system of the universe, however, the 
care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and 
not of man". And further, "To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more 
suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care 
of his own happiness, ofthat of his family, his friends, his country". 
Thus it is only by pursuing our self-interest in an enlightened manner that we can play our 
humble role in the great system of the universe whose invisible order is ultimately entrusted to 
higher powers. 
Let us consider just a few other implications of the machine metaphor ('machine is a little 
system, system is an imaginary machine'). Machines have parts, but the sum of those parts is 
more than the parts themselves, it is a 'whole' - the way the parts are set up in a machine 
produces ultimate benefits that could not have been produced had the parts not been set up in 
that particular way. When we view systems in the existence of Nature, State, Society, they are 
like imaginary machines, and certain questions take a back-seat in this conception. For 
instance, it draws attention away from striving to change the 'system', a telling example of 
which is provided in the laissez-faire doctrine where it is argued best not to interfere with the 
economic system. Similarly, the hierarchies of social order in an imaginary machine become 
just 'different' systemic levels, each serving its purpose in the larger scheme of things. But 
divergent theories of human motivation. On Smith, see also Henry ~lark (1993); Michael Shapiro 
(1993); Vivienne Brown (1994a); Vivian Walsh (2000); Emma RothschIld (2001). 
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this does not encourage us to ask the question - whose ends does the machine (State, Nature, 
Society conceptualised thus) serve? More pertinently, when we view 'the economic system' 
what conceptions of human beings, material interactions, and ultimate benefits, are we locked-
into? 
Further work accomplished by using the machine metaphor can be evident if one considers the 
way in which the notion of machines can be used to service the ideals of 'efficiency' or 
'rationalisation' of systems. The understanding that one has of an efficient and rationalised 
system, especially a rational and efficient economic system is far from innate or universal. As 
Theodore Porter (1994: 128-172) discusses, there was an intense debate in nineteenth century 
economics on 'rigor' and 'practicality' as rival ideals of quantification. 
First, there was the deductive writing of political economists such as Ricardo, Jean Baptiste 
Say, Marx, work which was seen as 'theoretical'. It was seen as lacking in rigour by people 
such as William Whewell, who wrote a mathematical exposition of Ricardian economics in 
order to expose its errors of reasoning which would become apparent in the light of 
mathematical rigour. Porter writes (134) of the admiration Whewell had for Bacon and 
induction, and his desire to help the work of his friend Richard Jones I4 who was a great 
advocate of statistical factuality (and induction), which motivated his project "to join political 
economy to mathematics and thereby to 'make nonsense of it"'. 
Second, there was the economics of engineers and physicists (first in France, and then Britain) 
who were more interested in quantifying economic magnitudes in practical terms, drawing 
upon scientific vocabularies of the effectiveness of engines. IS Drawing upon Norton Wise, 
Porter writes (142-3, emphases added), 
Here was a form of economic reasoning and, more crucially, a system of economic 
practice that would permit scientists to judge the productivity of machines and labour, 
as well as to improve them. In this economics, statistics of factories, workers, and 
production meant something. Quantification could aid administration, could guide the 
improving activities of engineers and reformers .... this formulation permitted a clear 
14 Porter (133) informs us that Jones was largely responsible for the organisation of section F., 
Statistics of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. This section F. in turn formed the , 
kernel ofthe Statistical Society of London, ancestor of the modern Royal Statistical Society. 
15 Typical examples of such practical calculation are provided by attempts to determine the "optimal 
mix of machine labour with human labour". Porter (143) cites some examples of James Thomson 
(engineer and brother of physicist William Thomson) - one interesting instance is Thomson calculating 
to decide whether it was energetically advantageous to boil urine as fertiliser, thereby producing an 
increase in food for human workers, or to employ the coal fire directly for productive work. 
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distinction between useful work and waste, and indeed give a quantitative expression 
of efficiency. 
Third, there was the economics of mathematised utility, with pioneers in Cournot16, and then 
Walras. 17 Porter gives an account (147-153) of how Walras's general equilibrium theory was 
understood as mathematics, but failed to generate interest as economics in the Circle Of 
Actuaries, or, engineer economists. Subsequent neoclassical economics has retained the 
Whewellian ideas about mathematical rigour as a way of exposing theoretical excesses, but 
not so much the inductive statistical components. Thus, today it is common to fmd the 
argument that the rigour of mathematics is a guard against theoretical excesses, but the 
purpose for which that argument was originally made (Le., to further inductive statistical 
work) is forgotten. The tensions in the enlightenment thinking between 'theory' and the 
'world' continue to impact deeply on economic (as on social scientific) thinking. Let me 
consider the issues arising from this in some greater detail. 
2.3.2 The Status Of Theory And Practice 
Recalling the earlier discussions on Smith, for him as for many other Enlightenment thinkers, 
theory and practice are separable. In fact, as we saw earlier, 'man' is probably better off taking 
care of his immediate self, family, and country, something to which he is more suited, than to 
engage in philosophical speculations. Note that this implies some sort of a split between the 
requirements of philosophical speculations and those of 'everyday life' (such as taking care of 
oneself). Such a postulation is well in line with the Enlightenment thrust of valor ising, at least 
16 In the words of Porter (ibid., 148-9): 
As Claude Menard [1978] points out, Coumot's strategy of economic mathematization 
depended on excluding history, with its irrationality and perpetual disequilibrium. Coumot was 
willing to pay the price of mathematical rationality by excluding the whole domain of 
economie socia/e, all the complications that would be as mud to the pellucid waters of pure 
economic reasoning. The 'logical reconstruction' effected by Coumot's mathematical 
approach was made possible by his willingness to assume pure rationality and not limit himself 
to what could be ascertained empirically or applied to policy. Real economic decisions, he 
conceded, involve so many complex factors that practical sagacity outweighs scientific 
apprehension. 
17 Samuelson (1952: 61) says: 
We may say of Walras what Lagrange ironically said in praise of Newton: 'Newton was 
assuredly the man of genius par excellence, but we must agree that he was also the luckiest: 
one finds only once the system of the world to be established!' And how lucky he was that' in 
his time the system of the world still remained to be discovered.' Substitute 'system of 
equilibrium' for 'system of the world' and Walras for Newton and the equation remains valid. 
This is in sharp contrast to Mirowski and Pamela Cook's (1990) assessment ofWalras's economics and 
its relation to mechanics. 
33 
for the greater part of humankind, the ordinary life. This affirmation of the everyday life, the 
commonplace and the ordinary is an important part of the Enlightenment. In the case of Smith, 
"the vision of the dignity of ordinary life" (see Griswold 1999: l3, 174) is an important theme 
to be defended. 18 However, theory is not utterly humbled by this affirmation of the 
commonplace and the everyday business of life. On the contrary, theory comes unsutured 
from a direct link to an apparent world. It is not replaced by practice, a practice which is 
rooted in the "world::, a physicality. Practice is mediated by the materiality of the world, and 
its necessaries and urget(cies for which theory is no substitute. As Candide's closing words 
remind us, "Excellently observed ... but let us cultivate our garden" (Voltaire 1759). But even 
then the linkage between theory and practice is more complex, and one of the tasks of theory 
is to make sense of the world. The enlightenment impUlse is to explain the extraordinary and 
the unfamiliar in terms of the obvious and the familiar, and theory can playa part in this. 
Theory retains its classical sense of superior reflection. In the platonic sense, 'theoria' is a way 
of viewing the world. According to Griswold, Smith uses the term philosophy "in senses that 
are perfectly familiar to us today". What is this sense of philosophy? He answers (1999: 22), 
'''Philosophy' can here mean a comprehensive account of things taken as a whole, the 
speculative effort to provide an explanatory system". However, he notes that on other 
occasions [in WON I.i.9], Smith also uses the term in less familiar senses (22), '''philosophy' 
includes the ability to understand the structure of a thing or process in order to improve it: for 
instance, he [Smith] speaks of a 'philosopher' as thinking of a method for improving the 
machine used in industry". 
In Smith's vision, theoretical and moral matters are insulated. In TMS (111.2.19-23, Griswold 
1999: 176), Smith remarks on the contrast between bitter 'literary factions' and equanimity of 
mathematicians and scientists. Clearly, part of the vision of the philosopher is to service the 
sublime to political, moral, and economic effect. Theory can result in practice, but theoretical 
speculation in the enlightenment era is apparently not the territory for everyone. 
18 Griswold points out that Charles Taylor (1989: 14-15) sees (a) the affirmation of ordinary life or the 
life of production and the family, (b) autonomy, and (c) the importance of suffering - as major themes 
of Christianity, especially (a) which "comes to receive new and unprecedented importance at the 
beginning of the modem era, and which has also become central to modern culture [being] one of the 
most powerful ideas in modern civilisation". In m~ vie,:, it is no c?incidence that the ~se ~fmoderni~y 
and that of capitalism can be read in parallel, and likeWIse that the nnportance of suffenng IS enacted m 
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It is the philosopher or the theorist or the scientist who can create theoretical knowledge -and 
further, in the debates in economics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we can see at 
least two senses of such 'theoretical' knowledge. One of the senses in which 'theory' in 
economics was seen as being excessive was a deductive, wordy, and often imprecise 
philosophical speculation such as that attributed to the later classical political economists. 
While such theory located economic thought (and thus 'the economic') in the world around 
the writers - in ongoing debates over taxation or produCtion or trade, it was not empirical in a 
~ 
quantifiable (measurable) sense, and thus was not quite claspy when it came to designating the 
difference between what could be 'objectively' confirmed and demonstrated and what was 
'mere' opinion or value judgement. The second sense in which 'theory' in economics was 
recognised, related more to the 'abstract', a mathematical, self-referential system where 'the 
economic' was located in a highly idealised version of the world. This was not 
straightforwardly empirical either - however, it could be applied to count as empirical work, 
but this is questionable. It is pertinent to the way in which these tensions were written into 
enlightenment conception of theorisation. 
2.3.3 The Play Of Forces In Theory 
The role of the theorist, philosopher, or scientist in the enlightenment conception is a curious 
mix of emphases. The various pulls that the theorist needs to balance are only matched by the 
external world which is itself extremely movement-oriented, by which I mean that it is a 
continually balancing system. There are, constantly, mechanisms in operation that interact and 
counteract to produce eventual harmony. In order for theory to do justice to this continually 
balancing external system, it also needs to reflect these forces, to represent them and by 
representation to enhance understanding, and eventual comprehension, of this complex reality. 
On this account, while the materiality of the world allows practice to be identified, theory 
needs the mind - in cognition, Reason, comprehension, imagination and vision. Let me 
provide examples of how this account - relating to theory as characterising a continual 
movement or pull of forces - was and is important in structuring knowledge in economics. 
The metaphor of 'play of forces' is a significant structuring device in much theory, economic 
theory is an attempt to best categorise these diverse opposing and interacting forces which can 
accounts of capitalism going through the recurring crises which enable it to proceed. Along similar 
lines, see Kanth (l997a, b). 
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be conceptualised to eventually produce an equilibrium. Then, it is this promised equilibrium 
state which needs to be reached by manipUlating these forces in the world 'out there', and 
often this is what economic policy aims to do. This manipulation of the forces imagined in 
theory constitutes app lication of the theory to the world, the practice. It remains however, that 
regardless of the intentions of the theorist, or the desire for pure forms of theory - no account 
is meant to be (or admittedly capable of) characterising the play of forces in a universal 
manner. The representations can at best be partial, as even the modernist freeze-frame . 
_/ 
technique cannot translate the whole of the presumed system into its representation. This.. 
being the reason why the famous 'ceteris paribus' (other things being equal) is needed to fIx 
the situation. Theory must remain partial, although this does not deter its universalisation in 
the enlightenment epistemological schema. 
Thus we have numerous accounts of the economy demonstrating how partial equilibrium can 
be reached in the individual markets (a comparative static analysis), famously represented by 
the demand and supply curves intersecting in the Marshallian cross diagram. In this 
framework, the diagrammatic visual representation plays a crucial role in structuring 
understanding. It is not just an additional adornment, but very much stuff of which the concept 
of equilibrium is operationalised in the context of economic theory. On the other hand, we 
have the highly stylised axiomatic mathematical formulation of the whole economy, the 
general equilibrium. However, these two accounts are not integrated, and as Michel De Vroey 
(1999) argues, do not stand in a relationship of continuity. His thesis being, "the generalisation 
of the Marshallian market does not lead to a Walrasian economy or, conversely, the Walrasian 
economy is not composed of Marshallian markets" (320), and that "they are two disjointed 
theoretical constructs" (327).19 While mathematics proper is rather a late arrival on the scene,20 
it is more the tendency to grasp and represent the play of forces in theory that has structured 
economic and social knowledge since the enlightenment. 
An early example of the "interacting forces" schemato]ogy can be read in Smith. According to 
him, pleasure and pain inflect the passions in varying ways and degrees,21 and in the context of 
the actor and the spectator, the spectator's willingness to sympathise with the actor's passions, 
19 According to de Vroey (331), the point here is not just semantic for "the frontier between semantics 
and substance may be thin". 
20 On this see Mirowski (1991a). Recall that the mathematisation probably begins in earnest with 
Cournot and then Walras. 
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to approve or disapprove of them varies. He describes it as follows ([TMS VI.iii.14] Griswold 
1999: 124): 
In some passions the excess is less disagreeable than the defect; and in such passions 
the point of propriety seems to stand high, or nearer to the excess than to the defect. In 
other passions, the defect is less disagreeable than the excess; and in such passions the 
point of propriety seems to stand low, or nearer to the defect than to the excess. 
Others have noted the way in which the commerce of passions in Smith resembles a continual 
search for equilibrium. For instance, Eugene Heath (1995: 466) discusses how in Smith's 
account, when both the actor and the spectator engage the sympathetic imagination, mutual 
sympathy results which is the equilibrating mechanism to ensure correspondence and social 
harmony. Similarly, Griswold (102-03) discusses how Smith often writes as though sympathy 
between persons is an ongoing process of adjustment, a continual search for equilibrium. He 
further comments how this is a process with analogies in the economic sphere, not only with 
respect to the search for equilibrium in supply and demand (as expressed by price) but more 
generally with respect to the importantly rhetorical dimension of selling and buying. 
2.3.4 The (Dis)Embodied Knower 
The next issue is that of embodiment in relation to enlightenment, epistemology and 
economics. Embodiment, which is a great help in affirming the radical physical separateness 
of individual human beings, and allows the identification of bodies as coherent and separate 
mind-containers, needs to be surpassed (or at least negotiated) for successful theory. This can 
be seen in several ways. To begin with, there is one strand of ideas relating to embodiment 
that I should mention first - this relates to the way in which embodiment affects subjectivity. 
There is a vast feminist literature that uncovers how historically at least since Descartes, mind-
body dualisms have played an important role in structuring knowledge, and through it, social 
orders. This separating out of the 'pure' mind from the 'lower and baser' body is an attempt to 
arrive at a higher knowing, a knowing free from captivity within situatedness. Resonant with 
this is the idea of the extent to which embodiment affects subjectivity, in the case of men 
embodiment does not affect their capacity for dispassionate and higher knowing, while in the 
case of women, their bodies overwhelm their mind, and thus leave them susceptible to the 
corruption of corporeality.22 There is a body of work that traces the links between women and 
21 This echoes with the later Benthamite calculus of pleasure and pain, neoclassical ideas of utility and 
disutility, and perhaps even modem day ideas of costs and benefits. . 
22 The limitation of women's cognitive capacities has been declared by many dead greats. Lorrame 
Code (1991: 9) gives the examples of Aristotle who contended that women's deliberative faculty is 
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nature, and the construction of gender in the Enlightenment era, and the relationship of 
feminism and Enlightenment (see Genevieve Lloyd 1993; Issac Kramnick 1995: 560-628; 
Outram 1995: 80-95; Eileen Janes Yeo 1996; Israel 2001: 82-96; Kate Soper 2001). These are 
not the immediate focus of my argument here. 
2.3.4.i The Signifier Individual 
./ 
The idea of the individual s!ructuring enlightenment epistemology is one that has been quite 
powerful especially in social sciences like economics. Theory, which is not seen as directly 
anchored in the materiality of the world (unlike practice), is often seen as arising in response 
to sense-stimuli. The mind of the individual is designated as the site where the complexity and 
franticness of external chaos is filtered arranged and resolved into theory. This individual then 
needs to be an identifiable unit in the larger scheme of things, a fully formed subsection of the 
systemic whole, capable of interacting with its environment in such a way as to translate some 
representation of that outside into the inside of the mind in a communicable format. However, 
these translations never completely substitute for the superior invisible order or the design of 
the system as a whole. There is always a residue, that does not get completely filtered between 
the system of the world, and the individual who is the subsection. It is this stubborn residue 
that lends credence to the necessity and existence of the higher order, which is variously God, 
Nature or in some accounts even an imagined and idealised intermediate entity such as the 
impartial spectator or the ideal observer. Typically, these higher order entities have more or 
greater comprehension of the systemic whole, something which is in part ensured owing to 
their perspective, a vision above all individual visions, a One to Many interaction. Also 
typically, these higher order entities are in some way unfettered by contaminating and limiting 
embodiment such as that of ordinary, same, average and common individuals. 
"without authority", Rousseau who maintained that young men and women should be educated 
differently because of women's inferiority in reason and their propensity to be dragged down by their 
sensual natures, Kierkegaard who saw women as merely aesthetic beings, and Nietzsche who 
considered women Dionysian (sensuous) creatures as opposed to the male Apollonian (intellectual) 
domain. More recently, Bela Szabados (1997) examines the significance of Wittgenstein's misogyny. 
Code (1991: 10) also gives the example of Wilhelm von Humboldt who sums up this line of thought by 
claiming that women lacked "analytic capacity which draws a strict line of demarcation between ego 
and world; therefore, they will not come as close to the ultimate investigation of truth as man". For a 
contemporary investigation of body, passions and citizenship in the US context, see Shane Phelan 
(1999). 
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Now, what are the requirements and peculiarities that arise from this picture? The creation of 
knowledge is represented as attempts by individuals to grasp and translate ever greater 
amounts of the corpus of the system of the world. In the natural ('exact') sciences, this means 
the dis-covering of the immutable laws of nature, laws which govern how the system of nature 
operates. In the social ('inexact') sciences, at least two major problems are immediately 
apparent?3 The fIrst relates to isolation of unique and yet meaningful control contexts, and the 
second is the inherent unpredictability of the 'social'. Given that the standards for what counts 
/ 
as knowledge have developed in close relation to the succe.-sses of the natural sciences, it 
becomes necessary to devise ever newer methods to approximate those standards. These 
methods cover a wide range of spectrum, from utilising mathematics to manipulate symbols 
designating the complications arising from individual human interactions, to shifting what is 
meant by the characterisation of theory, to (regardless of the problems cited above) 
systematically represent freeze-framed sections of the social world in thought-experiments and 
then regard the conclusions derived therein as universally applicable (and accordingly 
translated into practice) by drastically undervaluing the possibilities of difference. 
The idea of the individual is intricately linked to the idea of knowledge and its making. Later 
in the thesis I will critique this essentialist view of identity as it obtains in economics. In 
effect, this powerful notion of the individual has served to act as the marker of all knowledge 
and judgement. The ready identifiability of this notion is ensured by the biological fIxing of 
embodiment in personhood with its attributes of the radically split body carrying its own fully 
formed mind. Multiply this discrete entity many times over and we have the 'social'. Further, 
in order to comprehend the surrounding sociality, the individual has only to best understand 
itself ("Know then thyself ... the proper study of Mankind is Man"),24 something made 
23 Of course, one way to side-step the issue is to assert that social and natural sciences are the same 
thing. Consider Samuelson (1952: 61-62): "There are no separate methodological problems that face the 
social scientist different in kind from those that face any other scientist. It is true that the social scientist 
is part of the reality he describes. The same is true of the physical scientist ... we find no differences in 
kind" (61-62). 
24 Perhaps some lines from Alexander Pope's An Essay On Man (1733-34) will serve to illustrate. 
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! 
Go wond'rous creature! mount where Science guides , 
Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides; 
Instruct the planets in what orbs to run, 
Correct old Time, and regulate the Sun; 
But when his own great work is but begun, 
What Reason weaves, by Passion is undone. 
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tractable by the proposed sameness of all individuals. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that the mind of the individual is rational or self-transparent (in fact, thinkers such as 
Smith believed that it was ambiguously neither). In order to arrive at better self-knowledge, 
the individual (in Smith's account, the actor) uses the judgements of others (Coleman 1995: 
133). But who is 'the Other' in such a picture? 
2.3.4.ii Self And The Other 
This is an important question for it helps to reach at the heart of the self-other tension in 
enlightenment epistemology. What do we mean by 'an Other'? If we answer this question in 
terms of difference, that the Other is someone radically different from the self, then it is not 
possible for the self to grasp the Other. For if the Otherness of the Other is completely 
comprehensible to the self then there would be no reason to call it the Other on these terms. 
Clearly, this is an account of Otherness which will not hold well in the picture of the 
individual and of knowledge outlined above. This is because it would render fundamentally 
unstable the very join of all knowledge - the knower. And it is precisely this point which 
permits a crucial critique of enlightenment epistemology and of social science derived from it, 
as I will elaborate later in the thesis. For now, the question of what we mean by 'an Other' 
must be answered so that the Other is subsumed to the comprehension of the self in line with 
enlightenment epistemology. 
In these terms, the Other who is really important is the idealised intermediate entity. The entity 
that spectates, observes and whose judgements or approval matter. This idealised entity need 
not necessarily be designated as God, in fact in enlightenment thinking it rarely is. In Smith's 
account for example, there is an asymmetry between the actor and the impartial spectator such 
that it is the actor who needs to view himself from the eyes of the spectator to obtain his 
approval, whereas the spectator out of sympathy looks at the actor's situation and approves, 
this mutual adjustment is motivated by the pleasure attained by a harmony of emotions. Thus, 
as Griswold (1999: 105) points out, Smith's view is that we always see ourselves through the 
Trace Science then, with Modesty thy guide; 
First strip off all her equipage of Pride, 
Mere curious pleasure, ingenious pain: 
Expunge the whole, or lop th' excrescent parts 
Of all, our Vices have created Arts: 
Then see how little the remaining sum, 
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eyes of Others and are mirrors to each other. The theory of moral sentiments is about the 
actor-spectator relationship, but it is the spectator who jUdges. His act of 'spectating', of being 
able to spectate is what lends him superiority. Further, in spite of the radical separateness of 
embodiment, it remains possible to 'see' things from the other person's point of view. The 
theme of seeing, or vision can be linked to the notion of perspective. 25 The theorist's vision, 
like the perspective of the philosopher, remains composed by the act of spectating or 
observation . 
../' 
Another way in which difference is undervalued relates to the theme of the 'average' as 'the 
standard'. In line with the affIrmation of ordinary life discussed above, the average standard 
which as Heath (1995: 450) writes, "(almost) everyone expects (almost) everyone to employ 
in forming moral judgments" will be the standard of the common people. This will "either 
underweight or exclude those valuations unique to a certain (minority) class or institution". 
The 'strange' or the 'different' could be error or anomaly. Coleman (1995: 135) sees Smith's 
concern with the normal or the average as indicative of two things. First, it makes contact with 
certain ideal or non-real entities (he gives the example of 'natural price'), and secondly it falls 
within a deep manifestation ofrationalism26, "to explain the strange in terms of the mundane". 
Coleman (ibid.) gives an example of the idea of the "middle form" in Smith, the aesthetic 
norm which was beautiful, as opposed to monsters, "the singular and the odd". Monsters, thus 
serve to de-rnonstrate the norm by exhibiting their oddness and singularity. This desire to 
sweep difference under the epistemological carpet is common to Enlightenment theorists such 
as David Hume (cf. M. Jamie Ferreira 1994). It is a tension which runs deep through to 
present-day social scientific theorising. On the one hand, there is a desire to find general 
universal laws and regularities in confirmation of the sameness of 'human nature' - a 
powerful basis on which then arguments can be marshalled to legitimate ideas of control or 
even emancipation. On the other hand, there is the endless realm of perpetual lurking 
differences just around the corner - which liberal progressivist ideologies even now manage to 
cast into the enlightenment blackmail of either-or (see Michel Foucault 1984: 32-50), so that 
the differences are either indications of backwardness or primitiveness (advance or progress), 
Which serv'd the past, and must the times to come! 
25 As Griswold (1999: 138-9) tells us, Newton had written on optics. Smith values George Berkeley'S 
New Theory Of Vision (1709). Thus, Smith compares the process of making correct visual judgements 
to that of exercising balanced moral judgement - the idea that just as gauging the correct proportions of 
various sized objects requires a "transporting ... in fancy", similarly evaluations of Smithian Passion 
require a leap ofimagination to the impartial spectator: .. ... 
26 Coleman sees Smith as making an impartial synthesIs between ratIOnalIsm and antI-ratIOnalIsm. 
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or a sign of debilitating and dangerous relativism. I shall discuss this in greater detail in the 
next chapter. 
Staying for the moment with Hume, for him, we should not accept "travellers' tales" since the 
commonplace of one society can easily be made to appear strange by the tales based on a 
foreigner's eye. Now, this is important - since, the Humean story that there are some general 
principles which are legitimised by experience rests on delegitimising "travellers' tales", on 
the writing out of differenc( of radically different perspectives.27 The Enlightenment 
treatment of difference is not unique or unprecedented, it is very much integral to most social 
reflection on the human condition across time and space. 
To recap my arguments so far, I have made the case that there was a particular confluence of 
the structuring elements of enlightenment epistemology such as invisible orders, theory 
practice split, celebration of the average and the commonplace, mechanistic view of the world, 
and the like, which was especially pronounced in eighteenth century Europe. These themes 
have been understood in that particular way since, and have been extremely influential in 
undergirding the edifice of 'social science' as a particular way of knowing, and 'economics' as 
one significant constellation in this universe. 
2.3.5 The General And The Particular 
[The fragment] is simultaneously in the whole and it is in each part ... A fragment. .. 
involves an essential incompletion (Franson Manjali 2001: 117). 
In a large part, the debates around the salient structuring elements of enlightenment 
epistemology can be seen as arising from a tension between conceptions of the 'general' and 
the 'particular'. The 'particular' arises from 'part', of a presumed whole, and the terms 
general and particular rely on each other for their meaning and comprehension. To wit, if 
accounts of knowledge were to be created which made sense not only to the experiencer who 
was relating these accounts, but in a more general and universal way to everyone when faced 
with that account, then this required the manufacturing of a consensus on understanding the 
27 This is related in Coleman (1995: 67). Other Enlightenment figures such as Voltaire did write Persian 
Letters, based in part on how French society could be made to look strange from the eyes of Turkish 
travellers. But these Persians are a French man's construction, so in a way it is only making Hume's 
point. The theme of the "(ig)noble savage" runs through the Enlightenment and after. Daniel Defoe's 
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world and knowledge in some way. Therefore, the observed particulars must be assimilated in 
such a way as to blend in with the general telling of an account of knowing. What will be 
deemed as a worthy 'particular', or a singled out instance or specificity seen as inviting 
consideration, will depend significantly on what is allowed to be seen as such within the 
epistemological structuring. Similarly, the way in which knowing coalesces into disciplinary 
knowledge will depend on the interests served by drawing the boundaries in specific ways. 
A tension between the general and particular is however of a nature(h~t cannot be said to have 
been resolved, only negotiated. For there is an inherent instability in the partitioning of 
generaVparticular which will resurface in any telling. For instance, it has been argued that one 
of the inherent tensions of enlightenment and post-enlightenment cosmopolitanism is the 
"attempt to grasp the unity of mankind without working through the relation of part to the 
whole" (Romi Bhabha drawing upon Thomas Schlereth [1977] 1996: 201). As a social science 
following on from the enlightenment, economics has had its share of this tension, but has 
remained principally a deductive enterprise, with or without mathematics. This may be owing 
to the nature of a 'science' of 'society' - a body of knowledge that has claims to provide 
control over the understanding of certain social interactions (as exemplified by the phrase 
'science as systematic knowledge'). It is easier to achieve such systematic understanding (or 
epistemic control) by establishing generalities and then seeking to rein or tie them in, than it 
would be by engaging in (in)finite study of particulars which may not satisfactorily add up, 
leaving the possibility of an anarchy, the epistemic riot of interpretation.28 The establishing of 
generalities allows particular particulars to be identified and sifted, and enables the 
'disciplining' of comprehension, psyche and even desires.29 The appeal to the general can thus 
be read against the grain as the invitation of repressed particulars. 
Let me make two points relating to the Enlightenment negotiation of the general/particular. 
First, Enlightenment thinkers linked the 'general' to that which arises from experience. 
General rules thus arise out of experiences, but not everyone's experiences could give rise to 
general rules. In a remarkably self-referential gesture, we see that Hume writes out traveller's 
tales - the generalities were to be valued universally, but were not universally derived. 
Robinson Crusoe is one example (favourite of economists, though not for all the right reasons). For an 
account of Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, see Ronald Meek (1976). 
28 One might also add, all ideas are cumulatively built but singly discarded.. . . . 
29 In 1881, Henry James wonders, "How can places which speak so to the unag~atIO? ~n general, not 
give to it the particular thing it wants?" (preface to the Portrait Of A Lady, emphasIS ongmal). 
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Further, in order to be able to string one's experiences into generalities, among other things, 
one needed to possess Reason. Again, not everyone was thought as being capab Ie of 
possessing Reason - the philosopher-spectators certainly thought themselves as having a 
greater claim to Reason and understanding.30 By ruling out certain forms or certain actors' 
testimony as possibly valid enough to be generalised, the dangers of the epistemically rioting 
particular were somewhat averted. However, this was not achieved without making 
'difference' the perpetual remainder, aversion to anomalous particulars also wrote out 
undecidability . 
Second, the notion of 'essences' is another favoured stop in the travels between the general 
and particular. Coleman (1995: 73) discusses the Enlightenment penchant for the general man. 
He draws upon Carl Becker and other twentieth century historians to argue that enlightenment 
history was not interested in the diversity of humankind's experience; it was interested in 
explaining its general character; they were searching for 'general man'. Becker (1932) writes: 
"Man in general, like the economic man, was a being that did not exist in the world of time 
and place, but in the conceptual world, and he could be found only by abstracting from all men 
in all times and all places those qualities all men shared" (in Coleman ibid.). 
Recall the account given (some paragraphs above) of the 'individual'. This concept of the 
individual which functions as the very join of enlightenment epistemology is not an account of 
an actual individual. Consider Sergei Bulgakov (2000: 256, emphasis original): 
[political Economy] replaces the individual personality as the universal actor, as the 
living source of all that is new in history, with the economic machine postulated by 
Bentham and reminiscent of the contemporary automatic dispenser: if you deposit a 
coin, it will produce a candy or a piece of soap, but no more. All constructions of the 
economic man, whether individual or collective, are in fact based on the image of an 
economic machine. 
Rather, the signifier individual was an essence which plays an important role in the Cartesian 
framework (the self transparent thinking and knowing being of Cog ito Ergo Sum). While the 
essence of what it meant to be an individual was elevated, this did not necessarily imply 
individualism straightforwardly. On this discussion about essences, it is perhaps worth 
speculating on the relations between the philosophical (and social scientific) faith in essences 
of social entities and the valorisation of the experimental method (following Bacon). Science, 
as the ultimate human endeavour to translate the book of 'nature' was (and still is) about 
30 Denis Diderot writes, "There are some readers whom I do not, and never shall desire. I write only for 
those with whom I should enjoy conversing. I address my works to the philosophers; so far as I'm 
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getting at the very heart of the unknown (,mysteries of nature,).3l The notion of 
experimentation, examining and analysing, is spurred by the desire to extract - to squeeze out 
the essentials, the vital core, the kernel, the basic essence - out of any process. When this logic 
is approvingly applied to social science, the essences do not emerge at the end of a process of 
understanding (since outright experimentation is not possible), but are prefigured as the very 
beginning of any process of understanding. Frederick Nietzsche (1873) inimitably describes 
the formation of concepts thus: 
_/ 
_ Every word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as 
a reminder of the unique and wholly individualised original experience to which it 
owes its birth, but must at the same time fit innumerable, more or less similar cases -
which means, strictly speaking, never equal - in other words, a lot of unequal cases. 
Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal.. .. [We .call a person 
honest] ... We know only numerous individualised, and thus unequal actions, which we 
equate by omitting the unequal and by then calling them [honest] actions. In the end, 
we distill from them a qualitas occulta with the name of 'honesty' .... 
'Essences' thus become serviceable to 'generalities' which are the concatenations of abstract 
concepts (such as the general man arrived at by abstracting out all wo/men) on which to build 
social science. 
The role of the theorist (qua economist) in this context is not easy, constantly accommodating 
the observed particulars into the generalities of the prefigured essences. Keynes (1924) in 
writing on Marshall contemplates the "rare combination of gifts" that the "master economist 
must possess" (in Larry Wilmore 2002). 
Keynes writes (emphasis added), 
... he [master-economist] must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher -
in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must 
contemplate the particular in terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in 
the same flight of thought. He must study the present in the light of the past purposes 
of the future ... 
Thus we find curious juxtaposition of the mechanistic with the hermeneutic, especially when 
considered in the light of the role of the theorist (scientist/philosopher/economist). There is 
one conception where the world is a system of many forces like a machine with its movements 
which lend themselves to comprehension by the scientist seeking after objective truths to 
string generalities out there, and there is another conception where there is an appeal to the 
concerned, there is no one else in the world" (in Dunthorne 1991: 17). 
31 Much of this world view is still enacted every time the media in the twenty-first century relates the 
attempt of heroic scientists to decode the human genome - the "book of human nature". Recen~y, 
research into female sexual arousal was reported along the lines of "If you don't know how the machme 
works, you can't:fix it when it doesn't" ("Love rats point to female sex drug" 2002). 
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knower to 'understand' the particulars of world by imbuing them with 'meaning' derived from 
experience. To conclude, this overlay is insufficiently negotiated in the enlightenment.32 
2.3.6 The Section Revisited 
Until now I have discussed enlightenment epistemology through various themes which have 
served to structure knowledge 'such as the importance of machines the invisible order the 
./ " 
affirmation of ordinary life, the theQfyipractice split, the status of embodiment, the signifier 
individual, the self/other tensions, and the negotiations of the generaVparticular. These 
discussions have in tum attempted to set forth the salient emphases of the enlightenment 
epistemology on: explaining the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar; the possessing of Reason; 
the world as a system existing already performed; in relation to knowledge the possibilities of 
observability, discreteness, comprehensibility, measurability and commensurability; the 
notions of essences or ideal-types; the notions of average; generalisations. In what follows, I 
will consider aspects of the subject-world of economics and characterise its imprints in 
enlightenment epistemology. 
Before proceeding to this next section, it is important to point out that my consideration here 
is limited to locating the epistemological structuring of economics in the methodological 
compromises necessitated by the various emphases of enlightenment epistemology. But there 
is another avenue of inquiry not fully explored by this, and this is the curious relation of the 
Enlightenment age to the marketplace (on related themes, see Paul Delany 1999; Regenia 
Gagnier 2000). As many authors have noted, the enlightenment ideas gained ascendancy in the 
commercial climate of early capitalism, and the avid consumers of enlightenment ideas have 
been identified as the rising middle classes. These consumers were also the intended target of 
the principal enlightenment authors, and are sometimes explicitly identified as being SO.33 The 
texts of the Enlightenment period were thus often in a symbiotic relationship with the 
32 Put another way, there is an insufficient negotiation of the henneneutic moment in enlightenment 
epistemology. For instance, appeals to the Reason of a transparent self for the accomplishing of higher 
goals requires a well grounded hermeneuticist understanding (of the self, of the world, of the 
importance of striving for ideals) but this vast importance of the actual processes of understanding is at 
the same time negated in favour of a mechanistic systemic (machinic) world view where the 'familiar' 
is the 'obvious'. 
33 Dunthorne (1991: 17) quotes the characteristic remark of Lord Chesterfield, "All reasoning is thrown 
away upon the people; they are utterly incapable of it". By people, Chesterfield means the masses. 
Dunthorne (18) further comments "[t]rom sociological point of view, in short, the Enlightenment was 
an elite addressing elites". Also recall Diderot's comments from th. 30. 
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publishing industry of the times. Dunthorne (1991: 18-20) mentions the popularisation of 
scientific theories in simpler versions, the development of serial publishing, and the unworried 
attitude of the authorities towards the trade in literary smuggling (the high price of banned 
texts in the market confined circulation to the educated and well-to-do clientele). 
Enlightenment conception of knowledge did not demand ascetic self-denial as the path to 
higher forms of knowing (as perhaps elements in the medieval scholastic tradition did). Quite 
the contrary, it commercialised (among other things) appeal to ethics by 'selling' 
_/ 
enlightenment culture as the 'in' thing to the consumers with increasing wealth. The sphere of 
knowledge was thus not separated from concerns of 'materiality', but interlinked. 
Finally, I will move on but pause just to venture a hypothesis - that the particular forms of 
knowledges (both of science and society) arising in the Enlightenment age, and structured by 
enlightenment epistemology share the Enlightenment era's relationship to the marketplace. 
The disciplines that were institutionalised based on these particular forms of knowledges all 
share this genealogy, and thus rest on an unexamined 'economic logic' of the marketplace as it 
was understood at the onset of modernity. This includes economics, which is not a study of the 
logic of the marketplace, but a no-holds-barred affmnation of it, which successfully places it 
as the beyond of investigation.34 Thus, even the most pertinent and extensive critiques of 
modem disciplines (like economics) take an understood 'economic logic' for granted, and 
therefore do not excavate the precise ways in which this logic came to be established in the 
last few centuries, radiating outwards from Western Europe. This is a concern which 
motivates the present work, and is a pertinent strand running through this text. 
2.4 Subject-World Of Economics 
I now consider the subject-world of economics and unpack some of its received understanding 
to demonstrate how this is frrmly linked to the underlying enlightenment epistemology. It is 
extremely important to emphasise that I am not undertaking to deliver a methodological 
critique of economics in the following sections. Where relevant I will refer to the literature in 
the field of economic methodology, but this is not the focus of my endeavour. This is because 
a large part of the methodological literature takes the body of knowledge titled 'economics' as 
34 Consider Bulgakov (2000: 258): "Political economy was born under the star of commercialism, that 
is, of completely practical motives, of the need to figure out the complexities of the economic 
mechanism. It is the child of capitalism and is in tum the science of capitalism; it provides instructions 
for proper economic behavior". 
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given, whereas it is precisely this grounding of a body of knowledge as economics with its 
associated (and accepted) characteristics that I wish to interrogate. 
2.4.1 Questions And The Aim Of Economic Theory 
Let us start by considering the following closing remark of Hugh McLachlan and Kim Swales 
(1978: 21, emphasis added): "Our present aim ... to suggest that economists should seriously 
consider the question of what the aim of economic theory should be and why it should have 
that particular aim. Without acceptable answers to these questions the promulgation of 
economic theories seems pointless". There are at least two (relatively) recent notable attempts 
to ask such fundamental questions. The second one is by Mirowski (l994b: 50-74), and like 
the first one it is titled, "What Are The Questions?". These questions require a rethinking of 
the very basis of economics, and much of this thesis takes on their spirit. The questions that 
Mirowski discusses are as follows: 
Question 1: What are the standards? 
Question 2: What is so 'social' about social science? 
Question 3: Are we constituted by our subject matter? 
Question 4: How are we so pure? 
Question 5: Why do so much economics look like bad applied mathematics? 
Question 6: Is experimentation really impossible in economics? 
Question 7: What is neoclassical economics, anyway? 
The fIrst article of the same name was by Joan Robinson (1977: 1318-1339), a fascinating 
piece with these words on the very fIrst page, " ... there is no such thing as a 'purely economic' 
problem that can be settled by purely economic logic ... ". Mirowski summarises the signal 
topics that Robinson's "characteristically uncompromising essay" broached as follows: 
1. To what extent is orthodox economics driven by ideological error, and why does it 
persist? 
2. Does the subject matter of economics change too frequently to underwrite its putative 
'laws '? 
3. Why cannot neoc1assicals adequately encompass the passage of historical time ill 
social life? 
4. What is economic growth for, or what can we hope to achieve as an affiuent society? 
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5. Why does so much of economics take the organising principle of the nation-state for 
granted? 
6. And finally, to what extent can the evolution of economic explanation be 
comprehended as the 'choice' of (in)appropriate methods, for instance, opting for 
mathematics instead of participant ethnology? 
But one can only agree with Mirowski (50) when immediately after he writes: 
.But now, Robinson is dead, deprived of the Nobel Prize that was rightfully hers; and I 
./' glance at various recent books with 'Philosophy' or 'Methodology' yoked to 
- Economics in their titles, or at the journals Economics and Philosophy or Methodus, 
or attend various conclaves of economists and philosophers, and, by and large, those 
questions are no longer on the agenda. Perhaps some of my colleagues think that is 
just as well, bidding good riddance to what they perceive as naive rubbish. But some, 
myself included, feel that what we have left is diminished, desiccated, and not a little 
sad. 
Another way of going about it is that adopted by Alan Garfinkel (1981), who considers, "If 
social science is the answer, what is the question?" Analogously, we could ask, "if economics 
is the answer, what are the questions?" There is a whole range of issues involved here, and 
before I proceed, let me attempt to tease out some of them. There is first of all the issue of the 
questions that need to be posed to any body of knowledge, questions (at their broadest) as to 
what that knowledge is about. Further, in what way can these questions be posed, that is, 
which aspects of the claims to knowledge can be contested, against what, and how. There is 
the related concern about the questions that cannot be asked legitimately of a body of 
knowledge, questions that are either non-translatable (meaningless) or enforced as illegitimate 
within a particular paradigm. The (contemporary) dominant view of science and social science 
is one where there is a process of inquiry to arrive at newer and/or better understanding of 
phenomena deemed to be of interest. Albeit simplified, this is not an oversimplified rendering 
of what most people see anything with the signifier 'science' as doing. 
Let me illustrate. It is extremely useful to be faced with this reverse genealogical questioning 
to realise that a body of knowledge currently titled economics is not a response to the same set 
of questions which have remained universal, eternal and fixed. Rather, the nature of questions 
has changed (and will continue to change) over time, and at any given time there will always 
be a contested boundary between questions that are addressed and those that are not. This is in 
the very nature of power relations that constitute the questions of interest in the creation of 
knowledge. Now this may seem like an obvious enough point. But, when one confronts the 
most commonly accepted definition in this century of what economics is, one realises the need 
to foreground is crucial point about the contingency of knowledge. Robbins (1932, in George 
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Stigler 1984: 301) defmed economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a 
relationship between scarce means which have alternative uses", the conjunction of endless 
human wants and scarce resources with alternative uses. This places economics as a scientific 
response to the eternal fixed questions of how to satisfy endless human wants in a world of 
scarcity. This belief in the "prevalence of scarcity - always and everywhere" has become an 
article of faith almost beyond assessment. Carl Wennerlind (2000) develops the argument on 
the historical specificity of scarcity-;- linking it to the rise of capitalism. He argues that scarcity 
_/ 
is not a universal pre-existing condition, but rather a societal condition created by the 
confluence of a particular set of historically specific institutions, and the result of rules of 
conduct prescribed by economic theory in its quest for efficiency, utility and profits. 
Therefore, "by assuming that scarcity is perpetual and ahistorical, modem economics becomes 
relevant as 'cosmology'" (ibid.: 4). This focus on a purportedly scientific response to universal 
scarcity obviates consideration of situations of extreme plenty coexisting with those of 
extreme deprivation, as a rational organisation of resources under the worldview of 
economics. 
2.4.2 Grounding Explanations 
We can view this example in terms of Garfinkel's notion of explanatory frames, "a model or 
paradigm of a form of explanation and an object to be explained" (1981: 7). We need a 
concept of explanatory frames because we realise that "there are not only different 
explanations but different conceptions of what explanation is" (ibid.: 4, emphasis original). 
Thus, with reference to the explanatory frame of contemporary economics, we can figure out 
what would and would not count as an explanation and of what, to be seen as legitimate. But 
further, it allows us to see the particular grounding of the explanatory frame itself in historical, 
temporal and ideological terms. The concept of explanation provides a good handle to refer to 
the subject world of economics. Explanation is most often cited as the aim of theory. But just 
as there is debate over the exact status of theory (and its aims), similarly there is much debate 
over the nature of explanation. What do we mean by explanation in the social sciences? 
As I will go on to argue, there can be different understandings of what one means by an 
explanation (what counts as having provided a satisfactory explanatory account), and the 
particular questions and kinds of questions (for example the 'why-questions') considered 
significant. The particular form of explanation that is most often the (unstated but understood) 
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aim of theory in economics is - deductive explanation. However, this by itself does not tell us 
much. It is important to attempt to understand why and how this particular form of explanation 
came to be centre stage in economics. This will involve providing different prominent 
accounts of explanation (Aristotelian, Galilean or Newtonian) over time, and the particular 
rendering of the concept of explanation by theorists (Duhem, Mill) following on from the 
Enlightenment, and subsequent twentieth-century theorists (prominently Carl Hempel). The 
motivations which played an important role in the way the coileept of explanation was 
grounded in economics, as well as the eventually prominent deductivist c:ncept of explanation 
were also extremely influential in the related developments of the rise of formalism and the 
associated role of mathematics. In what follows, I will attempt to trace the epistemological 
basis of these developments, the particular form this took in the context of enlightenment 
epistemology, and its (especially late) nineteenth century mutations through the neoclassical 
revolution and its twentieth-century positivist product in contemporary mainstream 
economIcs. 
To begin with, let me revisit the relation between explanation and questions. Garfinkel (ibid.: 
7) writes: 
Explanations are sometimes answers to explicit questions .... But often there is no 
explicit question at hand, and in those cases it can be very instructive to perform a 
kind of diagnostic inference and ask what question the explanation is really 
answering .... The emphasis on questions, and on ferreting out the implicit question 
behind an explanation, is cruciaL .. Attending to the questions rather than the answers 
and looking for the implicit question hiding behind the answer are a useful device for 
analyzing explanations and understanding historical shifts.35 
The shifts in explanatory frameworks are marked not just by the answers that they give, but 
equally by the questions that they ask. To illustrate this, Garfinkel (7-10) gives the example of 
the shift from medieval to Newtonian theories of motion. In relation to an object in motion, 
the medieval physicists asked the question, "Why does it keep moving?", and provided the 
answer in terms of force called "impetus". Newton rejected such forces, and did not offer an 
alternative explanation for why the object keeps moving. Instead, on his explanation, things do 
not need anything to keep moving, and this question was mistaken. According to him, an 
object in motion just tends to remain in motion unless acted on by an outside force. The shift 
to the Newtonian explanatory frame marks the shift to the question "Why the motion of an 
object changes?" Drawing upon Stephen Toulmin (1961), Garfmkel writes that in the 
Newtonian explanatory framework, "the body's motion is treated as self-explanatory". It is 
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this self-explanatory aspect which signals that one has reached the outline of the explanatory 
frame in use. Thus, this could be formulated in very loose terms as - understanding usually 
presupposes further implicit understanding.36 Further formulation of this will follow when I 
discuss the 'trilemma' of explanation offered by Aristotle, but for now it is important to 
understand that there is some eventual basis for knowledge claims, and it is not clear that this 
basis is explainable in some fmal sense (it can therefore be inexplicable or self-explanatory). 
However, the relation between explanation and questions can be seen in the light of the 'why-
question' (that is, explanation as an answer to the why-question) and its distinguished history. 
2.4.2.i Causality And Explanation 
Now, causality and explanation are not the familiar territory in relation to economics. 37 John 
R. Hicks38 in his book unconventionally titled Causality In Economics (1979) writes (1): 
Causality and economics, which I have joined in my title, are words that are not often 
found together. Causality, the relation between cause and effect, is thought to be the 
business of philosophers; economists, though they often talk about effects and 
sometimes (perhaps less frequently) about causes, are usually content to leave the 
question of the meanings of these terms to others. I have come to think that this is a 
pity. 
Hicks is just the person to begin from, because as a prominent economist and economic 
historian writing in the latter half of the twentieth century, we fmd in his accounts of causality, 
explanation, theory, science - the negotiations of these themes as they have been constituted 
historically, with the special accommodations necessitated in the light of enlightenment 
epistemology in economics. 
Hicks describes 'Old Causality' as a system of thought in which "causes are always thought of 
as actions by someone; there is always an agent, either a human agent or a supernatural agent" 
(ibid.: 6). This way of looking at causes and effects in a theologico-Iegal manner was almost 
universal until the eighteenth century, "it originated in a time when men understood very little 
of the things that surrounded them" (5-6). He observes that in the literature of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, this Old Causality broke down, as questions began to be raised about 
35 Soon afterwards, Garfmkel (1981: 8) provides this very interesting quote from Marx: "Frequently the 
only possible answer is a critique of the question, and the only solution is to negate the ~uestion". . 
36 C£ Alfred Whitehead (1933: 197), "No science can be more secure than the unconscIOUS metaphYSICS 
which it tacitly presupposes". 
37 The recent critical realist work in economics is an exception to this, see Tony Lawson (1999a). 
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the moral quality of the supernatural actions.39 Hicks writes that the solution to this was found 
by the Enlightenment philosophers such as Hume and Kant (and Gibbon) who provided the 
'New Causality'. The Old Causality was based on an association between Causality and 
Responsibility, and this needed to be rejected. In the system of thought referred to as the New 
Causality, Causality is a matter of Explanation. This is an important change as, "when we 
explain, we do not necessarily praise or condemn"(7). Clearly, Hicks is setting up a contrast 
between the pre- and post-Enlightenment notions of causality, to argue that following on from 
the Enlightenment, causality was tied to explanation. But what is the significance of this? 
Causation can only be asserted, in terms of the New Causality, if we have some 
theory, or generalisation, into which observed events can be fitted; to suppose that we 
have theories into which all events can be fitted, is to make a large claim indeed. It 
was nevertheless the claim that thinkers of the eighteenth century, dazzled by the 
prestige of Newtonian mechanics, were tempted to make; not, even then, that 
knowledge of 'natural laws' was already complete, but that it was on the way to 
completion; a complete system of natural law seemed just round the comer .... But just 
because it is incomplete, it is capable of being improved. And there are no bounds to 
the improvement that one may attempt to undertake; there are no events which one 
may not attempt to explain (Hicks 1979: 8-9, emphasis original). 
The New Causality (as Hicks calls it) was a product of the enlightenment epistemology - with 
its faith in the complete system of natural laws composing an invisible order to the 
machinelike universe, the belief in the value of generalisations and comprehensibility of 
knowledge. To assert causation was no longer to imply the responsibility in terms of a human 
or supernatural agent, it was simply an application o/theory,40 an exercise in explanation. 
Explanation, which now was slowly in the process of changing from its Aristotelian origins 
into first, a Newtonian (also alternatively called Galilean) format which was adopted by the 
Enlightenment until the eighteenth century, and by the classical tradition of economists, and 
then, into an empiricist format by Mill in the nineteenth-century, a format which was adopted 
by twentieth century positivists, and by the neoclassical tradition of economists. All this while, 
the concept accumulated heritage which was Aristotelian in origins, but mutated through the 
Enlightenment and the nineteenth and twentieth-century renderings. 
38 Hicks was jointly (with Kenneth Arrow) awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1972. His major 
texts include The Theory of Wages (1932), Value and Capital (1939), and Capital and Growth (1965). 
See Frank Hahn (1990) for a survey of Hicks , work as a theorist. 
39 He gives the examples of Milton's Paradise Lost, and Voltaire's response to Pope's Essay On Man. 
40 Hicks would agree with me on this. He writes (1979: 8, emphasis original), "In a statement of 
causality, theory is being applied". 
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Harking back to the debate over the generaVparticular, Coleman (1995) presents the contrast 
Smith made between explanation by general principles and explanation by specifics in terms 
of , Newtonian' and 'Aristotelian' methods. He quotes Smith (137, emphasis added) thus, 
... in Natural Philosophy or any other Science of the Sort we may either like Aristotle 
go over the Different branches in the order they happen to cast up to us, giving a 
principle commonly a new one for every phaenomenon; or in the manner of Sir Isaac 
Newton we may lay down certain principles known or proved in the beginning from 
whence we acc;ount for several Phenomena connecting all together by the same 
Chain. - This lattel/We may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most 
Philosophical, and In every science whether in Moralls or Natural Philosophy etc., is 
vastly more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other. 
Smith favours the Newtonian method, or explanation by general principles.41 Now, modern 
economists and methodologists alike don't speak very much about explanation, and no doubt 
that if they were queried on this, at least some of them would respond with the Wittgensteinian 
dictum (whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent).42 However, it is still interesting 
to trace the epistemology of that 'cannot'. 
Referring to the title of Smith's book An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Hicks writes that he must have been thinking in terms of the New Causality. And so 
we find, "[e]conomics, ever since that day, has been committed to the New Causality, to the 
search for 'laws', or generalisations, on the basis of which we can assert something about the 
causes of events" (1979: 9). In understanding further this commitment evidenced in economics 
to a particular form of theory - generalisations, employing deductivist mathematical 
formalised models, and its basis in influential notions of scientific explanation, we need to 
journey from Aristotle to Mill and forward. 
2.4.2.ti Aristotle On Explanation 
41 According to Coleman (137) "Smith did not seek to derive all from one principle; but neither is he 
content to derive all from many". 
42 Frank Hahn replies in this fashion to Roger Backhouse in the issues of the Royal Economic Society 
newsletter (1992). First, Hahn as a retiring Cambridge economist in his "Reflections" (1992a) advises 
young economists that economics is not in a crisis, and that one need not worry about methodological 
discussions. He writes, ''Here is an old man's advice - don't worry. If you are very able and creative 
you will be heard and reap the benefits. If you are not, then you don't deserve to and there are many 
other attractive opportunities besides academic economics". Subsequently, Backhouse (1992) asks the 
question in an article "Should We Ignore Methodology?", and Hahn (l992b) answers "Answer To 
Backhouse: Yes". In his answer, Hahn quotes Wittgenstein, and further writes, " ... As for them [young 
economists] learning philosophy, whatever next? Philosophers themselves tell us that theirs is not a 
'linear' subject. The same questions have been debated for thousands of years. They form schools. 
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So, how can we interpret Aristotle on explanationr3 To begin with, for Aristotle there are 
different kinds of knowledge - not only is there scientific or theoretical knowledge, but he 
also admits of practical and productive knowledge. 
Aristotle has a doctrine of four causes (aitiai), which sets out four causes of (or explanations 
for) things - the matter, form, goal or end, and motion-originator of the thing. Now, although 
Aristotle wrote of these four things as 'causes', the sense Of the word aitiai in his time was 
_/ 
much wider than the current understanding of what we mean by a 'cause'. In contemporary 
philosophical accounts of causation, the idea of an efficient cause relates principally to a 
succession of cause and effect in the sense of the fourth Aristotelian cause (the motion-
originator). Therefore, contemporary scholars regard Aristotle's doctrine as setting out not just 
four causes, but four explanatory principles. 
Thus, to know something is to have an explanation for it, to have grasped the 'why' of it. 
Aristotle is offering a classification of different 'kinds' (topoi) of explanation, it does not 
mean that every thing has an explanation in each of the four senses, just that these four kinds 
of explanation exhaust the concept of explanation, or what it means to have grasped something 
in the fullest possible way. 
We can see that Aristotle has a very wide concept of explanation, or what it means to have 
explained or gained knowledge of something. But what is this concept of explanation based 
upon? If these four kinds of explanation are non-arbitrary then they must have some 
grounding basis.44 The grounding basis is - Metaphysics.45 To understand this metaphysical 
basis of Aristotelian explanation, one needs to appreciate what Aristotle means by 
'Substance', and this is defined by Moravcsik as "a set of elements with a fixed structure that 
moves itself towards self-determined goals" (85). It is easy to see that each of the four factors 
Schools of economics are bad enough. Add to that schools of economic philosophy and we can pack in. 
(There is no reason of course why one should not read philosophy for recreation.)". 
43 I will mainly follow the reading of Aristotle (and later Mill) after David Hillel-Ruben 1990 -
hereafter DHR (77-109 and 110-154). Please note that my reasons for bringing in Aristotle are sharply 
divergent from the attempts to argue for a 'return to Aristotle' for a 'moral' economics (on this see 
Ricardo Crespo 1998; Irene van Staveren 2001). 
44 DHR writes (84), "Aristotle appeared to have some reason for thinking that these four modes of 
explanation were exhaustive of the sorts of explanation there are: 'It is evident, then, even from what 
we have said before, that all men seek the causes named in the Physics, and that we cannot name any 
beyond these' (Metaphysics I, 10, 993a12-15)". 
45 Aristotelian theory of explanation is "ultimately grounded on and to be justified in terms of 
metaphysics" (85). 
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in the definition of substance correspond to the four elements of explanation - the element, the 
structure, the motion originator, and the goal. 
So far we have seen that the general Aristotelian account of explanation places a reliance on 
obtaining knowledge about something in terms of being able to 'explain' it. When it comes to 
scientific knowledge (episteme), the requirements of explanation are different than for general 
knowledge.46 Thus we already see that with Aristotle, 'science' has become a special--
knowledge requiring a special notion of explanation. He writes (DHR 1990: 96 [Posterior 
Analytics PA I, 2, 71 b8ff]), "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific 
knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist 
knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the facts depends, as the cause of that 
fact and of no other, and further, that the fact could not be other than it is ... ". 
Possessing 'unqualified scientific knowledge' for Aristotle, requires both knowledge of the 
bare fact (knowledge that), as well as knowledge of the reasoned fact (knowledge why). This 
can also be put as - scientific knowledge of something involves being able to give an 
explanation of it but also being able to know that it could not have been otherwise. DHR (96-
7) sums this up as, 
(A) :x knows that the reasoned fact that p (knows why p) iff, 
(l) for some q, x knows the bare fact that q is the explanation of p, and 
(2) (x knows that?) -p is impossible.47 
The special requirements of explanation are (AI) that one has an explanation of what one 
knows, and (A2) that one knows the necessity of what one knows. Such scientific knowledge 
has as its objects laws which can be deductively demonstrated. With regard to scientific 
knowledge, Aristotle has a deductivist theory of explanation. For Aristotle, a scientific 
explanation must therefore be as an argument, a demonstration - a deductively valid syllogism 
. I . 48 from necessary premIsses to a necessary conc uston. 
46 This is in contrast to Plato for whom explanation whether in science or generally must have the same 
requirements. .,. . . . , 
47 'x knows that' is placed in brackets with a questIon mark because thIS IS ambIguous In ArIstotle s 
text. 
48 Further, such syllogisms must meet the following six requin~ments: the premi~ses must be (1) true, 
(2) primitive and (3) immediate. The premisses must be (4) pnor to the conclUSIOn drawn from them. 
They must be (5) explanatory of the conclusion, which itself must be true. And finally, (6) they must be 
more familiar (in nature and to us) than the conclusion. 
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There is, then, a trilemma about explanation (and about epistemic justification) which can be 
stated (DHR:103) as follows, 
1. either explanations regress ad infinitum, or, 
2. there is some circularity in explanation, so that something can be part of the 
explanation for itself, or, 
3. there must be some ultimate explanans which IS itself inexplicable or self-
explanatory. 
_ According to Hillel-Ruben Aristotle's theory (like Plato's) agrees with the third alternative, 
that there are ultimate explanantia which are self-explanatory, that there is such a thing as 
"non-demonstrable understanding". Recap - scientific knowledge (unlike general knowledge) 
involves knowledge of laws to be attained by deductive explanations which are syllogistic 
forms of demonstrative reasoning fulfilling certain special requirements. But, the ultimate first 
principles of such scientific knowledge are self-explanatory, and not further explainable. How 
then do we get to these ultimate first principles of science? 
One possible interpretation of arriving at the ultimate first principles relies upon obtaining 
them by a process of induction (epagoge) from particular instances (DHR: 100, 104). 
However, even if we get to know the primary premisses by induction, these particular 
instances cannot provide the explanation for the ultimate principles of a science. Rather, it is 
the ultimate principles which explain the particular cases. Aristotle does not believe that the 
'particular' can be 'explained' in scientific knowledge. The objects of scientific knowledge are 
'laws', but in order to produce scientific knowledge of such laws by deductive demonstrations, 
it may be possible that the ultimate first principles are arrived at by a process of induction 
from particular instances (the particulars which do not explain, but are themselves explained 
by the general laws). 
Let me sum up some important trails here. As we have seen, for Aristotle, 
• There are more than one kinds of knowledge, especially there is scientific knowledge but 
also there is practical or productive knowledge. 
• The general theory of explanation is based on his metaphysical notion of substance with 
four important correlates which are - element, structure, motion originator, and goal. 
• The requirements of scientific explanation are different from those of general explanation 
because scientific knowledge involves knowing both the explanation of a thing and the 
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• 
necessity of that knowledge - that is, knowledge of the bare fact as well as the reasoned 
fact. 
Scientific explanation is deductivist, so that it is a demonstration of a deductively valid 
syllogism from necessary premisses to a necessary conclusion, and must in addition obey 
six stated conditions, one of which requires that the premisses must be more familiar than 
the conclusions in nature and to the knower (i.e., a move from familiar to the unfamiliar). 
• This leads to a trilemma~f explanation (and of epistemic justification) so that explanation 
_/ 
must either infinitely regress,_or be circular, or ultimately self-explanatory or inexplicable. 
• The ultimate self-explanatory first principles of a science can be seen to be the result of a 
process of induction (epagoge) from particulars. 
• The object of science is not to explain the particulars, but to explain as necessary the 
general laws of which the particulars may be an instance. 
Now, there is a tension between the general and the particular that has been inaugurated in the 
context of scientific knowledge. The particular instance in some way contributes to the first 
principles of explaining general laws in scientific knowledge, but it is the general laws which 
explain the particular cases. Also, because the first principles of science are arrived at by a 
process of induction (epagoge), they cannot be a priori, and so are not necessarily self-evident. 
2.4.2.iii Aristotelian Versus Galilean Traditions 
In what sense can the body of know ledge we now recognise as contemporary mainstream 
economics be said to be Aristotelian in its epistemological inflections? Let us explore this 
briefly. Economics (including classical political economy), uncomfortably saddles the 
intersection of practical and productive knowledge with (aspirations to be) scientific 
knowledge. Historically, the spheres of operation of these two kinds of knowledge were seen 
as separate and separable, but the enlightenment emphasis on 'scientific' as a criterion for all 
knowledge, and the successes of natural sciences, set in motion a vigorous intellectual ferment 
to align the 'social' with the natural sciences. Such an alignment, although never completely 
effected, nevertheless was repeatedly attempted. Mathematical formalism in the late 
nineteenth and then twentieth centuries, although neither necessary nor inevitable (and always 
much resisted, see Mirowski 1991 a), provided great service in giving a successful appearance 
of such an alignment, especially in economics. Being a deductivist system, mathematics (and 
associated mathematical models) could provide an intellectually convenient bridge in the 
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uneasy crossing of the general/particular divide in economics, by reinforcing the Aristotelian 
idea of explanation of general laws, rather than particular instances, as being the objects of 
scientific knowledge.49 Except, unlike Aristotelian first principles of science which are 
composed of non-demonstrable understanding, are self-explanatory but are not a priori, the 
first principles of economic science are often curiously a priori. 
George Henrik Von Wright (1971) provides a contrast between two main traditions in the 
history of ideas - the Aristotelian and the Galilean. He mentions t{at contrasts between these 
two traditions are often made by characterising the Aristotelian tradition as having a view of 
scientific explanation which is teleogical and fmalistic, so that it is tradition focuses on human 
efforts to "make facts teleologically or finalistically understandable" (2-3). The Galilean 
tradition on the other hand conceives of scientific explanation as causal and mechanistic in its 
attempts to focus on human efforts to "explain and predict phenomena"(ibid.).50 The next 
important thing to note is the relation of positivism to the Galilean tradition. Now obviously 
positivism is a term that can be (and has been) used in many senses, but I will draw upon von 
Wright's careful characterisation of positivism as, "an entire intellectual tradition extending 
from Comte and Mill not only down to the present-day but also upward in the stream of time 
to Hume and the philosophy of the Enlightenment" (4). The sense of positivism linked with a 
phenomenalist or sensualist theory of knowledge, and modem positivism with a verificationist 
theory of meaning, he sees as more appropriate for Mill. For Comte, he finds the 
characterisation of positivism linking it with a 'scientistic' and 'technological' view of 
knowledge and its uses, as more appropriate.51 What are the important features of positivism 
so understood? von Wright (4) identifies them as follows - methodological monism or the 
belief in the unity of method amidst the diversity of the subject matter of scientific 
investigation; exact natural sciences especially mathematical physics as the standard or ideal 
of perfection to which all knowledge must aspire; a view of scientific explanation which is in 
49 Of course, I am not suggesting that all economists since Aristotle, and especially enlightenment 
onwards were consciously taking up Aristotelian ideas. Rather, I'm attempting to trace a certain 
epistemological inheritance in what became known as economics. 
50 An important caveat is not to assume that the Aristotelian tradition has ancient roots while the 
Galilean is a relatively recent one. von Wright (1971: 2) is of the opinion that while there may be some 
truth in this characterisation, the Galilean tradition can also be said to have an ancestry going back 
beyond Aristotle to Plato. " .. . 
51 He draws an interesting comparison between Auguste Comte and Bacon as mISSIOnarIes of 
technological attitude to knowledge", writing that,. "both contributed greatly to the .creat:~n of a cer:ain 
'scientistic climate of opinion,' the next to nothmg to the actual progress of SCIence (Von Wnght 
1971: 171, emphasis added). Note that von Wright is able to make a distinction between prevailing 
scientism and actual progressive science. 
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some sense 'causal' so that it places an emphasis on explaining individual instances by 
subsuming them under hypothetically assumed more genera/laws of nature, including human 
nature,52 and a characteristic attitude towards 'finalistic explanations' (Von Wright defines 
these as "attempts to account for facts in terms of intentions, goals, purposes") which involves 
either rejecting them as unscientific or attempting to purge them of their "'animist' or 
'vitalist' remains" and transforming them into causal explanations. 
One is perhaps not surprised that these features of positivism that von Wright identifies 
resonate rather well with the body of claims that we have come to recognise as economics. 53 
Contemporary mainstream economics owes a lot to the positivist mutations of the 
enlightenment especially the onset of vigorous epistemological refurbishment in the late 
nineteenth century. This refurbishment was part of the general intellectual climate itself 
affected by many influences such as industrialisation, imperialism, Victorian mores, and 
developments in the natural sciences (especially those made possible by examining, 
experimenting, analysing - dissecting nature, mapping society - thus furthering the earlier 
enlightenment impetus to map the world, secure Reason, 'torturing nature's secrets out of 
her'). 
I would like to return to the fourth feature of positivism that von Wright identifies - it's 
attitude towards Aristotelian (or finalistic) explanation. When faced with a theory of 
explanation - which ultimately relied upon non-demonstrable understanding, or self 
explanatory (but not a priori) first principles of science which could perhaps be had from 
particulars by induction, but could not to be explained without the general laws - the 
empiricist alternative (which had been emphasised by enlightenment epistemology) is either to 
reject explanation as an unscientific concept, or, to reconstruct it in line with empiricist 
principles. Both these options were explored, Hillel-Ruben gives the example of Pierre Duhem 
who chose the first route, and John Stuart Mill who chose the second. 
52 In this context, consider the following remark by Mill (Von Wright 1971: 172 fh. 15 [Mill 1843, Bk. 
VI, Ch. iii, Sect. 2]), "The science of Human Nature may be s.aid to exist, ~ ~roportion as ~he 
approximate truths, which compose a practical knowledge of mankmd, can be exhIbIted as corollanes 
from the universal laws of human nature on which they rest". 
53 In fact these are some of the principal characteristics of contemporary mainstream economics - the 
neoclassi~al method (applicable anywhere any time), its mathematical ideal type in The Model™, and 
its underlying deductive nomological (I will soon come to this) mode of explanation. 
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In his The Aim And Structure of Physical Theory, Duhem defmes 'to explain' as 'to strip 
reality of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself. 
Explanation is for him a metaphysical idea which transcends experience and could result in 
subordinating physical theory to metaphysics. What then is the purpose of physical theory for 
Ouhem? (OHR 1990: 113, emphasis added) The answer is: 
... the aim of physical theory is merely to summarise and classify logically a group of 
experimental laws 'without claiming to explain these laws'. Having rejected 
explanation as a legitimate aim of science, Duhem claims that 'A physical theory is 
not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small 
number ofprinciples, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly 
as possible a set of experimental laws' (Duhem 1977: 19). Since explanation is 
connected for Duhem with a non-empirical conception of reality, it has no place in 
SCIence. 
Duhem's idea of a physical theory is reminiscent of a mainstream economic theory, except 
that for him, the system of mathematical propositions deduced from a small number of 
principles represents - a set of experimental laws. An economic theory of similar format will 
not claim to represent experimental laws, because conventionally experimentation is seen as 
impossible in economics. The current sub-field of experimental economics54 notwithstanding, 
experimentation has not historically had many adherents. Perhaps the enlightenment impetus 
to explain the general man, the high values placed on the search for uniformities of human 
nature, and the perpetual difficulty of dealing with 'difference' - ensured that the experimental 
basis of empiricism never took a stronghold in the set of ideas which coalesced as political 
economy or economICS. 
Mill, who is a significant precursor of modem economics, now enters this discussion as a late 
nineteenth century figure who is important in the epistemological redoing of explanation. Mill 
is part of an empiricist tradition (Hobbes, Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume) which sought to 
criticise or reformulate concepts or ideas which cannot be traced directly to experience. The 
Aristotelian concept of explanation was rejected by Smith as we saw before, but it was not 
until Mill that it was explicitly addressed. How did Mill see explanation? 
2.4.2.iv Mill On Explanation 
54 Even here it is not clear that 'experimental economics' is an attempt to secure empiricist 
epistemological underpinnings for Economi~s as a soci~ science. A. lot of experimental eco~omi~s 
literature is principally oriented around testmg neoclasSIcal as~umptIons abou~ human behaVIOur In 
simulated laboratory conditions. For a survey of sources on expenmental economICS, see Kaul (200 1 a). 
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Mill holds a deductivist account of explanation along with a reductivist account of deduction. 
But what does this mean and imply? I will now attempt to unpack this. 
For Mill, explanation does not reveal deeper mysteries of nature. 55 So the fIrst thing to note is 
that Mill does not want to explain in any fmal sense. Explanations, according to him, need 
laws, which he sees as uniformities. He makes the distinction between uniformities of 
coexistent phenomena and- those of successive phenomena - simultaneous or successive 
./ 
uniformities. If is the uniformi!ies of successive phenomena are to be causal, then they are 
invariable and unconditional regularities of experience. Mill rejects any nonempirical idea of 
causation as metaphysical. 
He differentiates between the ordinary and scientifIc meanings of explanation. The difference 
lies in ordinary explanation replacing the unfamiliar by the familiar, and scientifIc explanation 
(or explanation in science) replacing the familiar by the unfamiliar. So that in science (DHR 
1990: 114 [Mill 1970: 310-11], emphases added), 
it resolves a phenomenon with which we are familiar into one of which we previously 
knew little or nothing .... It must be kept constantly in view, therefore, that in science, 
those who speak of explaining any phenomenon mean (or should mean) pointing out 
not some more familiar, but merely some more general phenomenon, of which it is a 
partial exemplification .... 
Thes.e remarks represent the apotheosis of standing at the juncture of familiar/unfamiliar and 
generaVparticular, with both the Aristotelian ideas on general and scientifIc explanation, and 
the Enlightenment empiricist (in some part in GalileanlNewtonian) tradition, as well as the 
earlier rationalismlantirationalism tensions in Smith and Hume. Thus, one can already see 
with Mill the putting together of 'science' with the 'unfamiliar', in a lot of ways Mill 
represents the many intellectual traditions at play, and his ideas were remarkably influential in 
economICs. 
Hillel-Ruben comments that Mill often talks about "events and facts as what explain and are 
explained" (115) and points out that facts did not figure in Plato's or Aristotle's ontology of 
explanation. What is one to make of the notion ofa "fact"? Further, "[w]hatever facts are, they 
are not events or even patterns of events, although there is the fact that some event occurred, 
or the fact that some law or pattern of events obtains" (ibid.). For Mill, both particular 
55 According to Mill (DHR 1990: 113 [Mill 1970: 310)), the ''word explanat~on is here ~se~ in its 
philosophical sense. What is called explaining one law of nature by another, IS but substltutmg one 
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instances (or individual facts) as well as general laws are explained by an explanation. He is 
thus ofthe opinion that (DHR: 116 [Mill 1970: 305], emphases added), 
[aJn individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, by stating 
the law or laws of causation of which its production is an instance. Thus a 
conflagration is explained when it is proved to have arisen from a spark falling into 
the midst of a heap of combustibles; and in a similar manner, a law of uniformity of 
nature is said to be explained when another law or laws are pointed out, ofwhich that 
law itself is but a case, and from which it could be deduced. 
Mill's usage of the notion ofa 'fact', is both symptomatic and conr:;uctive ofa larger role that 
the epistemological unit of a fact has played in modernity. Mary Poovey (1998) provides a 
History Of The Modern Fact (subtitled: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society) in which she addresses the peculiarities of the 'modern fact'. She sees the category of 
the factual in most modern sciences in the West as positioned between the phenomenal world 
and systematic knowledge, as a result of which, "the epistemological unit of the fact has 
registered the tension between the richness and variety embodied in concrete phenomena and 
the uniform, rule-governed order of humanly contrived systems" (1). Poovey's focus in 
providing a history of the modem fact is Britain from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth 
century, and in this context, she sees Mill's elevation of deduction over induction56 in the 
emergent social sciences as an important move. This metatheoretical gesture owed to a 
recognition of the tension between observed particulars and theoretical or systematic 
knowledge as a problem that required a professional (or disciplinary) solution (3, 317-325). 
One relevant thread of Poovey's argument can be understood as follows. At the beginning of 
the period roughly understood as the enlightenment, Bacon was important in elevating the 
observed particular, from which one could move to making generalisations which constituted 
systematic knowledge. However, induction was anything but unproblematic, and one can see 
Hume's philosophical formulation of the problem of induction in the 1740s as a belated effect 
of Bacon's empiricism. Poovey points out that although Hume himself did not see this 
problem as particularly troubling (14), his formulation of this tension between the observed 
particulars and systematic knowledge allowed the peculiarity written into the modern fact to 
be conceptualised as such. In the nineteenth century, Mill (and others such as McCulloch and 
Herschel) were important in the formulation of a disciplinary solution to this problem, it was a 
mystery for another, and does nothing to ren~er the general course of.nature ~ther than mysterious: we 
can no more assign a why for the most extenSIve laws than for the partIal ones . 
56 Along with J. R. McCulloch's 1825 taxonomy of knowledge and John Herschel's 1830 attempt to 
deal with the problem of the fact in natural science (see Poovey 1998: 3,264-325). 
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solution which involved, "turning the task of knowledge production in the rapidly 
professionalising sciences over to so-called experts" (3). These experts eventually introduced 
the formulation to gradually elevate "rule-governed, autonomous models over observed 
particulars" (3). This reformulation (akin to what I have called epistemological 
redoing/refurbishment in line with positivism above) occurred at different moments m 
different disciplines, but as a result it was ensured that (Poovey 1998: 3, emphasis original): 
After the late nineteenth century, at least in the natural and social sciences, expert 
knowledge producers sought not to generate knowledge that was simultaneously true 
to nature and systematic but to model the range o/the normal or sometimes simply to 
create the most sophisticated models from available data, often using mathematical 
formulas. 
Poovey is providing an epistemological account of why and how - the important changes that 
occurred in the nineteenth century in the understanding of what is it meant to create 
knowledge about the world, and how it could be done, - could be linked to a history of the 
modem enlightenment concept of a fact' and its peculiarities stemming from an inherent 
tension between the world and its representation, and further - the methodological 
compromise of creating taxonomies of knowledge, classes of experts, usage of statistics and 
mathematical modelling as an effective solution. This is something that is otherwise just 
usually stated but not genealogically excavated, for instance, von Wright (1971: 7) states that, 
the "application of mathematical methods to political economy and other forms of social study 
was an inheritance of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment which found favour with the 
nineteenth-century positivists" . 
Given that Mill was an influential figure in effecting the methodological compromise 
following on from tensions in enlightenment epistemology, his rendering of the concept of 
explanation is a very good example of the varying pulls that he sought to characterise. It has 
been noted that Mill has a deductivist theory of explanation, but Mill also has a peculiar 
account of deduction. He writes, "[i]t must be granted that in every syllogism, considered as 
an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii" (DHR: 11 0). Mill sees 
deductive inference as circular, and as founded upon some sort of non-deductive inference, so 
that deduction cannot advance knowledge .57 When he has such an epistemically downgraded 
and reductivist account of deduction, then might one not expect him to relate explanation to 
induction instead? One surely might, but this is not what he does, and the odd conjunction has 
57 So that Mill writes, "nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism which was not known or 
assumed to be known, before" (DHR: 131 [Mill 1970: 120]). 
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been noted. Even though Mill believes that by inductive inference one can actually move from 
known truths to those unknown, in the same way that he believes predictions as being capable 
of advancing the predictor to new knowledge about the conclusion, his account of explanation 
remains deductive, and this is because he is attempting to epistemically downgrade 
explanation from its non empiricist pretensions (DHR: 130-1, 137). Mill does not see 
explanation as being able to answer the why question, we can never ever really know, all that 
'-we can do is to fit facts into wider patterns by deductive arguments (137). This is exactly the 
/ 
state of the discussion in contemporary economics, which does not really care much about 
what one does when one explains, all that one can do as a good scientist is to fit patterns by 
deductive mathematical models. 
Further, Mill's account of causation is deterministic so that there is a cause for everything that 
happens, and every such cause is a determining cause. Explanation involves fitting a 
universally general fact (or a uniformity) into the more general law or uniformity of which it is 
a special case. The derivative laws are themselves dependent upon a plurality of ultimate laws 
with no further explanation. However for Mill (unlike for Aristotle) since there is no non-
demonstrable understanding, these ultimate starting points are inexplicable rather than self-
explanatory. In this way, there is a double ultimacy of inexplicables - there are laws for which 
there is in principle no explanation; and there are particular brute facts for which there is in 
principle no explanation. Then, the causal laws explain by, either resolving the effect of the 
causes into separate laws of the causes which contribute to it, or demonstrating an intervening 
uniformity linking two uniformities, or by subsuming laws into a more general law - resolving 
individual particulars or uniformities under more general laws. 
Finally, Mill also originates the 'symmetry thesis', the idea that explanation and prediction are 
symmetrical so that they are both identical in content of their product, which is a deduction. 
This is another lasting influence of Mill on economic thought. As late as the second half of the 
twentieth century, debates in economic methodology discuss this concept58 (see Blaug 1980a, 
b; Alexander Rosenberg 1992). 
Let me now sum up point-wise the important trails below. 
58 It is a flawed concept in many senses - one, it relies upon construing explanations and predictions as 
arguments, two, Hempel who provided an influential account of explanation drawing upon Mill in his 
later work (DHR: 146 [Hempel 1965: 367, 376]) admits that at least the second part of the symmetry 
thesis (that every successful prediction is a potential explanation) is open to question. 
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• 
• 
Mill has a deductivist account of explanation, but a particular account of deduction, so that 
deduction cannot advance knowledge. 
This does not immediately tail in with his account of inductive inference, which he 
believes can lead from known to unknown truths. 
• However, Mill has introduced the notion of the 'fact' in relation to explanation, so that he 
• 
• 
can say facts explain facts. 
There is in fact a history Of t~notion of fact in Enlightenment epistemology, which 
originates in a generaVparticulaf tension from Bacon onwards, a problem of induction 
recognised by Hume. 
Subsequently in the nineteenth century, a methodological compromise was effected which 
involved Mill elevating deduction over induction, as witnessed in his account of 
explanation. 
• The notion of explanation is thus epistemically downgraded, to effect a compromise to the 
problem of the modern fact. 
• Explanation is no deep demystification, only the fitting of uniformities into patterns of 
more general uniformities, at the base of which there are ultimately inexplicable facts and 
laws. 
• This can also be understood so that the fitting of facts into patterns by deductive 
arguments can lead to gaining new knowledge of patterns in nature itself. 
• This cementing of a deductivist basis for explanation paves the way for abstractions such 
as nature, society etc. to be thus incorporated into models of a pared down notion of 
knowledge which does not aim to represent knowledge as being both true to nature and 
systematic, but a deductivist modelling of abstractions. 
• This deductivist modelling of abstractions as a basis for 'theoretical' knowledge in 
economics changes the very notion of theory and transmogrifies it into contemporary The 
Modei™. 
• This transmogrification of what one would mean by the term economic theory, and its 
peculiar way of carrying out associated role - to describe, explain and predict the world, 
as conceptualised in the formalised model, is a legacy of Aristotelian ideas inflected 
through the enlightenment, and nineteenth century methodological compromises effected 
as resolution to tensions in enlightenment epistemology. 
• The result is a positivist social science with theoretical understanding constituted by 
modelling abstractions in a deductivist mathematical format. As I argue later, all of this 
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requires the fIxing of individual choice as the focus of analysis, and characterisation of 
individual choice in a way as to make it mathematically tractable and commensurable. It 
further requires abstractions to function in a credible way, a task for which the role of 
metaphors is crucial. 
• Underlying this is a picture of the subject world of economics as it has been 
epistemologically structured in a temporal-historical-ideological way. But, because the 
particularity of these genealogical inheritances is msufficiently uncovered, and often goes 
unstated, the enterprise of economics appears to be a pl(usib Ie representation of a coherent 
universal system that exists already performed which the Economist as a theorist renders 
understandable by simplifying it using mathematical tools. This is challengeable on the 
account that I have provided. 
2.4.2.v Hempel And The Types Of Explanation - IS And DN 
According to Hempel, basic scientific explanation is of two types - a) the deductive 
nomological (DN) type of explanation, and b) the probabilistic statistical or the inductive 
statistical type (IS) of explanation. They are both ideal types in being idealisations/models or 
rational reconstructions by the standard of which actual explanations can be judged, and are 
found wanting in some or other aspect. Hempel does not aim to provide a plausible account of 
how scientists actually explain, rather, the purpose is "to indicate in reasonably precise terms a 
logical structure and the rationale of various ways in which empirical science answers 
exp lanation-seeking-why-questions" (Hempel 1965: 412). 
The deductive nomological type of explanation has a significant role for laws, so that on a DN 
account we can expect the explanadum event (that which is to be explained) to occur by the 
reason of explanans (that which explains) made up of particular facts and uniformities 
expressed by general laws. This can be roughly expressed as: 
An explanadum event E, can be said to occur from, 
Particular circumstances such as C b C2 .•. CN, in accordance with, 
General laws such as LI, L2• •• LK 
Causal explanations (which are answers to the 'why E' question) are thus DN in character.59 
The DN model has also been called the 'covering law' model such that an event is considered 
as being explained only if all possible occurrences can be subsumed under more general 
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covering laws. It is easy to see the link between Hempel's DN ideal type of explanation and 
Mill's empiricist rendering of explanation. This is not surprising since Hempel is an empiricist 
and believes that empirical phenomena is basically the same in all areas of scientific inquiry, 
so that 'scientific' explanation of empirical phenomena is in some sense a complete 
exp lanation. 
The inductive statistical explanation (which was a later addition) relies upon laws '-'1f 
probabilistic statistical type, so that it is an assertion that given certain conditions, event of a _/ 
particular type will occur with a certain degree of statistical probability. Within IS 
explanation, the logical occurrence of the explanadum event E is not deduCtively implied, but 
a high likelihood (inductive probability) is conferred upon it. 
First, as many have argued, Hempel's account of explanation is based on his view of 
explanation as nomic expectability, that is to show that given the circumstances, an event is to 
be expected. This means that his view of explanation is closely tied to prediction, so that a 
complete explanation is a potential prediction. Second, Hempel argues that the DN or IS 
explanatory schema relies upon resolving explanations which rely upon means-ends 
situational calculations conducted by an agent into either DN or IS explanations (Hillel Ruben 
1993). This implies that scientific explanation does not need to take into account the 
particular/specific dispositional features of the agent such as rationality or explicit deliberation 
in order to explain an event. This is because explaining the behaviour of an agent A in a 
situation C by saying that in a situation of type C, the appropriate thing to do is X, does not 
explain A's in fact having done X which is according to Hempel, a necessary condition for an 
explanation. To explain the underlying rationale, one needs to say the following: 
1. A was in a situation of type C 
2. A was disposed to act rationally 
3. Any person who is disposed to act rationally will, when in a situation of type C, invariably 
(with high probability) do X. 
And so the explanans again explains the explanadum by a DN or a IS type of explanation. The 
Hempelian idea here is that we can sensibly formulate an ideal type explanation by subsuming 
elements of explanations which account for an individual's behaviour in a particular situation 
by attempting to reconstruct their own deliberations, under explanations which rely upon more 
general laws that all agents act in accordance with. Particular meaning and individual 
59 This does not imp ly the reverse - that all DN exp lanations are causal. 
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intentionality are erased ill favour of a similarity of agents acting ill accordance with a 
uniformity of laws. 
It is here that recognising the positivist empiricist enlightenment epistemological intellectual 
heritage of Hempelian ideas becomes pertinent. The role of laws is significant only if they are 
seen to be uniformly operant. Invoking laws to explain particular facts as Mill (and later 
- /Hempel) did needs to subsume them under even more general laws, for which ultimately there 
_ is no explanation. The role of the social scientist then is to formulate theories which are now 
attempts to "model of the range of the normal" (Poovey 1998), as it is perceived. The access to 
facts and general laws on which to base explanation in this positivist empiricist enlightenment 
epistemological tradition60 cannot be grounded on any non demonstrable understanding, 
because that would be harking back to Aristotelian metaphysics. On the contrary, there has to 
be some perceived empiricist basis for them. I say 'perceived empiricist basis' because it is 
not clear that the basis (at least in economics as a social science) is in fact empiricist. For 
instance, in economics, contemporary theory as the model™ relies upon what are a priori 
assumptions, but these are defended as being based upon some self-evident uniformities of 
human nature. 
Further, numbers in the form of statistics are harnessed as providing evidence to testify to the 
overall uniformity of human behaviour. Thus, basing the theory (an effort to model the range 
of the normal) on the typical individual economic agent with certain (a priorily) assumed 
characteristics is seen to be empirically validated in the epistemological strength emanating 
from the law of large numbers. How did it come to be thus? It is here that the role of statistics 
in generating the realm of the average or the normal was important in the late nineteenth 
century. Recall my discussion above on Whewell and Jones (Theodore Porter 1994). Further, 
Poovey writes (1998: 325, emphasis added), 
... whereas British philosophers since Hume had asked how one could reason from 
observed particulars to fmal causes or from observed particulars to general laws, after 
statistics began to be equated with the law of large numbers, philosophers as well as 
ordinary readers began to ask how one could conceptualise free will, given that the 
60 The alternative view to positivist empiricist enlightenment epistemology is a view characterised as 
anti-positivism, one strand of which is the hermeneutic tradition. This tradition is characterised by 
emphasis on the contrast between the sciences that Wilhelm Windelband (1894) calls - 'nomothetic' 
(sciences which aim at generalisations about reproducible and predictable phenomena, the search for 
laws) and those that are 'ideographic' (sciences which want to grasp the individual and unique features 
of their objects, the descriptive study of individuality). Linked to this is the contrast drawn by the 
German historian-philosopher Johann Gustave Droysen (1858), between 'Eklaren' or explanation and 
'Verstehen' or understanding (for the source of both citations, see von Wright 1971: 5, 172). 
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regularities that emerge from "numerical calculations" seemed to leave so little room 
for volition, for morality, or for ethics of any kind. 
For Hempel, 'scientific' explanation of empirical phenomena accommodates explanation in 
social science. Relying upon the positivist tradition of Mill and his predecessors and 
successors, it is this aspiration to a covering law ideal type of explanation that one fmds in 
contemporary economics. The fact that actual explanations do not exactly conform to the ideal 
type, does not affect the deep-s~yaspiration of mainstream economists as social scientists to 
attempt to approach this ideal with formalised mathematical models so as to permit such 
approximations. 
2.4.3 The Section Revisited 
It is time to start pulling together the various threads in the comp lexly layered itineraries that I 
have attempted to present. I have argued that the contemporary epistemological structuring of 
economics reflects methodological compromises necessitated by tensions in the underlying 
enlightenment epistemology. Thus, I did not begin from economics as it is to argue its 
shortcomings, a strategy pursued at many levels by numerous critiques/assessments of 
mainstream economics (see Barbara Wootton 1938; DeirdrelDonald McCloskey 1986, 1994; 
Harold Lydall 1998; Rajani Kanth 1997a, b; Tony Lawson 1997; Steve Keen 2001). I will 
now relate some other elements of the subject-world into the picture presented above. They 
should be seen as issues arising from and useful in the service of fixing my arguments until 
now. In this, I will revisit some theorists and themes discussed above in order to pull together 
and conclude. 
2.5 The Theory And Science Of Economics 
Earlier I had discussed Hicks on causality and explanation. In the light of the arguments that 
followed it, I can now revisit Hicks' view of theory, the theorists and science - in economics. 
He writes, "[c]ausality, of whatever kind, is always a relation, a relation between facts. And 
yet it appears to be a theoretical relation. How can there be a theoretical relation between 
facts?" (1979: 27). Subsequently, he provides an answer which most economists would agree 
with. Hicks recognises that theories on which assertion of causal relations must be based 
cannot be purely deductive, so that if the theory is not pure theory (purely axiomatic) and if it 
is to be applied to facts then it must begin from some proposition or propositions which are 
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inductive. Can one link empirical association between characteristics with the demand for 
Reason (that they be brought into a logical system)? 
He believes that there is "plenty of experience in science (and even in economics)" (29) to 
show that a statement of association, even if purely inductive in character, can in its capacity 
as a proposition have implications in the logical sense some of which may be testable. And if 
the test is successful, then a logical bridge has been built between two inductions, and the 
logical coherence of this bridge strengthens confidence in the ind40n. Although he gives an 
example from Newtonian theory, it is his belief that, "[t]he pattern of deductions serving as a 
bridge between inductions is, however, general. The chain of deduction may be short or long, 
simple or complex" (32). 
According to him, a theory that is "properly established" must have been based on some 
evidence and all that new evidence can do is to show that its field of application is narrower 
than had been thought. And as with most economists, this leads him to argue that there is no 
reason to abandon the theory until "a new theory has been developed with a wider field of 
application" (34). The whole process of theorisation is for him like the image of "rungs on a 
ladder; the investigator climbs from one to the next"(34). I wanted to get to this crucial point, 
in order to ask the question that Hicks asks himself, "But where does the ladder start?" (35) 
He answers, "[t]hey are pure inductions, which are not verifications of some hypothesis, 
derived from results which have been already obtained" (35). But he simultaneously explicitly 
rejects the Baconian heresy which claims that such inductions can be obtained by a mere 
collection of facts, without ordering principle. Thus these pure inductions are obtained not 
from collecting facts but are made available from the "work of classification which has to be 
performed before the inductions can be made" (35). So that in relation to this work of 
classification, he writes (ibid.: 35 -7): 
It is a work which from one point of view is external to the science in which the 
inductions will be used; for it is a work which must be performed before the 
'climbing' can start. But from another point of view it is the first stage of the 
science;.... When these classifications are first formed, the science is still in the 
future; so we should not be surprised to fmd that as they start they are unscientific. 
Their purpose, at that stage, is not the advancement of science; it is something quite 
different. The primitive classifications which led to astronomy were made, in the first 
place, by astrologers.... There is a somewhat similar relation of alchemy to 
chemistry .... In a similar way the medical sciences begin with empiricists ('quacks'). 
One of the chief sources of primitive inductions is the practical arts .... Looking back, 
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we can reckon a classification as better if it led to inductions that were more fertile so , 
that they could be used as primitive inductions for a (later) 'ladder' of development. 
Thus, writing towards the end of the twentieth-century, Hicks embodies the epistemological 
spirits of foregone stories. He retains an Aristotelian love of generalisations6!, an awareness of 
the Humean problem of induction which stems from Bacon's overvalorisation of the 
deracinated particular, a Millean empiricist rendering of explanation in facts, and the 
consequent methodological compromise of creating a taxonomy of knowledge along with a 
special class of experts who 'do' science. This is the coming to a full circle of an important 
strand of my argument, which sought to show that the epistemological inheritance of 
economics is geohistorically-temporally-ideologically located and not universal. Rather than a 
science, economics is a disciplinary coalescing whose coming into being cannot be seen in 
isolation from the rise of disciplinarity and scientism themselves as ways and means of 
creating systematic knowledge from observed particulars to serve the interests of 
administration. 
Hicks further writes (ibid.: 37), 
[h]ow does all this apply to economics? ... Just as the first steps towards the natural 
sciences were made by non-scientists, so the first steps towards economics were made 
by non-economists. Administrators, calculating imports and exports; accountants, 
calculating profits and incomes and drawing up balance-sheets; it is from the work of 
such practical people that economics begins. And just as in the natural sciences, the 
first step towards science proper is the refinement of unscientific, or semi-scientific, 
classifications, so there is in economics the corresponding proceeding, the refinement 
of the practical concepts so as to fit them better to be tools of thinking. 
In addition to confIrming my previous arguments, we can see that this highlights another 
peculiarity - divergence of the commonly understood practical content of economics, and its 
scientific aspirations. As I mentioned before, economics straddles the inconvenient 
juxtaposition of (what is understood as) practical knowledge with (what is understood as) 
scientific knowledge. This has often meant that practical quotidian economic experience has 
come to be defined by its scientific construal. 
61 Hicks' ideas behind a ladder of science can be compared with the following quote on Aristotle from 
Hillel-Ruben (DHR: 104), "For Aristotle, in the finished setting out of the science, each generalisation 
should be immediate; each generalisation should follow immediately from its predecessor in the 
inferential chain. If it does not, then there are some further premisses on which the truth depends, or 
through which the truth is mediated, such that those premisses have not yet been incorporated into a 
science". 
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Meanwhile, where does the ladder of science get us in economics? Not very far,62 and Hicks 
attributes this to the fact that economics is in time, in the way the natural sciences are not. This 
is worth commenting upon since it highlights an interesting point - success in economics is 
perceived to be like climbing the ladder of science in the way that natural sciences do. Thus, 
while for Friedman (1953) judging the success of economic theory by its comparison to reality 
seems unpalatable because realism is unattainable,63 economists are not usually averse to 
- somewhat unfavourable comparisons with the status of knowledge in natural sciences, as it 
c(n indicate relative mathematical progress given the 'problematic' status of their subject 
matter. 
2.6 Mathematical Formalism, Representation And The Moralisation Of Objectivity 
Let me now turn to a few other points. I have earlier suggested that the mutations of 
enlightenment epistemology in the nineteenth century corresponded roughly to the transition 
from classical to neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics is famous for the positive-
normative distinction,64 first articulated by John Neville Keynes (1891: 34-5, 46), it is also 
known for its methodological individualism,65 and mathematical formalism. I will comment 
on this last as a way of concluding. 
62 See Daniel Hausman (1989) for an argument that argues explanatory progress has occurred in 
economics. He judges cumulative explanatory progress by: discovery of new laws and new "facts" 
(economists have come to recognise new regularities, he defers the question on whether these can be 
seen as laws), by correction of errors, by recognising the relevance of already known facts and 
generalisations, growth of systematisation, increasing conceptual articulation and clarification (early 
classical economists failed to understand marginal concepts, now we do), "deepening" or 
"superseding". 1 do not agree with his account. 
63 Even Samuelson felt compelled to disagree with Friedman on the "realism of assumptions" issue. For 
a compelling critique of Friedman on explanation and the nature of economic theory relevant to the 
nature of my arguments here, see McLachlan and Swales (1978). 
64 Samuel Weston (1994) argues in favour of retaining the positive/normative divide as a conceptual 
distinction (which will not cause economics to be value free). The reasons? As follows: to keep the 
questions distinct ("attach an asterisk to ethical questions because there isn't time to discuss them in 
undergraduate classes"); to issue a caution about credentials so that economists cannot abuse their 
credentials to advance certain ethical arguments; to maintain a scholarly environment; to promote the 
nonn of objectivity. See Walsh (2000) who discusses Hilary Putnam to underline the positivist 
insistence on sharp dichotomies such as science/ethics, science/metaphysics, analytic/synthetic - which 
serve to deny entanglements such as that of fact and value. Walsh presents theory as black with fact, 
white with convention and red with values. See also Rodney Wilson (1997) for a discussion ofmorality 
and economics, and Tibor Machan (1998) for an argument that ownership or property as a moral-
political concept is the nonnative basis of economics. However, it can be argued that the liberal 
ideology of property and person is neither natural nor neutral, for its unravelling in the face of race 
slavery, see Samira Kawash (1999). 
65 Garfinkel (1981: 16-19, 52-3) compares individualism in social theory to microreduction in physical 
science. He quotes Arrow (1968) on reduction: "A full characterisation of each individual's behaviour 
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Hicks again says it for most economists, when he writes that (1979: viii, emphases added), 
"[t]here is much of economic theory which is pursued for no better reason than its intellectual 
attraction; it is a good game. We have no reason to be ashamed of that, since the same would 
hold for many branches of pure mathematics". Mathematics is perhaps a link in the cherished 
association of economics with the natural sciences. How did it come to be thus? I am going to 
briefly discuss this along two lines - one relating to the ideal of objectivity, and the second to 
a history of mathematical expressi~ in economics. As before, I will not engage with the 
'standard' arguments on should economics as it is have more or less of mathematics, is 
mathematics just another language, is there more to formalism than mathematics in 
contemporary economics.66 
2.6.1 Objectivity And Representation 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (1992) examme the nineteenth century fIxing of a 
particular form of objectivity - mechanical or noninterventionist objectivity. This form of 
objectivity is different from other components of the conglomerate notion of objectivity (such 
as aperspectival objectivity).67 Of course the attempts of scientists, artists, social scientists, 
logically implies a knowledge of group behaviour; there is nothing left out. The rejection of the 
organism approach to social problems has been a fairly complete, and to my mind salutary, rejection of 
mysticism". 
66 For a detailed discussion along these lines, see Roy Weintraub, Sheila Dow, Victoria Chick, Roger 
Backhouse, Paul Krugman in The Economic Journal 1998 (451: 1826-99). On the related question of 
the status of models in economics, see Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison 1999; Daniel Little 1995. 
And finally, Peter McClelland (1975) examines causal explanation and model building in history, 
economics, and the new economic history. 
67 The relations between objectivity, representation, and maintenance of social orders are complex but 
open to historicisation and criticality. Aperspectival objectivity can be traced to the origin of Western 
perspective in the Renaissance painters such as Brunelleschi, Donatello, Masacchio and Alberti. This 
way of having a centrepoint or vanishing point of entry into the painting was later mathematically 
formalised by Desargues. (Christopher Zeeman's lecture at the University of Hull, 13 March 2002). 
This story of the illusionistic perspective as an arch-trope is undone in Hubert Damisch (1994 [1987]). 
Later, the Enlightenment produced pictures in boxes with an eye-hole so that the perspective could be 
fixed for view in a manner difficult for paintings. Anke te Heesen (2002) unfolds the story of an 
eighteenth-century picture encyclopaedia in a box. The box had images from nature, history, myth, etc. 
to demonstrate to children the proper way of collecting, storing, and ordering knowledge - "epitomising 
Enlightenment concern with the creation and maintenance of an appropriate moral, intellectual, and 
social order". Willie Henderson (1995) discusses the role of Maria Edgeworth in the nineteenth century 
in introducing children and young people to economic stories which taught them the virtues of-
division of labour ('The Cherry Orchard'), rational consumer behaviour ('The Purple Jar'), and work 
and thrift ('Lazy Lawrence'). Catherine Belsey (2002) discusses the relation between perspective vision 
and the Lacanian Real, and the many ways in which truth was 'conjured into being' in perspective 
painting, the nineteenth century novel, thus raising questions of the screened relation between cultural 
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theorists since the early Enlightenment were always oriented towards being "true to nature". 
However, Daston and Galison through their study of scientific atlases produced during this 
period argue that in the nineteenth century a particular form of being true to nature emerged, 
which was conceptually distinct from earlier such attempts. It was conceptually distinct in 
three ways - a ) in its methods, which were mechanical, b) in its morals, of self-restraint, and 
c) in its metaphysics, which was individualised (See ibid.: 84). The reason that this argument 
is pertinent for my discussion here is because the influences that wer€Lat work in science and 
art during this period, were also the ones influential in the shaping of wha~as to become the 
social science of economics. The disciplinary terrains were not marked out as they are now, 
and indeed, the very basis of what it meant to be scientific about the social realm was being 
worked out. 
2.6.1.i Until The Nineteenth Century: Representation As Interpretation And Mediation 
Thus, the argument of Daston and Galison is that until the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the scientific ideal was one of interpreting nature to produce representations which 
were both reflective of the ideal essence of nature as it ought to be, and were also systematic 
in the interests of creating knowledge. For instance, "typical" phenomena was the focus of 
consideration - the typus or "archetype" served the function of being both that which was 
drawn from all observed particulars but would not be observed in its entirety in anyone 
particular. 
The role of the theorist, artist, scientist, social scientist was an important one in order to 
mediate between the grand system of nature, and its true representation, where truly 
representing meant being able to distil the essence from the perfection of nature, or in the case 
of the social scientist, to discern the essential meanings from the vast systems of human 
interaction, in order to then represent this essential meaning in a general form. No doubt that 
individual instances would not conform to this essential and ideal archetype, but that this 
archetype is the systematic representation of the external world. Another thing to note is that 
the archetype is not seen as something that wholly transcends experience, in fact, Daston and 
Galison provide the example of Goethe (87-8), who is writing before the advent of mechanical 
fonus and the real or real-ism. Finally, for a discussion on the implication of perspective in relation to 
economics, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001 a, b) on debating knowledge and responses by Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse, Peter Wagner, Jo80 Cara9a in the same issue (European Journal of Social Theory 
2001). 
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objectivity, and for whom, "the act of 'definition' [is] required to distil the typical from the 
variable and accidental [and] is not a slide into subjectivity but rather a precaution against it". 
The enlightenment tensions are in full view here. In order to understand the external system, 
generalisations are required but with a somewhat empirical basis, however observing the 
deracinated particulars simply will not serve the purpose for there is no guarantee that they are 
not an anomaly, so the generalisations must be reflective of the essential ideal which will be 
derived from and tested by observation but against a definition. The act of defming serve a 
crucial purpose - it guards against endless subjective variations, it provides a basis for 
somewhat empirical anchoring, and it can be seen as being both systematic and true to nature 
at the same time. Besides the typical and the ideal, there was also the concept of 
'characteristic' - which attempted to locate the 'typical' in an individual, and along with the 
concept of the 'ideal', served to standardise the phenomena. Daston and Galison give several 
examples to illustrate their arguments, and I am drawing upon a much pared-down version of 
their ideas to suit my purpose here. 
My purpose here is to argue that a similar process was at work in the early social scientists 
work. As an example, consider Hicks' discussion of Smith (1979: 39-49), where he is 
attempting to examine if Smith's theory in the WON (he refers to 1976: 31) can be seen as a 
form of the bridge of deduction bridging inductions. If improvement in productivity comes 
about with a division of labour or specialisation, Smith also recognises that this division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market, such restrictions can also be naturally imposed, 
so that places with easy access to water transport should have a locational advantage. 
Now, my interest here is in one particular aspect of the way in which Smith argues. That is, in 
order to structure his argument, one of the steps that Smith takes is to assume that relative 
advantage implies relative wealth, something that Hicks calls the Economic Principle (he 
points out that this is wider than the profit motive).68 This usage of the economic principle as a 
defining characteristic serves to standardise the working objects of Smith's argument. It is 
important to point out that this economic principle is not seen to be empirical in any provable 
sense, however as Hicks writes (1979: 44), " ... the application of the principle to different 
times and places is to that extent an empirical matter ... the principle was one of defmition, or 
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classification". Now, Smith's des ignation of the economic princip Ie as a rather non-empirical 
defining characteristic of people's behaviour, to which he believes most people in most places 
at most times would conform if there are no obstacles, achieves a standardisation in terms of 
both being 'typical' and 'characteristic' (and also perhaps 'ideal' since conformity to this 
principle brings wealth in Smith's perception). 
Like the other enlightenment scientists and artists, Smith is also committed to his role as a 
_/ 
- social scientist which involves representing the system of human interactions systematically, 
but also being guided by the ideals of creating knowledge in the image of the typical, the 
characteristic, and the ideal as manufactured by the careful interpretation (hermeneutic 
mediation) of the external system of nature and human interactions. Qua social scientist, for 
Smith, interpretation is not ruled out - rather, careful interpretation ensures a standardisation 
of the working objects of social science in order to create systematically objective and 
meaningful knowledge from the welter of particulars. 
2.6.1.ii Nineteenth Century Onwards: Representation And The Effect Of Moralised 
Objectivity And Mechanised Science 
Now, and this is the second part of my purpose here, in the epistemological mutations of the 
late nineteenth-century, there emerges a different kind of ideal, in part due to what Daston and 
Galison call the moralisation of objectivity, and the mechanisation of science. The problem 
was not the earlier one of a "mismatch between world and mind", but rather "a struggle with 
inward temptation" (82). Briefly, this can be explained as follows. The fascination with the 
machine, and the ideals of the machine has always been part of the enlightenment,69 but in the 
late nineteenth (and then twentieth) century, this becomes particularly pertinent as machines 
(especially those of visual representation such as - the camera, the x-ray machine, the 
microscope etc) are now celebrated as the paragon of certain human virtues. What humans 
lacked, the machines had in abundance - they offered "freedom from will", accuracy and 
eternal vigilance "The phenomena never sleep, and neither should the observer ... ", and most 
68 The idea is that, as Hicks writes (1979: 43), "people would act economically - when the opportunity 
of an advantage was presented to them, they would take it". He further adds, "The people of Britain, of 
Holland and America, about whom he [Smith] was largely thinking, did seem to behave like that". 
69 A recent book by Gaby Wood (2002) titled Living Dolls: A Magical History of the Quest for 
Mechanical Life traces the history of the "romance of the machine encouraged by the Cartesian view of 
life as mechanism" (Steven Connor 2002). In addition, this cultural fantasy with automatons is 
gendered and raced. 
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of all the release from intervention by attributing meaning "for theory and judgment were the 
fust steps down the primrose path to intervention" (83). 
Machines had the advantage of being seen as devices to enable "nature to speak for herself', 
in the "language of the phenomena themselves" (81). The earlier attempts of theorists, 
scientists, artists and social scientists to interpret nature and the world were seen as interested 
intervention, something that..could be avoided by the machines, which could not and did not 
have any reason to lie. The sCiet§ist should then aim to be dutiful, self-restrained, alert and 
patient - embodying the ideals of the machine. Such heroic self-discipline and moralised 
vision of self restraint, would go well with the Victorian temperament. Science and morality 
were united in their condemnation of the undisciplined mere human as prone to excesses, and 
constant and incapable of grasping nature. The machines on the other hand were seen to 
operate in a vacuum of meaning, the enforced amenability of nature to machine enacted by 
human intervention was ignored. 
This was an ideal at work in what was to become neoclassical economics. A large part of the 
appeal of the machines lay in their visual representation of the truth of nature. This is an 
extremely interesting conjunction because of way the visual imagination was crucial to the 
Victorians. Douglas-Fairhurst (2002: 153), while reviewing Kate Flint's (2000) Victorians and 
the Visual Imagination, writes of how in a terse exchange at the end of Arthur Conan Doyle's 
A Case of Identity, Watson queries Sherlock Holmes on how he was able to read a great deal 
in someone which was quite invisible to him. Holmes replies, "Not invisible but unnoticed". 
There are two ideas at work here, one relates to how what one sees may not always be true, 
and the other relates to how certain kinds of observation (noticing) count for an accurate 
representation. The mechanical reproduction of an image through a machine like the camera, 
is not only a true representation of the object or event, but also a more trustworthy one when 
compared to a human rendering of the same object or event. The eye has to be habituated to 
see things in the scientific manner, and this often from the late nineteenth century onwards 
meant seeing differently. The machine ideal, moralised objectivity, visual imagination and 
science together played a great role in motivating formalism in economics. The symbols, 
illustrations, diagrams and graphs are now seen to represent the phenomena in a way that one 
learns to recognise as accurate, and minus the interference of the theorist. The earlier classical 
political economy writers are interpreting in accordance with a different ideal, now, their 
words are seen as inevitably theirs, while the symbols capture the phenomena. 
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While the science of political economy would unfortunately not admit of machines in any 
direct sense,70 the machine ideal and its correlate of visual representation without any 
interference of the theorist could be admitted into the new sense of theory transmogrifying 
into a model with mathematical symbols and graphs standing in for the objects of study. The 
words are now seen as imprecise while the symbols and graphs represent accurately and 
without any arguing over the content of what is meant by the theorist (see Rick Szostak 1999; 
Sassower 1985: chapter 4). This is paralleled by the rise of'statistics, the important 
epistemological role played by numbers in the aggregate, which are now seen to state 
unequivocally (Poovey 1998). The important census undertaken in Britain in 1851 is bringing 
new categories into being, literally constructing concepts, and their realities. Out of this a new 
type of epistemological entity is emerging - that of the 'average' (see Brian Cooper 2001). For 
instance, Sergei Bulgakov (2000: 251-252, emphasis original) in his Philosophy of Economy 
writes, 
the individual exists for political economy only as the average specimen of a social 
type ... This peculiar and as yet poorly understood logic of political economy's basic 
concepts - by means of which multiplicity is compressed into unity, isolating selected 
aspects of phenomenon - is analogous to the method of statistical collecitivities ... 
Thus we might say that the magnifying glass of political economy sees both more and 
less than the naked eye ... The overwhelming significance of statistical observation in 
political economy makes sense in light of its fascination with collectivities, with the 
general, the typical, the average. 
The average is different from the typical or the ideal in an important sense - the means of 
accessing the average are essentially those of cataloguing, classification, categorisation, 
taxonomy accomplished by statistics, mathematics and visual reproductions representing 
phenomena - all (apparently) without any hermeneutic mediation or interpretation. The 
theorist, scientist, social scientist needs to be a repository of readiness to let the world speaks 
for itself, without attributing any additional meaning through interpreting in words. 
2.6.2 Fixing The World For Mathematical Formalism 
But this extraordinary documenting of social science through the methods and ideals of natural 
science was not immediate, unproblematic or complete. The residue of the social has galled 
many economists as social scientists, but at the same time has also provoked evermore 
70 However, the pervasive influence ofmachines perhaps was even more intrinsic to the development .of 
economics in the twentieth century - Mirowski in his recent (2002) Machine Dreams: EconomICS 
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creative means of justification for translating excesses of meaning into graspable formulations. 
It is this point that I want to link to the history of mathematical expression in economics. As I 
have argued above, the epistemological structuring of economics is not separate from the 
wider debates of the times, and if the content of economic analysis needed to now reflect 
positive scientific mathematical professional methods in the late nineteenth century, then the 
world needed to be fixed in a commensurable way in order for this account to make sense. 
I agree with Mirowski (1991 a) when he writes that the onset of mathematisation of economics 
that is associated with the marginalist revolution, and fully flowered in the postwar period, 
was not cumulative, inevitable, or natural (145).71 Mirowski locates two inflection points or 
major discontinuities in the history of mathematical economics. The first one occurs after the 
middle of the nineteenth century, when a large number of economists adopted a single 
mathematical metaphor - of equilibrium in a field of force, to translate potential energy as 
utility. However, by the early twentieth-century this neoclassical marginalist revolution based 
on analogies from physics, was meeting widespread resistance in its social mechanics. The 
second quantum leap in the application of mathematical discourse to economic theory is 
identified in the decade 1925-35 (see ibid.: 149-151), and involved a new generation of 
economists applying more up-to-date mathematical techniques and metaphors to the 
I . I 72 neoc aSSlca program. 
Becomes a Cyborg Science links Cold War history, history of the computer, with the history of postwar 
economics profession in America. 
71 Many think otherwise. Writing in 1952, Samuelson believed that the problems of economic theory 
are "by their nature quantitative questions whose answer depends upon a superposition of many 
different pieces of quantitative and qualitative information. When we tackle them by words, we are 
solving the same equations as when we write out those equations" (63-64). Contrast this with Paul 
Krugman: "Without doubt there is too much mathematics in the economics journals, because 
mathematical elaboration is a time-honored way of dressing up a bad idea" (in Szostak 1999: 88). 
Bulgakov (2000: 253-259) critiques 'deductive' political economy thus, it 
is completely constructed on a particular representation of a typical or average form of 
behavior, any departure from which is seen as accidental or irregular ... We mustn't of course 
deny the scientific utility of ready-made theoretical models within certain limits... It is 
nonetheless clear that modeling and modernization, which to many constitute the quintessence 
of the scientific approach, sometimes obscure historical reality in its colorful individuality, 
even though the stylization of history according to the tastes of contemporary political 
economy -the application of ready conceptual schemas and orientations -can be convenient ... 
[it] can, however, be as dangerous as it is convenient, and we may one day be forced to rid 
historical science of these modernizing weeds .... Collecting facts with no guiding aim in mind 
is not science at all but a mere scientific game. 
72 Unlike the first wave of mathematisation (which was composed of economists borrowing metaphors 
from physicists) the second wave involved physicists, engineers and mathematicians themselves 
moving into economics. Mirowski names several of these - Frisch, Koopmans, Tinbergen, Allais, 
Arrow, von Neumann, Griffith Evans, Thayer Davis, Bidwell Wilson. New formalisms which had 
evolved in physics (he gives the examples of stochastic formalisms, improved mathematics of vector 
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Let me now turn to Samuelson's Nobel prize-winning lecture, published in the AER (1972). It 
is titled "Maximum Principles in Analytical Economics", and the very first line goes, "The 
very name of my subject, economics, suggests economising or maximising" (249). In the same 
paragraph he recalls the Cambridge economist Arthur Pigou once having asked the rhetorical 
question, "Who would think of employing an economist to run a brewery?", and answers, 
~ "Well, today, under the guise of operational research and managerial economics the fanciest 
/ ' 
olour economic tools are being utilised in enterprises both public and private". No doubt, he 
is right. The "application" of the "tools" of economics is de rigueur in government, 
enterprises, and most realms of human interaction. The appeal of the formal methods lies in 
their being able to provide answers, so that when the administrators require "expert" opinion, 
they turn to social scientists. Economists especially are valued for their formal mathematical 
procedures which seem to give accurate representations of average entities. Moreover, the 
nexus between the expert knowledge of economists and the political power of the 
administrators coexists with the widespread evidence of a disjuncture between the views of 
economists and 'laypeople' on the economy (see Sassower 1985: chapter 5; Robert Blendon et 
al. 1999; Bryan Caplan 2002). I am interested in what is required for this picture of knowledge 
and society. And as I have been discussing, the enlightenment ideals and emphases have been 
extremely influential in the epistemological structuring of economics as a social science. The 
concept of explanation, or the idea of what we do when we explain, is one such locus through 
which one can see the methodological compromises necessitated by enlightenment 
epistemology in these previous centuries. Here, I wish to underline that especially from the 
nineteenth century onwards the ability to render the world of human interaction 
comprehensible in mathematical terms in line with the mechanistic ideals and the appeal of 
visual representation, required important changes and fixing in how we see the world. 
Contrary to mainstream beliefs (see Samuelson 1952; Debreu 1984), nothing about the world, 
or its social scientific representation in economics is inherently suitable to mathematical 
formalisation. Like any other attempt at representation, doing so imposes its own peculiar 
adjustments. 
fields and phased spaces, linear algebra and constrained optimisation) were applied, and the "net result 
was a new discourse self-consciously patterned upon the rhetoric of the scientific research report, 
shifting the intellectual centre of gravity from the book or essay to the journal article constructed around 
a mathematical 'model,' eschewing the earlier discursive mode of expression accessible to economist 
and non-economist alike" (Mirowski 1991 a: 153). 
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All means of creating knowledge are not only attempts to view certain given objects in a 
particular way, but are ways of constituting the what and how of the objects of knowledge. 
And each such structuring imposes its own givens in terms of subjects, objects, acts, and 
themes which need to be unproblematically accepted for the resulting enterprise to make 
sense. In the case of mathematisation of the economic discourse, I agree with Mirowski that it 
"should not be traced to the natural quantification of commodities, but rather should be 
exp lained empirically by changin~social perceptions of the symmetries and invariances read 
into market activities through the instn(mentality of social institutions" (1991: 155).73 
2.7 Conclusion 
The enlightenment epistemology as I have argued throughout has fixed for view the world in a 
particular way, and in many ways economics is the social science par excellence. 
In this chapter, my aim has been to interrogate the epistemological tensions behind how the 
social science Qf economics came to be. I have argued that these tensions have always been 
part and parcel of any endeavour to create scientific knowledge about the social world, 
stressing that in the case of economics its geo-historical-temporal-ideological situatedness 
meant that they were especially accentuated. Some of the important elements of enlightenment 
epistemology that I have discussed relate to: the work of the machine metaphor; the status of 
theory and practice; the play of forces in theory; the signifier individual; relations between self 
and the Other, and, general and the particular. 
73 He further gives the following example to illustrate his point (1991: 155), 
The reason that modem economic actors express prices as ratios IS that the following 
regularities are being projected onto their quotidian exchange activities: 
1. The commodity preserves its identity through the exchange process; 
2. Buying nothing should cost nothing; 
3. The order in which the items are presented for purchase should not influence the amount paid 
in the aggregate; 
4. Dividing the aggregate into subsets and paying for each separately should not influence the 
sum paid; 
5. The net result of buying an item and then returning it should be zero; 
6. Everyone should pay the same price for the same item. 
The above regularities which are projected for tractable abstraction and perhaps reflect the nature of 
market activity in some market structures will not stand up to scrutiny for anyone who ~akes one st;oll 
through the popular Janpath Bazaar in New Delhi in India.1?e locatedness .0fmathematIcal expreSSIon, 
and its epistemological appeal is tied to a desire to make umform, standardIse, make commensurate the 
welter of human particulars. 
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I then relate these considerations to the subject world of economics, pointing out that the body 
of knowledge currently titled 'economics' is not a response to the same set of questions which 
have remained universa~ eternal and ftxed. Rather, if we genealogically excavate the concept 
of explanation, we [md that its mutations and inflections indicate the changing ways in which 
what counts as knowledge and the terms of access to it have been understood. This is also 
crucial for unconcealing how the notion of a theory operates in economics - its current form 
as generalisations employing deductivist mathematical formalised models, has its basis in 
influential notions of scientific explanation and its relation to scientific or theoretical 
knowledge (as opposed to practical or productive knowledge). And thus we ftnd that the 
eschewing of theory in favour of its transmogriftcation into a model can be seen as the 
blending of an Aristotelian love of generalisations, with an awareness of Humean problem of 
induction (stemming from Bacon's overvalorisation of the deracinated particular), with a 
Millean empiricist rendering of explanation in facts, and the consequent methodological 
compromise of creating a taxonomy of knowledge along with a special class of experts who 
'do' science. 
Further, the scientiftc ideal of being true to nature - which earlier meant the theorist 
interpreting the world to produce systematic representations in the interest of creating 
knowledge which was typical, ideal, and characteristic - itself underwent changes in the 
nineteenth century in part due to the moralisation of objectivity and the mechanisation of 
science, to the ideal of non-interventionist representation (in a vacuum of meaning) to create 
knowledge for which the entity of the average was more suitable. This valorisation of the 
average, diminished interpretive role of the theorist, and adoption of visual representative 
techniques such as diagrams and mathematical formalism was also a signiftcant influence 
upon what came to be economics. However, this fixing of the world in a particular way for 
certain kinds of knowledge to be deemed scientific and the terms of access to it was not 
immediate, unproblematic, or complete. 
The accumulated epistemological heritage of what we see as economics testiftes to its tension-
ridden theoretical and scientific status. In the next chapter, I will go on to interrogate the 
question of difference in the modernist rendition of knowledge of which economics is a part. 
This then becomes a statement to the effect that in order to interrogate the problems of 
economics as a social science, one can do a lot by focusing on epistemology, but in order to do 
even more, one has to move beyond the question of economics as a problem of modernist 
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knowledge to the question of modernist knowledge itself in its relation to its Other. For 
instance, the inability of economics to be juxtaposed with identity (something that I shall 
discuss in part three of the thesis) is symptomatic of problems in the way difference itself is 
fixed strategically and politically in modernist rendition of knowledge. 
To put it bluntly, [ am not content with examining and interrogating economics as a social 
science from a perspective delimited by historical methodological or philosophical guidance. 
--: The problems of knowledge in a modernist social science like economics are also those that it 
shares with social science in general, and by social science here, now I intend to imply 
Western modernist politically interested bodies of know ledges, that have refused to recognise 
their own provincialism, epistemic violence or complicity with the dominant regimes of 
power. It is thus that I will turn my attention to foregrounding the role of history in the 
conception of knowledge sanctioned by modernism, and argue for thinking knowledge Other-
wISe. 
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- Chapter Three: Modernist Rendition Of Knowledge-And The 
Question Of Difference 
Thus the- science of economy, or political economy, is also a dogmatically 
Conditioned branc1iorhuman- knowledge:.: -the 6-utcome, -iri- our tune -6fsCiimtific 
specialization is a peculiar but characteristic dogmatism of specialized sciences. We 
require the effort of philosophical an~ysis to free ourselves of this. We must begin to 
doubt th~ which is unusual or improper to 39:stion; we must look with the naive eyes 
of a foreIgner or a savage, for whom starched collars and white cuffs self-evident for 
- - - - , 
us, seem peculiar, and who asks about !herr true purpose (Sergei BuJgakov 2000: 42-
43). 
3.1 Introduction-
-My-aim in this chapter is to examine the questions of difference in relation to the questions of 
, . ., - . -~ . , . . , . - , 
knowledge. Until _ now I, have traced _ the influence _ of _ the tensions in enlightenment 
epistemology on the subject-world of economics, -but an acknowledgement of the geo-
historical-ideological-temporal locatedness of the enterprise of economics is also at the same 
. - --
time ali avowal of its imbricatiori as a contingent episteme in the modernist consteliation. One 
can then no longer sustain the claim that the scientific character of economics is a natural 
- - .-
norm, or even mammiri that this claim is separable: from the strategIc adoption of methods in 
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .- - - . - - -
social science, or from the way m which science itself was instituted as a legitimating 
ideology ofthe modernist era. :-
-- ------- ... ".- - --~---- ---
Economics today is universalist in line with the generalising impulse of the Enlightenment, it 
is peculiarly rationalist, it is eurocentric, it has tended to push differences of gender, race, 
cIass,-culture, ecology, sexuality under the epistemological carpet, -it has striven for crafting an 
-'eco~~~i~;-that i~-spli~-~p~';te~~d ~xplai~able-i~-its-t~~lity. Thi;~te~o~; ofth~ ~~onomic 
is seemingly unable to be juxtaposed With identity, and it is n?t_ e?ough to-_~0~tinlle-t9 critique 
-----~~o~o~ic-son the theoretical terms afforded by disciplinarity. Instead, the thrust here is to be 
able to think economics as a social science Otherwise. 
--- --- -- -------:.---- .... -----
.----- --- - .------ - --- ..... 
The 'Otherwise' referred to here-can-be- understood thus. Every-systematic structure, for its 
. ----~ --~- -own -c-omp~eh~nsibilitY (i.e~, in ord~~ to be seen as a structure in the sense of something which 
structures), relies upon a fundamental and founding move - that o(making impossible, to a 
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large extent, the possibility of thinking its own structurality.l This is because thinking the 
structurality of the structure is already a thinking against the nonns of comprehensibility 
flowing from an ordered systematisation. Further, this thinking against, or to put it more 
completely - thinking against the grain (thinking Otherwise than), is also the prelude to 
situations where one can attempt to face· up to all that which a structure needed to omit in 
order to establish its structurality as a structure. One must clarify that the omissions are not 
always identical in their content or in the ways/processes by which tlui are written out. 
However,jt is important to continually think against the grain precisely beCause it is important 
to confront the Other to every present, and to let its Otherness (in a word, difference) disrupt 
the comforting self-identical lullabies of the Same. Therefore, it is not enough to start from a 
socia~ science like economics and to poi~t out its errors and omissions in however detailed a 
. manner. It is also cruCial to be able to think its structurality, and to disrupt· its genealogical 
-- . - - - - - -
heritage by interspersing it with its constitutive exclusions. 
Therefore, the moves that I will make in this chapter are as follows. I wil1_ begin by alluding to 
the statuS of time and the· Other in modernisf knowledge. Next I· wiil argue that political 
- - - - -- . 
economy as a precursor of economics was not simply a discourse about a crafted:out and split 
realm· which could be ·tiniversally perceived as the economic. Rather,as will emerge from my 
discussion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's discourse on political economy, its situat~dness was 
tied to concept-resonance with European· discourses on virtue, nationality, government, 
maSCUlinity, under the arched theme of modernity. Underlying the dilemmas of modernist 
. knowledge in general~ and specific social sciences like economics In particular, is the binding 
- -- - - - - .- - - - - -- --- --
- - - --- _.- - - - - - - -
._--_.---- .-----_.--. ---- --- -------=--_._---- ._---- --_.,------- .----- ------
conceptual-glue of the idea of 'human nature'. In a critical vein, I will present the case that 
. appeals to human nature have almost always functioned as the authority· of at!al!~~endental 
pretence, which remains narrowly provincial whiI~ clairr,!ing !o be un!versai. In this process, 
difference remains the perpetUal remainder. One way ot situating this in modernist knowledge 
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - -= - _ .. - - - - - - .- -
is to consider the potent tension between Reason and history. Even when a compromise is 
. sought which combiries the fo·rces of Reason and history, such as with the Hege·l!an.dialectic 
~{wo~ldhisto~y; -it- acti~~ly ~~~ds to positio~ a~ Other (i~·Georg· Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's 
case, Africa} in order to derive its owri coherence. This is sympto~~ti~·_of_an _~ability to 
I This resonates with Jacques Derrida's work. Consider the term 'HauntoJ?gy' (a pJay on !he worded 
·certainties·or'ontology'}which owesto him (1994).:.....·50 tlurt to hauritdoes not mean to be present, but 
absent neither. Accordjng JO Derrida.-" .. .it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction 
. of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time". Thus viewed, every 
. .concept isan attempttocontinuallyex{)rci-se its own disjointedness;·· - - _. .. _. - .. _. - -
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negotiate the problem of difference in modernist discourses of science or society. In those 
cases where differeI!.ce is actively engaged, the tenns of engagement are woefully inadequate. 
For instance, nineteenth century Victo~ian race debates de~onstrated the ~ability to see the 
- Other as anything but a limit phenomenon in the context of knowledge. 
- - _. . - _. - - -
In view of this, the need is for reconstellated genealogies of the present. This will be addressed 
by arguing for a postcolonial intervention in epistemology, an intervention that allows 
questions of difference to be placed at the heart of self and identity-in order -to d-isrupt the 
modernist disciplinary logic that relies upon creating knowledge based upon manufacturing 
conceptual abstractions and universalising their essence. This would allow the connections to 
- ----- -. ----be -made -betWeen -interrogating -the - ilbtioYi" --6f -ecbrioniic-s as a modernist science, with 
excavating how economics was sanctioned as a -societal mechanism ...:..- a practice - of 
management, of colonisation, of organising what now came to be seen as 'economic' 
experiences under the lengthening shadow of modernity through -Which everything continues 
to be filtered. 
As a result, in the next part of the thesis, t will be ab1e fo- juxtapose-issues of identity and the 
economic, as a prelude to imagining the writing of economic theory an-Other way. 
3.2 Time And The Other Of Modernist Knowledge 
------ -- - -------- --------~ -------- ------ --------,-- --- ----2--- ----- ------- - ---- ----------
Modernity is an over-imagined historical construct. The linkages between modernity and the 
period of the Enlightenment have to be acknowledged. One could say that the Enlightenment 
was the - intellectual- counterpart -of modernity - as -the political, economic, and cultural 
- - -_. - ---
- -transformciilon that radiated outwards from Western Europe especially after the eighteenth 
-century. But at the same-time it is important to realise that the Enlightenment -was not simply 
2 Since_ the concept of modernity -is available for utilisation in various ways across disciplines, it has 
bee.ngjv~n_many enduring_meanings. In the histQricaJsense of peri odisat ion,. the -modems have 
-.sometimes sought to designate themselves in relation to the ancients or sometimes the medieval (John 
Yolton 1995: 25-27). In other historical accounts, modernity is inaugurated in roughly the sixteenth 
century, in the -compass-map~gJobe quests of the white, Western ?u!Op~ male adventurer, as the 
---adveift ora new kind ofkriowing anew (see SfuarfH8.l1 1(92). Still other accounts focus upon the links 
ofmodemity with a period of state governance, secular humanism, scientific advances and _instrumental 
Reason in Western Europe.fn addition to this, modernism as a rationally ordered ruling ideology of 
-contemporary· secular; capitalist, --liberaI,democratic rration.;states is· -counterposed· with -traditional 
systems of state and market governance mixes which are seen as inefficient and ineffective, breeding 
anachronisms. For work on the -characteristics of modernity, see Bruno Latour (1993); Agnes Heller 
___ ---_ o 2291;gefjp:d Del~ty (2_QOQ);_ Couze.Yenn.(2000 ).-,,~-~- -- ----~- -- -- - - - -- -- ,~~-- ---- --
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the theory to the praxis of modernity. Rather the designation as Enlightenment of a certain 
chronological period - which was seen to be marked by a confluence of advances in knowing 
(many of these advances in knowing relied upon crucial changes in the way they articulated 
what it means to know) -- is extremely important in engendering a subjectivity whieh came to 
be understood as modernist. This modernist subjectivity js deeply implicated in the themes 
and e~phases of enlightenment epistemology. For now, the world ~as to b~ ma~ufactured in 
- the image-<)-(science and-the individual knower. It is- the very self-conscious belief-in the value 
of these totems of modernity that is most striking in retrospect. Modernism is not a mere 
historical curiosity, soon to be surpassed, but is a potent (if not always productive) method of 
sweeping order into the business of knowing the present in presence of the past. 
As the -Enlightenment luminaries set about their task of interpreting everything as if no 
interpretations had existed before, it was also a desperate attempt at coming to terms with their 
present as they faced it. It was a present laced with ideas of instrumental rationalisation of 
society, secularisation, and the emergent capitalist -telationsof produ-ction. Amidst all this, 
--many reconciliations had to take place -between -entities that Were iilherited,- those that were 
constantly invoked, those that existed, and those that had to be fashioned. Some of these 
-entities were - God, Sovereign, Individual,-Nature, Nation, Science; Facts, Machines, and 
Economy. It is important to realise that these were not ideas or even physical formations that 
existed fully formed only to be grasped and explained and understood. Rather, these were the 
very bricks of the new modernist structure that was -going -to be vastly irifluential in the 
-Western world view and incredibly -disseminated in the -rest of the world. These were 
constructs that were formed over periods of time and in no particular organised discipline, it is 
only later that they come to be ass-ociated-withone or another relativelY-'autoriomous' spheres 
of inquiry (aka 'disciplines'). 
To begin with, modernist knowledge has always functioned by designating its history and its 
Other. One can-never be modern3 without having- been something else. In a trivial sense this 
gestures to a 'Whiggishness,4 in the way the very idea ofmodemity is written and understood, 
but it is important to reiterate that modernity's necessity for a history, any history, is also in 
J Indeed for some, ODe can never beinodern; fullstop. See Latour (1993). 
4 Mark Blaug (2001: 151) writes of the origins of the tenn "Whig interpretations of history" after the 
title of a 1951 book by the English historia,n Herbert Butterfield, which attacked the dominant tradition 
__ of-EngJish- historiography to depict the history of England as a story of steady progress towards the 
liberal ideals represented by the Whig party. 
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effect its impossibility of ever being anachronistic. The carving of the modem era in the 
- -
telling of history indicates the way a master concept like modernity is ensured that it is in time, 
- - -
in step with time, its time. There is always a before, and an after tainted by its before. Those 
ideas, subjects, civilisations that are counterposed with modernity are always ranked in 
- - - - - -
modern time, the time of the self-conscious emergence of the modern Western European self 
whose knowledge of its world, has since then served to function as knowledge of the world. 
Such self-conscious emergences are furth~.vforeclosed in the modern account, so that 
retrospective beginnings cannot be rewritten fOr non-modernist anachronisms.5 In other words, 
the modern has an exclusive purchase on splitting the melon of time. In Antonin Arnaud's 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - .- - - - - --- - - - --- - -
words (in Gaston Bachelard 1969: 137 [1950: 127]), it merrily declares, "Je suis l'espace OU je 
suis" (I am the space where I am). 
The modernist era has been the story of an infatuation with the compilation of time, the need 
for the modem Western European self to archive its contemporaries. Latour says it (97, 
emphases added): 
The great divide between Us - Occidentals - and Them - everyone else, from the 
China seas to the Yucatan, from the Inuit to the Tasmanian aborigines - has not 
ceased to obsess us. Whatever they do, Westerners bring history along with them in 
the hulls of their caravels and their gunboats, in the cylinders of their telescopes and 
the pistons of their immunizing syringes. They bear this white man's burden 
sometimes as an exalting chaUenge, sometimes as a tragedy, but always as a destiny .... 
In Westerner's eyes the West, and the West alone, is not a culture, not merely a 
culture. 
Thus _modernist knowledge is not simply the West writing its own history, but also the history 
of its Others' histories. It is this that makes anthropology viable - the ability to write not just 
5 Consider the following (Dibyesh Anand 2002: 110): 
Chronopolitics, or the politics of time, has played an important role in Western representations 
of the non-Western Other. The Other has been imagined as socially and culturally backward 
(in time) - medieval (feudal like pre-Renaissance Europe), archaic (like ancient Egyptians or 
Mesopotamians), pre-historic (primitive), or simply beyond the matrix of time (timeless). The 
colonial journey and travels of contemporary Western commentators is figured as proceeding 
forward in geographical space but backward in historical time. The otherness of non-Western 
cultures is 'accepted' as 'earlier stages of the evolution of the self (Ashis Nandy quoted in 
Inayatullah and Blaney 1996: 77). This trope, similar to what McClintock calls 'the invention 
of- anachronistic -space', renders non-dominant groups out of history. As she discusses, 
according to the trope of anachronistic space' co Ionized people - like women and the working-
class in the metropolis - do not inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time 
_ within the geographical space of the modern empire as anachronistic humans, atavistic, 
irrational, bereft of human agency - the living embodiment of the archaic "primitive'" 
(McClintock 1995: 30). Chronopolitics allows generalisations such as '[c]ritical philosophy, 
the mother of modern psychology, is as foreign to the East as to the medieval Europe' (Evans-
Wentz 1954: xxix). The Other is both a prisoner of time (frozen in a certain stage of history) 
and an escapee (outside the time grid, timeless, outside history). 
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one's own history and culture, but to write it so that it includes. the compiled and concise 
writing of every Others' being. What needs examining the belief that the Other has 
... -
_. 
surrendered its identity to be bound and placed on the shelf of a modern library.6 
- . 
It is no surprise then that Western anthropologists abroad have been able to seamlessly bind 
the e~~ir~ty of foreign exotic cultures in the single anthropological monograph.7 But, this 
- -
ability to generate authoritative knowledge abroad cannot be replicated at home. If there were-/ 
to be an anthropology of the modern world, it would mean analysing the very constitution of 
the principles of organisation, and justifying their existence. While everything else is 
compared to the standards of modernity, it is difficult and dangerous to undertake an analysis 
of the construction of those standards. Such an interrogation could even result in the 
realisation of recognising oneself as different, as another, just an Other.8 
And conventionally, when the anthropologists investigate at home, they confme themselves to 
the marginalised groups of society seeking to explain their' irrationalities' and 'excesses'. For 
instance,jn nineteenth century Britain, working class women and the Irish were frequently the 
subject of ethnological scrutiny (see also Latour 1993; Anne McClintock 1995). This 
anthropological and ethnological agenda in the West was closely tied to. the expectations of 
6 Interestingly, speaking oflibraries, one is reminded of Thomas B. Macaulay's lines (in John Southard 
1997), [he has] "never found one among them [Orientalists, an opposing political group] who could 
deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and 
Arabia". He continues stating, "It is, no exaggeration to say, that all the historical information which 
has been collected from all the. books written in Sanscrit language is less valuable than what may be 
found in the most paltry abridgments used at preparatory schools in England". Southard further adds, 
"While all colonizers may not have shared Macaulay's lack of respect for the existing systems of the 
colonized, they do share the idea that education is important in facilitating the assimilation process". 
7 Latour writes (1993: 14), 
every ethnologist is capable of including within a single monograph the defmition of the forces 
in play; the distribution of powers among human beings, gods, and nonhumans; the procedures 
for reaching agreements; the connections -between religion and power; ancestors; cosmology; 
property rights; plant and animal taxonomies. The ethnologist will certainly not write three 
separate books: one dealing with knowledge, another with power, yet another with practices. 
She will write a single book, like the magnificent one in which Philippe Descola attempts to 
sum up the constitution of the Achuar of the Amazon region ... 
8 The despair at this possibility is characterised by Paul Ricoeur (in Jenny Sharpe 1993: epigraph) as, 
When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just 9ne and consequently at the 
time when we acknowledge the end of the sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we 
are threatened with destruction by our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there 
are just Others, that we ourselves are an 'Other' among others. All meaning and every goal 
having disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through civilisations as if through vestiges 
and ruins. The whole of mankind becomes a kind oJmuseum. 
If one cannot preserve a monopoly on identity, then we must all be specimens in a museum. The 
imperial gaze is relentless. 
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the science of political economy (see William Darity Jr. 1995), as some Others were seen as 
not being capable enough of judging their own best interest or making rational choices. Robert 
Dimand (2001) gives the examples of William Stanley Jevons (one of the founders of the 
neoclassical marginalist 'revolution') who like -Nassau William Senior djd not believe that 
English working class or the Irish made rational intertemporal choices: deploring the 
"ignorance, improvidence, and brutish drunkenness of out lower working classes" which led 
them to save too little and marry too early. Similarly, John Rae and Irving Fisher (famous 
economist and also founder of the American Eugenics Society in 1923) also attributed lack of 
foresight and will-power to particular ethnic groups.9 
3.3 Rousseau's Discourse On Political Economy 
Knowledge in social science is thus also a movement in history, in time and place. Political 
economy is not simply the - reference to a -pre-existing economic system of production, 
consumption, and distribution, but is tied into the wider European discourses on the 
individual~ the- sovereign, and the state~ I shall term this ability of a concept like political 
economy to function successfully as owing to the sedimentation of concept resonance. By 
concept resonance, I mean, that th-e concepts do not function in isolation. They- make sense in 
a mesh of other interrelated and connected systems which lend them credence and credulity. 
For instance, it is not arbitrarily that certain inflections of the concepts such as sovereignty, 
individual and society are understood to denote particular understandings which holistically 
can provide an ideological umorella for working out further concepts as a whole more than the 
sum of its parts. 
As an example, let me discuss Rousseau's discourse on politicaf economy which is in line 
- with his wider objective of negotiating the relations between the individual and the state, a 
purpose for which he puts his notion of the 'savage man' to use. Rousseau advocated a social 
-constitution of indiviouality - the civilised man was socially constituted and -did not precede 
9 Dimand (2001) quotes Fisher from The Theory o/interest [1930: 374-375] as well as from Elementary 
Principles _0/ Economics [1912: 404]: _ 
The communities and nationalities which are most noted for the qualities mentioned above-
foresi-ght, self-cOntrol, and regard for posterity - are probably Holland, Scotland, England, 
France, and the Jews, and among these peoples interest has been low ... among communities 
and peoples noted for lack of foresight and for negligence with respect to the future are China, 
India, Java, the negro communities in the Southern states, the peasant communities of Russia, 
and the North and South American Indians, both before and after they had been pushed to the 
wall by the white man. 
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society. But, the civilised man was not necessarily the pinnacle of humanity. He..sketched out 
the differences of the civilised versus the savage man. While the civilised man is " ... always 
moving, sweating, toiling, and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he 
goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks to death to put himself in a position to 
live, or renounces life to acquire immortality" (in David West 1996: 27-8), the savage or 
natural m~n is "healthy and vigorous, has little foresight or fear of death and has no command, 
because little net!d, of language ... exists without morality ... has a healthy 'love of self (amour 
de soi) ... celebrates the simpler and healthier existence of the peoples colonised or enslaved" 
- - -
(ibid.: 28). In other words, the natural and savage man (humanity as lived outside Europe, 
modernity's contemporary archives) is where we started from, we were good, healthy, and 
simple, innocent, primitive, and happy. Now, modem civilisation in Western Europe has made 
us hard-working, competitive, tired, jealous and unequal, but also virtuous, honourable, moral 
and responsible. Yet, Rousseau is not advocating a return to the 'state of nature', he is very 
aware ofthe complexities of modem nexus of individual-society-sovereign and reconciles it in 
his notion of the 'general will'. Rousseau is not a typical Enlightenment philosophe, but his 
discussions embody several themes and emphases of enlightenment epistemology - for 
example, the conflict between the general and the particular, the notion of machines, plays of 
interacting forces, invisible orders, and the like. 
In his 1755 A Discourse On Political Economy, Rousseau starts by distinguishing between the 
"general" or "political" economy, and the domestic or particular economy. He postulates a 
great difference between the two, simultaneously differentiating between "public economy" 
(which he sees as his subject and also calls it "government"), and the supreme authority, 
which he calls "sovereignty". He further compares the body politic to an organised living body 
resembling that of man,IO this body politic is also a moral being possessed of a will - the 
general will, "which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every 
part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all members of the State, in their relations to 
one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust...". His concern is with joining together 
10 Rousseau writes: 
The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, the source of the 
nerves and seat of the understanding, will and senses, of which the judges and magistrates are 
the organs: commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and stomach whi~h prepare ~e 
common subsistence; the public income is the blood, which a prudent economy, In performmg 
the functions of the heart, causes to distribute through the whole body nutriment and life: the 
citizens are the body and members, which make the machine live, move and work; and no part 
of this -machine can be damaged without the painful impression being at once conveyed to the 
brain, if the animal is in a state of health. 
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governance and justice, the rule of law and the freedom of Reason. Governance is invoked as 
an abstract general principle regarding which the "Legislator" needs -to take into account" ... 
for every need of place, climate, soil, custom, neighbourhood, and all the rest of the relations 
peculiar to the people he had to institute". Already, a particular form of understanding the 
being of people in the world - a form involving a State" soyereign.and ex.ecuting legislators, 
citizens and body politic - is being placed ~s the unquestioned basis from which further rules 
of regulating this "system" can be derived. Further, Rousseau places an extreme stress on 
maintaining authority by internalising the ideas of citizenship and patriotism. "The most 
absolute authority is that which penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns itself no 
less-with his will than with his actIons". However, like Adam Smith's 'sympathy', Rousseau's 
virtue stops short of embracing humanity. He writes, 
[i]t appears that the feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all 
mankind, and that we cannot be affected by the calamities of Tartary or Japan, in the 
same manner as we are by those of European nations. It is necessary in some degree 
to confine and limit our interest and compassion in order to make it active .... it is 
proper that our humanity should confine itself to our -fellow-citizens,... greatest 
miracles of virtue have been produced by patriotism ... makes it most heroic of all 
passions ... 
lhis is an instructive lesson in understanding the foundational "humanity" of enlightenment 
modernity - it is a limited fund of humanity affected by distance, dissimilarity, but also racial 
difference (European nations are likely to be dissimilar as well, but they still fall within the 
ambit of the "mankind" destined for "humanity"), and therefore needs to be distributed 
prudently. II 
The love of country is situated as the fount of virtue, "[ d]o we wish men to be virtuous? Then 
let us begin by making them love their country ... ". In this interesting way, by linking up 
happiness with VIrtue, virtue With citizenship, c1tizenship with patriotism, -and country with 
II More than two centuries later, the "critical" theorist of enlightenment and- modernity, Jurgen 
Habermas diagnoses the sickness of modernity as not a fatal one. Venn (2000: 28) sums up Habermas's 
views on this by saying, "What is needed is for 'Europe' [footnote here, see below] to realise that the 
illness is- self-inflicted, aggravated by bad ·theoretical prognoses in conditions of unfettered capitalist 
development, and that 'Europe could draw from its own traditions the insight, the energy, the courage of 
vision' to cure itself(1987: 367, original emphasis)". Venn (68) writes of this "revealing slip, consistent 
with his [Habermas's] neglect of difference .... There is no recognition in his [Habermas's] analysis of 
the mutations in modernity in the context of its implantation in the colonies and the varieties of 
modernity that have developed today". However,. the irony is t~at ~hortIy afterw~ds, Venn .himself 
argues that a consensus on normative issues outsIde of Europe IS dIfficult to achIeve, and gIves the 
example of "the customary sexual mutilation of girls in. many Muslim communities" (28), .an i~sue 
which has become the new Sati. On the politics of SatI, see Vma Narayan (1997),- Gayatn SpIvak 
(1988). For the weaving of the politics of Sati into a literary narrative, see the novel Rich Like Us by 
Nayantara Sahgal (1985), especially Chapterll. 
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governance, and governance with the general will, he moves towards justifications for taxes 
by the state. 12 Indeed, for him, the instant of birth of the child is the inauguration of the 
moment of citizenship, and "ought to be the beginning of the exercise of our duty". The laws 
of both infancy and of maturity are necessary because, "Families dissolve, but the State 
remains". He envisages each house as a school of citizenship with the "unlimited power of 
fathers" (emphasis added). 
Now, witness the ways m which patriotism, authoritarian govern mentality, civic 
constitutionalism, European provincialism, and patriarchy meld into Rousseau's discourse on 
political economy. 13 Indeed, two things can immediately be said about this bringing together. 
First, it has always been a feature of modernist renditions that they are all brought together in 
the name of the general man. 14 In the split between theory and praxis, often praxis is 
designated by interaction with a brute materiality of the physical world, while accounts of this 
interaction constitute theory, theory which is characterised by a unified account provided by 
the theorist. The unity of the diverse ideas that are reconciled in recitation constitutes the 
power of theory, a power deriving from the proposed interrelation between many knowings, 
an interrelation thus permitting transcription into control and legislation. Second, the very fact 
that Rousseau chooses to bring together these competing signs under the umbrella of political 
economy is remarkable. Political economy is then not far from designations of virtue, power, 
government, nation, and man. It situatedness remains tied to concept resonance with European 
discourses on virtue, nationality, government, masculinity, under the arched theme of 
modernity. Yet, in the light of my discussions about the status of science, the latter-day 
universalisation of the development of a provincial discourse on political economy (later 
economics) is an affirmation of the West not being a culture, Science not being an ideology, 
and the Other as not capable of systematic and coherent management of any kind 
(management of passions to lead to virtue, management of authority for proper governance, 15 
12 Rousseau writes: "There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no virtue 
without citizens; create citizens, and you have everything you need; without them, you will have 
nothing but debased slaves, from the rulers of the State downwards". ~ 
13 This concept resonance is not out of date today. Consider the following comment on feminism made 
by Pat Robertson (right-wing US politician) in 1992: "Feminism encourages women to leave their 
husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and become lesbians". 
14 Jean Francois Lyotard tellingly said, '''Man' is but a sophisticated knot" (in Venn 2000: 21). 
15 Now we know that this is why the international financial institutions such as the. IMF, the WB and 
Western g~vernrnents continually recycle the rhetoric about promoting "good governance" in the 
"Third World". 
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management of the boundaries for sovereign nations,16 management of sexuality to produce 
proper maSCUlinity, management of subsistence - perhaps the idea of management Itself). 
The reason why I have stressed on management as a means to control in my discussion of 
political economy, is because, in the context of Rousseau,17 wise and good governance 
approximates economy. Economy, "which means rather the prudent management of what one 
has than ways of getting what one has not", so that the prudent administrators can fIx the 
system of the economy by balancing the needs of the present against the needs distant from 
now, " ... just as a mariner when he fmrls the water gaining on his vessel, does not neglect, 
while he is working the pumps, to discover and stop the leak". Already, the manufactured 
notion of the economy linked to the body politic of the individual State, is being sedimented 
as a system that exists out there fully performed, nonetheless in need of balancing, repair, and 
management. 
At several places in this text, Rousseau invokes China - as a place where the Prince maintains 
his authority by deciding against his officers in any dispute between them and the people, as a 
place where the peasants pay no taxes yet best cultivate (along with Englimd arid Holland with 
little peasant taxes), also as a place where 
the taxes are greater and yet better paid than in any other part of the world. -There the 
merchant himself pays no duty; the buyer alone, without murmuring or sedition, meets 
the whole charge; for as the necessaries of life, such as rice or corn, are absolutely 
exempt from taxation, the common people is not oppressed, and the duty falls only on 
those who are well-to-do. 
~urope, th,!s is exhorted, by the ex~ple of China. There are also examples of the "classical 
civilisations" of Rome and Greece. Rousseau's treatment of the Others of Europe is a 
c:omplexio oppositorum, complex and c?ntradictory.18 In sum, for Rousseau, civilisation meant 
that individuals transit from being primitive to being modern in societies governed in 
accordance with a general will, and what they. lose in natural ~berty, they gain in civil and 
moral liberty. 19 
16 The non-Western and non-modern governments and societies' incomplete incorporation into the full 
functionality of the idea of "sovereignty", works even today to their loss, as they have to make their 
case in terms of the grand narrative of sovereignty, or nationalist resistance. 
17 Rousseau even makes use of the notion of "ceteris paribus" in his discourse on political economy. 
18 In the case of China., Rousseau typifies the Enlightenment brand of fascination mixed with revulsion 
when it comes to looking beyond. If the Chinese taxation system is an example worthy of emulation, 
the Chinese people themselves are surely not. "[T]here is no sin to which they are not prone, no crime 
which is not common among them" (in John Clark 1997: 53). 
19 See West (1996:30) on this, where he gives a quote from Rousseau to say, 
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3.:1 Subjectivity Of Modernist Knowledge And The Transcendental Pretence 
The West is a name for a subject which gathers itself in discourse but is also an object 
constituted discursively; it is, evidently, a name always associating itself with those 
regions, communities, and peoples that appear politically or economically superior to 
other regions, communities, and peoples ... it claims that it is capable of sustaining, if 
not actually transcending, an impulse to transcend all the particularizations (Naoki 
Sakai 1998, ir0Jipesh Chakrabarty 2000: 3). 
If Rousseau's political economyls underwritten by enlightenment epistemology, it is also an 
indication of the extent to which the general man of civilised society drew his appeal from the 
-Cartesian subject. The common thread was tlie application- of Reason. Whether in 
philosophical meditation or in everyday conduct, Reason played an important part as a 
distinguishing feature of human nature. There were differing vfews on the extent to which 
Reason was influenced by passions, or the role it had in guaranteeing access to rational 
knowledge, but it was c6minonly held that the Cartesian subject with a Kantian mind20 was the 
ideal subject of social science. This conscious knowing subject is the benchmark for all 
knowledge, always and everywhere. The disciplinary structuring of modernist knowledge in 
its various fonns performs the act of shoring up all the world as it appears to this knowing 
subject. Rene Descartes (1641) in his Meditations on First Philosophy recalls Archimedes, 
"Archimedes~ in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of his place, and transport it 
elsewhere, demanded only that one point sliould be fIXed and immoveable''-. It is this one point 
that was to be the lever for moving everything else. The Cartesian cogito, the I that exists 
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in 
man, by substituting for instinct in his conduct, ami giving hi~ actions the morality they had 
formerly-lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and 
the right of appetite, does man, who so :far had considered only himself, find that he is forced 
to act on different principles and consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. 
20 From Descartes onwards, the mind was split from matter, the thinking being who is capable of 
doubting its existence, must therefore exist (cogito ergo sum). The world WllS not a teleological 
unfolding purposive experiencing, but a vast realm of matter that needed to be observed, analysed, and 
understood by the dint of a labouring, reasoning, and scientific human mind functioning like the most 
perfect machine imaginable, attributing causes to effects. With Immanuel Kant, this pure Reason is 
critiqued, and a synthesis is sought betWeen empiricism and rationalism. The empiricist bases too much 
on experience (impression, sensation, observation) and neglects the contribution of human mind itself, 
the rationalist relies too much on a priori knowledge and neglects the role of experience. The need is for 
realising the boundaries of knowledge, and fur creating its firm foundations. Kant's '''Copernican 
revolution' in metaphysics" seeks to do justice to both these objectives. This is achieved by his being a 
transcendental idealist and empirical realist at the same time. All human knowledge is to be made sense 
of in terms of the human mind - a mind which can know things in the world of phenomena, or the 
-~orld as it appe~rs to us, however, also a mind which cannot know the world ofnoumena, or the world 
of things in themselves. 
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because it can doubt its own existence, like the Archimedean lever, is the centre-pin that 
moves everything else, and thus manufactures the world in its image. The Cartesian cogito is, 
above all, a being with Reason. 
This knowing being inhabits a dualistic world which is split from itself. Also, an important 
part of the legacy of the Cartesian subject is its inability to conceive of an unassimilable Other 
whose difference cannot be reduced and explained tojt's irrationality, insanity, or inability. 
When the Other is invoked in canonical modernist meditations, it is called forward as if in a 
Court to testify to its difference, and thus mark out its own irrationality, insanity, or inability. 
Therefore, it is an important part of this modernist enlightenment (and also the semi- or 
counter-enlightenment strains inhabiting its folds) that the relation between the self and Other, 
even when conceptualised, remains an enactment within the consciousness of the knowing 
subject. 
This self knows no Other, and the centrality of its subjectivity, forms a large part of the 
epistemological thrust from the 'Cartesian doubt to the tIegelian absolute'. Robert Solomon 
(1988) captures this self-referential subjectivity by calling it the "transcendental pretence". 
Referring to the "practical and political dangers of a viewpoint that is so universally projective 
and self-congratulatory" (4), he points out that this is linked to the European self-image of 
which science and knowledge, along with the romantic imagination, are important ingredients. 
Let us consider his views on what the transcendental pretence is.21 He writes (7): 
The transcendental pretence is the unwarranted assumption that there is universality 
and necessity in the fundamental modes of human experience. It is not mere 
provincialism, that is, the ignorance or lack of appreciation of alternative cultures and 
states of mind. It is an aggressive and sometimes arrogant effort to prove that there are 
no such (valid) possible alternatives. In its application the transcendental pretence 
becomes the a priori assertion that the structures of one's own mind, culture, and 
personality are in some sense necessary and universal for all humankind, perhaps even 
'for all rational creatures'. In the realms of morality, politics, and religion it is the 
effort to prove that there is but one legitimate set of morals (the middle-class morals 
of Europe), one legitimate form of government (the form of parliamentary monarchy 
that ruled most of W estern Europe), and one true religion, to be defended not just by 
faith and with force of arms, but by rational argument, by 'reason alone'. 
Sometimes taking the form of 'human nature', this transcendental self is presumed to be 
timeless, universal, identical and embodied in everyone. Relating the story of its discovery, 
21 In the light of Solomon's views on the transcendental pretence, it really is interesting that when 
discussing Rousseau's influence, he writes, "it came to influence halfofthe civilised [sic] world". 
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Solomon (16) finds that Rousseau "[s]trolling in solitude through the lush forests of St 
Germain during early adolescence of the modern age, made [the] miraculous discovery ... [of] 
his self'. Rousseau's self was also the soul of humanity (to him). Soon Kant could say, "[a]s 
Newton was the first to discern order and regularity in nature, Rousseau was the first to 
discover beneath the varying forms human nature assumes, the deeply concealed essence of 
man and the hidden law in accordance- with which providence is justified" (in ibid.: 16). 
Indeed, one could argue that it is this very unquestioned transcendental pretence (how ironic 
_/ 
that the "transcendental" ideals of the foundations of "universal" knowing were put forward 
by a white European man, Kant, who never in his life left the port of Konigsbergl2 that 
provides the grounding legitimacy for universal modernist disciplinary knowledges. For, 
economics as the universal scientific study of human societies could not ever purport to 
provide rational explanations of all human choices without being bolstered by the 
transcendental pretence, and associated principles and assumptions about human nature. It is 
for this reason that economics is a Western science, its most notable practitioners prior to this 
century, geographically concentrated in Europe. I should add that the attempts by historians to 
dig up ancient economic traditions in all civilisations and at all times does not serve as a 
counter-argument to my point here. For, I'm not saying- that prior to the Western Europe of 
enlightenment times (and except for ancient Greece and Rome), no societies organised 
production consumption or exchange. That would refer to a notion of economy (and 
economising) which is not the invention of economics. Rather, it is the particular confluence 
of ideas on the economy (around the autonomous and insatiable individual freely choosing in 
the face of scarcity which forms the basis of understanding human behaviour), which emerged 
from a modernist disciplinary structuring,23 to provide the basis for a universal scientific 
study, that is actually located and contingent. It is further tied in to equally located and 
22 Solomon (1988: 7) writes about 'the white philosopher's burden', "[p ]hilosophers who never left 
their home towns declared themselves experts on 'human nature', and weighed the morals of 
civilisations and 'savages' thousands of miles beyond their ken", and gives the example of Kant. On the 
relation between philosophy, modernity, and colonialism, see especiaIJy Chukwudi Eze (1997). In his 
introduction to this brilliant critical reader on postcolonial African philosophy, Eze points out the dire 
provincialisms of the European greats - Hume, Kant, Hegel, Habermas and many more. Kant draws 
upon Hume to state "[t]his man was black from head to toe, a clear proof that what he said was stupid" 
(7), and in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime provides a hierarchical chart on 
the different "races" - "STEM GENUS: white brunette, First race, very blond (northern Europe), 
Second race, Copper-Red (America), Third race, Black (Senegambia), Fourth race, Olive-Yellow 
(Indians)" (7). 
2J This structuring of ideas may itself have been motivated by responses to problems of knowledge, its 
categorisation and management in the interests of the eminent social orders. See the discussions in 
chapter one of the thesis. 
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contingent ideas on governance, morality, patriarchy, sovereignty and so on.24 Finally, none of 
these ideas would have seemed sensible or credible as the basis for a universal social science , 
had it not been for the lure of the transcendental self, arrogantly reincarnated as human nature, 
but based upon a narrow model of Cartesian subjectivity. A model of SUbjectivity that has at 
its very core the picture of the transcendental self, a being in the world, that seeks to know the 
world. The world which in concentric circles radiates outwards from this knowing being. A 
crucial element is that although there are numerous other people, the transcendental self is 
identically incarnated in each, so that one can always know other people from the inside. This 
means that essentially everyone is the same, operates on the same logic, and can only be 
located at different places on the same grid - a grid which we can study. If there are 
anomalies, i.e. people, patterns, societies, then they must be irrational, insane, or unable. Then 
the question is, can they be made rational, sane and able, or, are they simply the damned? 
Further, only by seeing knowledge as separate from ethics, politics, strategy, subjectivity, 
Reason, and being, will we see it as scientific, rational and universaL because it will seem to 
emanate from a supposedly transcendental pretence, and can then be "applied" as praxis to 
specific contexts. 
3.5 Reason, History And The Hegelian Dialectic 
If one takes the conventional picture of the modernist subject world, with the Cartesian subject 
at its centre, and the world of everything else all around it, one returns to the tension with 
meaning. The Cartesian subject 'I' which is at centre of the whole enterprise of knowing, is 
itself left unexamined and untheorised. The subjectivity which forms the basis of the 
transcendental pretence is a knot. A universal self that knows the world, and at the same time 
24 It is especially tied in to imperialism, colonialism, and the empire. The colonial and the economic 
have always worked in tandem to propagate the logic of the capital to serve vested interests. George 
Joseph et al (1990) give an example of how the conceptual framework of the economic was constructed 
so that colonial ideology could be defended and extended within it. The Kikuyu of Kenya were being 
encouraged to grow coffee rather than maize around the same time as the Malays were discouraged 
from planting rubber and encouraged to concentrate on cultivating rice. The reason given was similar in 
the two cases - that the farmers would be better-off if they followed these economic prescriptions. Yet, 
the motivation was different in these two cases (3): 
hI the Malayan case, the volume of rubber production had to be controlled to safeguard the 
profit margins of European plantation owners and/or avoid rice imports that would be needed 
if there was a significant shift from rice to rubber cultivation. In the case of the Kikuyu who 
had to share their land with the white settlers, the need to bring them into the money economy, 
as either labourers or small producers of cash crops was felt to be paramount 
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is identical to every other self in that world. Further, as Lorraine Code (1991: 5) points out, for 
each knower, the Cartesian route to knowledge is through private, abstract thought, through 
the efforts of reason unaided by the senses or by consultations with other knowers. 'Reason' 
itself is conceived as autonomous and unassisted by the senses, enabling the independent quest 
for certain knowledge undertaken by rational beings. 
The tension between the-{consciOus) part and the (knowable) whole, the general and the 
particular, resurfaces as the divide between the self and the world, which is the master divide 
and simultaneously structures the difference between theory and praxis. If the self is a part of 
the world that knows itself and through itself knows the world, then the very question of the 
Other will cause it to unravel, because the concept does not make sense within this picture of 
the self and the world. The face of the Other will introduce limitations on knowledge, the 
reigning in of subjectivity, detranscendentalisation of the self, and the spectres of heteronomy, 
alterity, mysticism - that is, a complete alienation of this rather mechanistic picture of rational 
understanding and mediation between the part and the whole.25 
If, on the other hand, one takes the picture that is amended to include history and particularity 
of society and culture, it may seem that it can account for the selfs encounter with the Other 
in a productive way. However, what treatment is accorded to difference within the dialectic of 
world history? In order to answer this question, I will examine the pre-eminent synthesis of 
Reason and History effected in Hegel's rational dialectic of world history. 
Hegel's grand speculative enterprise draws up the connections between individual 
consciousness and universal consciousness in the philosophy of world history as unfolding 
stages in the dialectic of the spirit (Geist) as the progress of freedom. This dialectic of world 
history spirally ascends from the 'stationary' Orient to Europe not just as an unfolding of the 
25 A rational attempt at dealing with this is made within hermeneutics. For instance, a Gadamerian 
approach to hermeneutics, will reject the divide between subject and object, and also reject the 
possibility of contemplating a being removed from temporality or context. Instead of focusing on the 
attenuated Cartesian picture where the subject constitutes meaning from the world (in many variations 
with emphasis either on pre-given categories or sensations), we find that " ... the henneneuticist comes to 
appreciate the availability of meanings already in the world, and [interprets] these meanings" (Solomon 
1988: 170). The emphasis is not on method, but in the realm of practice and on the historical context. 
Thus, comparing multiple interpretations, even in the face of differences, will lead to an eventual 
"fusion of horizons". Thus, the radical challenge posed by an unknowable Other to the conscious 
Cartesian subject, is recast as a situation with multiple subjectivities, interpretations which then find 
satisfactory resolutions in ethical conversations. This rendering demonstrates the hermeneutic faith in 
Reason and hope fur future (172). See also 10sefBleicher (1980). 
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absolute spirit but also as its realisation. He combines and welds together the history of all 
peoples in all the world into the architecture of Reason itself, Reason that culminates in a 
present, spreading back its tentacles to trawl through an infmite realm of the 'before', catching 
resonances to designate a finite 'after' to the present. History is extremely important for 
Hegel. It is within the particular situated communities, its cultures, values and practices, that 
the individual can be free or ethical. The individual for Heg.el is not only the disembodied 
mind of Cartesian thought. The pure logic of a universal absolu{is nonetheless empirically 
situated in time and space, and the Hegelian oeuvre was to provide a narrative of the 
development as progress of this absolute spirit in history and culture. Further, the historical 
unfolding of Reason is not its truth at any particular moment, but, the dialectic of overcoming 
through contradiction. Through the dialectic of history, the spirit comes to realise itself on the 
unfolding path of progress and Reason. As West (1996: 38) puts it, "[h]istory can be 
reconstructed as a dialectical progression of structures of consciousness or 'spirit', embodied 
in particular historical societies .... the overall direction of the spirally ascending dialectic can 
be understood as the progress offreedom". So that, Hegel becomes "the architect of the dream 
of an absolute metanarrative of the historical unfolding of an always unitary reason" (Stuart 
Barnett 1998: 2). 
The Hegelian system is an enterprise made solely of mirrors - in the house of Hegel, wherever 
one looks, one cannot escape one's own presence. And at the same time, this presence 
provides the anchor for viewing anything else for as far as one can see in any direction. In this 
house, it would be impossible to argue the possibility of a shadow which cannot be reflected 
in the mirrors. By defmition of the way in which it is set up, the Hegelian dialectic of world 
history as the unfolding of the spirit on the way to its self-conscious progress of freedom, is a 
story where the tension between the opposing poles of the dialectic, is always productively 
materialised toward betterment. 
Hegel stands for the snowballing of Enlightenment ideas to the point where the self-realisation 
of modernity becomes a celebration of European (Germanic) present as the peaked 
culmination of everything everywhere at all times. As Spivak puts it in another context, (2000: 
43), "the triumphalist conviction that history happened in order to produce my kind". To 
confront Hegelian modernity, it is indeed important to be able to think the possibility of a 
negative which is not made productive by its sublation into dialectical narrative recognition. 
The thinking of such a negative, is intimately tied up to thinking alterity. The rational 
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resolution of every opposite fmds home in Hegel's house of mirrors precisely because those 
admitted into it have never really confronted an Other which is incapable of being reflected. 
Such an Other has to be staged, as a negative which is unassimilable into the dialectic of 
presence in history. But this other cannot be seen within Hegel's mirror, rather, it is Hegel that 
needs to be brought into view and confronted with all that he could not see, or chose not to 
see. What seems the infinity of systematic modernity, may only be the reflective dep'lb of 
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mirrors to the subject in history. Without the interweaving mirrors, the subject cannot be 
constituted. This unconstitutable subject, which is perhaps the ethical metaphysics of 
deconstruction, is the route to generating disrupted memories of modernity. 
Anti-Hegelianism will not do, because the opposite of modernity is also defined by it. Rather, 
a calculated remembering of the erasures of modernity, its many forgettings needs to be 
carried out. Michel Foucault (in Barnett 1998: 2-3, emphases added) deliberates the specifics 
of such a "calculation", 
[b]ut to truly escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay 
to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which 
Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which 
peIDlits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to 
deteIDline the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks 
directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us. 
Foucault is right, modernity's bankruptcies call for costly rememberings. These rememberings 
need to comprise of visits to the scenes where modernity's knowledge was constructed, and an 
examination ofthe procedures by which it was made possible. 
Robert Bernasconi (1998) takes a long journey back to bring Hegel to the Court of the 
Ashanti. He examines the role that 'Africa' played in Hegel's world. In order to situate his 
dialectic of world history, Hegel needed to place Africa as the outside of the progress of 
Reason. Bernasconi draws upon Hegel to demonstrate how in his world history's court of 
judgements ('Weltgericht'), he found Africans to be "barbaric, cannibalistic, preoccupied with 
fetishes, without history, and without any consciousness of freedom ... lack[ing] any 'integral 
ingredient of culture (Bildung)" (41). In fact, Bernasconi reiterates a summary of the portrait 
of Africans that emerges from Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. This is as 
follows (1998: 50): 
First Black (die Neger) are a childish people in their naivety (Unbefangenheit). 
Sec~nd they allow themselves to be sold without reflection as to whether or not this is 
right; they feel no impulse (Trieb) towards freedom. Third, this childishness is 
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r~flected in their religion. They sense the higher, but do not retain it. They transfer the 
hl?her to a stone, thereby making it into fetish, although they will throw it away if it 
falls them. Fourth, although good-natured and harmless when in a calm condition 
they commit frightful atrocities when suddenly aroused. Fifth, although capable of 
education (Bildung), as evidenced by their grateful adoption of Christianity on 
occasion and their appreciation of freedom when acquired, they have no propensity 
(Trieb) for culture (Kultur): their spirit is dormant and makes no progress. 
Now, at this point, note that my argument is not that Hegel, like a large number of his 
contemporaries (also his predecessors and successors) was simply a 'racist'. Rather, my aim is 
to argue that the status of Africa is crucial to Hegel's account of the dialectic of world history. 
Even as it was placed outside Hegel's system, it can be read as the fulcrum to the Hegelian 
meditations on progress of Reason in free and ethical societies. 
No doubt, it is not common to read the 'dead greats' in this way. In fact, the strategies of 
reception of earlier theorists range from either ignoring their 'inconvenient' views by arguing 
their irrelevance or insignificance in the larger scheme of things, or excusing their 
'inconvenient' views as only to be expected given their locatedness in an earlier time which is 
characterised by ignorance, intolerance and prejudice. This is not something I agree with, let 
me explain why. If one takes the fIrst route, and argues for the intricacies of Hegelian notions 
of political economy, ethical life, and freedom in society, without paying attention to the rest 
of his structure, then that is a reading of Hegel which ignores the very ways in which Hegel 
was able to say what he said. But, there is a vast and implicit gesture of epistemic violence in 
assuming universal relevance in readings of Hegel today, while not attending to the 'outside' 
of his structure. Thus, for example, if one is convinced that the dialectic of world history was 
in fact operant as Hegel argues, one would, no doubt, attempt to 'lift' those 'backward' 
societies and economies out of their thraldom from 'our' 'advanced' perspective. This is only 
too prevalent in the history of apologia for colonialism, and now in the rationale for neo-
colonialism. However, on the other hand, if one takes the second route, one is arguing that we 
should not 'hold against' the dead greats their inconvenient views, because such views are 
only to be expected in that time and place. But, this is itself a Hegelian move that implicitly 
assumes progress in history, towards the benevolence of Reason. Further, it accomplishes the 
feat of, at the same time, casting critical consideration of inconvenient views as a gesture of 
'holding against', and suffocating any examination of the 'how' or 'why' of the operation of 
such views. This latter is especially important. It is crucial to try to understand the ways in 
which considerations of race not only provided the justification for imperialism, but also 
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functioned from within to generatively write narratives of modernity. It is the interrogation of 
the appeal of such narratives, that can be approached by deconstructing the desires behind the 
setting up of categories (such as race or gender), and the ways in which they interacted. This is 
necessary to confront the logic of power behind the historical desires ofmodernity.26 
Thus, Hegel was not .simply describing Africa to the best of his knowledge in order to create a 
disinterested narrative of-{ure Reason. In fact, Bernasconi's research (1998: 45-48) would 
seem to suggest that Hegel was not even being completely true to his sources, especially 
Bowdich and Hutchison. For instance, Hegel reports that the Ashanti King inherits all the 
property left by his deceased subjects (where Bowdich mentions gold), or that the King of the 
Ashanti washed the bones of his dead mother in human blood (where Hutchison specifies rum 
and water), or that Ashanti chiefs were said to have 'tom their enemies' hearts from their 
bodies and eaten them while they were still warm and bleeding' (where Bowdich's accusation 
of cannibalism is unsubstantiated), or that at the end of public festivals, 'a human being is tom 
to pieces; his flesh is cast to the multitude and greedily eaten by all those who can lay hands 
on it' (source unknown), or that the Dahomey King has 3333 wives to produce children who 
could be sold as slaves (this was in Bowdich as the number of wives of an Ashanti King). 
Even Hegel's sources were exaggerating and embellishing their accounts, but Hegel was not 
simply conveying anecdotal disinformation, he was creating knowledge of 'Africa' and 
'Africans' without which he could not have argued that instinct and respect are not universal 
human characteristics (ibid.: 46). 
In fact, anecdotal disinformation was only too common, then as now.27 The point is not that 
Hegel did not know enough about Africa, or that his sources were inaccurate and prejudiced, 
but that Hegel's 'Africa' provides him with an understanding of his 'Europe'. His 'being' is 
predicated upon there being his 'Others' - others who are caught in the extremes of their 
climate, are incapable of achieving spiritual consciousness, are uniformly unchanging, are 
26 See Robert Young (1995) fur a discussion of colonial desire and racial theory in relation to Victorian 
imperialism. 
27 Even Hegel's sources such as T. E. Bowdich (author of Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee) 
were inaccurate. Bernasconi (ibid.: 45) writes, " ... the copy of the treaty that Bowdich negotiated with 
the Ashanti was different from that which he deposited on his return". Further, Bernasconi (50) points 
out that several of Hegel's chosen sources such as Dalzel and Norris wrote to further the pro-slavery 
cause, while the situation might have been different if he had relied upon anti-slavery authors such as 
Benezet. 
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"dominated by passion, savage, barbaric, and hence, most importantly for his discussion of 
history, at the first level (Stu/e)" (ibid.: 52_3).28 
Hegel is especially important for my discussion because of his influence upon political 
economists. Larrain (1994) provides some distinct examples of instances where Hegel's ideas 
were influential in the thought on political economy. Heg~l distinguished between the world-
historical peoples who were culturally developed and could contfibute to the progress of world 
-
history by building a strong state, and the people without history who were spiritually and 
physically weak and whose destiny was to be subject to the civilising mission of the former. 
Likewise, most political economists (Jean Baptiste Say, Thomas Malthus) saw colonialism as 
necessary for bringing about progress in the stagnating 'savage nations' possessing an 
'inferior civilisation'. John Stuart Mill believed that "backward societies have a very weak 
'effective desire' to accumulate, to work harder and to save" (19). James Mill's description of 
the moral character of Indians and Chinese impressed Ricardo who wrote "[ w ]hat a frightful 
obstruction to improvement does the immoral character ofthe people of India present!" (ibid.). 
The beliefs of even Marx and Engels belied Hegel's influence.29 And thus, 
For Hegel it is the Spirit as it manifests itself through the primacy of historical 
nations, among which the Prussian state has pride of place; for classical political 
economy it is the bourgeoisie as the representative of Britain, the first capitalist 
nation; for Marx and Engels it is the proletariat of Britain. The emancipating subjects 
may be different but they all represent the highest stage of historical reason as it is 
given in western Europe, and it is from there that they should carry out their mission 
(ibid.: 23). 
This lineage is not by any means 'over'. As Jean Franco (1988: 504) argues, metropolitan 
discourses on the Third World adopt either of the three devices: (1) exclusion as the Third 
World is irrelevant to theory; (2) discrimination as the Third World is irrational and its 
knowledge is subordinate to the rational knowledge of the metropolis; (3) recognition as the 
Third World is only seen as the place of the instinctual. 
28 As Jorge Larrain (1994: 19-22) points out, these Others include people of South America who are 
"physically and spiritually impotent" and where "even the animals show the same inferiority as the 
human beings". For instance, in Paraguay, "a clergyman used to ring a bell at midnight to remind them 
to perfurm their matrimonial duties, for it would otherwise never have occurred to them to do so". 
China too represented a stationary nation which did not contribute to the progress of world history. 
29 For instance, Marx following Hegel's remarks on Latin American creoles in his comparison of 
Mexicans with the Spaniards, writes ''the Spaniards are completely degenerated. But in the presence of 
a Mexican a degenerated Spaniard constitutes an ideal" and, Engels found the conquest of Algeria by 
France, "an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization" (Larrain 1994: 20). 
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The possibility of the Other is not confronted in its radical plurality, and multiple random 
scattering. The Other remains captive as a spectral possibility within the logic of the self-same 
subject in whose certainties, there linger anxious hauntings, forcing it to cast its tyrannous net 
ever wider. The disjointedness at the very core of this anxious haunted subject needs 
addressing. 
The status of the Other in the modernist subject-world is: "the Other of the Same". Luce_/ 
Irigaray used this concept to designate the way in which 'Woman' as the alternative to the 
conventional male subject has functioned. She provided an influential critique of Simone de 
Beauvoir's account of Woman in terms of "the Other of the Same". Woman is "the necessary 
negative of the male subject, all that he has repressed and disavowed" (Margaret Whitford 
1991: 24-25), and her access to universal subjecthood is based upon claiming sameness to the 
supposedly universal male subject, and repressing any social and symbolic representation of 
otherness and difference.3o 
The way in which Other is confined to being 'Other of the same' is also linked to Irigaray's 
critique of the Hegelian account of women's role in the maintenance of society. As Whitford 
explains (161, emphases original), 
For Hegel, men operate within the domain of the universal and the ethical (as citizens) 
but also have their particular needs attended to within the family. Women do not have 
this dual possibility; their particularity is subordinate to the needs of the family and 
the state .... While men can be spirit (universal), the family represents 'nature'. So long 
as women are confined to the family, their access to the universal is derivative, via the 
husband or son, rather than direct. .. For Irigaray, Hegel 'does not succeed in thinking 
the family other than as one substance'; he does not consider the possibility of the 
woman who is not subordinate to the family. As a result, the maternal genealogy is 
condemned by the patriarchal state ... with the backing of patriarchal and monotheistic 
religion. 
The universal 'spirit' manifests itself yet again in the domain of the male, women function as 
subordinate to this logic as 'Others of the same' (recall the discussion of non-European 
Others, especially 'Africa' above). The concept resonance here between European 'universal' 
spirit, male citizens, family, nation and the state is reminiscent of Rousseau's characterisation. 
30 In contrast, Irigaray argues not just for an equality based on claiming sameness but the recognition of 
women's difference and "for symbolic forms which correspond to women's specificity, the need for an 
identitY' (in Whitford 1991: 160, emphasis original). Whitford (162) clarifies further that Irigaray's 
concern is with the way in which "what she calls 'the people of men' has appropriated women's bodies, 
children's bodies, nature, space, symbolism, the divine and representation in general". 
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3.6 Human Nature And The Question Of Difference 
Yet hierarchies of gender, nationality, sexuality, class, race, etc. continue to trouble 
the waters of consensus and disrupt agreement on what it means to be fully human 
(Rhonda Williams 1993: 150). 
The inability of enlightenment modernity to face up to difference, to the Other, is vastly 
apparent. This has been a continuing story. The terms on which the Other is encountered 
remain violent, exclusionary, assimilative, and negating. The question of difference in 
modernist knowledge is particularly problematic. This is because on the one hand the 
legitimacy of a body of knowledge as social scientific derives from its grounding in human 
nature, and on the other hand, the positing of human nature as the basis for grounding 
knowledge has always been the universalisation of a narrowly provincial transcendental 
pretence. The question of difference is a challenge to modernist knowledge precisely because 
it threatens the coherence of its constitution which owes to its narrowly defined subject which 
knows no Other. At best, the Other can be a testimonial of the limits of modernist knowledge, 
functioning as a limit-phenomenon, but there is no engagement with difference which 
questions the self. Of course, modernist knowledge functions as ifnone of these tensions exist. 
Apparently scientific discourse on society (such as that of economics) relies heavily upon 
eliding the question of difference while at the same time being ever more method-driven in its 
appeal to scientificity. 
However, as Williams notes (1993: 145), the "forefathers of neoclassical economic theory 
were also the children of an imperialist world, one in which enslavement, colonisation, 
genocide, and the discourses thereof were formative of self, norms, values, political means, 
and ends". It is then no surprise that "as the brainchild of Western man's philosophical 
traditions, homo economicus bears the markings of his fathers' gendered social and cultural 
lives" (ibid.). Economics is thus an ideology which disguises its particularity under the signs 
of objectivity and generality (see William Milberg 1993). Robert Heilbroner (1990: 104) gives 
two instances of this. The first is a statement by Milton and Rose Friedman that the 
distribution of wealth may be "unfair" but life is unfair in the unequal distributions of talent. 
They write, "the inheritance of property can be interfered with more readily than the 
inheritance of talent... But from the ethical point of view, is there any difference between the 
two?". The second is the response of Robert Lucas to the question of whether government 
might not be an instrument for the redress of social injustice: "That wouldn't be anything like 
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my view. I can't think of explaining the pharoahs as being in existence to resolve the social 
injustice in Egypt. I think they perpetrated most of the social injustice in Egypt". As 
Heilbroner goes on to discuss, it is unclear that inequalities of talent can be applied the term 
"ethical", and inequalities of wealth are social differences to which ethics addresses itself 
Similarly, Lucas's selection of pharoahonic Egypt to illustrate government and justice is 
ideological. Thus, viewing economics as ideology allows a challenging of "the sheer facticity 
of the economy", thus changin0the observer's view of the economy from that ofa system to 
that of a regime" (ibid.: 107). 
This draws attention to the mixing of power and interest in the questions of political economy. 
At present, viewing certain questions as 'economic' is only made possible by disregarding 
this. In the late twentieth century, different disciplines (economics, politics, literature, 
anthropology, philosophy, and so on) act like so many windows of the modernist structure that 
looks upon essentially the same 'human condition' .31 The question of difference within a 
purportedly universal human nature is galling. This is not surprising if we consider the 
ambivalence of human nature in founding modernist knowledge. 
Let us examine the especially concentrated focus on some encounters with difference through 
a nineteenth-century example. Catherine Hall (2002) discusses the relation between the 
Metropole and the Colony in the English imagination between 1830 and 1867. She describes 
how 'the empire' was central to English domestic life and popular consciousness and mentions 
the shift in perspective from an earlier missionary paternalist type to the more vociferous and 
biologically racially determinist discourse of difference. The earlier missionaries such as 
Knibb delighted in "pleading the cause of the injured, the degraded and the oppressed", and 
believed that a proper subjectivity could be provided for the (erstwhile) slaves by adopting the 
Christian vision. On the other hand, after the abolition of slavery, Victorian imperialism 
betrayed its more overt racial obsessions (see Young 1995), Robert Knox argued that "Race is 
everything", and Thomas Carlyle argued differential treatment for different races.32 Now, after 
the 'Indian mutiny' of 1857, and after the brutal repression of rebellion by Governor Eyre in 
31 However, these windows are all on the foggy side of the building - the side which faces the social, 
the messy human. If you want a really good view, you have to move a few floors up towards a 
satisfYing analysis of the essentially unchangeable nature of the world of objects, the physical world -
the exact sciences. Or so they say. 
32 Hall (2002) quotes Carlyle on considering black people as born servants, in his imagination like 
animals, "sitting yonder with their beautiful muzzles up to their ears in pumpkins, imbibing sweet pulps 
and juices; the grinder and incisor teeth ready for ever new work". 
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Jamaica in 1865, the debate in England took the following form. On the one side there were 
the 'liberal intelligentsia' comprised of Thomas Huxley, Charles Darwin, Charles Lyell, and 
led by Mill. On the other, defending Eyre, were Carlyle, supported by Charles Dickens, John 
Ruskin, Charles Kingsley, and Alfred Tennyson. While the former argued that they were 
concerned with legality not race (loving the law, not the negroes), the latter maintained that 
"Eyre was a manly hero who had saved Europeans from 'black unutterabilities"'. The debate 
was anchored around the question of whether "these" people c()"'(!(d be made civilised like 
"us" . 
Dickens, who was so concerned about the impact of industrialisation, and is still brought 
forward as a role model to illustrate resistance to the excesses of industrial economy (see 
James Henderson 2000), is the person raging at "'that platform sympathy with the black - or 
the native' and the indifference to what went on at home - as if 'New Zealanders and 
Hottentots... were identical with men in clean shirts at Camberwell'" (Hall 2002). The 
enlightenment humanism in its hollowness is perhaps the biggest modernist myth, systematic 
in its manufactured method, perpetuating via disciplinary knowledge. And Ruskin, who loved 
Utopias and saw "political economy not as an abstract, mechanistic and self-referencing 
system, justified by 'arithmetic', but a set of ideas focused upon the problem of economic 
behaviour and justice within given social settings" (in Willie Henderson 1995: 116), is also 
the person leading nineteenth century critics of art and design against the figure of the 
arabesque in architectural or interior design, " ... because it was Islamic or, more generally, 
'eastern'" .33 The continuing inability to face up to an Other takes many variations. 
Political economy was never far from these concerns. James Hunt who was the founder of the 
Anthropological Society (as a means to conduct empirical anthropology, rejecting theory, 
unproved hypothesis, and popular superstitions, and based "on actual demonstrable facts, and 
33 In a remarkable study ofGiIman's arabesque wallpaper (referring to Charlotte Perkins Gilman's The 
Yellow Wallpaper) and its implication in the culture of nineteenth-century imperialism, Marty Roth 
(2001: 148) writes of Ruskin thus, "He regarded arabesque as an 'Oriental' writing that 'proved' that 
eastern races were inherently superficial, fanciful, and cruel: 'The mncy and delicacy of eye', he wrote, 
'in interweaving lines and arranging colours - mere line and colour, observe, without natural form -
seems to be somehow an inheritance of ignorance and cruelty, belonging to men as spots to the tiger or 
hues to the snake'''. Turns out, Gilman, sometimes recorded as an early feminist (she wrote Women and 
Economics in 1898), herself adopts white supremacist attitudes at home while setting utopian fiction 
abroad (Roth 2001: 145). The yellow wallpaper can thus be read for its yellowness, and for its 
arabesque wallpapemess (the infinity of pattern defying a finite economy of negotiation with the 
infinite). 
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arguing solely from the logical inferences from such data", in Ronald Rainger 1978: 52-53) 
and a believer in polygenetics, had this to say about political economy: 
That the science of political economy must be based simply and solely on the facts 
discovered by the anthropologists ... Now a social science cannot be based on mere 
philanthropic theories. In other words, social science must be based on the facts of 
human nature as it is, not as we would wish it to be... Weare the students and 
interpreters of nature's laws, and it is our duty carefully to ascertain what those laws 
are, and not attempt to raise up in the name of 'social science' a code of morals based--
upon an assumption of human equality and consequently equal human rights, because ~. 
we know that human equality is a mere dream and all systems based on it are mere 
chimeras (in ibid.: 61, emphases added). 
Either 'human nature' is rejected in favour of racial superiority and the stereotyping of 
difference, or narrowly provincial Western experiences are falsely universalised under the 
domain name of 'human nature'. Further, all of this is carried out as a signifier 'science'. 
There is no place for a genuine Otherness. 
Even when the Other is admitted into comprehension as an unknowable and radically separate 
alterity, a dilemma arises. This is a dilemma around moral responsibility, consider Anthony 
Strugnell (1996: 180) who discusses the philosopher of alterity Emmanuel Levinas to say, "the 
tension between a 'pure Otherness, separated, in some way, from any whole', identified by 
Levinas, and his acknowledgement that its mortality is nonetheless his business, is revealed as 
a contradiction". This is the unravelling of humanism around Reason in the face of the Other. 
Either Western enlightenment humanity is to be happily waved off on its path to negating, 
assimilating, violently excluding the Other, or, if the possibility of 'alterity' (radical 
Otherness) is to be seriously admitted, then further concern cannot be expected.34 
In modernity, which is constituted around its subject, the Other is only introduced as a play 
within unitary consciousness, that is, when it is not being materially vampirised.35 The debate, 
34 In addition, the ethical standards of a Levinasian ethics is open to the problems of maintaining a 
generalised Other. Irigaray writes (in Whitford 1991: 182), this can "give rise to an infinite series of 
substitutions, an operation which seems ... non-ethical. No one can be radically substituted for the other, 
without depriving the other of identity. Even a substitution which is authorized by proxy is 
questionable, given the irreducibility of each". This leaves the way open fur everything to "slide in this 
historical and genealogical deracination. There is no longer any irreducible difference of the other". As 
a result, ethics may become indistinguishable from what can be seen as a "kind of formalism or a 
disordered drift" (ibid.). 
35 Ziauddin Sardar (1992: 515-6) describes Europe's encounter with the Other in metaphorical terms as 
vampirisation - the relationship where the vampire has insatiable desire and can survi.ve only .b~ a 
never-ending supply of victims, the victims are enticed and penetrated, subsequent to WhICh the VICtIm 
is physically and mentally possessed. 
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m this knowledge, which is at once and already a fonn of ethics, politics, strategy, 
SUbjectivity, Reason and being, is then cast as - whether they (the insufferable Others) belong 
perpetually on the outside, or can they be brought in? 
And so, the costly rememberings of modernity's bankruptcies need to face up to examining 
the procedures of modernity in its claims to its many knowledges. A modem writing of history 
is premised upon a fundamental denial of coevalness to the Other. The disciplinary 
~ . f 
_constructIon 0 modem knowledges such as anthropology (for a critical undoing of 
anthropology, see Johannes Fabian 1983), political economy, sociology, Darwinism, history, 
literature, and natural science is underwritten by enlightenment epistemology. 
The effect of the inability of modernist knowledge to engage with difference is especially 
acute for those at the receiving end of this knowledge. The science of political economy has 
accomplished the functioning of unrestricted greed. Right from the hagiography of 'Columbus 
the great', glory is closely tied to god, gold and greed.36 This has undergone mutations in the 
service of trade, commerce, and often, development. While the subject at the heart of 
knowledge is thus constituted, it's Others are designated as uneducated, uncultured and 
uncivilised (Hegel's das ungeb ildete), although with a manufactured and understood 
multiattribute hierarchy generally in place. While uncultivated Europeans will still have a taste 
for freedom (see Heller 1999), Hegel's uneducated included "among others, the poor, Arabs, 
savages, children, and the mad" (in Bernasconi 1998: 58).37 
36 See Sardar (1992) on this. He draws upon Bishop Bartholomew Las Casas's Historia des la Indias to 
point out features of the model of colonial governance employed by Columbus. In relation to gold, he 
writes, "[e]very Taino over the age of fourteen was ordered to supply the governor with a hawk's bill 
fulJ of gold every three months. Those who did were awarded a token to wear around their necks; those 
who did not had their hands cut off and were left to bleed to death; the deserters were hunted down and 
killed" (ibid.: 502). God also usually had a part at least in the earlier stages. An excellent illustration is 
Robinson Crusoe. For a reconstruction of the reality behind Crusoe's tale, see Diana Souhami (2002). 
37 I say that the multiattribute hierarchy is generally in place, because it functions like a sort of scale 
where the sum total depends on all the beads in all the rows of the Abacus. An example of this 
hierarchical scale can be seen at work in Aristotle's Politics when he remarks, "The freeman rules over 
the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the 
child; although the parts of the souls are present in all of them, they are present in different degrees. For 
the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, 
but it is immature" (in Code 1991: 9, emphases added). 
Or to take a recent example, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre towers in New York, 
USA on September 11th 2001, and in the aftermath of the US bombing attack on Afghanistan, there 
were numerous programmes on television in 'the West', discussing the issue of how do we tell "our 
children" about what happened. That the rare reportings of the horrible plight of the Other (Afghan) 
children was crowded out to select alternative media, probably confirms Rousseau's remarks (see 
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3.7 The Postcolonial Moment In Epistemology 
[D]riven by the subaltern history of the margins of modernity - rather than by the 
failures of logocentrism - I have tried, in some small measure, to revise the known, to 
rename the postmodern from the position of the postcolonial (Homi Bhabha 1994: 
1~~ . 
I earlier defmed the postcolO~1 moment in epistemology as the placing of difference at the 
heart of self and identity in order to disrupt the modernist disciplinary logic that relies upon 
creating knowledge based upon manufacturing conceptual abstractions and universalising their 
essence. 
Let me clarify a few things. To begin with, I could be asked, why the "postcolonial" moment? 
This can be interpreted in several ways. For instance, it could mean, why go further? Why not 
say that the subject is dead, and this is enough - why this fascination with 'post-al politics'? 
Does not my cup overflow? In my argument, therefore, the Other of enlightenment modernism 
is not a fixed and stable category of exclusion whose origins can be foundationally traced. It is 
the very unravelling of the illusion that enlightenment modernism ever was, and also at the 
same time it is a demonstration of the grasping power of this illusion in disciplinary 
knowledge (see Edward Said 1978). Indeed, the whole thrust of my thesis has been that one 
cannot begin from the discipline (say, economics) in order to undo the seams where it is 
sutured together. Rather, one has to confront its coming into being in a strategic manner in 
which one never suspends the suspicion over its existence. 
It is, therefore, an unfamiliar theoretical geography which can let monsters erupt (unfamiliar 
because it is a theoretical geography which is not 'proper' theory, method, history, philosophy, 
anything - it questions the status of 'proper' as a rational economic production). It will not be 
a simple matter of mapping exclusions from an Archimedean point because the geography of 
studying boundaries as already marked out depends on imagining a prior unbounded 
coherence. The act of mapping, connoted as it is, to imperial surveying, relies upon the 
comprehension of a structure which cannot be further interrogated. Structures have to be 
above, the discussion of his discourse on political economy) on the limited and geographically specific 
store of sympathy, at least fur a significant section of the population. 
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situated in place (placed) before they are destabilised, and it is the traces of the act of 
differentiating excesses to create meaning, that require attention.38 
I will now turn towards discussion of the much-anticipated (and already inaugurated) 
postcolonial moment in epistemology. I would like to argue for the postcolonial moment in 
epistemology - because, the globe extends beyond Europe, because, there might have been 
people before the Greeks, because, the dilemmas of the unlfoldjpt Western European subject 
(the w.e/'we') are not exhaustive of me. In short, because, there are many. Many traditions, 
languages, philosophies, ways of thinking, writing and being and saying so, but also saying. 
Like the obscure Jude's little child's scrawt,39 the graffiti on the walls of history - in one ink 
should not testify to murder, even as suicide. It should not read - "Done because we are too 
menny". Some of us had to die. Rather, it should be about breathing multiply against the 
suffocation of the One. 
On the other hand, the question could be why the 'post' of 'colonial', specifically? To this, I 
have the following to say. I do not believe in the lexicographical understanding of 'post' as 
that which comes after, as a temporal prefix. Numerous writers have defended or chastised the 
'post', attempting to locate what "exactly" it means, and it is "precise" relation to the other 
'posts'. For me, to forcefully recognise the postcolonial only as the hyphenated post-of-
colonial is a significant blunting of a term connoting a constellation of ideas which are urgent 
and crucial. This is because the 'postcolonial' is not, in my view, a fashionable-Iefty-third-
world kind of lit-crit badge! The reason I have chosen to take the longer, tortuous, definitely 
'non-mainstream' attempt to theorise the violence of the modernist scientism of economics is 
because I want to make the connections between strands of thought such as the following. 
There is the notion of economics as a science. This is located in the establishment of the 
conceptual idea of what a science is and does - something which is not universal. On the 
contrary this is historically, temporally, geopolitically, ideologically located and contingent. 
38 This attention to textuality is not at the expense of giving up any 'real' concerns. Reality exists in 
language, with language. There is no other way of accessing it. However, if the comprehension of 
materiality within language resonates so well with the immediate physicality of our being in the world, 
then this should not be a problem. The material concerns of our physical being in the world are 
undeniable, but no less, and no more, real than anything else. In sum, the real is not a terrifying spectre 
in my account. 
39 This refers to Jude the Obscure (1895) by Thomas Hardy in which the eldest child of the protagonist 
kills himself and two younger siblings, leaving behind a note that said "Done because we are too menny 
[sic]" . 
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Enlightenment epistemology underwrote such a universalised idea of 'science' and further , , 
made its formalistic emergence possible in the nineteenth-century mutations of responses to 
the problem of knowledge, of which economics is an example. 
Now, there are also implications of the above. That is, how economics was sanctioned as a 
societal mechanism - a 'practice' - of management, of colonisation, of organising what now,-
came to be seen as 'economic' experiences under the lengthening shadow of modernity 
through which everything was filtered. By the same token, a knowledge management exercise 
feeds and feeds off other knowledges and means of access to them. These strands are 
intimately connected. The belief that calls for an uncritical acceptance of the split between 
theory and praxis, is the same as that which painstakingly ensures the pigeonholed separation 
between the economic, the political, the cultural, the scientific. 
Thus, modernist knowledge needs to be haunted by a postcolonial memory, a re-membering, 
which can be instigated by placing the question of difference at the heart of the story. When 
one re-members, one does not simply recall - to re-member is to put it all together again. This 
putting together all over again is not a temporalised recitation of what happened after what. 
Rather, it is fIrst of all an undoing of the present. Think of it like this. There is a present (it 
could even be doubly metaphorical, so one can even think of a present as that which one 
holds, an uncertain gift).40 In order to re-member the present, one has to not undo simply the 
present, but also undo oneself. As one rethinks all the trajectories that led to the here-and-now, 
as one undoes all the strings of the uncertain gift that one holds, it dissolves the coherent 
continuity of the grid of comprehension. Now, as the closures of the present moment are 
revisited, its coherence (and one's own) is undone. We have, therefore, an implicit unravelling 
in any re-membering. 
40 The word 'present' can stand in for a gift. Present, in time, can also be seen as an (uncertain) gift. 
Further, a gift unsettles the logic of economism. Yet, if economy is the dialogue between the infinity 
and finitude, then an economy of the gift is impossible. But if this is speaking in the spirit of Jacques 
Derrida, there is also Marcel Mauss. John O'Neill (2001: 41-48), following Mauss, would rather not 
endow a philosophical pedigree to the "free gift", making the gift both voluntary and obligatory. He 
writes, "today, as we give less to the poor, by refusing them work, reducing their wages, and 
withdrawing welfare, market theorists rationalise the withdrawal of the gift and articulate an ideology of 
the free gift - the gift that obligates neither the donor nor the donee". Constantin Boundas (2001: 2) 
summarises O'Neill's belief in the significance of Mauss, according to whom, "social life involves a 
meta-gift, that is, an inalienable surplus of labour and service, incapable of being reduced to the 
calculation of contracts". 
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In this way, the postcolonial moment in epistemology, is immediately also the interpellation of 
knowing with re-membering. For, after all, how does one know in the face of memory? This is 
an important question because trawling through the backyard of Western enlightenment 
modernism, one fmds that this question has been erased from significance by the positing of 
science as universal memory. But since no erasure can be traceless, the haunting comes back. 
And one can interrogate the how of one's knowledge by undoing the coherence of oneself 
(untie the strings of the uncertain gift, the present) in the face of memory, by re-membering 
differently, with difference. 
At once, many issues arise. Modernist enlightenment epistemology sought to explain "the 
unfamiliar in familiar and everyday terms". For Smith, monsters served the purpose of de-
monstrating Others. Now, by remembering difference, the move is to make the familiar 
unfamiliar. This is what is underway when I speak about the attempt to en culture, historicise, 
politicise the 'economic' context. What this calls for is a translation - not of terms, but of 
oneself. The 'I' that stands between theory and praxis, needs to 'see' differently. Hume's 
disregard for travellers' tales will not do. Instead, theory itself will have to travel. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Francis Fukuyama's End ofhistory and the last man (1992) is a recent presentation of Hegel's 
dialectical history to interpret contemporary historical events as the ultimate "triumph" of 
liberal democratic capitalism. As Derrida has argued, Fukuyama's eschatological 
announcement of the end of history is based upon reducing the singularity of events to 
"historical empiricity". 
William Spanos (2001) brings into relief the imperialism of Fukuyama's metaphysical 
ontology (the hegemony and mediatisation of this representation). In his critique of 
Fukuyama, Spanos argues that to an extent the impasse of emancipatory political practice in 
the post-Cold War period is in some significant degree "an impasse of thinking itself' (35, 
emphasis original). My link to this argument is exactly this focus on the relevance of re-
thinking, and thinking Otherwise. Along with Spanos, I would argue for a reconstellated 
genealogy to "instigate a rethinking of the relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated 
by the post-Cold War global occasion" (41, emphasis original). His project, which is "to make 
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visible and operational the substantial practical role that ontological representation has played 
and continues to play in the West's perennial global imperial project", therefore requires this 
need to reintegrate theory and practice - the ontological and the socio-political, 
thinking and doing - and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this 
relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonisation of thinking in 
the age of the world picture, ... [T]his reconstellated destructive genealogy will show 
that the 'triumphant' liberal democratic/capitalist polity rests on a fabricated 
ontological'-base that privileges the hierarchically structured binarist principle of 
principles - thandentity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the 
other way arouiid - and that, therefore, this polity is imperial in essence as well as in 
its multi-situated political practices. 
Modernist knowledge has consistently striven to elide the question of difference. But, 
difference is a slippery slope. When it is not attended to at all, it does not go away - rather, it 
remains beyond the boundaries, returning a silent powerful gaze. Thus we find that the 
repressed of the Cartesian remainder has returned. On the other hand, when one attends to 
difference, but only by making identity as a condition for the possibility of difference - then, it 
is no longer clear where to draw the boundaries of difference. This situating of difference as 
the latent monster that will not go away, is not merely literary or poetic-philosophic, it is 
political and ethical (in short, it is not 'merely theoretical', but also practical - of course, it is 
another matter that the divides between literary, poetic-philosophic, political, ethical, or even 
the economic, are sustained by the originary act of splitting theory from praxis, itself a most 
important systematic policing of the differentials). Just as the Queen in Alice's adventures in 
Wonderland had only one way of settling all difficulties ("Off with his/her head"), modernist 
disciplinary knowledge can only keep up its house-of-cards facade by denouncing critique as 
'airy-fairy'. The remarkable fairytale is the way in which modernist abstractions stick as 
'real', while the hard work of uncovering and blowing apart concepts such as the sovereign 
individual subject, the nation state, culture, is dismissed as 'theoretical'. 
Recent critiques of modernist knowledge in the form of feminism, poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, deconstruction, and postcoloniality have attempted to grapple with the 
dehiscence in modernism, inaugurating newer handles to subjectivity such as the theorising of 
desire and scrutiny of modes of representation. However, within modernist knowledge even 
critique is subject to pigeon-holing and neutralisation, and the thrust has been to limit 
participation in these multiple theoretical theatres. The privilege of multiple attendance is 
taboo, and this ghettoisation of critique is itself an effective strategy of policing the channels 
through which responses to enlightenment modernism can be conducted. In accordance with 
these views, I shall not definitionally clarify each of these terms, attempting to set their 
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boundaries and locate their emphases. Modernist lexicography in all its strategic inadequacies 
is the place for that.41 Many alliances can be made under the shadow of the subject, but as long 
as they are made under the shadow of the subject, they will impose the same neurotic 
insistence on affiliation ("identification") as the unexamined precondition for concern or 
political ethics. Finally, if the call of difference prevails in an absolute sense (and there is no 
inkling of danger of this being the case in the world t9day), then it means that difference, like 
a monster, has erupted from within identity itself. Such di-tference is not a theorisation of the 
-
Other, it is instead a stepping beyond ever being able to define the self. In which case, 
thinking is "questioning and putting ourselves in question as much as the cherished opinions 
and inherited doctrines we have long taken for granted" (Martin Heidegger 1968: Xll, 
emphasis added). 
41 How do I support this assertion? Well, lexicography is the ultimate modern art of taxonomising 
comprehension, at the same time blunting it irrevocably. One can imagine the whiteness of the page as 
set into the authority of the black marks in the middle, the margins, and here, down below, the 
footnotes. The footnotes are for paraphernalia, so the conventional wisdom goes. But, two or three 
things I know about meaning insist otherwise. The origins of the word "paraphernalia" indicate that it 
was used to designate the property that remained under a married woman's own control- since when 
did we come to understand that as being (or, more importantly, why is that) insignificant? Now, to the 
inadequacy of lexicography. Nicholas Royle (2000) in an article titled "What is Deconstruction?" 
brilliantly takes apart the Chambers English Dictionary definition of the term. I will not repeat the 
Chambers definition here but instead recall the hypothesis Nicholas Royle offers for its awfulness, 
"your definition is haunted by the anxiety that, with deconstruction, the very possibility of a dictionary 
explodes" (ibid.: 2). The rest of Royle's text discusses deconstruction, text and contexts, and offers 
alternatives. The next question is why are these inadequacies of lexicography strategic? Let me now 
give an example of my own (telepathy, perhaps, but I had for formulated this example from Chambers 
too, and befOre setting eyes upon Royle 2000) to illustrate what I term (yes, even the footnote can be a 
place fOr naming, it was in fOotnotes that Kant declared the exceptions of Reason, and the American 
Declaration declared the limits of freedom) "lexical politics". The Chambers Dictionary (1999) which 
claims to be "The Authority on English Today" (emphasis original), defines the word 'Hottentot' as, 
Hottentot n. one of a dwindling, nomad, pastoral, pale-brown-skinned race in SW Africa 
(resembling Bushmen and Bantu), calling themselves khoi-khoin (men of men); their language; 
a barbarian; a member of any black or coloured people (old derog); ... [the rest of the entry 
refers to non-capitalised meaning relating to a fish, fruits animals etc.] 
Note the way in which the entry is phrased, with the usage "calling themselves", "their language". It 
does not begin to mention that Hottentot is "our old derogatory" term for the "khoi-khoin" people. In 
other words, Hottentot is the term for people who call themselves khoi-khoin, rather than, it being our 
derogatory term for the khoi-khoin. 
This is a lexicographic entry strategic in its politics - making strategically invisible a politics enacted in 
history over SaaJ1je Baartman (1789-1816), a native Khoisan woman who was exhibited in Europe as 
an ethnological and sexual freak to curious Europeans to support their ideas on African race and 
sexuality (the "Hottentot Venus"). She later drifted into poverty and prostitution and died. Her re~ai~s 
(her brain, genitalia were bottled as scientific specimens), until recently at the Museum ofMankmd m 
Paris, were returned to South African government on the 3 May 2002, as a result of talks initiated in 
1995. The Los Angeles Times reports a leader of Griqua Heritage as "This is not the coming of one 
person - it is the coming of a nation" ("A S. African Native's Homecoming" 2002). For more on this, 
see S. Hall (1997). 
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Knowledge creation is then no longer a prelude to effectively intervening in the world, but is 
itself an intervention whose effectivity relies upon an ethics which is experienced in its 
enactment. Or, that knowledge creation is already a fonn of ethics, politics, strategy, 
subjectivity, Reason, and being. It is in this spirit that I will go on to juxtapose the economic 
with identity in the next part of the thesis. 
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Part Four: Juxtaposing Questions Of Identity And The Economic 
It was~'t only wic~edness and scheming that made people unhappy, it was confusion 
and rrusunderstandmg; above all, it was the failure to grasp the simple truth that other 
people are as real as you. And only in a story could you enter these different minds 
and show how they had an equal value. That was the only moral a story need have 
(Ian McEwan 2002: 40, emphasis added). 
In parts one and two of the thesis, my concern was with the possibility of social science, and 
the particular fonn of theorisation that is involved in being scientific about the economic 
realm in the social, and how this theorisation in economics relates to the methodological 
compromises necessitated by an underlying enlightenment epistemology. In chapter three, my 
aim was to examine the questions of difference in relation to the questions of modernist 
knowledge, demonstrating how the transcendental pretence that has functioned under the sign 
of human nature has taken for granted a particular version of subjectivity which was also 
influential in the discourses on political economy. In contrast, the postcolonial moment in 
epistemology allows us to move beyond the disciplined categories of knowledge which have 
situated the Other as a limit-phenomenon. 
In linking up the concerns raised by an exploration of the theoretical status of economics and 
its imbrication in the wider modernist elisions of difference, it becomes imperative to examine 
the links between identity and the economic. Accordingly, in this third part of the thesis, I will 
approach the issue of identity and economics. In chapter four, I want to turn my attention to 
examining the 'essentialist individual' view of identity which is dominant in economics and 
mainstream social science. I will discuss several critiques of it, and then reflect on other ways 
of thinking identity which arise from assessing the limitations of these critiques themselves. 
The action in this chapter can be seen as the setting up of contrast between different versions 
of identity - the 'essentialist individual' notion of identity as followed in economics, and as a 
response to the problems inherent in this view, the version of identity as a matter of politics in 
relation to inalienably situated subjects. This second version can provide the resource to 
envision what I will term the 'politics of identity', and which avoids the pitfalls of standard 
'identity politics'. 
In chapter five, I will discuss and critique the only rare instances where economists have 
attempted discourse on identity. The fIrst of these is a straightforward economic model where 
identity is introduced as a variable into utility function, and in the second, identity is seen as 
119 
an important matter but it is nonetheless subsumed by the overarching dynamic of rational 
urUversalFleason. 
In chapter six, I will introduce the 'concentric mode of identity' which is deployed by not only 
the abstract essentialist view which underlies the economists' discussions, but also by 
prominent cosmopolitan. accounts such as that of Martha Nussbaum. I will present critiques of 
thinking identity in this m~r, and link back to the 'politics of identity' view discussed 
-
earlier. Drawing upon the work of Homi Bhabha, I will argue that a productive way of 
thinking about identity is to formulate it as translational experiencing. This 'translational mode 
of identity' not only avoids the difficulties associated with conventional identity politics, but 
also enables us to affirm the ethical importance of being always-already different. Following 
on from this, I will transpose the discussion to considering how the divide between identity 
and economic as separable rests upon a presumed separation between the spheres of culture 
and economy. This then allows economics to function as the science of economy and a 
representation of the economic category, however the very basis of economics in a fixing of 
value, is always the fixing of values in translation. I will explain this and theorise the slippage 
between the categories of economics, economy, and economic. I will conclude with making 
the case that a translational view of identity in relation to the economic makes it imperative to 
envision the writing of economic theory anOther ways. 
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Chapter Four: Identity Prolkmatics 
4.1 On Identity 
I know who I am and I know where I am from (US Senator Robert Dole in Dan 
Smith 2001: 32) ,-' 
/ 
The question of identity can be approached in many ways, for -many strategic reasons (see 
John Shotter and Kenneth Gergen 1989; Raymond Corbey and Joep Leerssen 1991; Scott 
Lash and Jonathan Friedman 1992; Henry Harris 1995; Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay 1996; 
Kathryn Woodward 1997; du Gay et al. 2000). The question of identity has been discussed by 
framing it in terms of whether identity is mostly a fixed, self-same continuity over time, or 
whether it is something that 'comes about' at a point in time, and so is not predetermined or 
always present, but happens. Also, one can contrast the personal identity of the 'I' with the 
collective identity of the 'we'. 
F or the purposes of my argument here I need to make a· distinction between identity as it is 
tied up with the supposed epistemological subjects and agents which are the objects of inquiry, 
and identity as an aspect of subjectivity. While the first raises questions of identity as a 
construction within the production of knowledge, the second relates to an experiential 
dimension of identity. These notions are inevitably connected, but my discussions here will be 
more pertinent to the exploration of identity and difference in relation to knowledge 
production in a social science like economics. 
Within economics, the 'subject' of knowledge is seen as being abstract and universal. In line 
with modernist social science in general, the aspirations of disciplinary knowledge imply that 
the universal subject is an essence distilled from all the particularities of time and place. This 
essentialist individual view of identity plays an important part in economics, and identity is 
seen as a fixed and continuous sense of self of an abstract rational individual. However, as I 
will go on to explore, there are many ways of problematising this construction. The 
essentialised and universal subject of social scientific inquiry available to be understood 
through formalist methods, is not simply a convenient way of enhancing scientific knowledge, 
but a very particular view of identity in relation to knowledge. This view crucially depends on 
identifying individuals as isolatable units, employs a notion of choice which is problematic, 
and does not adequat~ly r~fW~~ ~4~ reality of human existence. These are some of the many 
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critiques that have justifiably been levelled at the abstract essentialist view of identity in 
economics. In what follows, I will summarise these criticisms, and then discuss the ways in 
which we can go beyond basing knowledge on the study of abstract essentialised individuals 
, 
to thinking about knowledge in relation to 'standpoints' and identity politics. While standpoint 
theory and identity politics are able to go some way towards accommodating difference in 
relation to knowledge production, I will also discuss some limitations of these endeavours '-, 
and argue for maintaining a position which may be called the 'politics of identity'. Such a way 
of rethinking identity in relation to knowledge can provide us with ways out of the 'difference 
conundrum' where either difference is added on or it is excluded. 
4.2 Abstract Essentialist Individual Identity 
[T]he private is measured by and contains within it the possibility of the social. The 
seemingly concrete individual is predicated by the possibility of abstraction (Gayatri 
Chakravorty SpiVak 1999: 178). 
The most important component of the essentialist version of identity is continuity and 
sameness. Identity, on this account, becomes a corroborative seamlessness whose clarity and 
stability is not subject to question. Also, this ties in rather well with the personal account of 
identity as originating from the personal I. In practice, the sum of these two views is often 
traced back to the Cartesian self and the Kantian subject with transcendental pretence. This 
self-aware subject is necessarily an individual who is the basic conceptual apparatus through 
which everything else is filtered. This individual self is the bounded container of autonomy, 
rationality and Reason. 
This essentialist individual mode of identity underlies, apart from several other ideologies, 
liberal individualism. William Connolly (1991: 73-74, second emphasis added) in his 
discussion of liberal individualism in relation to identity rightly points out that, 
individualism presupposes a model of the normal or rational individual against which 
the conduct and interior of each actual self are to be appraised.... the doctrine of the 
steadfast individual (the autonomous agent, the self-interested agent, the normal 
individual) easily becomes ... a doctrine of normalization through individualization .... 
The theory of the normal individual establishes its parameters of normality not so 
much by specific argumentation as by omissions in its generic characterization of the 
individual. 
The ideal subject of knowledge is pointed out not by careful distinguishing of its outlines, but 
rather by a positing a 'legitimate' version of identity. This normalising of essentialist 
individualism is not just a fictive exercise, but also an important political move. It limits the 
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terrain of explanation and fixes the basic atomic structure concept of abstract individual 
identity that has to be mobilised in order to create meaning in a social science like economics. 
For instance, it both structures and confmes what can be seen as political, and how. As a result 
(ibid., emphases added), the 
~endenc~ is.t~ reduce the poli~cal to the jUridical- to condense most issues of politics 
mto the Jundical category of nghts, justice, obligation, and responsibility and to treat 
the remaining issues instrumentally as contests in which individuals and aggregations 
compete within juridical rules to advance their "interests" or "principles" by 
rational means. 
Within essentialist individual mode, the legitimate conceptualisation of identity is one based 
upon basic uninterrogable units who interact in accordance with pre-understood rules in 
predetermined ways. 
The work done by the idealisation of the abstract individual as the basic anchor of knowledge 
can be seen in two different ways. The position of the knower and the object of knowledge are 
both idealised in the image of the abstract individual. The social scientist is seen as the 
collector of knowledge, who, in order to better theorise and augment the store of knowledge 
and create 'good' science, should try to approximate as closely as possible the characteristics 
of an ideal abstract individual in pursuit of knowledge. Analogously, the object of knowledge 
or what knowledge is about, is also seen as graspable in terms of the abstract individual. 
These two positions are seen to be reflected in each other whereby the ideal pursuit of 
knowledge requires abstract individual type social scientists to engage in the study of their 
subject matter which is characterised in terms of abstract individuals like themselves. There is 
a strong normative aspect to this idealisation, since it is believed that good knowledge is one 
that is available universally in terms of abstract individuals, and in order to reach such 
knowledge, the social scientist has to approximate the position of an abstract individual 
knower. 
This view of identity as an attribute of self-aware subject individuals acting in their self-
interest in conformity with the ideas of rational choice and economic principle is the basis of 
the economic agent, 'homo economicus', as conceptualised in economic theory (see Nancy 
Folbre and Heidi Hartmann 1988; Paula England 1995). In this scenario, the economic agents 
are usually by definition rational, self-interested (thus profit motivated), utility maximising 
(thus constantly calculating), amoral, disembodied and disembedded, abstract individuals. As 
a Hobbesian mushroom, this homo economicus (HE) is the quintessential Rational Economic 
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Man (REM). As Martin Hollis and Edward Nell (1975: 54-55, emphasis added) write, HE is 
an abstract being: 
His i~ the behaviour to be predicted; he is the bearer of economic variables. Unlike the 
man ill the street, he never misses an opening, ignores a price change, overrates the 
short-run or turns a blind eye to the unquantifiable. Every model predicts the rational 
response. Rational economic man is both the average and the ideal ... 
Identity of the homo economi~us signals a "stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning 
to end through all the vicissitudes gfhistory without change; the bit of the self which remains 
always-already 'the same', identical to itself across time" (Hall 2000: 17). REM's identity is 
seen as a possession, an essence, abstract, and naturally flxed, not at "all as contingent, 
processual, contextual, and in flux. 
Thus, in order to understand the 'market' as an economic phenomenon, one would resort to a 
thought process whereby numerous similar self-aware subject individuals (further assumed to 
be acting in their self-interest, a motive deriving from human nature, and reminiscent of the 
transcendental pretence) interact and transact in goods and services together. Similarly, to 
understand any other social process or institutional setting, the explanation would begin from 
an abstract individual who is the self-aware subject and rational agent. 
Further, within the essentialist individual mode, the having of identity is grounded in the 
exercise of choice. There is an important role for a subject who is capable of conscious choice 
in a radical sense. This is because in this act of choosing, the subject of knowledge seemingly 
locates its identity flrmly and irrevocably. The 'I' of identity is a conscious self-aware subject, 
who not only is always able to calculate the possible outcomes of alternatives and then make 
the rational and free decision (exerts choice), but also serves as the theoretical boundary 
within which responsibility for actions can be fixed. The ability to then exercise conscious 
rational and free choice, for which responsibility can be located, gives us the model of 
subjective identity which is the condition for any identity. 
But this focus on the role of choice in constructing the identity of the free and rational 
economic agent, does not clarify what counts as a free choice. Knowledge production in 
mainstream economics takes the following form. We assume the existence of an abstract 
essentialist individual being able to maximise its utility, or rank order its preferences! over a 
! The answer to "where do the preferences come from?" is typically, you need to go t.o psychology for 
that. As if, the separability of disciplines in the modernist rendition of knowing and bemg can somehow 
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bundle of goods in a way so as to give us 'well-behaved' (convex to the origin of X _ Y axis 
, 
not cross each other, etc.) indifference curves. Further, there exist externally given constraints, 
which do not influence preferences and the indifference curve and the budget constraints are 
matched at the beautiful and aesthetic tangency on the graph.2 The basic neoclassical 
micro economic conceptualisation of consumer theory is mirrored in production theory,3 and 
the competitive markets match demand and supply to ensure equilibrium. Further, 
mathematical proofs ensure that under certain conditions the whole ec~omy (a mathematical 
system) equilibrates to a perfect and brilliant humming aesthetics.4 This abstracted essentialist 
individual economic agent is like the one point that Archimedes wanted, and Descartes craved, 
to be able to accomplish everything else. 
4.3 Critiquing The Abstract Essentialist Individual View Of Identity 
The challenge is to recognize ourselves for what we are, and not for pale, essentialist 
shadows (Dan Smith 2001: 46). 
The next question is, what can we make of the essentialist individual version of identity? I 
now want to critique this view of identity especially as it underlies much of economic theory. 
First, if the basic premise of knowledge in a social science is the idea of a universal subject 
like the rational economic being, then the actual study of people can only proceed by ignoring 
all the ways in which they are not like the rational economic beings. We have a trajectory that 
deny that all these structures of knowledge share their common bases in Cartesian subjectivity, 
enlightenment epistemology and modernism. 
2 Of course there are complications. But, basically: 'Consumers demand. Producers supply. Self-interest 
being ever present. Markets oblige. Everything else is a complication'. 
3 So budget lines becomes iso-cost lines, indifference curves become iso-quants, marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) between the choice of goods for the consumer becomes marginal rate of technical 
substitution (MRTS) in between factors of labour and capital for the producer, and so on. For 
confIrmation, browse through introductory chapters of any economics textbook. 
4 As Erwin Klein (1998: 189-190) summarises (referring to Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu 1954, 
which stated the general conditions for the existence of equilibrium, the 'existence proofs'): 
An Arrow-Debreu economy consists of a [mite number of units executing production plans 
and a fInite number of units realising consumption plans. Such production and consumption 
plans are always expressed as real, finite-components vectors of commodities .... A competitive 
economy is one in which each agent takes prices as given and these are independent of ~e 
agent's individual choice decisions. Evi~ence o~ the consistency of a competitive economy IS 
the existence of a competitive or Walraslan solutlOn for such a system. 
On the other hand macroeconomics has the share of the messy questions of trade, employment, 
inflation, exchang~ rates, business cycles, growth but there are no 'microfoun~ations' of 
macroeconomics, and in any case macroeconomics too proceeds from the assumptron of the 
'representative agent', see Alan Kinnan (1992). 
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begins from a desire for universal knowledge, for which it requires conceptual abstractions, 
which in tum limit the inquiry to formalist modelling. The formalism and universalism of a 
social science like economics feed upon each other. Tony Lawson (1997) explains this 
problem of method in the following way. Mainstream economics is based upon a method of 
deductive closed systems modelling in order to obtain conclusions of if-this-then-that type. 
However, this presumes that the world is a closed system within which we can postulate event 
regularities, and is not suited to grasping the reality of an open system such as the real world 
where conclusions of if-this-then-that type are not sustainable. As a result, economic theory 
based upon the assumption of abstract similar and universal rational economic agents both 
requires and is required by formalism. 
Second, the identity of the economic agent as universal subject which underlies knowledge 
production is not simply an abstraction, but also an important and political construction. We 
can see this in two different ways. The abstract individual economic agent is both an 
individual, and a particular type of individual. Thus, while the first criticism (see above) 
draws attention only to the way in which this abstractiQn serves the ends of formalism and 
universalism, we can broaden this critique by focusing on the way in which this view of the 
identity of the subjects of knowledge is limited to their being individuals of a particular type. 
What at frrst seemed to be a convenient fiction manufactured in the interests of knowledge 
productio~ is actually an interested construction that serves particular ends. For instance, as 
feminist economists have argued, though the homo economicus is deemed to be an abstract 
individual, a being without a body, this abstraction is based upon a normalisation of gendered 
(masculine) and raced (white) Enlightenment rational man.5 A focus on this version of identity 
simultaneously obscures from view not only the constructed nature of the individual subject, 
but also confirms it as the model of ideal identity which must be aspired to by everyone. 
Let me now give two examples of the consequences that can result from unquestioningly 
keeping with the view of identity which is limited to individuals of a particular type. The first 
example is to draw attention to the link between this notion of identity and the conception of 
an individual as an isolatable unit. Given that this view of identity places a premium on the 
sense of continuity and sameness, the notion of an 'individual' seems to fit in naturally since it 
5 England's (1993) work on the separative self in neoclassical economics, Ulla Grapard's °.996) work 
on the "benevolence of the (famous Smithian) butcher's wife", Susan Feiner's (1999) portraIt of HE as 
a young man, and especially Gillian Hewitson's (1999) deconstruct~on of Robinson Crusoe as the REM 
- all have dealt with the androcentric character of the homo econonncus. 
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ostensibly provides a way of thinking a coherent and continuous I which [lXes continued self-
aware identity. In the context of economics, the single unit of the individual is used to signify 
a core stable essence which is determinate and not subject to interpretation. The study of any 
situation can proceed as ifbetween different individual actors, and the conclusions can then be 
applied to situations where the actors may be different people, groups of people, or countries. 
Jhe problem arises because on this account there is no way of paying attention to the 
sign¢'cance of sociality which is not fixed by simply individuals. The social becomes just an 
aggregation of individuals, and nothing more. We have a billiard-ball like model of 
interactions, with no insight on the processual nature of how social outcomes come about. We 
study human behaviour and social processes by taking a 'snapshot' of situations where there 
are essentially similar individual actors who take upon identities A or B (for instance, 
consumers or producers), and then the hypothesisations of their interactions can be universally 
generalised. 6 This format of comparative statics 7 in economics is a social scientific gloss that 
serves as an excuse for obliterating serious consideration of how meaningful knowledge can 
be generated about the widely divergent social contexts in which processual identities are 
continually discovered and enacted upon. 
An example of extremely simplistic characterisation of interactions is to assume that there are 
two units (for instance, country A and country B) and under certain conditions certain 
outcomes (e.g., the benefits of free trade) will mathematically hold. Lifting the conclusions of 
this study to talk about two nations (who are now thought of as two countries from the 
economic world) and argue for certain policy measures, does not allow power differentials to 
become visible. This is very destructive for instance in international negotiations (climate 
change, aid, trade related, etc.) where all nations are assumed to be like abstract isolatable 
individuals, the ideal concept of a nation, so we have a situation with power imbalances -
hundreds of delegates (lawyers, scientists, negotiators) representing the powerful matched by 
the meagre resources of another nation. As Jagdish Bhagwati (2001: 29) asks, "[w]hy not get a 
rich country to give the poor countries against which it is bringing the case a sum that matches 
its own estimated legal expenses, so that the contest is equal?". Another way of going about 
6 For instance, the way in which economists have continued to study discrimination as the outcome of 
interactions between groups such as W and N (white and 'negro' as in Arrow 1995 [1972]) or W and B 
(white and black as in Coates and Loury 1993). See al~o Arr0:V (1998)., . . 
7 In comparative static analysis, one of the 'other things bemg equal p.arameters .IS altered to see I~S 
effect on equilibrium price and quantity. So, what . .w~uld happen if. som~thillg was al~er~ ill 
equilibrium one - the new equilibrium would be equilibnum two. Bear ill mmd, the analYSIS IS not 
about the process (the 'how' of change) but about two states of a hypothetical system. 
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the situation is to realise that the linkages and similarity of interests are not always bounded by 
geography, so that one begins by starting from the imbroglio where interests are multiply and 
variously aligned, there is an enormous diversity of actors, and actions have real-time 
consequences. A 'snapshot' will not do, and neither will it help to carry out the two stage 
routine where fIrst we get conclusions on the basis of the essentialist individual abstract 
economic agent, and then attempL to graft this upon a 'messy real world'. There is no 
substitute for making way through the-{arious interpretations that exist of the materiality of 
the world,8 and how inalienably situated people navigate processually through its various 
comp lexities. 
The second example alludes to the consequences of not realising that this model of identity 
does not simply posit anly individual as the marker of knowledge, but a particular type of 
individual. An essentialist abstract self-aware subject individual rationally acting in its self-
interest, not only normalises such behaviour making the political into the juridical and is 
unrealistic as the basis for social science, but, is also representative of the patterns of 
behaviour following from the privileges that accrue to masculinity in society. The white 
heterosexual middle-class able-bodied Anglo-Saxon man (and this 'incidentally' fits the 
description of a typical economist) is perhaps most representative of the economic agent in the 
economic world. Feminist economists have pointed out how this version of identity has 
excluded people for whom relationality is not an option but a part of their life (see England 
1993; Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson 1993; Diana Strassmann 1993a; Folbre 1994; Edith 
Kuiper and Jolande Sap 1995; Grapard 1996; Hewitson 1999). Women, who are in almost 
every society in the world, expected to be the most 'natural' caregivers and mitigate the 
excesses of the economic agent by situating them in a wider context of nonmarket social glue, 
most obviously do not fit into this view of identity. Their difference is to be claimed as a 
deviance from the individualised norm of abstract essentialist identity. 
Third, partly as a consequence of the critiques above, one of the most common ways in which 
the view of identity underlying economic theory is rejected amounts to saying (in many 
different ways as evidenced by the various heterodox schools of thought) - economic theory is 
not realistic, its underlying notion of how people are and how they behave does not match up 
with the reality of people's lives. The abstract essentialist version of identity based upon a 
8 I am not arguing that there is a brute materiali~ that is no.t available to interpretation. But ~e~ther am I 
arguing that materiality does not matter. ill my VIew, attentIOn to (what appears to be) matenality and to 
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self-aware coherent sameness of self-interested individuals does not do justice to how people 
actually are. People do not behave like standard economic agents - people don't always know 
what they want, cannot always decide the order of their choices, are not insatiable, often go 
out of their way to help others (see Sen 1977), are not completely motivated by self-interest 
(see Ferber and Nelson 1993), often contradict themselves, and so on. Human beings are 
multidimensional, and cannot be flattened out into fictive rational economic agents. 9 
_/ 
Fourth, another way of critiquing the view of identity underlying economic theory is to focus 
upon the role that is played by employing the notion of 'choice' in the theoretical explanation 
of social outcomes. That is, the theoretical recognition of individuals in an economic 
explanation occurs only through their individualised free choices, whether as consumers or as 
producers. But, as I explain below, there are enormous implications of the way in which the 
concept of choice is utilised to fIX the identity of economic agents in the economic world. Let 
me start with the question - how much is the essentialist individual conception of identity 
dependent upon the capacity of this self-aware rational subject to be able to choose? By choice 
I don't mean that general sense of doing one thing rather than another. Rather, what I wish to 
interrogate in the abstract essentialist individualist version of identity is its need for the 
coherence of the subject that is most manifest in the strong sense of a decision, 'free choice'. 
The relation between identity and choice is clear in economics in a dense filling-in of the 
economic agent with conscious choice which is both free and rationa~ and justifies the 
outcomes in terms of responsibility for having made that choice. Let me explain this. For the 
purposes of economic science, one takes as a starting point any social outcome (say 
unemployment or discrimination). Then, one proceeds to explain it (i.e., constructs a model) 
which we might only have discursive access is still an important part of our work. 
9 However, it should be pointed out that the realist critique of economic theory, while useful, remains 
limited to the extent that it relies upon a correspondence theory of truth. Claiming that economic theory 
does not reflect the reality of people's lives, presents the issue in terms of a misplaced or 'wrong' 
theorisation which excludes certain aspects of reality. Then the way forward is to analyse the ways in 
which there is a 'mismatch' between the theory and the real world so that we can then augment the 
theory in order to make it better or more correct against some verificatory external reality which 
remains brutely available and unaffected by interpretation. But, critiquing economic theory for its 
realism does not go far enough in interrogating the privilege available to the social scientist from whose 
transcendental perspective reality is admitted as uncontested data from which to postulate ontology. 
This approach forecloses the exploration that economic ~eory is Il:0t ~ust a. '~smatch: w~ch can be 
corrected but a power laden production of knowledge whIch needs Its constItutIve outsIde ill order to 
function and at the same time creates its own real. Taking this further would mean admitting the 
contested nature of reality itself whose perception is the effect of power-laden processes of 
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as having occurred as the consequence of conscious purposive rational and free choices made 
by self-aware responsible essentialist individual subject economic agents. This rational choice 
type of explanation lO for social outcomes is seen as an example of the scientific economist 
uncovering causal connections between choices and outcomes. It is seen as merely 'positive' 
economics (as opposed to 'normative' economics). When prescriptions resulting from such 
models or explanations are utilised, the outcomes can be quite stark. For instance, take the 
case of women earning less than men, one can 'explain' this as their rational and free choice to 
have babies and so lose a few years of productivity, in response to which the rational and free 
employers view them as potentially risky and accounting for their lesser productivity over the 
lifetime, pay them less. Take another case, black people earn less than white people, one can 
explain this by some employers having a 'taste' (a term used by Gary Becker of the Chicago 
school) for discrimination, which will in time with competition prove to be costly to sustain, 
and so wage gaps will decrease as the competitive markets will force the discriminating 
employers to realise the increasing costs of their otherwise rational decision made in 
accordance with their 'tastes' (for the bleak ways in which economics and discrimination 
intersect, see William Darity Jr. 1995). Or even, the geI.1dered division of labour within the 
household, the asymmetry between husbands' and wives' share of housework can be 
explained by referring to the specialisation of women in household production in the light of 
which it is a rational choice for household to have an asymmetric gendered division of labour 
to maximise total utility. 
Now, at first glance, the economist as scientist might argue that these justifications are not 
ethical but explanatory. However, this needs to be problematised. Consider now the practical 
consequences of operationalising the prescriptions following from these models. Two that 
Frederic Jameson lists as his 'favourite' are: oppressed minorities only make it worse for 
themselves by fighting back; and, 'household production' in Becker's sense is seriously 
lowered in productivity when the wife has a job (1991: 260-278). Some economists have even 
argued that discrimination could benefit those who are discriminated against by forcing them 
representation. The consequence in this case would no~ be additive ~ut transfonnatory requiring us to 
link up the exercise of power in relation .to the ~nstruct1on of economI~ knowled~e. ., . 
10 For a critique of rational choice theones whIch unp~c~s the four.basIc as~ptIOI~S - that mdIvIduals 
act on the basis of self-interest~ that interpersonal utilIty compansons are lffipoSSIble~ that tastes are 
exogenous to economic models and unchanging~ that individuals are rational- see England 1995. 
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to accumulate more 'human capital'.ll As Barbara Bergmann (2002: 65-66) explains by 
example, 
Glenn Loury published a theoretical paper in the AER on affinnative action. There 
were several very complicated diagrams in it that pwported to show that under certain 
ass~ptions, affirmative action could be harmful to its supposed beneficiaries. The 
mam idea of the paper is this: if a black man is unable to get a job as a truck driver 
because he is discr~~ted ~gainst, he might become a lawyer instead. But if things 
changed. and n-.uck drivmg IS opened to blacks, he wouldn't become a lawyer. So 
_.fiffirmatIve actIon prevents the acquisition of human capital. Loury ignores the 
- possibility that the man turned away from trucking might be unemployed or might 
take up a life of crime. Of course it is possible that affirmative action could do more 
harm than good for other reasons, but you would never know·. for sure using a 
complicated diagram. This is an empirical question. 
In fact, Stephen Coate and Glenn Loury (1993: 1239, emphasis added) conclude with stating 
the "important practical application" of their results thus: "if one objective in the fight against 
discrimination is to break down stereotypes, then it will sometimes be better to encourage 
disadvantaged workers to supply greater efforts, than to bribe or coerce employers into 
promoting these workers". In the light of these examples, the standard response, that the 
economist is simply uncovering causal regularities between choices and outcomes, and that 
the ethical aspect only attaches to otherwise 'scientific' conclusions in the political domain, is 
untenable. Economic theorists functioning under the cover of mathematical method do still 
state their results in practical terms. 
The next question is the extent to which governments can intervene to minimise unequal or 
discriminatory social outcomes or more generally intervene in market for achieving desired 
policy outcomes. Even at this stage, the economists write out not simply the ideological 
rationale for government intervention, but also claim a theoretical rationale against 
government intervention. So that not only on normative, but also on positive terrain, the 
economists explicitly argue against government intervention. Let me given an example. The 
'new classical economics' (mainstream macroeconomics) relies upon the idea of 'rational 
expectations' (leading to a Nobel prize for the economist Robert Lucas), which serves to 
11 Justifying or explaining away discrimination as being favourable. to the discr~ated is not v~ 
different from the oft-expressed sentiment at the turn of the twentIeth century m the US regarding 
slavery being beneficial to the 'negroes' and its abolition having had. adverse influenc~ on them. F~r 
instance in 1891, one of the reasons that Francis Walker, the first presldent of the AmerIcan Econorrnc 
Associa{ion, offered for what was seen as the declining black share in the US population, was the 
competition from the 'vigorous, resolute white element' (see Darity Jr. 1995: 39). 
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demonstrate the irrelevance of government intervention. Ben Fine (1999: 408-409, emphasis 
added) explains this as,12 
the idea that, in effect, each economic agent acts upon the same, consistent economic 
model, fully deploying the information available. This simple, wildly unrealistic, 
assumption raised dramatic implications - that all previously estimated 
macroeconomic models were inappropriate for policy making, and government could 
not effoctively and systematically intervene to shift the path of the economy. Economic 
fluctuations became understood primarily as the consequence of responses to shocks 
by optimizing and efficient etonomic agents who would neutralize systematic 
government intervention by anticipating its intended impact. 
Therefore, social outcomes are 'explained' as a result of rational choice by individuals, there 
is no regard to the simplistic assumptions of the model when policy prescriptions are put 
forward, and at the same time, this is matched by an argument for the irrelevance of 
government intervention at the macro level since peoples' expectations are rational and would 
neutralise government intervention. Again, the crucial assumption that economic agents are 
optimising, efficient, and similar generic individuals is left ungrounded. As a result, the basic 
idea remains the same. Take any outcome, and explain it as having occurred as a result of 
conscious and rational choice by free economic agents. Where this is a bit more difficult in the 
face of continued empirical evidence, bring in 'technological change' as a determinant. 13 
Generally, never question the competitive wisdom of 'free markets', since there is nothing 
better to start an explanatory account than the freely choosing abstract universal self-interested 
rational utility maximising economic agent. Governments, or regulatory agencies should not 
'interfere' with the free choices of economic agents. Moreover, even when governments or 
bureaucracies are created, they are no different from economic agents in pursuing 'rent 
seeking behaviour'. The concept of choice is further linked to the idea of 'willingness to pay' 
as a measure of valuation. As a result, in "the conventional model differences in income for 
personal services reflect ultimately the willingness of the community to pay for such services 
as derived from market desires and preferences", and the net outcome is that "[i]nequality in 
12 Further, he argues that the professions' embrace of rational expectations not only considera~ly 
ratcheted up the levels of mathematical and statistical techniques required, but also ser:ved the Cru~Ial 
function of rescuing the discipline from the analytical stagnation attached to the Keynesian/monetansm 
debate. . 
13 James Galbraith (2000) in his discussion of "how the economists got ~t wron(, gives as one of hIS 
examples: the pet rationale of economists w?en ~xplaining rising pay mequahtIes - they st~ from 
technological change. Never mind that ~e d~Ion o~ technology speeded up after 1994, while pay 
inequalities declined at this time, after havmg illcreased ill the 1980s. 
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nonproperty mcomes thus derives a substantial measure of functional sanction" (John 
Galbraith 1970: 477).14 
All of this suggests that this notion of 'choice' is problematic. Not only is it unjustifiably 
serviced as being rational in the interests of accounting for and maintaining hierarchical social 
outcomes, it is also debatable whether it is 'free' in the way assumed h.y economists. I5 If the 
choice is one between starvation and exploitation, I would not consider it a -~ice in the sense 
that the notion of choice is grounded for the individual essentialist view of identity. Further, I 
cannot accept the logic of a system of understanding economic outcomes which does not take 
into consideration the historical ways in which those starting points came to be. I am referring 
here to way in which economists start from 'initial endowments' taking them as 'given', a 
move which makes it impossible to account for history. And finally, to start from any social 
outcome and justify it as the logical outcome of conscious free and rational choice by 
economic agents is a sure way of never challenging the status quo. A system that produces 
'caviar for the rich before milk for the poor' is not simply producing outcomes in line with 
'effective demand' or 'willingness to pay' and requires not just theoretical justification and 
explanation, but change. However, it becomes impossible to conceive of change if the model 
is presented as being the description of an inevitable outcome of people's choices, when it is 
in fact an interested and problematic refusal to step outside a particularly narrow method, by 
economists who are ideologically complicit with the status quo (also recall Robert 
Heilbroner's discussion of Friedman and Lucas's ideology, referred to in chapter three of the 
thesis). Multiply this need for change many times over for every concept that is uncritically 
harnessed in the service of social scientific justification for capitalist liberal democratic 
outcomes, and it is no longer curious why the essentialist individual version of identity is not 
enough. 
So, let me return to the general account of the relation between identity and choice which 
gives us the 'I' as the model of subjective identity which is the condition for any identity. 
Choice is not a happening, but rather a conscious act of the subject who is both rational and 
free. There is no place here for undecidability within the 'moment of choice' , or the possibility 
14 John Galbraith suggests moving away from assuming consumer sovereignty to account for. prod~cer 
sovereignty which makes this income inequality, at least in part, the product of bureaucratIC desIgn, 
tradition and self-arrangement. 
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that the very idea of choice as an originary moment is an illusion useful for sustairring a 
particular version of identity. There is no choice in the sense of 'the choice' envisaged in this 
version of identity. 
To sum up, the essentialist abstraction of this view of identity can be critiqued for its feeding 
into formalist simplification, interested construction of the particular individual economic 
agent, its 'unrealism', and its deployment of the notion of choice in theoretical explanation. 
All of these draw from thinking of identity as the self same continuity over time of an abstract 
individual agent capable of being located as the origin of the 'I'. This 'subject' of knowledge 
is part of a picture of knowledge creation where the economist as social scientist produces 
simplified theories about the world by assuming it to be full of such abstract similar subjects. 
The demarcations on this account of knowledge are quite clear - there is the social scientist, 
the external reality, and the subjects of knowledge who are all alike. The production of 
knowledge involves a neutral scientific exercise whereby the social scientist applies a method 
to reality in order to theorise it. The application of proper methods will result in proper 
science. Admittedly, this picture of knowledge creation linked to the abstract individual of the 
liberal tradition has been extensively critiqued and relegated in some branches of social study, 
but within economics it retains its fervour. 
My interrogation of the place of 'difference' in the creation of knowledge about the social 
world means that I fmd this picture of knowledge in economics extremely inadequate and 
problematic. The most important problem that I have with the view of knowledge creation 
underlying the identity of the universal subject of economic theory is to do with the treatment 
of difference. Within the essentialist view of identity, the place of the Other is a perpetual 
remainder which destabilises the whole picture of knowledge creation. Difference is either 
ignored, or excluded, or assimilated, or considered as being the 'Other of the same' (as 
discussed in chapter three). 
If knowledge creation is a political endeavour, then we need to pay attention to the implied 
picture of knowledge creation for the ways in which we can justify the claims to knowledge. 
Why should theorising about the economic which relies upon an abstract essentialist 
individual view of identity have any more significance than another way of theorising the 
15 The economists' favourite illustration of Robinson Crusoe and Friday hardly shows any recognition 
of the extent to which Friday was not 'free'. See Grapard (1995); Melanie Samson (1995); Kaul 
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economic which recognises that knowledge production about the economic can only ever be 
contingent upon what is designated as the economic, and political because it involves placing 
the subjects of knowledge in particular relations to the knowledge that this produced about 
them? In other words, we need to examine more closely the politics of knowledge creation and 
in this endeavour we can start from destabilising the view of identity which underlies 
econo,?ic theory, to thinking about the identity of the subjects of knowledge in ways that have 
more productive relation to difference. It is this that I want to do now. But, before launching 
-
. into ways of rethinking identity in relation to knowledge, I want to briefly consider what 
possible justifications could mainstream economics offer for maintaining its viewpoint. This is 
because one might ask, given all these criticisms, how could the mainstream still hold on to 
such a model of knowledge? To this end, I will now set up a possible dialogue between a 
mainstream economics perspective and a critical response to it. In this exercise, I will draw 
from some of the critiques that I have already mentioned above, but I will also link back to 
some of the points I made in the earlier chapters. 
4.4 The Orthodox And The Heterodox: A Possible Dialogue 
Although the rational-discursive day-time I is the sharpest expression or symptom of 
life, it grows out of the depths and has its roots in the darkness of the night-time, 
dreaming I~ the personality is immeasurably deeper and broader than its 
consciousness at any given moment (Sergei Bulgakov 2000: 53, emphasis original). 
(a) The Case For Orthodox Economics 
To begin with, let me put forward a possible perspective from the point of view of mainstream 
economics and social science. To the extent that mainstream economics is aware of some of 
the critiques levelled at it, but still continues to theorise in the same manner, a possible 
response could be the following. 
Of course, not everybody can be a rational-selfinterested-utilitymaximising-calculating-
amoral_disembodied-disembedded-abstract-economic-agent-individual all of the time. We all 
do depart from this baseline, and some more than others. However, first, this is not a bad 
approximation to make because most of the people most of the time do behave as if they were 
confonning to the characteristics outlined above (see Milton Friedman 1953). It is a moot 
question whether they in fact conform in their heart of hearts, but as long as we perceive them 
(forthcoming, n.d.). 
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to be behaving as if they confonn (and action is more important than talk),16 we are on safe 
ground. 
Second, the main purpose of theory is good explanation and prediction of economic reality 
(see Philip Klein 1994). So, going by the law oflarge numbers, what most of the people seem 
to do most of the time is good enough. subject matter to attempt explanation and try 
predictions. _/ 
Third, making this characterisation of the identity of the economic agent is important in order 
to make considerations of behaviour tractable for mathematical fonnalisation using modelling 
methodology. So, if one did not make these assumptions when trying to study economic 
behaviour or social processes, how would one be able to put the detenninants of human action 
in equations, how would we approximate the language of science, how would we get all those 
neat and aesthetic diagrams and equations? 
Fourth, if one were to give up the modelling methodology, and try to understand human 
behaviour and social processes in their context, how would we generalise enough to do 
'proper science'? 
Fifth, if we didn't do proper science, we wouldn't be able to serve as the handmaidens (sic) of 
governance by providing answers to 'what if' questions. Economics would, by a single stroke, 
lose both its claims to science, and its claims to practicality. For all the arguments in favour of 
greater realism, where would we be then? 
(b) The Case For Heterodox Economics 
Let me now put forward the arguments against the mainstream point of view. 
First, to reiterate - people are not rational-selfmterested-utilitymaximising-calculating-amoral-
disembodied-disembedded-abstract-economic-agent-individuals. More importantly, assuming 
that people are so disguises the political and power-laden nature of this construction itself. 
While seemingly a universal assumption, this manner of characterising people is itself 
16 As Deirdre/Donald McCloskey and Arjo Klamer (1995: 191) put it, "[e]conomists view talk as cheap 
and culture as insignificant". 
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particular and located in the way that it serves to detract attention from the operation of power 
differentials. Further, people are not rational-selfinterested-... not because they cannot 
manage to be thus all of the time, or for some, at any time. This is because to people untutored 
in economics, this starting point does not make sense at all. Not because they can never act in 
their own interest as they perceive it at the moment, or because they are 'irrational', but 
because this conception of human identity as a basic uninterrogable unit to explain behaviour 
and social processes, seems itself an irrational thought-experiment in the face of the enduring 
complexity, fluidity, impennanence and variation in human behaviour. If this means that a 
focus on complexity will detract from the benefits of excessive simplification then, 'it is better 
to be vaguely right than precisely wrong'. As I have argued until now in the thesis, this way 
(i.e., abstract, essentialist, universalist, and fonnal) of conceptualising the form and content of 
knowledge is immensely steeped in its origins in enlightenment modernism, and the 
consequent trails of valorising a particular narrow segment of human experience (in 
accordance with class, gender, geography, morals, governance, nationality and race) at the 
expense of silencing its radical Others. At this point, I must emphasise that I am not arguing 
for the incapability of the Others of enlightenment modernism to subscribe to this version of 
knowledge and behaviour. This is emphatically not a plea for those who cannot grasp 
instrumental rationality or enlightenment ideals or self-interested profit motives. This either/or 
questio~ something Michel Foucault tenns as the "blackmail of the enlightenment" (1984: 32-
50), is unproductive. The Others are not geographically determined happy community oriented 
innocent tribes in faraway places who just cannot be self-interestedly rational in the manner of 
the individual economic agent. Freedom or rationality or the individual are not European 
belongings. However, the particular ways in which they have been invoked in the version of 
human identity employed in economics, are tied to located intellectual legacies. Further, 
because the conception of the economic agent is generously inapplicable and seemingly 
irrational to people everywhere, it is not a good baseline. 
Second, this version of identity as a thought-experiment (i.e., assuming that the basic unit of 
knowledge is an abstract essentialist individual) cannot be defended as necessary for the 
theoretical purposes which are seen as being mainly to explain and predict reality. 17 This is 
because explanation and prediction have long been undennined by social theory as the 
unquestioned aim of theory. Even within economics, it is fairly well accepted now that 
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economic theories have not done a good job of any predictions. 18 Methodological attempts to 
diagnose why this is the case point towards the culprit of complexity and inherent 
unpredictability in the world. This leaves us with explanation. As I discussed in chapter two, 
there can be and have been various ways of understanding what we do when we explain. None 
of the various things we might do when we explain necessarily require one to start from the 
premise of identity outlined above. It is only when the explanation is implicitly oriented 
towards putting the determinants of human action into equations to construct models and 
diagrams that can be applied 'universally', that one is concerned about the mathematical (and 
more generally, formalist) tractability of human behaviour. 
Third, there is no justification for an unquestioned apriori overvalorisation of understanding 
human behaviour and social processes in formalist terms using modelling methodology. This 
is the argument that (see Lawson 1997; Steve Fleetwood 1999), the nature of reality is open-
ended and unlike the closed systems studied by the natural sciences. Therefore, the 
methodology of formalist modelling cannot begin to approximate the complex richness of 
human behaviour, for the understanding of which we need to proceed differently. 19 
Fourth, given that there is no reason to adopt formalist modelling methodology, and many 
good reasons to proceed from more realistic bases of human behaviour, we cannot justify 
adherence to this version of identity. And, there is no doubt that understanding human 
behaviour and social processes in their context would defmitely mean that one cannot 
generalise universally, as is permitted in the abstract formalist modelling methodology at the 
moment. Now, to those who wring their hands in despair wonying about how one can do 
'proper science' - without the trappings of aesthetic equations, models, diagrams, universal 
applicability - consider the following arguments (drawing upon chapter two). The idea of a 
'proper science' as something which comprises of aesthetic equations, models, diagrams, 
17 Of course there is the argument that reality itself is a construct, but until now within economics 
(whether mainstream or heterodox) this argument has not had much impact. In chapter seven of the 
thesis, I put forward this view and analyse its implications in detail. .. 
18 Therefore the line "an economist is someone who will tell you tomorrow why the things he predIcted 
, . 
yesterday did not come true today" (I let the 'he' stay in that sentence because most economIsts are 
men). A few words from Steve Keen (2001: 4, emphasis original): . . 
Though economists have long believed that their theory consti~tes 'a body of ~enerahsatIOns 
whose substantial accuracy and importance are open to questlon only by the Ignorant or the 
perverse' (Robbins 1932), for over a cen~ economists. have shown th~ economic th~ry is 
replete with logical inconsistencies, SpecIOUS assumptlons, errant notIOns, and predIctions 
contrary to empirical data. 
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universal applicability is not itself universal. Systematic knowledge is not mortgaged to the 
language of mathematics, or, universality. Further, the belief in these characteristics of 'proper 
science' is itself traceable to the successes of natural science (especially physics) in general, 
and as far as economics is concerned, mid nineteenth-century energetics in particular (on this, 
see chapter two, and Philip Mirowski 1989, 1991a, b, 1994a, b). Thus, there is no reason to 
believe that the study of human behaviour and social processes should conform to the methods 
used for the study of inanimate matter. Also, science itself is not a pure, higher order, 
dispassionate, innocent way of knowing (see Helen Longino 1990; Jane Flax 1992). The 
practice of science is tied to history, ideology20 and culture - it is tied to the representation of 
science as not an ideology, of West as not a culture. 
In addition to these critiques, I would like to add further points which are useful for 
questioning the mainstream. Note that if economics cannot be a 'proper science' (noting 
however, that proper science itself is not proper science either all the time), it would not have 
a claim to privileged service as the handmaiden of administrative governance and social 
management. This is indeed the case. But, consider the implications of this. To begin with, 
one would be able to comprehensively overhaul the basis of what counts as 'the economic', 
paying attention to what 'the economic', in fact, designates. Next, acknowledging the 
inextricably normative context of human behaviour and social processes could lead to a 
serious consideration of the important issues - such as, systematic and structural inequalities, 
deprivation, injustices - whereby the politics of knowledge creation in the academy, its role in 
the preservation of structures of governance, and its dissemination via trans-contextual 
management applicability, are all seriously questioned. Finally, the universality of economic 
knowledge as neutral representation will be questioned in its construction and applicability. 
One might even dis-cover the extraordinary parallels between the wannabe 'proper science' of 
economics (classical political economy/marginalist-neoclassical economics/neo-liberal 
economic view), and the unrolling of Western (mercantile/industrial-imperiallpostindustrial-
neocolonial) capitalism. And what is more, we can explore alternative ways of writing 'the 
. , 
economIC. 
19 For instance, Lawson suggests instead to aim for contrastive explanation (explanation by 
comparison), looking for demi-regularities rath~ than ex~l~a!io~ ~fthe fonn if.x, then y. 
20 The dominant view is that science is not an Ideology, if It IS, It IS not true SCIence. AB Bruno Latour 
(1993: 93) characterises it, "On1y what breaks forever with ideology is scientific". 
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To sum up, economic world is anchored in the abstract essentialist individual version of 
identity that underpins reified models such as the homo economicus (the REM), and critiquing 
this view of identity is a step towards recognising the violent gestures inherent in this 
conception. This is a violence which is enacted materially as structural inequalities, injustices, 
and deprivation are perpetuated while economic theory is unable to analyse them in any but 
the most simplistic terms based upon the abstract essentialist individual version of identity. 
This means that this material violence is often justified as the random outcome of rational-
self-interested-etc. agents freely interacting and transacting. However, in addition to this, I 
would argue that it is also important to recognise violence at the epistemic or the 
representational level where recognition as rational-self-interested-etc. agents is withheld from 
most 'Third World' people and governments, who then need to be advised, taught, even 
coerced by 'advanced' Western economic agents such as governments or international 
fmancial institutions. 
So, the purposes served by the essentialist individual view of identity include the following -
the terms of access are predicated upon the privilege of an ideally abstract individual 
embodiment (which is patterned after privileged masculinity); it fixes responsibility in choices 
which are seen as rational (this naturalises outcomes thus often perpetuating inequalities); the 
assumption of sameness and definiteness mostly does away with the need to consider 
difference in relation to identity; and, all this theoretical incomprehension goes along with 
practical non-redressal. Finally, this view of identity 'fixes' difference as its Other in an 
extremely political manner while claiming to be a neutral category. 
4.5 Rethinking The Relation Of Identity And Difference In Knowledge 
Until now I have discussed the ways in which knowledge production in economics relies upon 
the underlying model of an abstract essentialist individual view of identity. The idealised 
economic world gives voice to supposedly universal truths based upon the viewpoint of the 
'universal knowing subject'. Economics as a social science is not unique in this, but while the 
debates in feminist theory have influenced most other disciplines to a significant extent, within 
economics the influence of feminist thought still has a long way to go. In what follows, I want 
to examine some of the ways in which feminist theory has attempted to respond to 
know ledges based on the universal subject. 
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One of the most prominent critiques of the liberal individualist or abstract essentialist view of 
identity and the corresponding structuring of knowledge can be said to be the epistemology of 
standpoint theory, and its political correlate in identity politics. Starting from the view of 
knowledge from 'nowhere', feminist standpoint theory relies upon the idea that all knowledge 
is from 'somewhere'. 21 In other words, the most important point of departure of feminist 
standpoint theory from the earlier models of knowledge is to argue that the subjects of 
knowledge are not disembodied and dis embedded abstract agents as is often presumed in 
disciplinary knowledge, but that we can only have knowledge from particular subject 
positions. Knowledge is no longer universal but situated and perspectival. Having its origins 
partly in the Marxian project, the criteria for what counts as knowledge in standpoint terms is 
not simply what we know in the classical sense, but includes "seeing, tasting, feeling, and 
thinking" (Nancy Hartsock 1997: 370). What we know is not universally available from any 
and every subject position, but it is crucially linked to who we are and where we are situated 
in a wider totality of social relations. In this sense, the categories of gender, race, class are not 
additional empirical data which can be added on to the abstract universal knowledge, but 
rather our gender, race, class and other aspects of our identity determine what we know. 
The forcefield of social relations is always determined by the criss-crossing flow of power, 
and the discourses of the oppressed are different from those of the dominant groups. At this 
point, we can clearly see the way in which feminist standpoint theory is not only a project of 
knowledge gathering, but is seeped with political considerations. The having of knowledge is 
made always already political on this account. Even further, most standpoint theorists argue 
that it is not only that knowledge differs according to situation and perspective, but also that 
knowledge from the perspectives of the oppressed allows us to generate better accounts of 
society which can then be used for bringing about greater emancipation. Therefore, those who 
are oppressed under the current system of power relations in society have perspectives on 
society which are not only different from those of the dominant group, but are better because 
they afford a view from the 'outside within'. This is not the same as saying that the knowledge 
of the oppressed is better just because they are 'oppressed'. Sandra Harding (1997: 385) 
explains this in relation to modem science. She writes that when one asks questions about 
21 This is not to say that all feminist standpoint theorists agree. There are ~deed different v~sions ,of 
standpoint theory, for instance, ranging from those inspired by object-relatIons theory (assocIated ~th 
Nancy Chodorow 1978), to those influenced by marxism. Some em:ly works include Doro~y S~th 
1974, Nancy Hartsock 1983, Sandra Harding 1986. I should emphaSIse that my purpose of discussmg 
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standard accounts of the growth of modem science, for instance, starting from the lives of 
people who suffered from that growth and from the associated European expansion that made 
it possible and benefited from it (thus taking into account the resources of postcolonial science 
studies and the critiques of development, and feminist work in these areas), then one arrives at 
better accounts of the growth of modem science than if one had restricted oneself to northern 
and northern feminist science studies. This is not because "poor, Third World women are 
'more oppressed"', but because "thought that begins from conceptual frameworks developed 
to answer questions arising in their lives starts from outside the Eurocentric conceptual 
frameworks within which northern and northern feminist science studies have been largely 
organised" (ibid., emphasis added). When we look at theorising in this way, "[s]tandpoint 
theories are technical theoretical devices that can allow for the creation of accounts of society 
that can be used to work for more satisfactory social relations" (Hartsock 1997: 370). 
An important aspect of standpoint theory is the way in which it conceives of the identity of the 
subjects of knowledge. The subjects of knowledge are not simply individuals as isolated 
subjects, but collective subject positions. As Hartsock puts it, "the subjects who matter are not 
individual subjects but collective subjects, or groups" (ibid.: 371). The central aspect of 
identity that underlies knowledge is not the identity of the individual subject of knowledge, 
but the collective identity of a social group which comes into being over time through the 
sharing of experiences. For standpoint theory, it is not the isolated experience of individuals 
that is crucial, but rather the study of how certain social experiences 'come to belong' to 
certain social groups in ways that individuals of a particular group are likely to experience 
systematic similarities in their negotiation of the asymmetric power relations in society. This 
is not to deny that individual experiences can be different, but the emphasis here is on the 
group based experiences and commonalties. Patricia Hill Collins (1997: 375) gives the 
example of the African-American experience with racism to illustrate this point. She argues 
that African-Americans as a "stigmatized racial group" existed long before she was born and 
will probably continue after she dies, and no doubt her individual experiences of 
institutionalised racism as an African-American are unique, but nonetheless, the types of 
opportunities and constraints that she would encounter on a daily basis will be similar to those 
that confront African-Americans as a grOup.22 What this means is the following, "[r] ace, 
standpoint theory or identity politics here is not to summarise these vast fields, nor even to discuss them 
generally, but to draw the insights that are relevant to my arguments.. ., . 
22 Hill Collins further adds, "[a]rguing that Blacks as a group come mto bemg or dIsappear on the b~IS 
of my participation seems narcissistic, egocentric, and archetypally postmodern. In contrast, standpomt 
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gender, social class, ethnicity, age, and sexuality are not descriptive categories of identity 
applied to individuals. Instead, these elements of social structure emerge as fundamental 
devices that foster inequalities resulting in groups" (ibid.: 376). In this way, standpoint theory 
aims to make visible the workings of power which are disguised in the universalist account. 
And so, "standpoint theory concerns the commonality of experiences and perspectives that 
emerge for groups differentially arrayed within hierarchical power relations" (ibid.: 377). 
The conceptions of knowledge and of identity that structure standpoint theory find their 
political expression in 'identity politics'. If we think back to the abstract essentialist view of 
identity and the liberal individualist types of knowledges that it structured, then we can recall 
that in those frameworks, the political was reduced to the juridical. As Connolly argued (1991: 
73-74), most issues of politics were condensed into the juridical category of rights, justice, 
obligation, and responsibility, and the remaining issues were treated "instrumentally as 
contests in which individuals and aggregations compete within juridical rules to advance their 
'interests' or 'principles' by rational means" (ibid., emphasis added). On this view, politics 
was the result of constituencies of neutral abstract individuals coming together based on their 
shared interests. Political mobilisation has to do with common interests, and there is no great 
role for who one is in terms of identity affiliations. The notion of identity politics as the 
political correlate of standpoint epistemology enshrines a very different view of politics. 
Within identity politics, politics is not the arena where abstract individuals who share interests, 
compete. The focus is shifted to the question of shared identities. That is, on this view, politics 
is an effect of shared identities. It is this relation of politics with shared identities that has 
given rise to numerous debates in the last decade. For even when theorists are agreed on the 
idea that politics can be seen as an effect of shared identities, it is not clear how these shared 
identities come into being. Are we simply born as naturally aligned to some groups and not to 
others, or do we have to work in thought and action in order to realise that we belong to 
certain group? Most standpoint theorists now hold the view that we do not automatically have 
the situated and perspectival knowledge of the identity groupings to which we belong. For 
instance, that not all women will possess the feminist standpoint simply because they were 
born biologically women. Or that there is no simple trajectory from one's less privileged 
subject position as a woman in the totality of social relations to the feminist standpoint. 
theory places less emphasis on individual experiences within socially constructed groups than on the 
social conditions that construct such groups" (1997: 375). 
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However, this does not detract from the conceptualisation of knowledge as being based upon 
and shaped by the experiences of exclusion, and the relation between knowledge that is 
produced and those whom the knowledge is supposed to be about. The position of the 
'collective subject' (for example, woman) of identity in a particular situated relation to 
knowledge is not merely the aggregation of the individual subjects (for example, individual 
women), but the constitution of the collective subject is the result of "a complex interplay of 
'individuals' and larger-scale social forces" (Hartsock 1997: 372).23 In other words, the 
constitution of the collective subject of standpoint theories requires "an always contingent and 
fragile (re)construction/transformation of [these] complex subject positions" (ibid.). Hartsock 
quotes Kathi Weeks as follows, "[t]he project of transforming subject-positions into 
standpoint involves an active intervention, a conscious and concerted effort to reinterpret and 
restructure our lives ... .A standpoint is a project, not an inheritance; it is achieved, not given" 
(ibid.). Thus, politics involves the assertion of shared identities, but the standpoint of the 
shared identity is not something given naturally, rather, it has to be realised and achieved. 
According to Hill Collins (1997: 380) this realisation can come about through the process of 
'consciousness raising'. Similarly, Hartsock (1997: 372) also draws upon Chela Sandoval's 
(1991) notion of 'oppositional consciousness' in order to illustrate how subject positions of 
those who are less privileged can be used as effective sites of resistance once they are self-
consciously recognised by their inhabitants. Sandoval's example in this case is to see US 
Third World feminism as a model of oppositional political activity. If the world is viewed as a 
kind of "topography", then the points can be defmed around which "individuals and groups 
seeking to transform oppressive powers constitute themselves as resistant and oppositional 
subjects" (in Hartsock ibid.). Then, the subject-positions of the oppressed, if self-consciously 
recognised by their inhabitants, can be transformed into effective sites of resistance through 
the operation of what Sandoval calls a "differential consciousness", which operating like a 
clutch of an automobile, allows the driver to engage gears in a "system for the transmission of 
power" (ibid.). 
23 Hartsock draws upon Gramsci in her discussions about rethinking the nature of identity. She takes 
from Gramsci the idea that our capacity to think and act on the world is dependent upon other people 
who are themselves also both subjects and objects of history. And so, the idea that the individual is a 
synthesis of the social relations and the history of the social relations, a "precis of the past" (1997: 372 
[Gramsci 1971: 353]). 
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Identity politics as an advance on the earlier notions of politics in relation to knowledge has 
become a central issue for feminist theory. 24 The appeal of identity politics can be understood, 
as Dan Smith (2001:37) puts it, because, "part of the process of identity politics is a battle to 
assert the salience and meaning of a given identity". Not only is standpoint theory responsible 
for the appreciation of a situated and perspectival nature of knowledge (which is at least 
initially a great improvement on the abstract universal presuppositions of knowledge type 
thinking), but also its correlate of identity politics is responsible for thinking politics as 
something determined by the identities of the political actors involved. Because there is a great 
thrust on recognising the experiencing of identity in collective similarities, especially those 
similarities of experience which result from exclusion or oppression, identity politics serves an 
important function when strategic visibility in the political arena is at stake. An example of 
this is the way in which the assertion of the identity of woman as a political move (owing to 
systematic similarities between the experiences of women as marginal groups in society) 
results in the strategic visibility of women as important political actors. Smith (ibid.: 44) 
argues that another possible reason for the appeal of identity politics lies in its basis in 
essentialism. That is, the "simplicity and non-reflexive nature of the discourse allows it to 
work equally well on both sides of potential line of division". 
Thus, we begin to see the ways in which identity politics might be open to difficulties. An 
important difficulty, and one that has just been mentioned above in relation to Smith's 
argument relates to essentialism. Put another way, the collective subject positions of 
standpoint theory which provide the basis for identity politics face the following problem. The 
constitution of the collective subject position will require that it be a relatively stable ground 
from which politics can ensue. This will mean first that differences of experience within a 
collective subject position will need to surrender their salience, and second that the collective 
subject position as a shared identity will rely upon the idea of identity itself as a stable and 
24 The reader may notice that I have not referred to economics ever since the close of discussions on the 
abstract essentialist individual view of identity. This is not an oversight. Rather, feminist economics as 
the only subfield of economics that might want to engage with standpoint theory or identity politics, at 
present does not have many such intersections. An exception might be Barker and Kuiper (eds) (2003). 
Gillian Hewitson (1999: 87) speculates on the possible reasons for this:. . . . 
[T]he lack of feminist work [in economics] which is in fact underp~ed by fem~st standpomt 
theory may simply be due to the immaturity of the field of fermmst .econo~c.s as a wh?le, 
practitioners of which are still to a certain extent assessing a~tematIve femll11st theoretIcal 
works and their implications. There may also be some heSItancy over how actually to 
implement the research project based on feminist standpoint theory ... 
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shared continuity which can provide the basis for political action. In both cases, the discourse 
of essentialism functioning both normatively and descriptively, is not transcended. 
Further, although standpoint theory as a response to universalist knowledge is undoubtedly 
welcome for the way in which it is committed to a linking of knowledge with knowledge-
producers, an espousal of situatedness, and a bringing into relief of the relations between 
power and knowledge, ultimately however, its wider pedigree in modernism comes to the fore 
in the way in which it conceptualises of truth and identity. This is related to the homogeneity 
of the collective subject position, but also to the way in which it is assumed that we can 
identify social or material positions which give us privileged knowledge, and that even though 
these knowledges are from particular situations, they can yield up knowledge which is 'good' 
for everyone. 
So, the issues that arise from identity politics afford no easy capturing. The responses to 
feminist standpoint theory and identity politics are varied. This is because there are those who 
fmd the idea of knowledge as multiple, situated, and perspectival as troubling because it no 
longer provides the grasp that the modernist universal knowledge promised. Such theorists are 
anxious to ask the question, 'but if this is the case, then how will we be able to arbitrate 
between knowledge claims, and decide which claims are better than others?' Similarly, people 
may also fmd the idea of identity politics troublesome because it involves a radical 
redefmition of politics as something which is dependent upon and determined by identities. 
Their worry is that the political arena will become a contest amongst multiple identity 
groupings, and that as these groupings of the different identities proliferate, it will be difficult 
to achieve coalitions or solidarities which are crucial for political action. As a response, those 
who fmd standpoint theory and identity politics problematic in the ways mentioned, can 
advocate a renunciation of identity politics. An example is Susan Hekman who raises the 
problems I have mentioned with standpoint theory and identity politics, and argues for saying 
no to identity politics, in order to develop an alternative epistemology which will allow us to 
retain the powers of arbitration between competing knowledge claims. 25 
25 There are many others who give variants of the same response. I'm not discussing Susan Hekman's 
position here for many reasons, as I explain here. To begin wi~, her I?o.sition. is not cle.ar. She s~ to 
see herself as a sometimes-postmodem (but not poststructurahst) femlll1st epIstemologISt. She cntIques 
standpoint theory for its conception of knowledge as multiple, situated, ~d perspectiv~ because it ~o.es 
not allow her to arbitrate between knowledge claims. However, respondmg to her cntIque of feffillllst 
standpoint theory, Hartsock, Hill C~llins, Harding, .S~th (al~ ~andpoint ~eorists) P?int out. that she 
does not understand the way in which the standpomt m femmIst standpomt theory IS not SImply an 
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4.6 The Politics Of Identity 
In this exchang.e, they would be 'no geometry, no accounts'. It would be beyond the 
calculable and 1Il1IIleasurable, beyond the quantitative: like 'the first instants of love' 
or like admiration, perhaps. And this text too, like so many others, is written under 
th~ sign of love: that which does not calculate, does not ask what it risks, gives 
Wlth~ut guarantee, does not seek to protect itself. The possibility of stepping outside 
the c~cle of the 'proper' is presented here as risking life itself - in order perhaps to 
have It more abundantly? (Margaret Whitford with Luce Irigaray in quotes 1991: 
164). 
There is also another response to standpoint theory and identity politics which focuses on its 
essentialist basis. This is a poststructuralist view which does not worry so much about the 
aggregation of individuals, but involves group experiences, thus misrepresenting and misunderstanding 
all their respective positions (see Harding, Hill Coilins, Smith, Hartsock - all 1997). In a detailed 
exchange between standpoint theorists in the jOlU11al Signs (1997), Hekman completely leaves out 
questions of power in relation to questions of knowledge, and argues that the way forward for feminist 
analysis requires a paradigm shift involving a return to Max Weber's 'ideal type' methodology. Two 
things need to be said about this. First, Hekman's case for the adoption of Weberian methodology is 
unpersuasive and sketchy. As Smith (1997: 393) says, "the oddest thing is to find Hekman restoring us 
to the law of the father: Alfred Schutz, Michel Foucault, and, fInally, Max Weber". Second, in relation 
to the value of feminist analysis for economics, the adoption of an ideal type methodology is far from 
useful since most mainstream neoclassical economics already relies upon 'ideal type' methodology (for 
e.g., perfect competition). 
Now, Hekman's (1999a, b) problems with identity politics are even more complex. She worries that 
identity politics makes for too many differences in the political arena, and wants a resolution of the 
paradoxes of identity. A resolution which for her demands that identity politics be given up. Repeatedly 
in her discussions of identity politics and standpoint theory (1997, 1999a, 1 999b ), she keeps arguing 
and demanding in the name of a "WE" - a "we" that is having problems because it cannot determine 
what knowledge is superior in the face of multiple knowledges, a "we" that is having problems acting 
politically because it does not know who it is any more in the face of so much multiplicity (for instance, 
she asserts that "I need to know who 1 am before 1 can choose and act, politically or otherwise", 1999a: 
9). In fact, Harding (1997: 386) terms this stance ofHekman, the "administrator perspective" and writes 
that Hekman's responses to identity politics and standpoint theory arise from her Eurocentric reaction, 
frustrated as she is by "too many axes of analysis" and "inability to speak for certain categories of 
women". Similarly, Hartsock (1997: 367) finds in Hekman, "a kind of American pluralism that prefers 
to speak not about power or justice but, rather, about knowledge and epistemology". My own reading of 
Hekman corresponds to Harding and Hartsock, and in my view, part of her troubles with multiple 
knowledges and identity politics stem from a frustrated Eurocentrism unable to speak in universal terms 
any longer. In her introduction to Feminism, identity and difference (1999a), despite the title, she makes 
no attempt to consider any Third World feminists, but continually laments (in the face of 
poststructuralism) her inability to have a coherent identity, and power of epistemological arbitration. 
Her ultimate aim is to apply what 1 would call a diagnostic approach to the question of difference. For 
instance, in her book titled The foture of differences: truth and method in feminist theory (l999b), the 
very fIrst chapter is called "the problem of difference" (emphasis added) wherein she repeatedly asserts 
that feminist should "get on with the task of devising a theory and method for differences" (7), and that 
"the politics of difference provides no way of justifying the eliding of some differences, the emphasis 
on others... provides no method of argumentation by which this and other issues can be decided. 
Jettisoning the modernist metanarrative of logic, the politics of difference offers no viable replacement" 
(21). 
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multiple situated and perspectival knowledge positions, or about the proliferation of different 
identities in the political arena, but which questions the very idea that identities can precede 
politics. That is, it does not see politics as either the effect of shared interests or the effect of 
shared identities, but questions the mutually constitutive and problematic nature of both 
identity and politics. On this response, the proliferation of difference is not something to be 
feared as that which would put an end to identity and politics, but rather seeks to destabilise 
identity as something that can be immune to the effects of difference. It is this view that I wish 
to formulate, discuss, and contribute to. 
The question of identity is intrinsically born out of the question of difference. The sense of 
seeing/experiencing something as 'different' to the same is closely tied to defIning and 
acknowledging one's sameness in relation to difference along certain parameters. There are 
immediately two ways of thinking this. The fIrst can be summarised in the words of William 
Spanos (2001: 41) where identity is the condition for the possibility of difference. I agree with 
his assessment of this view of difference as a "hierarchically structured binarist principle of 
principles" which forms the "fabricated ontological" basis for a '''triumphant' liberal 
democratic/capitalist polity" which is "imperial in the essence as well as in its multi-situated 
political practices". In other words, on this view, identity preexists difference so that being 
acknowledged as different relies upon first being identifted as different from the same. The 
difference is a categorisation claimed in direct proportionality to its deviance from the same. 
The identity of the same, or the very basis on which the category of identity itself is made 
operational, remains unquestioned. 
It is this conception of identity and difference that operates both in the abstract essentialist 
individual version and the standpoint version of identity. Difference quickly becomes 
translated into Otherness, which is called upon to verify sameness. Indeed, difference serves 
the purpose of 'identifying' and making coherent the self, or making coherent one's 
understanding of collective experiences. In this scenario, the calls to accommodate difference 
are not so much a concern with Otherness, as they are the response to collating one's own 
identity in a crisis. Likewise, the collective experiences which are redeemed as a feature of the 
group identity are claimed as coherent in relation to their 'difference' from other stable 
identities. In Judith Butler's words (1990: 121), " .. .identity categories tend to be instruments 
of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the 
rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression". What are the implications 
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of this? Can we think of difference without starting from its relation to other pre-existing 
identities? 
This is the second way of thinking the relation between identity and difference, where 
difforence is the condition for the possibility of any identity. On this account, difference is not 
something that has to be claimed from a pre-existing identity of the same, but rather, 
difforence is the most fUndamental undifferentiated excess from which the concept of identity 
is fashioned. Any identity is a continually structurally contingent attempt in the face of 
universal difference. This way of conceptualising identity is an affront to the imperial liberal 
democratic capitalist polity where difference cannot preexist identity, since this possibility 
would make every identity open to question, and not just some different ones. It is also quite 
clear that this is a radical move and critics of various stripes (including some postmodem or 
feminist ones) while criticising some aspects of the essentialist individual identity or 
standpoint inspired identity politics, may not be at ease with questioning the basis of a pre-
existing 'identity' itself in the face of difference. If we do not take the having of stable 
identities as the starting point of our thought about the world and of the possibility of politics, 
then we can reimagine the nature of identity and of politics so that difference becomes integral 
to knowledge. 
The thinking of difference as the condition for the possibility of any identity involves a 
destabilisation of identity as something which is a stable belonging or recognition. It also 
leads to a challenging of the view where identities precede politics, because if (as I will argue) 
identities are unstable and constructed, then they cannot function as affiliations which exist 
prior to the political arena. In contrast, identities then become discursive constructions which 
arise in and through politics, or as Butler puts it (ibid.: 148), "the deconstruction of identity is 
not the deconstruction of politics; rather it establishes as political the very terms through 
which identity is articulated".26 There are many consequences of this view for the importance 
of knowledge in relation to 'different' subjects, since the subjects of knowledge can then be 
seen as being constructed as 'different' in the political process of knowledge creation, rather 
than the received view where knowledge creation functions neutrally in relation to subjects 
who are 'different' (that is, different from some standard normative identity conventionally 
26 To quote Butler again (1992: 13, emphasis in original), the "epistemological model that offers us a 
pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political 
prerogative" . 
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ascribed to the 'valid' subjects of knowledge). Therefore, let me now argue for moving 
beyond identity politics to what I call the 'politics of identity'. 
Contrary to some disciplinary thought, identity is not like a name tag with affiliations that can 
be taped on to each isolatable individual person and groups (where groups themselves are seen 
as an individual unit). Rather, identity can be thought of as something that arises in sociality, 
is shaped by the surroundings, affected by interactions, and changes in multiple and 
contradictory ways. Instead of taking identity as a 'given', if we consider it as something 
which is socially and politically constructed (and not simply recognised or claimed), then 
(following Judith Butler 1990: 25), it can be seen as something that is "performatively 
constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results". This allows for 
considering identity as "always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly 
categorisation by others ... [it] is a creolized aggregate composed through bricolage" (Lisa 
Malkki 1992: 47). Further, discussing identity in terms of identification, Stuart Hall (2000: 17) 
argues that though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material 
and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end conditional, 
inevitably lodged in contingency: "Identification is, then, a process of articulation, a suturing, 
an over-determination not a subsumption". 
Because standpoint theory starts from the point of there being different subject positions in 
relation to knowledge, it does not adequately raise the question of how these different and 
reasonably stable subject positions came to be recognised. Analogously, identity politics 
requires that politics be an effect of shared identities, but begs the question of how identities 
can themselves be dynamically constructed in the political arena, in fluid and contradictory 
ways. In all of this, identity itself as a concept is not politicised. But, if we think of identity as 
a mobile performative constitution subject to overdetermination and suturing, then it can be 
creatively reimagined and reconstructed as the politics of identity. 27 The politics of identity is 
an attempt to make visible the basic agonisms which are functional at the moment in which 
identity coheres. That is, at the very root of the designation of identity lies the long trek 
between an 'I' and a 'we'. Most modes of thinking about identity derive their legitimacy and 
27 The phrase 'politics of identity' has been used by some authors to denote something similar to 
identity politics (or the politics of identity and difference), and has also be~ ~sed t~ denote the renewed 
interest in and relevance of categories such as race, class, gender, sexualIty m SOCIal theory or cultural 
geography. In contrast to these connotations, I am arguing for the availability of a radical analytic of 
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functionality by making invisible any trace of this difficult train between the I and the we. 
Whether individual or collective, identity remains subordinate to a logic of ftxing 
responsibility in 'difference'. But, the generally unquestioned contours of this logic of fIXing 
responsibility in difference evade the questions of how identity itself is ftxed for difference to 
be recognised. The politics of identity is a politicisation of identity which gathers in its train a 
rethinking not just of politics but also of identity. 28 
This involves stressing on the constructedness of any identity category, and loosening the 
recognition of identity politics as the political coming together of people who have essentially 
similar identities in favour of considering identity as a fluid and constructed contingent 
process of discovering with shifting and multiple alliances. The difference between identity 
politics and the politics of identity can be seen as a function of the extent to which differences 
should be allowed to matter, and what response should be undertaken in the face of the worry 
engendered by a recognition of the multiplication of identities. While identity politics is seen 
as divisive and requires the bridging of gaps between the different identity constituencies, the 
politics of identity is a call for making difference 'foundational' to the having of any identity 
in the sense that there exists an ethical responsibility inherent in the comprehension of any 
identity (whether I or We) which realises the suturing functional at the moment in which 
identity coheres. This making/thinking of difference as the condition for the possibility of 
identity confronts us with a radical alternative where identity becomes irreversibly politicised. 
What Butler (1992: 15) writes about the subject and deconstruction is applicable to my stance 
on identity and retheorising it in the light of difference: 
To take the construction of the subject as a political problematic is not the same as 
doing away with the subject; to deconstruct the subject is not the same as doing away 
the concept; on the contrary, deconstruction implies not only that we suspend all 
commitments to that to which the term 'subject; refers, and that we consider the 
linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To 
deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most 
importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a reus age or redeployment that 
previously has not been authorized. 
This politicisation of identity constructs it as a contingent structure whose structurality is 
always open to question in the face of difference, a difference not from something but 
interpretation and conceptualisation in the phrase 'the politics of identity', something which is not 
within the ambit of the designation 'identity politics'. . . 
28Tzvetan Todorov (1984: 249) wrote: "We want equality without its compelling to accept Ident1t~, b~t 
also difference without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority". My addendum to this m 
differentiating the notion of the politics of identity is this - who poses this demand to whom? 
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everything as different. The politics of identity is therefore always-already also the politics of 
difference. 
The implications of this politicised identity - the politics of identity - are enonnous. The very 
grounds on which identity is claimed become open to interrogation, revision, and change. This 
is not something that has been taken on board in standard disciplinary knowledge because the 
openness and variation in identity are hard to reconcile with the neutrality and universality of 
knowledge that applies in relation to those identities. Let me briefly consider some immediate 
implications of the politics of identity. 
First, it entails the recognition of all (and not only some) identities as being the result of 
contingent manufacturing. If identity itself is a politicised perfonnance, then no identity is 
secure against which the Other or different identities can be claimed in reaction. Thus, we 
need to challenge the conventional view where some identities (the meta-identities) are open 
to question, but not others. In this view, identities can be questioned only until such 
questioning does not threaten to destabilise the 'strategically important' identities. For 
instance, the idea that the identity of women in relation to knowledge should not be questioned 
when it comes to differences between women. So, some feminists and feminist economists 
would have all the women be good champions of the feminist cause, and not let the issues of 
difference, matter when it comes to claiming the different identity which is most important -
as women.29 Another example is where claiming some identities becomes problematic if they 
'interfere' with other strategically important identities. Carrie Tirado Bramen (2002: 3) in her 
discussion of Richard Rorty [2000: 101] notes that according to him, "to take pride in being 
black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has 
been subjected. But in so far as this pride prevents someone from also taking pride in being an 
American citizen ... it is a political disaster". Recognising that it is all and not some identities 
that are contingent and 'fIxed' in the face of difference, will mean that all identities become 
open to question and politicised. 
29 For instance, the difficulties that black or third world or lesbian feminism poses to the dominant 
Western feminism which deploys the category 'woman'. Consider the following: "There are some less 
auspicious developments as well. For instance, there is some dissension between African-~eric~ and 
white feminists. The more sensible ones in both camps recognise that they are natural allIes agamst a 
model that is white and male" (Ferber 2002: 49-50). This leaves the question of black males 
unutterable. 
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Second, the politics of identity draws attention to thinking about identity as a political 
construct. Identity is a construction within knowledge producing texts and is therefore tied up 
with relations of power and exclusion. This is important because a politicisation of identity 
which stresses upon the constructedness and fluidity of identity can be misunderstood as a 
claim that identities are simply ludic performances - fluid and flimsy. I'm not asserting that 
identities cannot be freely chosen, the claiming of an identity also relies upon its recognition 
within the context in which it is being claimed. And, not everyone can equally withhold 
recognition, and the constraints in the experiencing of identities are inevitably greater for 
some.
30 As Charles Taylor puts it, "since identities are formed dialogically in social contexts, 
they require recognition from others, not denial or misrecognition, and hence withholding 
recognition can be a form of oppression" (in Andrew Sayer 2000: 183). The way in which 
differences are fIxed for view in relation to identity is a political one. This power of 
signifIcation is observed by Butler (1992: 17-18) as follows: 
The violence of the letter, the violence of the mark which establishes what will and 
will not signify, what will and will not be included within the intelligible, takes on a 
political signifIcance when the letter is the law ... So what can this kind of 
poststructural analysis tell us about violence and suffering? Is it perhaps that forms of 
violence are to be understood as more pervasive, more constitutive, and more 
insidious than prior models have allowed us to see? 
This importance of signifIcation extends to the way in which 'different' subjects are 
constituted as valid subjects of knowledge. Constructions of identity are produced in relation 
to knowledge and are inflected through power. 
Third, as mentioned before, the politics of identity is also the politics of difference since 
identities are only contingently formed out of the undifferentiated excess of difference. 
Conventionally, difference is either seen as a threat to the coherence of identity, or difference 
is seen as an additive advantage in knowledge production (difference as more data, a better 
picture). Thus we have, within feminist economics, an attempt to create better knowledge by 
adding women's experience in order to get a more complete picture. In this case, the supposed 
connection between women's experiences and their difference from the abstract essentialist 
individual version of identity (rational economic man) has been questioned. But, feminist 
economics has been unable to move beyond claiming difference under the sign of 'woman', to 
30 For instance, my remarks on feminism might be t~en to be des~gn~ting .'Thir~ ~orld !em~is~',. or 
the voice of a 'woman of colour'. Also note that this range of SIgnification Wlthm which Identities, 
opinions and politics can be expressed is sys~ematically wider f~r some. T~us, an Indian commentator 
on Gennan philosophy, or Renaissance art IS commonly perceIved as qUIte an anomaly whereas an 
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question the grounds of the processes by which difference has to be claimed - namely, the 
process of identification and assimilation. 31 
Therefore, the move from identity politics to the politics of identity is not one of merely 
identifying positions and their access to knowledge. Rather, it is about recognising that 
identity categorisations are constructed within texts and discourses and are linked to power 
and privilege. So that instead of privileging some identities as allowing access to additive 
better knowledge, the task is to interrogate texts for the ways in which they construct identity 
categories and to make visible the arbitrariness of these constructions. The politics of identity 
is then a method for interrogating any coherence in the arising of identities, so that the 
responsibility for identity is not fixed in difference. This allows us to examine the processes 
by which 'difference' itself comes into being. The consequence of the politics of identity for 
interrogating knowledge producing texts are crucial because it needs a plurality of theories to 
see that identity can be constructed out of difference in multiple ways which are linked to 
power and privilege. 
Linked to the difference conundrum in knowledge (i.e., where difference is only seen as 
exclusion or addition) is the worry engendered by identity politics - an infinitely multiple 
world where it would be impossible to admit difference while claiming solidarity. Lawson 
(1999b: 49) warns of the dangers of "a world of universalised difference". He writes "in an 
awareness that the existence of multiculturalism or of differences in general, need not in any 
way undermine or contradict [such] emancipatory practice", so long as we focus on the 
commonalities of human nature and needs. I would go much further in thinking identity 
politics as a route to the politics of identity, so that identity is not the result of pre-fonned 
political actors carefully and consciously deciding what to contest for, from an a la carte menu 
of identities. Politics of identity is about politicising the identity question - about treating 
identity and politics as mutually constitutive - while identity politics is generally seen as 
politics based on given identity. The politicisation of identity is not an option but a way of 
living in the liberal polity that forces a terrain of contestation where one is seen as having 
English commentator on Indian feminism, or Middle East politics is de rigeur. This asymmetry in the 
range of how something can become someone' s is~u~ is ~ .arena ?f constant. co~testatio~. " 
31 That is, despite the extreme usefulness of femmIst cntIques m economICS m stressmg the IdenlIty 
'woman', it is also important to recognise the diversity and difference within that category, and attend 
to the problematics thus raised in the way that the wider feminist movement has sought to do (see 
Chandra Mohanty et al. 1991; Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford 1994; M. Jacqui Alexander and 
Chandra Mohanty 1997; Irene Gedalof 1999; Sara Ahmed et aI2000; Rachel Alsop et al. 2002). 
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chosen one's identity in order to then politicise it, while all the time that choosing and 
politicisation are not separately available to many actors. For example, 'Third World women' 
do not choose their identity as 'Third World women' before they digress from the universalist 
claims of feminism in order to argue for differences. 
The operationalised logic of comprehension in capitalist imperial liberal democratic polity 
means that in order to be different, often one just has to be. Often, hasty and misjudged calls to 
undermine the recognition of difference are common both to the liberal left and the 
conservative right. But this is not to say that solidarity is not an extremely important 
ingredient of emancipatory sentiment. It is, and it is definitely worth imagining. However, I 
would argue that one needs to move beyond the possibility of recognising political action as 
being confined to acting only on common needs - 'my issue' is the world. Imagining such 
political action is not just to 'build bridges' between different constituencies, but involves a 
radical rethinking of the very principles on which difforent constituencies are organised and 
recognised. 
As a summing up, consider the following. Identity as a continuous politicised processual 
construction which grounds the sociality of life differently everywhere, is captured well in the 
statement of Subcomandante Marcos (in E. San Juan Jr 1999: 19), head of the Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico: 
Marcos in gay in San Francisco, Black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano 
in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, a Mayan Indian in the 
streets of San Cristobal, a gang member in Neza, a rocker in the National University, a 
Jew in Germany, an ombudsman in the Defence Ministry, a communist in the post-
Cold War era, an artist without gallery or portfolio, a pacifist in Bosnia, a housewife 
alone on Saturday night in any neighbourhood in any city... a dissident among free-
marketeer economists. .. So Marcos is a human being, any human being, in this world. 
Marcos is all the exploited, marginalized and oppressed minorities, resisting and 
saying 'Enough!' 
So far, the questions of identity have been linked to economics only through the abstract 
essentialist individual discussions. In the next chapter I will consider in greater detail two rare 
and illustrative cases where the questions of identity have been juxtaposed with economics. 
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Chapter Five: Economics And Identity 
The world econo~y i~ an ~tricate, evolving game with nearly 4 billion players. The 
players are organIsed mto lIterally millions of overlapping organizations (Richard H 
Day [1975] in Richard England 1984: 91). . 
5.1 Expanding "Economics Inc." (Economics Incorporated)? 
Frankly, economists are not interested in identity. It seems, I am sure, to most of them, a 
completely alien concept - adapting the words of a famous song 'what's identity got to do 
with it'. 
Further, the discussion of new topics as an academic exercise in economics happens when it is 
seen as the extension (or application) of the economic method (rational choice theory, cost 
benefit analysis, game theory, modelling human behaviour as an exercise of utility 
maximisation) to 'new' pastures. 1 The merits of interdisciplinarity are summed up in the 
interesting phrase usually adopted: 'economics imperialism' (see George Stigler 1984; Jack 
Hirshleifer 1985; Gerald Radnitzky and Peter Bernholz 1987; Richard Swedberg 1990; 
Geoffrey Ingham 1996). The 'colonisation' of other social sciences in the explanation of 
human behaviour following economics, for instance, "[t]here is only one social science ... 
Thus economics does really constitute the universal grammar of social science" (Hirschleifer 
1985: 53). And Dasgupta (1998: 24) proudly writes, "Modem economists have demonstrated 
the power of their discipline by crossing into law, political science, anthropology, 
demography, ecosystem ecology". 
Discussing the question of economics as colonising the other social sciences, Ben Fine (1999: 
413) believes that this is based upon simply extending the notion of rational agents to all 
domains. And he argues that, increasingly, the barriers between other social sciences and 
economics are lessened as the method of economics - peculiar form of methodological 
individualism (behaviour reduced to utility maximisation), analytical focus around 
equilibrium, uncritical use of ahistorical and asocial concepts (capital as physical object, 
1 As Grahame Thompson (1997) notes, there is a preference in economics for 'new' as a prefix as 
opposed to the 'post' (schools of thought such as - neoclassic~: new classical, neoliberal, ~ew home 
economics new institutionalism, new growth theory, new pohtIcal economy). Although Fme (1999: 
421) rem~ks that this excludes post-Keynesian economics, which is perhaps a significant exclusion in 
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utility, commodities as goods, production as a technical relation between inputs and outputs, 
etc.) - is universalised. He gives the example especially of the notion of "human capital" 
which has played an important part in Gary Becker's new home economics (incidentally, 
Becker is seen as a paradigmatic "postmodern" economist by Frederic Jameson 1991), and is 
now spearheading "the assault of the economic approach upon other social sciences" (414). 
Further, Fine discusses how this notion (and variants such as personal capital, social capital) 
has been picked up by the World Bank and used as the "missing link" in explaining economic 
development and performance - past, present and future (1999: 416-417, emphasis added): 
In this way, issues such as the environment, community, gender, conflict, ethnicity, 
customs and culture are incorporated into economic analysis. The World Bank has 
even set up web site for social capitaL.. social capital is colonizing the theory of 
development just as economics is colonising the notion of social capital. The 
promotion of social capital by the World Bank is part and parcel of its move towards 
what has been termed the post-Washington consensus, a more state-friendly stance 
than the previous neo-liberal Washington consensus. 
Another example of this can be seen in the World Bank policy research report (2001) on 
"Engendering Development" where the Bank wants to make a case for the importance of 
gender inequality in deve1opment.2 But, as Suzanne Bergeron (2002) discusses, the approach 
adopted is narrowly economistic, and qualitative evidence is not seriously admitted into the 
discussion. In line with the discussion here (see also Bergeron 2000; Nitasha Kaul 2002a), 
economics is seen as the provider of tools and concepts (a disinterested method) which can 
then be unquestioningly applied to any situation. I agree with Bergeron's comments, "[I]t is 
not so much an exercise in critical interdisciplinarity (challenging the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics) as expanding the toolkit of an existing discipline" (ibid.). As a result, 
any analysis becomes about translating its scenario in economic terms. Inevitably, these terms 
are such that there are no proxy variables for history or culture, and so these non salient 
attributes are allowed to drop out of the analysis. As far as the overall outcome of such 
expansions of (what I would term) 'Economics Inc.' for the other social sciences is concerned, 
Fine believes it "to intensify the features of economics' influence - the reductionism, 
the light of the greater radicality of the 'post' to the 'new'. As the American poet Frank O'Hara said, 
"'New' is an old word, lets get a new one". . . . . . 
2 This report generated a lot of discussion at the international aSSOCIatIon for femmist econoIll1~s 
conference in 2002. There were many critical assessments of the report, and a book length response IS 
to follow (Drucilla Barker and Edith Kuiper Forthcoming). For some of those present (like Stephen 
Gudeman), the very casting of the discussion in the terms of "social capital" seemed to take away an 
enormous ground of possibilities. 
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eclecticism, empiricism, unevenness, ignorance, parasitism, contempt and critical, at times 
futile, conceptual reaction" (415).3 
And thus as the uncritical use of ahistorical and asocial concepts from economics is 
universalised, there is a corresponding careful guarding of the basic premises of economic 
logic as being scientific, timeless, and universal. The strategy for this guarding is a 
combination of stifling interdisciplinary dialogue by the adoption of unjustified mathematical 
formalism and at the same time pointing out the obviousness of economic postulates based on 
human nature such as scarcity, self-interest, greed, importance of incentives. There are 
numerous implications of this. Economics functions as an ideology of market capitalism, and 
further asserts that the identities of the actors who play certain roles at the micro and macro 
levels is of no concern. Literally anyone (person or nation) could take on any role, so that the 
specificity of history or the politics of identity becomes a farce in a world where anyone could 
rationally grow, develop, trade and prosper. The effectiveness of this strategy is clear in the 
way in which it spellbinds its critiques as well in their homage to the god they seek to 
dethrone. In any case, the timelessness or universality or scientificity of the basic building 
blocks is easily problematised.4 Given all this, it is telling that it is the students of the 
discipline who are at the forefront of pedagogical revolt today (the post autistic economics 
movement@ ). 
Referring to economics as it is studied, in his review of conservatism's best young economists 
('Delta Force'), Peter Warren (1994, emphases added) writes: 
The creeping rot of multiculturalism, feminism, de-constructionism, and other 
fashionably radical intellectual trends has spread to nearly every branch of study in 
American universities. But economics appears to have developed an immunity to such 
diseases. It is one of the few disciplines in which radical Left ideology has failed to 
take root. Market capitalism - anathema to the bulk of the professoriate - flourishes in 
economics departments, where Keynesians have been unable to prevent the growth of 
various offshoots of classical free-market thought. This lack of political correctness is 
one of the reasons why U.S. economics programmes are considered to be among the 
best in the world, while humanities and most other social sciences attract fewer 
foreign students. 
3 Even fairly well-converted supporters of rational choice axioms such as the political scientist Robert 
Keohane (1988) lament about economists not really conversing with them, but preaching and 
dominating the conversation. ., . 
4 Hrnnan nature, as I excavated in chapter three is another name for the hIstone ally SItuated 
'transcendental pretence' in modernist disciplinary knowledge. Scarcity is a scare spectre of capitalism 
usefully employed to divert attention from the pol~tical nature of .the c~oices made (on. scarcity and 
greed, see Carl Wennerlind 2000). Finally, the lIDpo~ce. of rncent~ves was not discovered by 
economics, but operationalised in such a way as to make Its ethics unquestIonable. 
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He illuminates the rationale for my arguments beautifully, linking up economics with the 
"creeping rot of diseases" of multiculturalism, feminism, de-constructionism, market 
capitalism, pedagogy, political correctness, foreign students. 
Economics is the 'science' of market capitalism resisted by 'ideology'. The diseases that have 
contaminated all other knowledge, economics has been immune to. The inoculation against 
'multiculturalism, feminism, de-constructionism'- reflect, for a moment, that all Warren's 
diseases are intimately related to questions of the politics of identity and the fixing of 
difference in knowledge - has been achieved by lacking 'political correctness' (which I defme 
as 'not so much the "restriction of the sayable" but rather the politicisation of saying which 
questions the grounded privilege of utterability'). 5 As a consequence, more 'foreign students' 
are attracted to the study of the science of market capitalism in American universities in an era 
where its dominance goes serially unquestioned. 
It is a legitimate question to ask of every theoretical premise, 'what does it take for granted?' 
The important questions in the interrogation of knowledge are not just the details of its edifice, 
but an examining of its unstated basis. And, thus thinking the structurality of the structure is 
also to ask the question, 'how is the legitimate ground of theoretical contestation constituted?' 
The questions of 'why is there no talk of identity in economics?', and, 'why would economics 
talk about identity?' are interlinked in the politics of knowledge creation about the economic. 
5 Political correctness, defmed by Martin Amis (2002) as "the restriction of the sayable", is an 
interesting issue in relation to identity. Amis celebrates the retreat of "the PC". Unable to bring himself 
to say 'politically correct', he nonetheless denounces it as being the "lowest common denomination". 
He is thankful that, "PC, having made its gains in the restriction of the sayable, is now in modest 
retreat. And it is true that the expansionist phase, with its denunciations, its invigilations, it is organised 
execrations, seems to have run its course". The point is this. The signifier 'political' is a powerful 
construction which opens up everything to question. The political is automatically the contested, 
opening up the carefully sutured together closures of taxonomised difference. No wonder then that the 
politicisation of language hits where it hurts - and the 'PC' is resented with a liberal vengeance that 
wants to claim as uncontested and prior some terms of identity from which everything else can then be 
p roblemati sed. The PC is not so much the "restriction of the sayable" but rather the politicisation of 
saying which questions the grounded privilege of utter ability. 
And so, consider the following illustrative application. At an economics seminar that I attended, an 
economist presenting intergenerational transfers model in terms of fathers and sons (in economics, the 
transfers between generations is conventionally studied in a fathers-and-sons type setting) when 
questioned about the possibility of mothers and daughters, had this to say, "now this is as PC as we are 
going to get". Now, it is clear from the work of feminist economists that, in fact, intergenerational 
transfers and the relative altruism of fathers and mothers differs, so that within the institutional setting 
of a typical family, women are much more likely to have less discretionary income and leisure, lower 
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It becomes interesting, therefore, to now confront the isolated instances where economists 
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000), and Amartya Sen (1999) have spoken of identity 
and economics.
6 
But before this, let me give an example of what I don't mean by my 
discussion until now. Deirdre McCloskey is a well-known 'postmodem neoclassical 
freemarket feminist economist' (see McCloskey 2000). Kimberley Christensen's (2001) 
assessment of Deirdre McCloskey's memoir Crossing describes the experience of her 
transition from a man (Donald) to a woman (Deirdre). In her reading, Christiansen fmds "a 
bewildering lack of self-consciousness regarding the implications of McCloskey's transition 
experience for the neoclassically based, individualistic economic theories slhe has espoused 
all hislher professional life" (2001: 113). In other words, McCloskey still supports the mission 
of the Chicago school of economics with its rational choice analysis, while recognising that 
there is more to human existence and experience than 'rationality'. Thus, one should not 
underestimate the complexity of identity in relation to the economic.7 This illustrates that the 
simple proliferation and accessibility of more and more identities (at least to a few people) 
will not necessarily mean that those identities will be adopted in a questioning manner-
something typified by McCloskey's remark (quoted in ibid., emphasis added), "]t's identity, 
stupid. Not cost and benefit'. 
5.2 Illustration One: Akerlof And Kranton On 'Economics And Identity' 
5.2.1 Summary Explanation 
bargaining power, and a disproportionate share of costs of raising the next-generation (on this, see 
Nancy Folbre 1994, n.d.). 
6 Amartya Sen was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1999 and George Akerlof in 2001. They are not 'typical' 
economists in the sense that Akerlof has worked at the intersection of economics and psychology, and 
Sen has worked at the intersection of economics and philosophy. Despite being important in the 
profession, Sen has his detractors. Steven Pressman and Gale Summerfield (2000: 89) mention that 
when the Nobel Prize was announced for Sen in 1998, the next day's op-ed article in the Wall Street 
Journal complained that the award was given to "an establishment leftist" with "muddleheaded views" 
(Robert Pollock "The wrong economics won"). They also mention further griping. by Peter Coy in 
Business Week and Sheldon Richman in Human Events. It was suggested that Sen did not deserve the 
award, but was given it as "Noble penance" by the awarding committee since ~e previous year's 
winners Myron Scholes and Robert Merton ''were the brains behind Long-term CapItal Management, a 
hedge fund that nearly brought down the US financial system in the Fall of 1998". . 
7 Consider for instance, two remarks by Gary F ethke, the Dean of a College of Busmess at the 
University of Iowa to McCloskey when s/he informed him of her plans to become a woman -. "T~ank 
God ... I thought for a moment you were going to confess to converting to sociali~m !." . and, Jokmgly 
mentioned that now that she's a woman, he can lower her salary! (both quoted m IbId.: 105, 112, 
emphasis original). 
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In August 2000 the Quarterly Journal Of Economics published an article titled "Economics 
and Identity". The paper claims to "introduce" identity which is defmed as "a person's sense 
of self' into economic analysis. The stated aim is to "incorporate the psychology and 
sociology of identity into an economic model of behaviour". Accordingly, the authors propose 
an amended utility function which would take into account the effect of identity on behaviour 
by associating identity with different social categories and how people in these categories 
should behave. They also construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can 
affect individual interactions. Let me trace the main points of their argument. 
(1) People have identity related 'payoffs' from their own actions and from others' actions. 
Further, third parties can generate persistent changes in these payoffs, and the choice of 
identity is open for some but maybe prescribed for others. In all these ways, since social 
categories are salient for human behaviour and interaction, identity can influence behaviour. 
(2) Identity is based on social categories, C. Each person} has an assignment of people to 
these categories represented by Cj. Each person has a conception of their own categories and 
that of all other people. An individual may be mapped on to several social categories, and also, 
individual j' s mapping of another individual k into categories need not correspond to k's own 
mapping. The appropriate behaviour for people in different social categories in different 
situations is indicated by prescriptions P. Prescriptions can also describe the ideal for each 
category in terms of physical characteristics and other attributes. Further, categories may have 
higher or lower social status. Identity refers both to a person's self-image and to her assigned 
categories. 
The utility function which incorporates identity as a motivation for behaviour looks as 
follows: 
Thus, for each person}, utility will depend not only on the usual vectors a j (for j's actions) 
and a-:i (for others' actions), but also depend uponj's identity or self-image I j. 
Further, a personj's identity I j itself will depend uponj's assigned social categories Cj. It will 
also depend upon the extent to which j's own given characteristics E j match the ideal of j' s 
assigned category, indicated by the prescriptions P. Last but not the least, identity will depend 
upon the extent to which j's own or others actions correspond to prescribed behaviour 
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indicated by P. The function I j (·) below gives the social status of a category, and a person in a 
category with high social status "may enjoy an enhanced self-image" (719). 
The increases or decreases in utility that derive from I j are called "gains or losses in identity" 
(719, emphases original). 
The idea at its basic is that the individual j will choose actions to maximise utility taking all 
else given. In the usual tradition of argumentation in economics, the authors are of the opinion 
that although this 'choice' may be unconscious, the outcome remains the same. This is 
because, even if people are not always conscious of the motivations for their behaviour, they 
behave as if they were maximising the utility function. 
(3) The reason why economists should take the utility function amended for identity seriously 
is because we know from psychology that a person's sense of self or the ego lies behind 
individual behaviour. Further, taking this into account will "expand" economic analysis by -
being able to "explain" behaviour which might appear detrimental (the examples are: why do 
people self mutilate, why do people feel ambiguous about their work when being in an 
occupation which does not match the gender prescriptions of behaviour, why do alumni 
contributions reflect identity, why do people mountaineer); being able to recognise that 
identity underlines a new type of 'externality,8 (the examples are: men acting to affIrm their 
masculinity against female co-workers in a 'man's job', men acting in response to an insult 
which if left unanswered impugns their masculinity,9 changing group or violating 
prescriptions as provoking scorn and ostracism); recognising that identity reveals a new way 
that preferences can be changed, that is, the creation and manipulation of social categories C 
and prescriptions P. (the examples are: advertising, professional and graduate schools, 
political identityl~; the recognition that "the choice of identity maybe the most important 
'economic' decision people make" (717) (the examples are: many women in the US choosing 
8 An externality is said to exist when the costs or benefits of production or consumption are not 
completely borne by the producer or the consumer, but, for i~stance, ?y society. .. . 
9 Akerlof and Kranton consistently cite evidence from expenments ill psychology, ill thIS case, NIsbett 
and Cohn (1996). 
10 "Politics is often a battle over identity. Rather than take preferences as given, political leaders and 
activists often strive to change a population's preferences through a change in identity or 
prescriptions .... symbolic acts and transformed identities spur revolutions" (727). 
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either to be a career woman or a housewife, parents choosing schools to influence children's 
self-image identification and behaviour, students at college choosing where to live,11 an 
immigrant choosing to become a citizen). 12 
(4) The authors then construct a "prototype model of economic interaction in a world where 
identity is based on social difference" (727). Not only the tastes, but utility from actions will 
also depend on identity. Identity depends on two social categories - Green and Red, and how 
much one's own and other people's actions correspond to the behaviour prescriptions for their 
category. There are "standard economic motivations for behaviour" (ibid.). Each individual in 
the population has a 'taste' for either of the two possible activities - Activity One and Activity 
Two. Engaging in the activity for which one has a taste, one earns utility V, choosing the 
activity not matching one's taste yields zero utility. Standard utility maximisation would 
imply that each person would engage in the activity corresponding to their taste. 
The authors construct identity based preferences assuming in the simplest case that all people 
think of themselves and others as Green. The behavioural prescription is that Greens engage in 
Activity One. Anyone violating this loses identity causing a reduction in the utility of Is (s for 
self). Externalities of identity mean that in a pairing of two individuals i and}, if i engages in 
Activity Two, it also diminishes the Green identity for} causing} a loss in utility 10 (0 for 
other). Now,} may choose to 'respond' and restore its identity at a cost c, causing a loss to i in 
amount L. This forms the basis for an interaction which is represented as a "game tree" 
between Person One and Person Two. 
Person One chooses Activity One> Person Two has the choice of Activity One (for Vor 0) or 
Activity Two> (if Activity Two chosen by Person Two) Person One has the choice of Not 
Responding (V- Is or V-10) or Responding (V- c or V-Is - L). 
The four possible subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game are detailed - Person 
One deters Person Two from engaging in Activity Two when c < 10 and Is < V < Is + L; Person 
One responds but does not deter Person Two from engaging in Activity Two when c < 10 and 
1 + L < V Person One does not respond and Person Two engages in Activity Two when c > 10 s , 
11 "Fraternities, sororities, African-American, or other 'theme' -oriented donns are all associated with 
social groups, self-images, and pr~crib~ b:,havi?ur" ~72?).... . ., . 
12 The authors also point that thIS "ChOIce of Identity IS liIDlted m a SOCIety WIth raCIal and ethnIC 
categories, so that while those with "non distin~ishing phy:sical features mi~t be able t~ 'pass' as a 
member of another group .... others will be constramed by therr appearance, VOIce, or accent (726). 
163 
and Is < V; Person Two does not engage in Activity Two regardless of Person One's response 
when Is > V. 
The three lessons to be extrapolated from this model for the authors are as follows. One, it 
"establishes the connection between economic interactions and the psychology of identity, 
especially the implications of identification" (730). Two, it "allows a comparative static 
analysis on identity related parameters" (ibid.). Three, the elementary assumptions suggest 
"extensions that entail greater realism and for the implications of identity for economic 
interaction" (ibid.). 
Regarding lesson One above, the authors' point is that people intemalise rules of behaviour, 
and experience anxiety when these intemalise rules are violated. The authors depend on 
psychological literature to argue that a person's "identity, or ego, or self, must be constantly 
'defended against anxiety in order to limit disruption and maintain a sense of unity'" (728). 
Regarding lesson Two above, comparative statics can be used to see how conventional 
economic policies may affect behaviour. They give examples of a case where one could 
consider how the imposition of a 'tax' T on the response to activity two, at certain levels will 
cause behaviour to switch, and benefit Person Two. One could also consider the case of the 
tax being imposed on Activity Two. They also raise the possibility of policies changing 
prescriptions themselves, for instance, a rhetorical campaign which might make Activity Two 
more loathsome to Greens and cause greater conformity to the prescriptions. 
Until now, I have considered the basics of how an attempt has been made to model identity in 
economics, attempting in part to introduce the psychological motivations for people's 
behaviour more explicitly into economic analysis. 
Now, I will interject and critically discuss the implications of the above and critically evaluate 
the extensions to the model suggested by the authors in the rest of the paper. 
5.2.2 Assessing Implications 
The attempt by Akerlof and Kranton to model identity in relation to economics starkly 
illustrates my arguments in the previous chapters of the thesis. 
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In their attempt, identity is seen as 'a person's sense of self and used interchangeably with 
ego. It represents the psychological motivations for behaviour and links directly to the social 
categories which people slot into. The social categories are 'different' in the sense of having 
different prescriptions attached to them. How well any Person (One or Two) does in terms of 
utility maximisation is partly dependent upon their identity, that is, the social status of their 
category. This social status is itself in part a function of the extent to which a person's own 
characteristics match the prescriptive ideal of their assigned category. Finally, even if the 
abstract individual Person cannot tell the motives for their actions, the transcendental social 
scientist can recognise them as being oriented towards utility maximisation. 
Underlying the whole endeavour is the picture of the abstract essentialist individual version of 
identity. Amended and embellished, this abstract essentialist individual is recognised as 
having psychological motivations, and inhabiting social categories. While the conventional 
model would have the individual as a black box not amenable to further investigation, this 
amendment would have the individual as tied to 'different' categories. 
A couple of things should be noted. First, all the various individuals are essentially the same 
as far as the raw matter of subjectivity is concerned. The difference arises from the same and 
similar people being in different categories. However, and this is important, the categories by 
themselves are not systematically hierarchical. The categories are just that - categories of 
'difference', partly chosen and partly not chosen markers that people fmd themselves in. 
Rationally, people would try to maximise their gains in the sum total of identity. Identity itself 
can metaphorically be conceptualised as a jar, whose contents are evaluated according to their 
worth, to arrive at a sum total the maximisation of which is in everyone's interest. Second, this 
account allows for no conceptualisation of power or oppression. When people are acting to 
oppress others (for instance, men discriminating against women) they are merely acting with 
rational empirical motivations. I shall soon come to an example of this. 
The argument of the paper proceeds by alternating between the experimental world of 
'subjects' in psychology, the economic world of a priori 'agents', and the evidential (or as the 
authors designate it within inverted commas, "real-world") world of 'people'. It is not clear at 
all whether these different worlds in fact lend themselves to formal modelling tractability in 
the way that the authors proceed. I would argue that they do not, and that, the paper is an 
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attempt to whisper into the ears of mainstream economists, 'but look, our unifonn economic 
agent can be expanded by introducing the variable of identity'. 
In the sections of the paper where examples of identity related behaviour are provided, my 
question is this - are the authors really arguing that some but not all behaviour can be 
explained by introducing the variable of identity? They are, and, I would argue to the contrary. 
Let me explain. It is not only those who tattoo, body pierce, hair-conk (examples in the paper, 
721) and so on who behave in ways that are linked to their identity. Even those who wear dark 
pinstripe suits demonstrate identity related behaviour. In this regard, the authors also give the 
example of women who undergo female circumcision in rural Egypt or women who practice 
Sati in Rajasthan (721). Rather than the common imperial ideology which takes these people 
as being irrational, the authors try to rationalise their behaviour as stemming from the 
internalisation of prescriptive ideals for the different social category of women. Perhaps 
unaware of Spivak's (1988) article "Can the subaltern speak? Speculations on widow 
sacrifice", the authors have provided us with yet another example of the way subalterns are 
regularly picked up as extra empirical variables who are 'spoken for' in the dominant 
discourse. 
It is interesting to consider the way in which the authors have chosen examples of those who 
would overtly illustrate 'difference' to the 'nonn' as people exhibiting identity related 
behaviour. Identity, is something possessed by the outer latitudes and longitudes of secular 
imperial capitalist liberal democratic polity. Or, those who affirm their identity as 'different' 
are not the only people who possess 'identity'. Given that this is a case in their argument, they 
operate finnly on the model which takes identity as the basis for difference. 
Further, the authors visualise a sort of scale of prescriptive ideals attached to each social 
category on which different individuals score differently depending on the extent to which 
they conform to these ideals. One could therefore confonn to sixty or forty or eighty or even a 
hundred percent to the prescriptive ideals for one's social category. The more one conforms, 
the better it is for one's identity (sense of self). And, the less one conforms, the more anxiety 
and loss of identity one faces. 
This picture unravels if we consider how these scales of prescriptive ideals come to be 
attached to each social category. The authors don't really concern themselves with how the 
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categories come to be. According to them, individuals just slot into these categories and 
perform better or worse in terms of conformity and intemalisation of the ideals. However, 
what if the persons who fully conform and absolutely match the prescriptive ideals of their 
social category are not performing well on an externally given and internalised indicator, but 
actually are confrrming and perpetuating the systematically hierarchical basis of society, 
further reinforcing their dominant position by the exercise of power? What if the process of 
categorisation is not a neutral cognitive mapping exercise carried out in an individualised 
manner with repercussions for individual people's behaviour in line with a calculation of costs 
and benefits, but a systematically operating oppressive hierarchy of power and dominance? 
The authors might say that this is not what they are engaging with, however, I am arguing that 
neglecting this is a severe problem. They are treating identity as a variable which can simply 
be added into the picture, a factor out there which exists fully formed and can simply be 
incorporated into the equation of utility maximisation. Identity is an outcome rather than a 
precedence of human interaction. In constructing their model, they completely neglect the way 
in which identity is constructed out of opportunities available to people, and through 
discourses. The construction of people into these categories of identity by those around them 
is not simply available from a transcendental perspective. Further, in their account, the politics 
of identification is completely absent - rather than seeing identity as a process, they treat is as 
a 'thing'. 
Thus, the authors employ identity allegiances in ways that naturalise the discrimination or 
oppression that occurs due to systematic power differentials. Also, in many of their examples 
the authors take as universal, particular contingent versions of (heterosexual) masculinity and 
femininity dominant in American society. As far as identity groupings are concerned, for the 
authors, the margins are simply just another grouping. There is no possibility for an ethical 
revolt based politics. 
There is no recognition of any contingency or differentiation in the idea of the 'self. The self 
is a constant timeless spaceless universal continuity taking concrete forms in embodied 
abstract individual essentialist economic agents. 
The whole scenario of modelling methodology displays the desire to get the general principles 
which could then be 'applied' in any specific setting. Not once is there any question of the 
suitability of this methodology which reduces the complexities of human behaviour to 
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deterministic if this then that kind of reactions. The social scientist, presumably, is just 
'equipped' by the very nature of who they are to make deterministic universal 
pronouncements on how any person's sense of self affects their behaviour in conjunction with 
their social category (assigned by whom? how is it perceived?). Akerlof and Kranton simply 
assume that everyone acts in accordance with their 'sense of self'. That this 'sense of self' is a 
historical and ideological construct deriving from the transcendental pretence of universalist 
humanism (especially of the Euro-American variety in its intellectual legacy if not 
geographical spread) in line with the philosophical underpinnings of enlightenment 
epistemology and modernist knowledge, is not recognised. 
5.2.3 Evaluating Extensions 
In this section, I will critically evaluate the extensions to the model suggested by the authors 
as applications in specific 'situations'.13 These broadly fall under three categories - identity, 
gender, and economics in the workplace; identity and the economics of exclusion and poverty; 
identity and the economics of the household. I will deal with each of these in tum. 
The authors attempt to 'explain' social outcomes, explanation as I discussed above, is usually 
in economics a process of justifying the occurrence in rational choice terms. Rational and free 
choices made by self-aware responsible essentialist individual economic agents are formalised 
to explain the status quo. 
(1) The first situation relates to identity, gender, and economics in the workplace. The authors 
propose to expand the economic analysis of occupational segregation by the inclusion of 
changes in the societal notions of male and female. To begin with, all occupations are 
"associated with the social categories 'man' and 'woman,' and individual payoffs from 
different types of work reflect these gender associations" (732). The authors do not pay any 
attention to how these associations came aboue4 in the first instance. By constantly using the 
terms man and woman to refer to gender associations, they also do not take into account the 
literature on the sex/gender distinction where the biological categories of man and woman do 
not neatly map on to the performativity of gender, masculinity and femininity (see Butler 
13 According to the authors, they follow sociologists in using this concept of a situation - "who is 
matched with whom and in what context" (731). 
14 These associations may not simply be labels patterned after characteristics or levels of skill. See Anne 
Philips and Barbara Taylor (1980) for an early argument that defmitions of skill are not gender neutral. 
168 
1990, 1993). The authors assume that jobs have gender associations. However, their ignorance 
of the sex/gender distinction is apparent in their not considering that the gender association of 
a job as masculine, would disbar not only women but also 'feminine' men. Identity and 
embodiment resist straightforward assimilation into neat models. Treating identity as a static 
factor in relation to which choices (whether conscious or unconscious) are made to maximise 
utility by increasing the identity factor (or as they call it "the gains in identity") is problematic 
because it cannot account for the way in identity is performatively constituted, to a significant 
extent, by the very choices that are supposed to follow from it. 
Consider the way in which the authors claim to provide 'micro foundations ' for earlier models. 
This is because they argue for understanding the 'distaste' of men for working with women in 
terms of the loss that they would incur in male identity when women work in a man's job. 
They also argue for understanding women's assumed lower desire for labour force 
participation (in numerous previous economic models) in terms of the result of their identity 
as homemakers. The 'new' frontiers of economic analysis are 'expanded'- by formally 
modelling abstractions to provide justifYing confirmations for previous unjustified 
assumptions. We are not allowed to think critically about the location of the starting point of 
an analysis. My adaptation of Murdoch's question15, 'what does it take for granted?' is a way 
of thinking the structurality of the structure, to ask 'how is the legitimate ground of theoretical 
contestation constituted?' As discussed below, instead of questioning the gender associations 
which are perpetuated by the exercise of hierarchical power and privilege, the theoretical 
invocation of these folk culture associations is neutralised as possibly being the result of 
women's inherent identity. 
The authors seem to be somewhat aware of this, but do not see this as significant. In a 
footnote, they contrast their analysis with that of (a liberal feminist economist) Barbara 
Bergmann (1974) where "she has argued that male employers are averse to hiring women for 
particular jobs, and may collude to keep women out of high-paying occupations, reserving the 
gains for other males" (732). "In our theory", they argue, "the source of occupational 
segregation is empirically motivated - the maintenance of gender identity on the part of 
employees" (ibid.: emphases added). 
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The model, in this 'situation', has two social categories (men and women) with attached 
prescriptions of appropriate activities for each. A fIrm wishes to employ labour to perform a 
task which by initial prescriptions is appropriate only for men. Any woman doing this job 
would lose identity in amount Is and male co-workers would lose 10 • The male co-workers may 
"relieve their anxiety by taking action against women co-workers, reducing everyone's 
productivity" (733). To avoid productivity losses, the fIrm could change gender job 
associations, but there is a cost involved. The authors argue that gender job associations will 
persist because the fum is likely to create a '''woman's job' alongside the 'man's job', rather 
than making the whole job gender neutral, when a new job description can piggyback on 
existing notions of male and female" (733). Further, they argue that there is not enough 
incentive for perfectly competitive fIrms to invest in new job categories since the job 
associations may be sectorwide and economywide and not fIrm specifIc. A fIrm would not 
want rationally invest in something for which the benefits could also accrue to other firms. 
There is an interesting slippage here between the various worlds (experimental, economic, 
real) that the authors bind together. Perfectly competitive fIrms do not exist in reality, as the 
authors know. Yet, they link up the rational ofunderinvestment by perfectly competitive firms 
with policy and attitude changes of the real world in the examples that they give next. To 
illustrate their point that a shift in social attitudes and legal intervention would be necessary 
for changes in employment patterns, they give the example of sex discrimination law in the 
United States and the women's movement. 16 
Interestingly, past tense is used for describing the goals of the women's movement ("the 
movement goals included. .. ", 735, emphasis added), and subsequent changes are described as 
if the agenda has been dealt with. It should be quite clear that the model (like most labour 
market models in economics) takes as its starting point the fIrm wishing to employ labour for 
a gender associated job. What if one started from the premise of a person wishing to get 
gainful employment in order to survive? And then, instead of assuming that the person is a 
rational actor out to maximise utility, and instead of wanting to get generalis able and 
purportedly universal (but actually provincial, located, and specific) equilibrium outcomes, 
15 Iris Murdoch once said that it is a legitimate question to ask of every philosopher, "what are ~ey 
afraid of?" Analogously, I would argue that it is a legitimate question to ask of every theoretIcal 
premise, "what does it take for grantedT'o . . " , 
16 While invoking the collective identity of the phrase (and a subtItle ID. the paper) - t,he women s 
movement" - it is assumed that the reader should follow that the reference IS to the women s movement 
in the USA. A footnote informs us that "The Feminine Mystique was published in 1 %3, and the 
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one looked at contextual and concrete cases of how social provisioning can best be brought 
about in specific scenarios (a central argument of feminist economists, for example Nelson 
1993; see also Paul Langley and Mary Mellor 2002), what would we lose? We would lose, no 
doubt, the validity of the model, the status of the signifier science, the beauty of equilibrium 
possibilities, but we would gain an important achievement in recognising the ideological 
nature of formal methods, a meaningful body of research located in the complexity of life, and 
an intellectual starting premise which derives from its context rather than one which falsely 
universalises its specific starting premises (the idea of labour markets, formal sector jobs, 
notions of gender). My argument is thus that the way in which Akerlof and Kranton have 
constructed the question of identity makes possible certain kinds of thinking, but rules out 
others while seemingly being unaware of these foreclosures. 
Finally, and very importantly, one would realise that history in identity matters in ways that 
cannot be formalised. When the authors come around to a few lines from the perspective of 
the decision to participate in the labour force. They write (733, emphasis added), "If women's 
identity is enhanced by work inside the home, they will have lower labour force attachment 
than men. Historically, female labour force participation rates, relative to male rates, have 
been both lower and more cyclically variable". While this seems to be a factual statement in 
view of certain event regularities, it disguises the way in which the construction of the 'labour 
force' has historically excluded women. 
Scientific writing, is not simply the writing of science, but rather a kind of writing which 
performs an invisiblising of its own premises. When the authors present the decision from the 
point of view of a woman, they never ask what reason they have to make the conditional 
clause, "If women's identity is enhanced by work inside the home". Further, it is presumably 
seen not part of the remit of the paper to question why female labour force participation has 
been historically lower. It is simply a decision that women have made in a certain way in the 
past, and are now not making it in the same way. If you want to find out more, go and do 
history. The pigeonholed separability of modernist knowledge (the many windows in its 
architecture) serves the pmpose of delimiting territory in a particular and always political way, 
yet presenting the demarcation effected in its writing as neutral taxonomy. 
National Organisation for Women was founded in 1%6" (735). Conte~ta~ons w.ithin modernist 
knowledge, as I argued in chapter three, remain within their own narrow provmclal ambIt. 
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(2) The second situation relates to identity and the economics of exclusion and poverty. The 
authors takes as their starting point "identity and behaviour in poor and socially excluded 
communities" (737). This model is a variant of the earlier Green and Red model (see summary 
in 5.2.1 above). The authors state (737, emphases added), 
Greens ide~tify wi~ .the do~inant culture, while those with Red identity reject it and 
th~ subor~ate positlon aSSIgned to those of their 'race,' class, or ethnicity. From the 
po~t . of VIew of ~ose with Green identities, Reds are often making bad economic 
declslOns; they mIght even be described as engaging in self4estrnctive behaviour. 
Taking drugs, joining a gang, and becoming pregnant at the young age are possible 
signs of Red identity. 
At this point, if you think they might have termed the Red identity 'Black' - you might be 
right. Within a line, follow the phrases "black ghetto poverty" and then "significant dummy 
variables for 'race"'. The authors are arguing that their model reflects the "many ethnographic 
accounts of 'oppositional' identities in poor neighbourhoods" (738). 
Before going on to outline their model in this situational application, they point out the 
motivation for their model. This comprises of basically the citations of other work outside 
'economics' on identity. Interestingly, they mention Homi Bhabha, Frantz Fanon, Mahatma 
Gandhi, W. E. B. DuBois, and many other people who have written in the context of African 
Americans in the United States. They also mention Edward Said. However, I would argue that 
nothing is subsequently done in the spirit of these names. It seems that situating their 
motivation is rather to emphasise that many oppositional identities exist and are prevalent. 
And that while the lack of economic opportunity "may also contribute to the choice of an 
oppositional identity", "Red activities have negative pecuniary externalities" (739). 
Their actual prototype model has two activities - One and Two, which can be "thought of as" 
(740) working and not working. I will not again discuss all the conditions for the various 
equilibrium scenarios. 17 Rather, I'm keen to point out the starting assumptions of the model. 
Of the two social categories Green and Red, the dominant Greens have the behavioural 
17 These are as follows (740-743). A large community, normalised to size one, of individuals. The 
economic return to Activity One for individual i is Vj and is uniformly distributed between zero and one. 
Economic return to Activity Two is normalised to zero. A Green suffers a loss in identity r which shows 
the extent to which someone from this community is not accepted by the dominant group in society. 
Red identity which is less adaptive does not suffer this loss. A Green (Red) loses identity from ~ctivity 
Two (One) in amount fisCfs)' "Because Reds reject the dominant Green c:'lture, they are al.so ~~e1y t~ 
have lower economic returns to Activity One than Greens" (740, emphasIs added). A Red mdlvlduall 
only earns v· -a from Activity One as well as suffers the loss f s. There are also identity externalities 
when Green~ and Reds meet. A Green (Red) suffers a loss fio (fo). All this being the case, there can be 
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prescription of engaging in Activity One, that is working, while behavioural prescriptions for 
category Red say that they should engage in Activity Two, that is not working. The questions I 
raised regarding the origin of behavioural prescriptions in the previous section, remain 
pertinent. 
Thus we have (741), 
Each person i chooses an identity and activity, given the choices of everyone else in 
the c~~~ty. We assume that people cannot modify their identity or activity for 
eaCh. ~divldual encounter. Rather, individuals choose an identity and activity to 
maxImISe expected payoffs, given the probabilities of encounters with Greens who 
choose Activity One, Greens who choose Two, Reds who choose One, and Reds who 
choose Two. 
If the model appears simplistic, consider the following possible problematisation of the 
"Further Lessons from the Model" (743-747). 
According to the authors, the three further lessons that one can learn from this model are based 
on the rationale (to oversimplify) - take people out of their neighbourhoods in order to 
eliminate the negative influences of interaction with those with Red identities. Therefore, 
residential job training programmes in the US succeed, because poor trainees can then be 
taken out of their negative neighbourhoods. Also therefore, minority kids who learn Standard 
English at schools which take the initiative to separate "Green students from Red students" 
(744) reduce the loss in identity of Red students. And fmally, "the rhetoric and symbolism of 
affirmative action may affect the level of social exclusion r" (ibid.). 
The factor of most salience in the identity of those who are socially excluded is their 
exclusion. Their exclusion in all cases is from the dominant group. The authors point out that 
what seems to the dominant group self-destructive behaviour does not come from individual 
irrationality on the part of the Reds, but derives from low economic endowments and a high 
degree of social exclusion. This cannot be disputed. But what the authors then extrapolate 
from this is open to question. Because they see identity as a commodity to be maximised, the 
advocate accordingly. They conclude thus (745, emphasis added): 
The identity model of exclusion, then, explains why legal equality may not be enough 
to eliminate racial disparities. If African-Americans choose to be Red because of 
exclusion and if whites perpetuate such exclusions, even in legal ways, there can be a 
permanent equilibrium of racial inequality. The negative externalities and the 
consequences, however, would disappear when the community is folly integrated into 
an all Green equilibrium., a mixed equilibrium., an all Red equilibrium, tm.der various equivalencies of 
the parameters. 
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the dO"!ina~t culm.re, so that r.= a = 0, and everyone in the community adopts a 
<?reen Identity .. This, of course, IS the American ideal of the melting pot, or the new 
Ideal of a mOSaIC where difference can be maintained within the dominant culture. 
The point is this. The model is supposed to be about abstract identities Green and Red. To 
recall, Greens work and Reds do not. The Red identity is constructed in opposition to the 
Green, the Greens come folly sprung. We are back to the imperial model of difference _ 
tattooing is and pinstripe suit is not an identity in the same way. Also, the reason why Reds 
have lower economic return from Activity One or working is attributed to their own rejection 
of the dominant Green identity. Rather like the earlier slippage, and not completely benign 
(liberalism is never benign, but insidious in its apparent benignity, in my view), now suddenly 
in the conclusion we hear about African-Americans who inhabit the 'real world' rather than 
the Reds of the economic world. 18 The authors' claim that they are providing regularities is not 
sustainable, because their construction is not neutral, but feeds a political outcome - that of 
assimilation. 
As a result, we start from the here and now of abstract essentialist individual view of identity, 
which has no place for history or difference. I would like to re-emphasise the points I made in 
my discussion of the politics of identity. Identity is not a jar to be fully filled, it is not even a 
score, or a function. Identity is a political living. The authors' suggestion that in order to 
eliminate racial inequality, the community facing it has to be integrated into the dominant 
culture treats difference using a diagnostic approach, and the remedy prescribed involves the 
exercise of epistemic violence (see Homi Bhabha 1997).19 The challenge of difference is to be 
able to think difference which is not a monster that de-monstrates, verifying sameness. We 
remain within the imperial model of difference not just in economics (though significantly 
here), but in the wider modernist rendition of knowledge. Difference is not difference if it is 
18 It is epistemically violent to study social exclusion (in this case that of African-Americans) in tenus 
of abstract r's and a's and i's. I would argue that it is completely inappropriate to carry out such 
analyses, even if to justify or prove that black people are not irrational in "taking drugs, joining a gang, 
and becoming pregnant at a young age". This abstraction is based on homogenising identity categories 
as stable and composed of essentially similar stereotypical elements. 
19 No doubt, even the liberal suggestion of multiculturalism (the maintaining of difference within the 
dominant culture) is not immune to resistance. In her interview on neocolonialism, Spivak (1991: 226) 
says, "This benevolent multi -culturalism is one of the problems of neoco~onialist know ledge-productio.n 
as well". In the context of education in humanities, she further says "It IS necessary to assert even this 
rather pathetic kind of multiculturalism in order to put some sort of platform against the white majority 
racist argument that humanities education ... should be devoted to a study of whatever Western culture 
is" (227). From Nazi Germany, Idi Amin's Uganda, and Taleban's Afghanistan to the ongoing attempts 
of Hindutva forces in India, history is rife with the attempts to put into action the fetishistic appeal of 
mono cultures. As one BNP (British National Party, a far-right organisation in the UK) member, Mark 
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maintained within the dominant culture. In that case it is - difference from the dominant 
culture on its terms and within its context which leaves the dominance of the dominant culture 
as the unquestioned centre from which difference is to be claimed as a deviation. Difference is 
difference when it becomes a condition for any identity, making every identity open to 
question. 
(3) The third situation relates to identity and the economics of the household. This is a 
relatively short situational application of the model. The authors have in mind the asymmetric 
division of labour between husband and wives. They argue that the identity model predicts this 
asymmetric division oflabour, while the standard model based on comparative advantage does 
not. Let me explain. 
We begin from the common observation that women do more housework than men, even if 
they work outside as well. This is an empirical and statistical observation. While those in 
disciplines which are not obsessively focused on individual choice, might have long attributed 
this to the existence and perpetuation of systematic patriarchy, economists would like to 
explain everything at the level of the individual. Theorising structural oppression affords us 
the opportunity of being able to talk about power and resistance. On the contrary, standard 
economic analysis 'explains' this asymmetry as follows. Recall again, to 'explain' means to 
take a social outcome, any outcome, and show how it is the result of rational behaviour on the 
part of individuals. 
The authors summarise the comparative advantage model which generally proceeds as follows 
(747, emphasis added): 
Husband and wife both have the same utility function, which is increasing in quantity 
of a household public good that derives from their joint labour. Utility is decreasing in 
own labour inputs in outside and home production. We assume equal bar~aininf5 
power, so that each marriage partner enjoys the same level of utility. WIth thIS 
framework, returns to specialization explain the observed division of labour when a 
wife has the comparative advantage in home production. 
That is, in order to maximise their joint utility, and assuming that there is equal bargaining 
power in the marriage, women do more work at home because they have comparative 
advantage in scrubbing the floors, washing the dishes, and staying up with an infant to name a 
few components of 'home production'. This is the conventional explanation. 
Collett (incidentally a student of economics) put it: "the idea of a completely white society appeals to 
me" ("I'm drawn to a racially pure white society" 2002). 
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The trouble for the authors here is not - that it is pointless to talk about people's behaviour in 
terms of maximising utility functions, or that husband and wives may not have the same utility 
function, or that the assumption of equal bargaining power is patently false and an 
unreasonable one to make, or that it is strange to start from the idea that the wife inherently 
(biological determinism) has comparative advantage in home production, or that all this 
merely confmns and provides justifications for the status quo - any of this, but the following. 
Although, this model explains the lower share of housework for husbands when they do a 
larger share of work outside the home, it does not explain why even when wives do a large 
share of work outside the home, they still have a high share of housework. If we care to look, 
one explanation is structural, but then the (so-called) positive and the normative become 
explicitly intertwined.20 And as I mentioned before 'structures' don't get good press in 
economICs. 
Therefore, the authors congratulate themselves that their model ill fact predicts this 
asymmetry. This is because (747, emphasis added), 
[aJdd to the above model two social categories, 'men' and 'women.' Prescriptions 
dictate that 'men' should not do 'women's work' in the home and 'men' should earn 
more than their wives. [Hochschild's interviews suggest that] many men, and some 
women, hold these prescriptions. In the amended model, the husband loses identity 
when he does housework and when his wifo earns more than half the household 
income. Equality of utility is restored when the wifo undertakes more housework than 
her husband. 
This is a rather sophisticated way of saying that 'men will be men'. The situational application 
ends here. The problems of where the prescriptions come from are not addressed yet again, 
and seemingly the asymmetric division of labour within the household, which is an oppressive 
and unfair system reinforced by dominant discourses of gender and sexuality, is presented as 
the 'natural' outcome of identity related behaviour between two 'differently' prescriptive 
social categories of men and women. 
5.2.4 Final Observations 
20 Economists like to keep the 'positive' (what is) separate from the 'nonnative' (what ought to be) to 
do 'good science'. Once an overtly disc~inatory struc~e ~s brought in as an explanation, then the 
explanation becomes a call for change - which the profeSSIon IS not well known for. 
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While the authors make numerous innovative claims for their attempt to incorporate or include 
identity into economics, these can only be upheld if one is judging from a neoclassical 
perspective. That identity matters is no news to others. The authors remain firmly within the 
ambit of the essentialist individual version of identity. Identity is introduced as a variable into 
economic analysis which is arguably 'expanded' by the inclusion of identity into the utility 
function. In their conclusion, the authors write, "Identity is likely to affect economic outcomes, 
for example, in areas of political economy, organisational behaviour, democracy, the 
economics of language, violence, education, consumption and savings behaviour, retirement 
decisions, and labour relations" (748, emphasis added). They further raise the possibility that 
models incorporating "well-documented existing" social categories and prescriptions could 
yield new results (749). 
It is significant to note that the consideration of identity in no way affects our defmition of 
what the economic is or how it should be written. It is possible to make radical claims for 
profoundly conservative justifications of the status quo instead of actually attempting to 
imagine radically altered knowledge in the face of the politics of identity. Identity can be 
'brought into' economics without being critical of any disciplinary basis. 
Even when suggesting that another development of this agenda could be to examine identity 
across space and time (why notions of race or class vary across countries, why gender and 
racial integration vary across industries and what might explain the rise and fall of ethnic 
tensions), the authors suggest that all these will be a "fruitful way of exploring the formation 
of identity based preferences" (749). And in a footnote they are at pains to point out that the 
formation of identity based preferences can be studied from principles of optimisation. The 
examples they give derive from evolutionary psychology and social cognition theory. That is, 
"hostility towards 'outsiders' might be inherent to human nature as result of an evolutionary 
process", and that "stereotypes summarise information and compensate for human beings' 
limited cognitive abilities" (ibid.). It may be difficult, however, the authors warn us, to 
accommodate complex social categories and prescriptions and their variety across societies 
and across time. This last statement is telling. 
It is clear, therefore, that an 'add identity and stir' approach to juxtaposing identity and 
economic is not what I have in mind. I hope to have illustrated the limitations and errors of 
such an attempt. Affirming the model of behaviour in economics as the basis for 
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understanding the category economic is manifestly inappropriate. Further, it never moves us 
beyond the essentialist individual version of identity. And finally, it is ideological and status 
quoist in its attempts to explain and rationalise social outcomes which can better be engaged 
with by radically interrogating the very basis of their existence and perpetuation. As I argued 
in chapter four, it is this radical engagement with difference that the politics of identity needs 
to be oriented towards. 
5.3 Illustration Two: Sen On 'Reason Before Identity' 
5.3.1 Summary Explanation 
The 1999 piece by Amartya Sen is titled Reason before Identity.21 This is an interesting text 
which is quite different from the attempt by Akerlof and Kranton. Sen's article makes a 
serious attempt to juxtapose identity and the basis of economic considerations, in a way that is 
not fatally circumscribed by 'economics'. This is in line with Sen's view that "the issue of 
identity can go well beyond that of 'externalities' in the way that concept is typically seen in 
economics" (1986: 350). However, in what follows, I will argue that it does not go far enough 
in moving us away from the version of identity which relies upon the foundational individual. 
On the contrary, sometimes the author discusses identity as if it is a benign pursuit when 
indulged in moderation, but a scare spectre if allowed to disrupt the Reason in the world. But, 
fIrst let me explain the author's argument tracing its main points. His position begins with 
problematising the concept of narrow self-interested individual and cautiously claiming the 
influence of social identity on behaviour. He defends liberal Rawlsian theory of justice against 
communitarian critiques, and conceptualises social identity as requiring both the concept of 
choice and that of reasoning. In sum, 'Reason must come before Identity'. 
(1) In the beginning there was a passport. The author starts by narrating an incident when he 
was questioned by an Immigration offIcer at Heathrow airport in London about whether he 
was a close friend of the Master of Trinity College at Cambridge. 'Can one be a close friend of 
oneself?' he thought. His hesitation while thinking prompted the further query of whether 
there was some impropriety involved in his being in Britain? Identity, if one ever needs 
reminding, is a complicated matter. 
21 This was based on the Romanes Lecture for 1998, and also formed the basis of his later British 
Academy talk in November 2000. 
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(2) The formulation of human behaviour in the social sciences proceeds as if there is no need 
to take into account social identity since in deciding on what objectives to pursue and what 
choices to make no identification is involved other than with oneself Especially a significant 
amount of economic theory is based upon the assumption of the self-interested individual 
which is seen as adequate in explaining human behaviour and in explaining the efficient 
operation of market-based economies. This is traced to Adam Smith by modem economist. 
However, Smith himself did not consider self-interest as the only motivation for human 
behaviour. He recognised as important values such as sympathy, generosity, public-
spiritedness, and other affiliative concerns.22 While self-interest may be explanation for why 
people want to engage in exchange, a society or an economy is further composed of 
distribution and production. Even exchange needs responsibility, trustworthiness and social 
norms that would allow a successful market economy to prosper. The laurels of capitalism rest 
not merely on a triumph of unconstrained greed, but also on its moral success. 
(3) Departure from narrowly defmed self-interest does not necessarily mean that there is an 
influence of social identity on behaviour. There could instead be other influences such as the 
adherence to norms of acceptable behaviour, whose origin might be related to the rules of 
evolutionary selection of behavioural norms in which perceptions of social identity can play 
an instrumentally important part. Thus, ideas of identity can be important both in reflective 
choice and in the evolutionary selection of behavioural modes. 
(4) Next follows a discussion of community, norms, and reasoning. While it is questionable 
that all departures from self-interest can be traced to social identity, there is no doubt that 
social identity is significant influence on human behaviour. By social identity, the author 
means the influence of community and fellowship in shaping human behaviour, knowledge 
comprehension, ethics and norms. Typically economists are over-sceptical about the domain 
and authority of social identity, but there is also evidence of under-scepticism in some social 
analysis. The reference is to the ascendancy of communitarianism in contemporary social, 
political, and moral theorising. According to the author, there is a fundamental question 
relating to the manner in which our identities emerge, "whether by choice or by passive 
recognition, and how much reasoning can enter into the development of identity" (6). This 
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question is important for assessing the communitarian conceptions of rationality and the 
associated critique of communicable reasoning, and for assessing ethics including 
universalisable theories of justice. 
The author fmds problematic the combination of theories which make social identity the 
principal determinant of people's understanding, reasoning, rationality, behavioural norms and 
practices, personal moralities and political commitments alongwith those theories which 
consider the nature of rationality, knowledge, and morality as being entirely parasitic on the 
subjects' perceptions. Thus criterions of rational behaviour and moral judgements can only be 
invoked within particular communities. In the political context, this leads to the rejection of 
intercultural normative judgements about behaviour and institutions, and undermines the 
possibility of cross-cultural exchange and understanding. 
(5) Rather than making strong and morally debilitating claims for identity based theorising, it 
is better used to interrogate theories of justice and rationality if they don't pay sufficient 
attention to the claims of community and affiliative concerns. The author discusses the 
Rawlsian framework of justice as faimess23 and considers the communitarian critiques of 
liberal theories of justice. On the one hand, there are those who put forward rival ethical 
claims to that of liberal justice, for instance the associated values of caring for other members 
of the same community (Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire). However, while these 
concerns can be additional to justice, according to the author they cannot disestablish the need 
for justice. On the other hand, a different critique comes from Michael Sandel's argument that 
the demands of Rawlsian justice themselves require pre-existing communal solidarity and 
social identity. The author has a threefold response to this - if the critique holds, the 
requirement of solidarity could be a part rather than a rival of the demands of justice; there is 
little empirical evidence in favour of the critique; and while a sense of community is 
22 For more on Smith, refer back to chapter two of the thesis. Also, in chapter six, I will argue that even 
then the affiliative concerns are added to the notion of the self, the underlying mode of identity is not 
significantly altered. 
23 John Rawls's (1971, 1993) liberal theories of justice are based on the notion of justice as fairness. In 
order to arrive at a situation where the guiding principles of social organisation paid similar attention to 
everyone's interests, concerns, and liberties, use is made of the device of the 'original position'. In this 
hypothetical state of original equality, individu~s arrive at rules. and ~iding p~~ipl~s ~ a cooperative 
exercise, but they do not know who they are gomg to be once thIS SOCIal orgamsatlon IS Implemented so 
it is in their interests to arrive at fair rules (there is an assumption of mutual disinterest). Next, particular 
principles of justice are identified which include the first principle of ~~ pri?rity ~f liberty,. and the 
second principle of equity and efficiency in the distribution of opportunIties (mcl~dmg the difference 
principle which is an allocational criterion that gives priority to the worst off people m each group ). 
180 
important, justice cannot solely rely on communal solidarity. This then applies between 
"different economic and social groups which compete and contest; and yet they have to co-
exist and co-survive. Justice is important, and has to go much beyond the domain of 
communal affection" (13, emphasis original). 
(6) Social identity is therefore a matter requiring both the need for choice and for reasoning. 
This can be examined by considering the importance of social identity in two different ways _ 
its delineating role and its perceptual function. 
(a) The delineating role of social identity is important in diagnosing the social good, since it 
necessarily involves asking who is included in that aggregative exercise. But delineation still 
leaves room for choice and reasoning. This is because it has to be defended by reasoned 
support and any particular map of group partitioning can be questioned by asking whether 
lines can be redrawn on the same map, or whether a different map and procedure is needed. 
Further, "[g]iven plural delineations, alternative identities can compete for relevance, even in a 
given context" (15). 
The author next critiques communitarian approaches since they seem to make communal 
identity a matter of self-realisation and not of choice. This section takes on constructing an 
opposition between the 'discovery' and 'choice' of identity. The author argues that on the 
discovery view, a person's identity is something that he or she detects rather then determines, 
and that while the choices of identity may be implicit and obscure, they are no less real 
nonetheless. Some clarifications of the choice of identity view are offered. First, choosing 
need not mean one-off and permanent, it can be a repeated process. Second, choice need not 
be unrestricted, and in fact is always limited by "our looks, our circumstances, and our 
background and history" (17-18). Third, of course the choice view does not rule out people 
discovering some aspect of their identity (a connection, a descent and so on). However, even 
when something is discovered, the person still has to make the choice "to decide about what 
importance to give to that identity compared with other competing identities - of nationality, 
class, political beliefs, and so on... Choices have to be made even when discoveries occur" 
(19). 
Assuming that choice does not exist when it does is not only mistaken but pernicious, and 
such conformism typically has conservative implications. Umeasoned herd behaviour causes 
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hann since it does not leave place for critical examination. Also, regarding the communitarian 
approach, "within-group solidarity can go hand-in-hand with between-group discord" (20-21). 
Further, accepting one's identity without scrutiny leads to the tyrannies of newly asserted 
identities which may have important political roles but can also be oppressive. 
(b) The perceptual role of identity is important because the 'communities or cultures' to which 
a person belongs can have a significant influence on reasoning, beliefs or decisions. But while 
local knowledge, rational norms, particular perceptions and values that are common in a 
specific community are empirically obvious, in the author's view, this does not undennine the 
role of choice and reasoning. The alternative is not the availability of reasoning from nowhere, 
but "choices that continue to exist in any encumbered position one happens to occupy" (23). 
Therefore, no doubt that the way one reasons can be influenced by knowledge, presumptions, 
attitudinal inclinations, but this is simply influence on the nature of reasoning which cannot 
fully determine it. It does not follow that one "can reason only within a particular cultural 
tradition, within a specific identity" (ibid.). Further, there may be considerable internal 
variation and difference within 'cultures' which "an adult and competent person has the ability 
to question ... " (24). Culturalist arguments in the realm of Reason are invoked not for the West, 
but for non-Western cultures - "Cairo and beyond" (writes Sen) - who are seen as 
"inescapably imprisoned in the tyranny of unreasoned fundamentalism" (27). Also, in return 
"[t]he constrained individuals are then seen as heroic resisters of Westernization and defenders 
of native tradition" (25). 
(7) Finally, the author turns to the liberal theories of justice, the Rawlsian in particular and 
argues that its supplemented two stage structure of intranational and international levels in the 
exercise of fairness do not do justice to the conflicting demands that arise from different 
identities and affiliations derived through the relation between nations. An example of such 
identities is provided by professional identities such as those of a doctor, or "markets and 
exchanges in a rapidly globalising world economy, with its own discipline and own mores" 
(29). 
5.3.2 Critical Evaluation 
Sen's argument is a nuanced one, and calls for a careful evaluation. In critically assessing it, I 
will draw upon the theoretical framework set up in the chapters until now. 
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To begin with, Sen frames his argument as partly a debate between liberal and communitarian 
critiques of justice. However it is not just that. It also derives much of its force from the 
constructed opposition between two alternative visions of identity - one where identity is a 
matter of reasoned and responsible choice, and the other where identity is a culturally or 
community determined persona. Finally, I think it is also legitimate to read his argument as an 
attempt to vindicate the universal applicability and availability of 'universal Reason', which 
although assumed universal is often seen as not being applicable to those from non-Western 
cultures. Reason, Sen seems to be saying, is not something that is available only to the West. 
I have much sympathy with the ethical issues that he is attempting to place on the agenda. Sen 
has always worked in important social issues of great relevance.24 It is especially remarkable 
that he feels the need to do so, rather than simply rest his laurels as an economist on 
conventional economic theorising. I will argue that while Sen's endeavour can be read as 
challenging, it does not end up by sufficiently addressing the crucial issues in relation to 
identity, and the economic. 
At the heart of the matter is the way in which identity for Sen remains within an amended but 
still essentially individual view. To be sure, Sen does not see human beings as abstract 
puppets motivated solely by greedy desires otherwise termed 'self-interest'. However, 
personal identity remains something which can be claimed by individual people with mostly 
individual implications. Thus, although he repeatedly stresses that people are not "merely self-
concerned islands" (30) and that the world is not "split into little islands that are not within 
normative reach of each other" (7), yet what he seems to be actually saying is that possibly 
people are islands, possibly the world does consist of little islands but these people are not 
exclusively self concerned, and the islands of the world are within normative reach of each 
other. The tone and sentiment is overarchingly humanist, in a wider cosmopolitan sense.25 The 
24 Pressman and Surrunerfield (2000) provide an extensive bibliography and a survey of economic 
contributions of Sen which are as follows - providing a philosophical critique of traditional economic 
assumptions, attempting to build a more realistic economic science based on the notion ~f entitlements 
and human capabilities, and a long series of practical contributions to welfare eco~oIll1cs that. follow 
from the capabilities approach (poverty and inequality measurement, understandmg. of famme and 
hunger, importance of gendering economic development, difference between econoDllc development 
and economic growth). . . 
25 I will illustrate the perils of overarching cosmopolitan universal humanism in chapte~ SIX. I Will 
especially consider the example of Nussbaum's work (she has also co-authored work WIth Sen; see 
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thrust of the argument is that we all link up in many ways to mitigate the basically individual 
aspect of our personal identities and an example of this is collective identities. 
Yet it is worthwhile recalling chapter four where it was argued that the individual limits the 
terrain of explanation and fixes the basic atomic structure concept that has to be mobilised in 
order to create meaning in social science like economics. By starting from the individuals as 
the basis on which one can talk about identity, one has already structured and confined what 
can be seen as political, and how. As Connolly (1991: 73-74) argues - it reduces the political 
to the juridical. Sen's argument maps rather well with what Connolly sees as the implications 
of this. First, that this condenses most issues of politics into the juridical category of rights, 
justice, obligation, and responsibility. And second, that the remaining issues are then seen 
instrumentally as contests in which individuals and aggregations compete within juridical 
rules to advance their 'interests' or 'principles' by rational means. Similarly, Sen's argument 
places an inordinate amount of emphasis on the responsible choice of identity by individuals 
as relating to an important part of justice, but every time he comes to the question of 
contradictions between multiple identities within this box of the individual, he defers the issue 
to the appeal of Reason in such a case. Identity, instead of being seen as a political living, 
becomes, ironically (in view of Sen's aims) a matter of responsible choice being made by the 
rational consumer of politics. Politics itself takes on the shape of a hypothetical contest in the 
metropolitan heart of liberalism where all the participants arrive with already constituted 
identities that they have chosen with a generous dose of Reason. Consequently, Sen fmds 
himself defending that any and every participant in the arena is inherently capable of 
accessing a universal store of Reason (with a capital R) in a broadly similar way, although 
some might face greater situational constraints than others. 
Sen is arguing in part against communitarian critiques, and I should make it clear that my 
disagreement with Sen is not my automatic endorsing of communitarianism. Discussing the 
specific merits of liberal or communitarian theories of justice is less my concern here, than 
objecting to the foundational underpinnings of some of Sen's argument. Meanwhile it is 
important to mention that narrow communitarian sentiments are often used to legitimise 
oppression against those seen as not belonging to that 'community'. In my view, both liberal 
and communitarian perspectives in general rely upon a 'concentric' ideology of the self and 
Nussbaum and Sen 1993). For a perspective on how even the supposedly 'universalist' modernist 
knowledge is grounded in provincial assumptions, see Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000). 
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the world (I discuss this concentric view in next chapter), where there is located T at the 
centre of all knowledge and subjectivity. Moreover, invoking 'communities' instead of 
individuals does not mean that the centred atomic unit of the self is challenged. Often 
communities can themselves function as surrogate individuals on this view and carry the same 
implications as the idea of the individual. 
To return to the present discussion, another striking point about Sen's discussion of identity is 
a remarkable voiding of difference. This is to be welcomed if it means a turn away from 
positing difference as difference from the nonn. But, in the context of his aptly titled 
discussion (,Reason before Identity' , emphasis added) this elision of difference is the fear of a 
proliferation of not simply multiple identities but the multiplicity of 'identity' in "a world of 
universalised difference", which will hurt the sanity of a universal Reason. 
Interestingly, Reason itself functions as an undifferentiated concept whose appeal is left 
ungrounded, and considered obvious. This does not address any concern which can draw from 
the extremely chequered fate of the exercise of Reason in world history. After all, all the 
significant crusades of enlightenment modernity - capitalism, slavery, imperialism, 
colonialism were all claimed as legitimate in the name of Reason. By invoking a timeless and 
universal conceptualisation of Reason as an abstract quality of all people at all times, Sen is 
opening himself to the charge of naively benevolent and uncritical appreciation of the excesses 
of 'Reason' in different times and places. Preswnably, Sen will claim that, of course, excesses 
have in the past been carried out in the name of Reason, but that is no reason to not embrace 
universal Reason as an abstract good. Well enough, but if we can separate out Reason itself 
from projects legitimated under the name of Reason, then how do we conceptualise the 
abstract and timeless essence of universal Reason? In other words, wherefrom will one glance 
at Reason? As it is, Reason is definitely on the good side in Sen's account. 
The limitations of Sen's starting premises come into view when in his rejection of exclusively 
self-interested individuals, his next port of call is individuals who act in accordance with 
nonns which might be evolutionarily selected. But, none of this critically interrogates the basis 
of how we came to situate the individual as the starting point of social science, what purposes 
does this serve, and what would be changed by a radical rethinking of it. At the very least, 
some crucial problems that arise by starting from the self-interested atomistic individual as the 
premise of society, politics, economy are not addressed by just admitting that this individual is 
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a part of society and is influenced by its surroundings. For instance, not only does starting 
from the individual as the basis of the social order provide a remarkable sustenance to 
perpetuating the logic of capitalism, it also nourishes the modernist renditions of disciplinary 
structurings like economics. Sure, making the point that individuals are not completely self-
interested does dent the disciplinary infrastructure a bit, but this critique remains 
fundamentally unable to address the pernicious consequences of a tradition of applied 
knowledge which starts from individual premises. Any other grounding must be approached 
with scepticism, which may be under- or over-, but this scepticism does not apply to the basic 
theoretical terms of individual, Reason, choice, identity. I attach identity to this list because 
even when Sen appears to question identity in a political way, he simply addresses himself to 
identity politics rather than a politics of identity. Following my discussions in the previous 
chapter, thinking in terms of a politics of identity entails a politicisation of identity which 
gathers in its train a rethinking not just of politics but also of identity. Sen's scare-spectre of 
multiple identities which make solidarity impossible is based upon adopting a very particular 
notion of coherent individual identity as the starting point for conscious attempts to initiate 
solidarity. Such an account does not have any space for a productive rethinking of difference 
which does not simply obstruct, but which enables emancipatory coalitions. 
In common with a lot of other analyses, Sen finds the determining particularisation of 
concepts such as rationality, knowledge, or morality as morally debilitating in the political 
context. The oft repeated worry of 'anything goes'. I argue that this fear is often overstated. 
The threat of all consuming relativism is twinned with its polar opposite of universalism. First, 
it is sensible to point out the extent to which the universality of concepts such as rationality or 
morality is actually a universalisation. Second, the alternative to narrow universalisation is to 
admit of contextualisation. The worry that we will lose the ability to judge is based upon 
conceptualising judgements as only being salient if they are universally valid. Once it is 
accepted that judgements are themselves positional, we do give up the security of universal 
Reason, but we take responsibility for contextual arbitrations. Recognising the contextuality of 
rationality or morality does not mean that it is rendered immune to any and all responsibility. 
On the contrary, it means that the responsibility for justification of particular rational or moral 
norms is now a matter of contextual assessment. 26 The possibility of trans-contextual 
26 There is also another less nuanced way of refuting the fear of 'anything g~es'. On .~i~ view, 
'anything goes' is more the manifesto of ethical resistan~ than it is the cr~o of u:esponslbllit~ (see 
also Paul Feyerabend 1987, 1988). Let me exp~ain. Only ~ a ~orld of no hler~chles 0; operatl~n of 
power could multiple standards of different subjects based ill dIfferent commumtles (or cultures) run 
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dialogues are not precluded by the differences in knowledge about oppression. As Lorraine 
Code recommends, this is the perspective of a "mitigated relativism" which involves thinking 
along the lines of, "[w]hose knowledge are we talking about? Such a relativism would 
recognise the perspectival, locatedness of knowledge and its associations with subjective 
purposes. Yet it would develop strategies for evaluating perspectives and purposes" (1991: 
320, emphasis original). 
Further, as I explain below, Sen's worry that 'anything goes' could be influential in "the 
defence of particular customs and traditions, on such matters as women's unequal social 
position, or the use of particular modes of traditional punishment" (7) is also problematic. 
Note that the specific examples that Sen gives of the possible dangers of this morally 
debilitating political context are themselves illustrative of the outer limits of an explanatory 
frame which combines universal Reason with particular ethics. Consider fIrst the worry that in 
the political context intercultural normative judgements will be rejected. This worry seems to 
be innocent of the recognition that - (a) at best, there might be some limits to the validity of 
intercultural normative judgements about behaviour and institutions, and (b) more 
importantly, these intercultural normative judgements have, since the onset of modernity, not 
been intercultural but mostly unidirectional, following the imperial (and now neocolonial) 
gaze and in direct opposition to the path taken by benefIts of capital. 
the risk of developing into mutually unjudgeable constituencies. Thus, anything goes is not a legitimate 
worry in this our world, primarily because anything cannot and will not be allowed to go. Everything 
transpires in a matrix of power and interests, and admitting the particularisation of universal concepts is 
not automatically to mean that their validity is established. Perforating the universality of concepts such 
as rationality, knowledge or morality is less an exercise of meaningless and mutually exclusive 
standards of validity, and more the preconditional basis on which certain alternative understandings of 
rationality, knowledge, and morality can gain entry into the museum of the legitimate competing 
standards. Warren Samuels's (1991: 522) comments in the context of economics have a wider 
resonance: 
It should be possible, I think to be eclectic and agnostic with regard to the epistemological and 
discursive nature of economics. We should be willing to tolerate ambiguity and open-
endedness, if only because, whatever our preferences, the actual price of knowledge s~~ 'in 
fact' to be one of social construction and therefore possessed of the charactenstIcs of 
ambiguity and open-endedness. I appreciate that some people ~ay consid~. the view 
presented ... as the complexity, relativism, nihilism, indiscipline, mala1se, ~d cyn1cIsm of our 
age. But epistemological and discursive pluralism is, it seems to me, wha~ 1S call~ for by the 
challenges to confident knowledge, not self-deception, however subtle. T.his'p~ura1ism dO.es not 
strictly mean that' anything goes.' It points to the requirement that each mdlvldual does m fact 
have to exercise his or her own judgment. The alternative is that 'only one thing goes,' plus 
myopia, pretence, and false confidence. 
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His examples work through an implicit tradition versus modernity characterisation. Even 
though he does not say it, "the defence of particular customs and traditions, on such matters 
as women's unequal social position, or the use of particular modes of traditional punishment" 
(7, emphasis added), I would argue, has more resonance with the scare-spectres of Sati, female 
circumcision, Purdah, Koranic punishment, than it does with women's pay inequality, sexual 
harassment, or death penalty in the US prison system. I will add here that my opposition is to 
the author's somewhat unquestioned linking of moral debilitation with the particularity of 
'custom' and 'tradition', but that I am all for women's equality in every sense. It is just that I 
do not see it as something which maps neatly on to the debates in question. In fact, the issue of 
women is involved in this debate from every angle - left, right, and centre - literally and 
metaphorically. But, the feminist critiques of structures of knowledge and practice (a critique 
which has not yet radically entrenched itself even in feminist economics, let alone economics) 
which call for a radical rethinking of the very basis of knowledge are often seen as a separate 
issue to invoking 'women' as a legitimate cause in the service of argument. An immediate 
example to hand is the same text by Sen where in his discussion of Rawlsian justice and its 
communitarian critiques, a feminist critique is never mentioned27 (for an example of such 
externalist feminist critiques, see Carole Pateman 1988; Susan Okin 1989, for a recent 
internalist feminist critique of Rawl's theory, see Frances Woolley 2000). 
Moving on, I am not convinced that there is not more to Sen's questioning of identity. I think 
that his difficulties illustrate the appeal of the individual as the anchor of knowledge. While, 
for Sen, it is not a completely sovereign individual, yet ultimately, it is an individual 'only 
influenced but not determined' as he repeatedly stresses (for instance, 1999: 23) by the 
particularities of the context. We get an equation like, determination minus influence is equal 
to some part of universal Reason (or to transpose the terms, universal Reason plus local 
influence is equal to determination). This is important to realise because it allows Sen to 
escape from thinking the structurality of the structure. And further, by maintaining that 
distinction between influence and determination, he is able to admit causality in the sense that 
ultimately the individual is the locus of responsibility and determination. And then a study of 
27 In fact, Sen does not cite any woman apart from Emma Rothschild briefly. In his argrnnents cal~ing 
for a move beyond identity which is constrained simply by the nation-~tate, he does not take mto 
account the feminist literature on nations and nationalism (see Kumarl Jayawardena 1986; Floya 
Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis 1989; Ann Tickner 1992; Sylvia Walby 1996; Jan Jindy Pettman 1996; 
Nira Yuval-Davis 1997; Anne McClintock et al. 1997; Cynthia Enloe 2000). 
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society or the world attempting to know it, would automatically be grounded upon mediation 
through the individual - a one which may take many forms, but in essence knows no other. 
Let me now tum to Sen's discussion of the choice of identity. The aim is not to dispute that at 
a trivial level, some conscious identification does not happen. Rather, it is to examine the 
significance of choice in identity. If the point is that people must always be self-reflexively 
aware of their choices, and experience identity as a political living since unquestioning 
conformism can lead to conservatism, I would agree.28 But the point for Sen goes beyond this. 
He draws upon K wame Anthony Appiah (1996) to discuss the oppressiveness of identities, 
and the argument is again a warning about the perils of identity politics. While racial identities 
can be the basis of resistance to racism, they should not become oppressive or tyrannous (the 
example relates to the identity of being black or African-American). But, if racial identity is 
only to be invoked as an instrument to combat racism, that would leave unmarked those racial 
identities which are hardly ever the subject of racism. We can also look at this in the following 
way. In Sen's account, people choose their identity, and this choice should not be assumed 
away since it is a responsible decision. Of course there are constraints on choices, but "it is not 
news that choices are always within certain constraints, and any choice theorist knows that 
characterising the constraints foced by the chooser is the first step in understanding any 
choice that is being made" (18, emphases added). Such a characterisation of choice as the 
exercise of self-aware Reason by a responsible adult individual in the face of an assessment of 
constraints, belongs in the liberal arena to those who can afford to fit this picture. There are 
many for whom choice of identity is not a matter of exercising responsible judgement in the 
face of constraints, coupled with a careful consideration to arrive at the important identity in 
the case of multiple and conflicting identities. In order to be identified as a 'refugee' one just 
has to be, and the other identities do not compete for choice in different contexts, but are all 
mediated through the attributed identity in the liberal arena?9 
28 Although, even here questioning is not a straightforward matter - John Stuart Mill who is 
approvingly mentioned by Sen as someone who published The Subjection a/Women (1869) is also the 
figure who in the race debate in England was on the side that argued that they 'loved the l~w, not the 
Negroes', and this was why they found Governor Eyre unjustified in his brutal repreSSIOn of the 
rebellion in Jamaica (see chapter three). As an aside, it is interesting to note that almost all of John 
Stuart Mill's work was done collaboratively with Harriet Taylor (Mill), so that it is in fact the 'Mills' 
who were writing when the name of the author mentioned was John Stuart (see Michele Pujol 1992, 
1995; and also Ronald Bodkin 1999). . . . 
29 The example Sen gives (see summary explanation above) is that of a pro~esslo.nalldentl1J'. such as a 
doctor. In 1999 when attending a conference on 'women refugees' at the Uruverslty ~fHull ~ the~, 
a doctor who was a black woman refugee narrated her painful case - none of her medIcal qualifications 
or practice were seen as important, she could simply not do anything and was seen only as a 'refugee'. 
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Finally, the "adult and competent person" who "has the ability to question" (24) seems 
remarkably similar to the Cartesian individual. At one point, Sen writes, "I may not go so far 
as to argue for the slogan: 'Dubito ergo sum', but that thought is not very distant either" 
(ibid.). Sen's strategy is to reclaim the (European) Universal as the Universal Worldwide. But 
the appeal of this strategy can be seen as limited for two reasons. First, it is limited for those 
who believe in the (European) Universal only because it is so, and not because it is Universal. 
Second, it does not allow room for exposing the narrow basis and peIpetuation of the 
(European) Universal which is critical for fmding alternative ways of being a valid Other. 
Even the attempts by Sen (here), and by Akerlof and Kranton (for instance in trying to use 
their model in the study of social exclusion to argue for the 'rationality' of behaviour on the 
part of those at the margins of liberal society) remain profoundly difficult for non-Nobel 
economists to attempt within the discipline of economics. The attempts by Sen, in particular, 
throughout most of his career to focus on social issues and demonstrate their neglect within 
conventional economics are significant. Here, his attempt to widen the umbrella of universal 
Reason is pertinent as a first move in considering the relations between identity and the 
economic. But this has limitations eventually. At some point, it is important to question the 
very basis of how Reason came to be associated with some and not others, and realise that 
extending the fabric of Reason to cover everyone will only stretch to give them thinner and 
more contingent coverage. Not because they are inferior, but because the particular 
interpretation of modernist Reason cannot be divorced from its violent exercises by those with 
the power to oppress. Ultimately, holes in the fabric will show, and this must be thought of as 
the 'event' which can disrupt the constitution of the structure. 
F or Sen, the many problems of identity politics point towards only one possible response -
the invocation of Reason. The sanity of universal Reason then demands the elision of 
difference. The problematics of identity, on the other hand, can also be thought through by 
taking the alternative route of the politics of identity so as to politicise the picture of identity 
where stable identities precede difference. Difference itself can be rethought as a non-
systematic ethical imperative of 'response and responsibility', a translation which Others 
identity, and makes a politics ojpalimpsestic configurations possible. 
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To wrap up this discussion - I have critically evaluated Sen's argument for its relation 
between identity and the individual, its conception of politics, its treatment of difference, and 
its modernist ambit. A fmal point needs making. Isn't it curious that Sen's discussion of 
Reason and identity invoked the 'economic' at only two points? At the beginning, where the 
conception of sole self-interested individual in economic theorising was deemed inadequate. 
And towards the end, when he discusses the "practical interactions across the borders [often] 
involve norms and rules that are not derived through the relation between nations" (29). 
Consider the following (ibid., emphasis added): 
This applies powerfully to the markets and exchanges in a rapidly globalizing world 
economy, with its own discipline and own mores .... national laws are still the very 
important... and yet so much of global commerce involves direct interactions between 
parties - with its own ethicS, rules, and norms - which can be supported or scrutinised 
or criticised in tenns of inter-group relations that are not confined relations between 
nations. 
The economic is invoked as 'markets and exchanges' in a 'globalising world economy' 
comprised of the interactions of 'global commerce'. The phrases - "with its own discipline 
and own mores", and, "with its own ethics, rules, and norms" - invoke the separate sphere of 
the economic where the considerations of identity take on a different ("it's own") fonnat to 
those detailed (which relate to culture or community). 
The inadequacy of the economic theorising which relies upon the self-interested individual is 
not linked here to peculiarities/particularities of the sphere of the economic. This is the 
connection between the logic of economic theories and economic logic which will only be 
available for scrutiny when neither identity nor the economic are available in an 
uncontextualised and depoliticised manner. Through the thesis, I have argued, that this 
requires an interrogation of enlightenment epistemology, a dismantling of the modernist 
rendition of disciplinary structuring and a postcolonial re-membering. 
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Chapter Six: Rethinking Identity Trans)ationaIIy And 
Reconsidering The Economic 
When so~eone sp~aks of ~~-interest, I will be aware of how ~uddled this notion is. 
Of whose mterests IS he thinking? Of.the self he is now? Of some future selves of his? 
Of the bundle of selves with whom his ClUTent self is tightly connected? I will also 
know that the 'selves' of that 'interest' are so dispersed that no one of them nor of -
those of some other string, can ever assume to be the 'best judge' ... 'Behind ~ 
'autonom~'. some other self recognizing me is necessary. I now know that beyond 
every declSlon of my clUTent self, 'some other kind of otherness' must be sought 
(Alessandro Pizzomo 1986: 372). . 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I make two moves - the fIrst is related to a rethinking of identity in terms of a 
translation (6.2), and the second is to analyse the separation of culture and economy as a 
divide between identity and the economic, by considering the relation between Value and 
Values (6.3). 
The starting point is to argue that in the juxtaposition of identity and economic, identity needs 
to be rethought. The accounts of identity (except the discussion calling for a move towards the 
politics of identity) that I have invoked until now, are based in thinking of identity as a 
coherence that flows from the centred '1' outwards - what I term a concentric architecture of 
identity. In contrast to this, I argue for the imperative to imagine identity as a translation, in a 
translational architecture. This will be linked to the previous discussions on the politics of 
identity as a politi~isafion of i~¥Htity Wpi~H i~ impPrtoot f,qr r~nWr~W~lt~m~ ffl~~~~~~ 'ffi~ 
ffflfRrl~~Rpr ~~f gQr~ l1°f rlrty llP~P ffr eli~tm~ qr ~~ ftWBffl~f~Hf1H Qf 4RfrfQflr9' 
In section 6.2, I will dwell upon a concentric architecture of identity, pointing out that it 
originates in the idea of the coherent '1' and can have 'benevolent cosmopolitan' implications 
when circles of affiliative concerns are added onto the 'I'. Ultimately, there are severe 
limitations of the benevolent cosmopolitanism that we can expect from a concentric 
architecture of identity. To illustrate this I will use the example of Martha Nussbaum's 
cosmopolitan universalism. Following on from this I will explore the translational account of 
identity and its implications in terms of thinking knowledge and enabling struggles. 
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In section 6.3, I will reconnect the issues of identity and the economic by arguing that the 
divide of identity and economic is only available to us in tenus of the difference between 
culture and economy. It will be elaborated that this its~lf relies upon a crucial slippage 
between the terms of economy, economic, and economics. The edifice of the economic 
depends upon a singular and coherent _ fixing of 'Value' as that which is free of values. 
Questioning the identity of rational economic Value (that is, applying the politics of identity to 
the question of economic Value) allows a recognition of the multiplicity of values which are 
erased in the distillation of Value from values. It is a translational thinking of Value in terms 
of values that enables us to see the significance of what is at stake in the 'rational economic 
fixing of values' (which manufactures the consent on the impossibility of being irrational 
without also being uneconomic). As a result, thinking economics Otherwise is not about 
simply bringing in the 'outside' but involves a genealogical disruption in the dominant 
discourse of the economic to render it visible in its perfonnativity. 
6.2 Concentric And Translational Architectures Of Identity 
6.2.1 Concentric Identity And Cosmopolitan Universalism 
First, what is a concentric architecture of identity? I derive the terms 'concentric' and 
'translational' from Homi Bhabha's (1996) discussion of two texts, one by Adrienne Rich, and 
the other by Martha Nussbaum. However, my discussion here is not simply an explanation of 
Bhabha, but an appropriation. 1 
At the basis of understanding identity as concentric, lies the idea of the'!,. Let me explain. 
Think of a picture box, with a tiny hole at its front. Nothing can be seen until the eye is put to 
that :fiole. The I in the concentric architecture of identity is the one thing which holds 
~~g else together. Because it is so crucial in maintaining the whole picture, its integrity 
~, on the one hand, be always protected and defended from everything else that is not the 
I, and on the other hand, never be questioned or destabilised too much. 
This mrtiDg~ is in itself not new, and has certainly been around as an important aspe£t of 
Enlight~nment modetwity -ad modernist rendition of knowledge. Consider Adam Smith 
(TMS.III.I.46; 1759), 
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Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants. was 
~udden1y swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man ofhum'anity 
ill Europe, who had no sort of connection with- that part of the world, would be 
affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine 
fIrst of all, express very strongly his sorro~ for the misfortune of that unhappy people: 
he would m~ke many melancholy reflectl~ns upon the precariousness of human life, 
and the vanIty for the labours of man, whIch could thus be annihilated in a moment. 
He wou~d. too, perhaps, if he were a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings 
concemmg the ~ffects which .this disaster might. produce upon the commerce of 
Europe, and ~e trade and busmess of the world ill general And when all this fine 
philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly 
expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his 
diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. 
The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real 
disturbance. 
Yet, the benevolence of human beings comes from "not a soft power of humanity" or 
"strongest impulses of self-love", but from "reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the 
breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct". Thus redeemed, the self is 
free to go about its business as long as it doesn't affect Other selves. In other words, as 
Charles Griswold Jr. (1999: 83, emphases added) puts it in his discussion of Smith, "other 
things being equal, we have an immediate experience of ourselves, of our pleasures and pains, 
that we lack of others' pleasures and pains". The 'I' functions as a designation of boundaries 
of pleasure and pain, concern and detachment, a totality of response and responsibility. 
As a next step, imagine numerous concentric circles radiating outwards from the 1. In fact, the 
I is at the very centre of these circles, which like those fonned by a pebble in the pond, or a 
radio transmitter, extend away from it. This, I'm arguing is the dominant way in which 
identity is understood, imagined, and conceptualised within social science. The I of identity is 
the self and its afflliative concerns radiate outwards. This is also an identity which comes 
, 
prepared in the sense of always already having a map o/its situatedness and its issues. 
For Smith, as for Rousseau (recall from chapter three, Rousseau's statement that one cannot 
be affected by the calamity of Japan), the limited store of sympathy characterising the 
affiliative concentric circles - like water waves when the pebble is dropped into the pond or 
radio waves emitting from the transmitter - die out as the circles are enlarged. With variations, 
on the theme of how the affiliative circles of concern are to be structured, or what is their 
significance, the essential idea in the account of identity is the unquestionable starting point, 
the I of the self. 
1 Any references to Bhabha are explicitly acknowledged. 
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The appeal of a concentric architecture of identity can· be thought of m' l'ts u" f connec VItv 0 
affiliative concerns. Rather than have a notion of identity which is limited only by one's ~wn 
community, the circles radiating outwards present the potential for imagining the self as 
available for cosmopolitanism. 
Th . f .. / e project 0 cosmopohtamsm can be visualised in both liberal and radical ways (see Nick 
Stevenson 2002). My illustrative example to show the eventual limitations of liberal 
cosmopolitanism based upon a concentric notion of identity will be NussbaUm. Nussbaum has 
worked on a wide range of issues from the ancient classics to the contemporruy debates over 
women's rights andjustice (for a comprehensive bibliography, see Eddie Yeghiayan n.d). The 
segments of Nussbaum's work of interest to me here relate to an espousal of cosmopolitan 
virtues based upon the liberal Rawlsian idea of an individual as a rational self and the 
importance of practical (moral or political) Reason. She has argued for the normative adoption 
of an expansive global cosmopolitan consciousness. Based upon this, her version of Sen's 
'capabilities approach' is a fonnulation of constitutional principles and a list of central human 
functional capabilities (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Nussbaum 
2000).2 In her conceptualisation of a cosmopolitan universalism as well as in her formulation 
of the desirable human capabilities, she has an implicit underlying view of identity that can be 
described as concentric. In what follows I will attempt to unravel the notion of identity central 
to both Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and her capabilities approach. 
The cosmopolitan ideal is celebrated as carrying agIo bal orientation, as opposed to a narrow 
and limited sense of identity. Nussbaum advocates, "[t]he world around us is inescapably 
international. Issues from business to agriculture, from human rights to the relief of famine 
call our imaginations to venture beyond narrow group loyalties and to consider the reality of 
distant lives" (in "Globally Speaking" 2002). Her view is that, "even just to show respect for 
2 The background for this is the distinction between growth and development, the distinction which is 
often only formally made and not treated significantly in ~no~c~ as well as in developm~t 
economics. Growth refers to the increase of national product (nsmg mdicators such as gross domestIC 
product or gross national product) that is increase in the volume of goods and ~ervices produced wi~ 
an economy (by a country, or by its citizens). Development, on th~ other hand, IS an attempt to consIder 
the quality of life, for instance, rates of infant I?0rtality,yoverty, htera~y ~d so o? .There c:m be ~~~ 
indicators of development based upon .the weI~tage given to each cn~ena. Sen ~ Idea of. capability 
along these lines, is to ask further questIons not SImply related to people s satIsfactIon or theIr comman,d 
over resources, "but about what they are actually able to do or to be" (see also Sen 1992).. ~ussbaum s 
version of the capabilities approach also involves a list of desirable universal human capabilitles. 
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people, we ought to be curious about their lives", andtherefore we have to not only "ask how 
the cultures of the West have influenced, have colonised, have exploited the cultures of the 
east", but also we "want to know something about what th,ose cultures have achieved in their 
own right" (ibid.). At first sight, this seems like an extremely laudable goal. The concentric 
identity of the cosmopolitan ideal is useful, for instance, to bring in the question of concern 
which is not limited by narrow self-interest. Yet this is also an identity which comes always. 
already prepared with a map of it own situated ness and its issues. The liberal westei::' 
individual ought to peer on the outside as it were, since there were so many issues that were 
inescapably inter-national (almost all of Nussbaum's international issues vii. famine, business, 
human rights, are actually those on which the West acts in the 'interests' of the distant others), 
and in order to be respectfully curious about other people's lives, 'we' should know something 
about what their achievements have been (even here, Nussbaum mentions the effect of the 
West upon the others and the others' own achievements, but not the effect of the others upon 
the West or the constitution of the West itself). As Bhabha explains (1996: 200, emphasis 
original), "For Nussbaum, the identity of cosmopolitanism demands a spatial imaginary: the 
'self' at the centre of a series of concentric circles that move through the various cycles of 
familial, ethnic and communal affiliation to 'the largest one, that of humanity as the whole'''. 
However, difficulties arise when we want to move beyond this set-up which is characterised 
by identity as the basis for difference (as opposed to the other way around, see contrast earlier 
in chapter four) in the secular capitalist liberal democratic imperial polity. The cosmopolitan 
purposes of concentric identity, rather than questioning and politicising how identity comes 
into being, affirm the locus of identity as the prerequisite for any action. What if, for instance, 
one wants not simply to transform the self-interested identity into an affiliative one, but to 
politicise the having of identity itself? The difficulty with the concentric architecture of 
identity is that the I is affirmed as the fixed locus of identity. Anything else, in the doing, 
thinking, being depends upon this pre-existing I fixed in a particular way. In this process, 
difference is fixed rather awkwardly. Cosmopolitanism and universalism are seen as worthy 
goals, towards which the self must strive by acting on commonalties, and fixing difference. 
This cosmopolitan universalism is an important part of Nussbaum's work on women, human 
development, and the capabilities approach. I shall now consider two separate but commonly 
motivated critiques of such cosmopolitan universalism put into practice. 
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(a) The fellow city dwellers 
The project of cosmopolitan universalism never seriously questions the processes by \vhich 
one is placed in a situation from where one can attempt universal benevolence. It is like the 
surge of goodwill in the hearts of a walled community which now wants to look beyond and 
- make everyone have as good a life as 'ours'. Consider what Bhabha has to say about / }{ussbaum (1996: 200-201): 
The task of the citizen of the world, she writes, lies in making human beings more like 
our 'follow city dwellers " basing our deliberations on ~that interlocking 
commonality'. In her attempt to avoid nationalist or patriotic sovereignty, Nussbaum 
embraces a 'universalism' that is profoundly provincial. Provincial, in a specific, early 
imperial sense. Nussbaum too readily assumes the 'givenness' of commonalities the 
centres on a particular image of the 'empathetic' 'self' - as the Satrap of a belated 
liberal benevolence - as it generates its 'cosmopolitan' concentric circles, of equal 
measure and comparable worth. 
The task is to make human beings more like "our fellow city dwellers". The whole world 
outside Nussbaum's fellow city dwellers has to be remade in the image of the people in 
Nussbaum's neighbourhood. You may think that this is too severe a critique. After all, all she 
really wants is to think about other people's betterment. But the point is precisely this. In the 
attempts to make the whole of humankind more like 'our fellow city dwellers', there is a 
picture implied of there being no connection between the well-being of our fellow city 
dwellers and destitution elsewhere. Like Sayer's (1999) 'moral economy' (which I will 
discuss later), universalism, when it is most needed, always falls short. 
Linking this issue with the wider question of development, anywhere ones turns, one sees 
'them' being urged to 'develop' following 'our' example (for critiques, see Arturo Escobar 
1995; Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree 1997; David Levine 2001). Moreover, the 
specific approaches to development such as micro credit, while seeming to be 'self-help', can 
also as a gendered governmental strategy constitute forms of subjectivity to service 
neoliberalism.3 Such benevolent cosmopolitan universalism underplays the links between 
3 Katharine Rankin (2001) gives the example of the construction of 'ration~ econo~~ wom~' ~ l~e 
with consolidating the neolibera110gic through a very contes~ed tr~f~rmahon of polihcal ranonality ill 
Nepal. "When poor women are construc~ed ~ resp~nsible ~lients ill this way, ~e onus for development 
falls squarely on their shoulders, and th~lf cltIzenship ~~fests not through ~htlement but through the 
'free' exercise of individual choice" (Miller and Rose ill lbld.: 29). See also SPlVak (2000). 
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'our' development and 'their' destitution in history. History is seen as a chronological story of 
what is now 'over'. Now, we can help them to learn from-our example. 4 
Following my discussions in chapter three, despite wanting! to insert considerations of 
humanity or history or culture, the debates in modernist knowledge remain limited. Similarly, 
a cosmopolitan universalism which is based upon the concentric architecture of identity also 
. I ·th· th / 
remams secure y WI ill e unquestioned privileges of 'having' an identity which can then be 
encouraged elsewhere. 
In other words, the universalist and cosmopolitan contestation of the narrowly self-interested 
and discrete identity by inserting the concentric circles of affiliative concern, remains 
profoundly limited by its inability to question the grounds 0/ its own benevolent translation. 
As with modernist knowledge, so with universalist social science. 
Finally, could we ask who exactly is it that dwells in the comfortable and warm benevolent 
ideal of Nussbaum's 'our fellow city dwellers'. I will let Bhabha ask this question (1996: 
201): 
So that, 
But who are our 'fellow city dwellers' in the global sense? The 18 or 19 million 
refugees who lead their unhomely lives in borrowed and barricaded dwellings? The 
100 million migrants, of whom over half are women fleeing poverty and fonning part 
of an invisible, illegal workforce? The 20 million who have fled health and ecological 
disasters? 
[t]hese 'extreme' conditions - or awkward questions - do not stand in the limits of the 
cosmopolitan ideal. It has been one of the tensions internal to Enlightenment and post 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism... - to attempt to grasp unity of mankind without 
working through the relation of the part to the whole. In Nussbaum's argument such a 
tension becomes emphasised as a certain liminality in the identity or subject of 
cosmopolitan process. It is a subject peculiarly free of the complex 'affect' that makes 
possible social identification and affiliation. 
For a moment let us use Nussbaum as an anchor to throwback a line to my argument through , 
the thesis. The epistemology of the European Enlightenment was a fabric of tensions which 
structured compromises in the way the purpose of theory was understood. Knowledge 
fashioned in this modernist rendition was never really contested since the Other functioned as 
a kind of limit phenomenon. Such a fixing of difference is extremely political but this is not 
4 So that continuing and exploitative neocolonial linkages are seen as rectifiable errors. If only the 
corporations would say "let's see how I could protect the lives of children here, let's see how I can help 
to increase literacy in this country where I'm doing business, let's see how I can help to advance 
ecology" (Nussbaum in "Globally Speaking" 2002). 
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acknowledged within the narrow ambit of identity politics where identity precedes politics. 
Economics as a modernist enlightenment scientism par excellence is a star in this constellation 
to the point where its construction of the economic often goes unquestioned and t b t 
.. ,a es., 
attempts to extend self-interest to affiliative concerns of cosmopolitan universalism exhibit the 
same inability to break out of the mirror of the Same. 
Like the Victorian race debates I discussed before, the 'debate' ()~ identity becomes can they 
be made to be like 'us,s or should we not care since everyone has an adequate dose of 
universal Reason, and that we should be concerned about the moral economy for 'our society'. 
Thinking of identity along these lines is the concentric enterprise where the centre is never 
questioned or politicised. That the centre - the identity that fixes difference as 'difference 
from': 'deviation' or 'additional interest' - needs to be questioned and politicised is ethically 
imperative. 
On a radio programme recently ("Start the Week" 2002), the discussion about refugees and 
asylum seekers took the following form: too many of them come here, they are usually 
involved in thefts, 'good honest tax paying' English people feel that they are being taken for a 
ride, how can we distinguish between the economic migrants and the political refugees, should 
the latter be holding a sign to say that they are political refugees, so treat them kind. The one 
person in the group who attempted to argue against treating people like they were just a flood 
of numbers, was subjected to this retort from Jeremy Paxman (a well-known UK media 
person), 'but, they are not people, they are thousands of people, aren't they?' and the 
discussion moved to whether the UK was now "full", to which the one person objecting 
answered, 'no, we are not full yet' . 6 
5 Nussbaum's answer is a Yes. She even draws up a 'list' of human capabilities which has to be 
implemented everywhere, I will discuss this soon. . . 
6 Contrast this with statistics that show refugees (and asylum-seekers) made a net contrIbutIOn of 
approximately £2.6 billion to the UK economy, ten times more than ~ey 'took.out' (Refugee Council 
2001). This figure does not take into account their contribution to SOCIety. While ~e~spapers such as 
the Daily Telegraph (19 February 2001) talk of UK as the "num~~r one destmatIon !>~ asylum-
seekers" in terms of number of refugees to total GDP, UK ranks 78 ill the world, and 6 In Europe (Refuge~ Council 2001). Further, if 'good honest tax paying' people either cannot?e bothered ab?ut 
democracy, or feel that they are unable to stop their governments fro~ bombmg an~ .wrecking 
elsewhere every now and then - then they should recognise that everyone IS a common VIctIm of ~e 
democratic svstem which does not represent. Finally, this if not anything else should be a way of taking 
the blinders ~ff nation state ideology. 
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An identity which never questions the basis of its own ground, is one which can only fLX 
difference as the Other which functions as a limit phenomenon. National identities are by 
defmition of this form and also have the 'economic' as.an important element to them. In 
juxtaposing identity and the economic, as I will go on to argue; we have the opportunity to 
connect value and values and question the very basis of constructing knowledge which takes 
the individual or the nation state or the economy as the system existing out there already 
performed. These are not simply 'academic' questions. Questions of knowledge are al:;: 
questions of social order. As I argued before, knowledge creation is always already a fonn of 
ethics, politics, strategy, subjectivity, Reason and being. 
(b) The final list of good things 
Amartya Sen's capabilities approach is an attempt to demonstrate the limited usefulness of 
income as an indicator of well-being by adopting the notion of the 'capability' to designate a 
space within which comparisons of quality of life can be usefully made, and concerns of social 
inequality raised. This is a theoretical framework designed to raise concerns about the actual 
level of functioning that people achieve. Sen does not further provide the list of good things 
which should be applied to all people always and everywhere. 
This is what Nussbaum undertakes to do in her cosmopolitan universalism. She wishes to 
"articulate an account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a threshold level of 
capabilities, can provide the basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have the 
right to demand from their governments" (2000: 12). Nivedita Menon (2002) provides a 
rigorous critique of this enterprise for its inability to move beyond its own origin. So that, 
"[w]hat is deeply puzzling is Nussbaum's calm assumption that she has arrived at the final list 
of good things no good person could possibly not want for everyone" (157, emphasis 
original). Nussbaum's identification of a list of central human capabilities is an attempt to 
achieve "a strong universalism committed to cross cultural norms of justice" that is 
simultaneously "sensitive to local particularity" (153). Sounds good. 
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The difficulty with this strong universalism, as Menon points out, is that it is ''just too strong", 
and 'local particularities' within this account can only be seen as 'tradition' We b k 
. . are ac to 
the familiar tradition versus modernity debate, in a nuanced form.7 
The critique that Menon provides is as follows. First, an overwhelming role is envisaged for 
the state, so that human condition can be transcended by way of constitutional mechanisms. 
While individuals are free, the choices of children cannot be taken into account, neither can 
those of adults "who do not have full moral powers" (154). The state is justified to take 
decisions on the building codes, food, medicine and environmental contaminants, because "the 
difficulty of making informed choices ... and the burden of inquiry such choices would impose 
on citizens" (ibid.). The interest of the nation state, is always conflated with the interests of the 
'we'. What if the nation state itself suppresses sections of its population, and more generally 
does not permit of thinking its own contingent structurality?8 
Second, Nussbaum sees the list of capabilities as simply political goals, free of any 
metaphysical grounding. Yet, the idea of the individual as the basis for identity is itself a 
situated one. Consider (156), 
[t ]his notion of individuals recognised and valued as separate persons is itself a 
modern conception available to the ludaeo-Christian tradition... The core idea of 
modern democracy as it involved in the West is that '1' am this body and that my 'self' 
stops at the boundaries of my skin. Although this seems an entirely natural 
identification to the modern mind, it is, as we know, only about four hundred years 
old and has specific cultural moorings in the experience of the West In non-Western 
societies this notion of the individual, separate from all other individuals, as the unit 
of society, is still not an uncontested one. 
Liberal individualism, Menon rightly points out, "never became the uncontested core of anti-
imperialist struggles for democracy ... and there remained always a tension between the 
individual and the community" (156). With reference to Nussbaum (ibid.), 
[t]he point is not that we have failed the test of meeting the standards set by Western 
liberal democracies.... The point is, rather, that democracy has travelled a long way 
and taken many shapes, often unrecognizable in terms of the criteria set ?y ~e 
original Western experience, and the dilemmas that arise escape easy charactensatlon 
into the tradition/modernity dichotomy. 
1 Bear in mind that not a1l1ocal particularities get translated as tradition. Usually the charac~erisatio.n 
goes thus - in the West, one speaks of there .being a 'diffe:ence' in views, h?w7ver, in the 'Onent', thIS 
'tradition' from within and there is 'moderruty' from outsIde. So that there IS lIttle scope for agency on 
the part of the Others. . 
8 One should remember that more people have been killed in history by the ideology of th~ nat1o~ ~te 
than by anything else ever, including religion. The fundamentalism of the nation state IS perruClOUS 
beyond belief, almost the unthought. 
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All of this links up with my argument about the politics of identity - that the individual or the 
state is not the uncontested starting point of politics. That it is not only some identities which 
have to be placed within question marks and understood as different, but all identities, identity 
itself, the having of which needs to be politicised. This will not'give us a formula or a list or 
an equation whose 'economic' aspect can then be analysed by plugging it in. As Butler argues 
(2000a), these vety t/s of signification have to be rethought genealogically. Or even to 
recall Spanos (2001) we need reconstellated genealogies that are not seen as a prelude to 
doing something, but are in themselves a 'redoing' by rethinkingo/the terms o/knowledge. 
The inadequacy of cosmopolitan universalist terms of concentric identity is evident from the 
narrowly universalised elements of Nussbaum's list which can only see one kind of state -
modem secular liberal democratic capitalist constitutional9 - "as if it were self-evident and the 
only one possible" (Menon 2002: 157). This benign state is allowed to have laws of "general 
applicability" which include "mandatory military service". Nussbaum assumes that "the state 
has legitimate monopoly over coercion", as is evident from Nussbaum's statements like, "We 
want them [the soldiers] to obey a lot of time, but not all of the time" (158). Just like the 
questions I raised earlier, Menon asks Nussbaum, "We do? Who is this we ... ?" (158). 
But, all 'we' s' leave their clues .... 
Consider my earlier example: Todorov (1985: 249) wrote, "We want equality without its 
compelling to accept identity, but also difference without its degenerating into 
superiority/inferiority". My addendum to this in differentiating the notion of the politics of 
identity is this - who poses this demand to whom? 
Now, in order to fmally dispel any doubts about who Nussbaum's 'we' are, consider the 
following (Menon 2002: 164): "The universalism espoused by Nussbaum includes the idea 
that nations which have adopted this account of human capabilities should 'commend this 
norm strongly to other nations', using whenever necessary 'economic and other strategies to 
9 The issue of the natures of democracy is important because as Sudipta Kaviraj (1996, cited ~ Menon 
2002: 156) points out, in many countries of Asia and Africa democracy enter~ befor~ the I1:0tIOn of the 
individual was rooted (unlike the West where democracy followed individualism). !his tenSIOn ~etween 
the individual and the community is reflected in the constitutions of .P?st-co~o~al democracIes (~e 
ibid.). As an example, Spivak (1991: 233 - 234) in her discussion ~f ~CtIVIst pohtIc~ and decons.tructIon 
(tribal activists and capitalism) in India says that the Indian constltutIon does not belong to tnbal1aw 
and culture". 
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secure compliance"'. The 'we' that can use "economic and other strategies", is the West, like 
Nussbaum's "fellow city dwellers". In championing cosmopolitan universalism, one need not 
ever re-member the continual exercise of power which affQrds the claiming of an identity prior 
to its politicisation. 
6.2.2 The Ability To Speak In Translation, Or, Translational Politics Of Identity 
/ 
In contrast to the above, I propose that we think of identity translation ally. Let me explain. In 
chapter four I had argued that by adopting the politics of identity, we can see identity as a 
construction within knowledge producing texts and this can give us the resources to loosen the 
conventional link between subjects and knowledge. So far we have seen how the identity of 
subjects in relation to knowledge is either based upon - the universal Cartesian subject which 
functions as an abstract individual and anchors universalist (and also often formalist) 
knowledge in its own image, and politics is the effect of shared interests - or, collective 
subject positions based upon commonality of experience which have to be consciously 
achieved and which provide situated and perspectival knowledge, and politics is the result of 
shared collective subject positions. Giving up the stability of both the Cartesian I and the 
essentialist subject positions, we need to move beyond thinking in terms of obtaining an 
epistemological formula which designates a mapping between fIxed and coherent subjects or 
subject positions and knowledge. 
Identities are constructed and political, their comprehension as stable can only be at the cost of 
submerging their contingencies and exclusions. The constant translation between identities 
that enables the negotiations of difference is also an ethical project which functions to 
constantly Other oneself experientially, as well as to Other knowledge in the way that it fixes 
subjects. Thus, the politics of identity is a method of interrogating any coherence for the 
processual ways in which that coherence is manufactured in the face of difference (how 
identity fixes difference). This interrogation of texts and discourses for their power-laden 
constructions of identity categorisations, is made possible by adopting the ethics of translation. 
The ethical stance of translation is what makes it possible to see what is at stake in the 
constructions that we then want to deconstruct. As we have seen, the concentric architecture of 
identity has severe limitations in its inability to question the grounds of its own situatedness. 
This questioning of starting points and the politicisation of identity itself becomes feasible 
when we give up the comforting sanity of the coherent I in any identity. Then theorisation also 
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is not just about looking out from where we are, but a moving between multiple accounts 
which makes likely the recognition of the way in which categories are constructed out of 
difference. 
So, the exhortation is to think of identity (conceptual and/or exp~riential) as something which 
is constituted in encounters, in translation. This is imperative because identity is a political 
living and its continual translations should be understood as 'its c:!Ptested experiencing. A 
translation is the experience of attempting to understand that which is-different. 
To begin with, let us consider 'attempting to understand'. Difference, when it is not seen as 
'different from' is the always already condition of having an experience of identity. The 
attempt to understand should not be seen as assimilation of terms or an explanation of the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar (in line with the Enlightenment tensions of creating 
knowledge). Rather, it is the gesture of constituting identity itself through the experience of 
attempting to understand difference. 
The principle behind modem constitutional liberal democratic individualist capitalist secular 
imperial polities of the nation states is thinking of identity as the basis for difference. As 
administrative and embedding structures of modernity, they are intimately linked to the 
modernist rendition of knowledge which does not allow any serious questioning of the 
structurality of the structure - it's continuous attempts to exorcise its own disjointedness. 
This is the map of the world, and the moral economy or values are to be worked out within 
each basic unit of this map. Nussbaum's suggestion that each of these units adopt the list of 
good things which can then be administered by the state everywhere, was problematic for two 
main reasons. First, it was unable to give up the appeal of universalist knowledge, so that 
rather than emancipation being a continual and multiple 'working out' from within the 
contexts (which need not be limited by the nation states), it became the idea of imposing the 
list of good things from above in a top-down way. And second, Nussbaum while seeming at 
one level to challenge an account such as that of Smith above, does not move beyond the list 
of good things that good people can arrive at in a good city, i.e., us. Why could somebody 
possibly want anything else? And, even more importantly, if they did, it must be 'tradition'. 
Against this, I would agree with Menon who writes, "[a]nd every 'context' is by now 
inescapably modem - what we have to deal with is not 'tradition' opposing modernity, but 
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alternative modernities in context" (2002: 164, emphasis added). So that, "'sensitivity to 
context' if it is to be more than a formula used to disguise universalism, must rigorously 
engage with context and with ideas produced within that c9ntext, even if universalism fails to 
survive in the process". This rigorous engagement with context, is the beginning of the 
process to experience identity in translation, to continually Other oneself. 
Before proceeding, I should add one important clarification. Nothing that I have argued should 
be construed as saying that Nussbaum 'has no right' to speak about 'that which she is not'. 
This, in my view, is the problematic other side of the universalist coin - we cannot say 
anything about something because it is not our issue. Or, how can we say something to them 
(any we, any them)? 
This is an easy and unethical privilege. This is also related to my characterisation of the 
difference between identity politics and the politics of identity - it is not about not being able 
to say anything, or uncritically start from what one is and build bridges with what one is not, 
but rather, it is about an ethical involvement in the knowledge production process which is 
willing to take chances, to Other oneself through the experience of the encounter in which one 
is translated, and only through which one can experience identity 'translationally'. To begin 
with this requires becoming a stranger to oneself Edward Said (1999: 295) articulates the 
predicament of his identity, 
I occasionally experience myself as a cluster of flowing currents. I prefer this to the 
idea of a solid self, the identity to which so many attach so much significance. These 
currents, like the themes of one's own life, flow along during the waking hours, and at 
their best, they require no reconciling, no harmonizing. They are 'off and maybe out 
of place, but at least they are always in motion, in time, in place, in the form of all 
kinds of strange combinations moving about, not necessarily forward, sometimes 
against each other, contrapuntally yet without one central theme. 
In this process of seeing identity as a contingent translation, the domain of responsibility 
becomes infmite. 
Robert Young asks Spivak to answer a similar concern to the one raised above. He asks, "If 
you participate you are, as it were, an Orientalist, but of course if you don't, then you're a 
eurocentrist ignoring the problem". She replies (1991: 227, emphasis added unless otherwise 
mentioned), 
It's not just that if you participate you are an Orientalist. If you participate in a c~rtain 
kind of way you are an Orientalist and it doesn't matter whether you are white or 
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bl~ck. T.oday you don't need to have the right kind of skin colour in order to be an 
Onentalist. 
And further, 
[l]is~n, if Y0",l do it aft~r so muc~ hom~work, not just of information-gathering that 
learnm~, ~ot Just knowmg - that IS a difference between learning and knowing ... If 
you do It m such a way that we can really talk to you, then there is no problem. But if 
you can just talk about doing it in this nice superficial way so that people can say you 
are also interested in the Third World, then you will get nothing. It is not easier 
[emphasis original] to do than other kinds of work. That is something that is very 
important because this is completely different from a chromatist argument - you have 
to be the right colour, a nativist argument, you have to be from the place - it just says 
either you do it as carefully as you do your own work or don't do iL. You can 'tjustbe 
a revolutionary tourist and be the Saviour of the world on your off days. This is the 
message, as I say: you can be a new Orientalist and be one of those. 
The involvement in knowledge creation is one which recognises that (to repeat) knowledge 
creation is always already a form of ethics, politics, strategy, subjectivity, Reason and being. 
In the case of the cosmopolitan universalism discussed above, Nussbaum's engagement with 
the context falls exceedingly short when she discusses women's rights in India. She does not 
engage with positions within the Indian women's movement that "have largely moved away 
from seeking state initiatives for reform" (Menon 2002: 160). Similarly, Nussbaum conducts a 
debate with liberal individualist arguments to protect the family from state intervention, when 
in India these arguments would be "communitarian, conservative and religion inspired" (ibid.: 
162). The result, as Menon points out, is shadow boxing between Nussbaum and Rawls about 
the "possible 'tragedy' of banning dowry - the loss of 'the liberty to give dowry"'. Adds 
Menon, "Nobody in India defends dowry on that ground" (163). 
Thus, when I wrote, a translation is the experience of attempting to understand that which is 
difforent - 'that which is different' - is not simply an Other which is the limit phenomenon for 
the self but that which is different - is also 'one-self'. One cannot start from any unquestioned , 
identity and then translate everything else into the language of the self Rather, one can only 
experience a constantly translated sense of identity through encounters with 'that which is 
difforent', everything. 
The position from which the subject speaks is crafted in presence of the present, but this 
speaking is always translational, always in memory. Bhabha quotes Rich (1996: 201), " ... I'm 
. . " d" I 't b till I' h re " In this Atlas 01" a a table set WIth room for the Stranger... an ... can e s me... . 'J 
. . f I' I' with different Difficult World by Rich, there is a constant repetltlon 0 m ... , m ... , 
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geopolitical locations. The idea is this. The subject here is not a coherent self-assured entity 
clearly defined by its body and its own historical narrative, which is the kind of subject th~t 
one encounters in modernist disciplinary knowledge of sociality. 
F or the coherent and concentric subject, the lines of identity are clearly drawn at the I and at 
the eye. Identity is the I that speaks and appears to speak. The I and the eye are closely 
interlinked. Akerlof and Kranto{write (2000: 726, emphases added): 
Identity 'choice,' however is very often limited. In a society with racial and ethnic 
categories, for example, those with non distinguishing physical features may be able 
to 'pass' as a member of another group. But others will be constrained by their 
appearance, voice, or accent. 
Similarly, Sen writes (1999: 16, emphases added), "[t]he real options we have about our 
identity are always limited by our looks, our circumstances, and our background and history". 
Contrast this coherent and concentric subject with the translational subject of Rich. Bhabha 
writes (1996: 202-203, emphases added): 
The subject of 'unsatisfaction' ... keeps setting new, disjunctive scenes of repetition for 
the recognition, perhaps misrecognition, of the speaking '1'. It is both a situational 
form of ethical-political discourse, and a kind of identity or identification that, in its 
iterative field of address ... attenuates the sovereignty of a 'representative' human or 
world-subject authorised in its mastery of events. 
However, bear in mind, that this is not the same as McCloskey's many identities (,feminist 
postmodern neoclassical free market economist'). Bhabha cautions that this is not a 
"postmodern souffle of identity" or "naive and benevolent pluralism" which is equally visible 
from everywhere, but that this "translation-as-transformation" is an insistence upon grasping 
that the 'human' is what is always in need of translation, rather than something which can be 
assumed is given under the grand and abstract sign of Humanity. 
The translational architecture of identity draws attention to the continuous process of 
translation in the experiencing of identity. This is at work not only in the identities of those 
with "non distinguishing physical features", but at work in identity itself In this situational 
ethical political discourse, can exist, the resources for thinking the very structurality of 
structures and structures of knowledge. This rethinking does not take the form of a 
transposition of terms from discipline to discipline, self to self, state to state but involves, a 
translation arising in context. A calling to mind, a re-calling, what I have termed elsewhere as 
a postcolonial re-membering. 
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In all of this, the I is unsatisfactory. Rather than the I grounding the is-ness of everything else, 
it is the is-ness of the I that remains ungrounded. As Martin Heidegger formulated it _ the I is 
'a non-committal formal indicator' (in Robert Solomon 1988: 163). Repeatedly, the generality 
and authority of the I have to be sieved through its re-visioning. 
Further, as Bhabha points out this space of unsatisfaction is not simply a state of denial. "it is 
the need to work through the problem of memory in reconstructing a 'sign' of h(story that may 
not provide a causal or deterministic narrative" (1996: 204, emphasis original). The human is 
in translation and the subject is in process, and knowledge will simply have to do in these 
terms. Just as 'anything goes' is less a manifesto of nihilism and more a credo of resistance 
(this is discussed previously), similarly, the postcolonial re-membering enacted in the politics 
of translational identity is an attempt to translate knowledge less as a collection and more as a 
transformation. 
Consider Jeremy Gilbert's (2001) argument that we can employ Bhabha's conceptualisation of 
sociality as interstitial in order to think "out" the concepts nation-state and the individual. The 
modernist characterisation of the individual and the nation state relies upon -- "the ideal of 
nationality as centralised homogeneity and the assumption of individuality as radically prior 
to all sociality" (ibid.: 98, emphases added). Attempts to imagine translational politics of 
identity will need to "break with that logic of the subject which sees it as a definitive and basic 
category of human experience, social or in-dividual" (99). In other words, in tenns of a 
translational architecture, there is no '1' of the self at the centre of identity, instead, there is a 
fixing of difference that takes on a complexity which is not open to easy spatio-temporal 
determination or assimilation. Sociality can then be conceptualised as interstitiality so that the 
social and the subject are "each the limit/product of the other" (101). One might raise the 
question that if the subject of identity is unsatisfactory as the basis of experience as well of 
sociality, and is in need of displacement, then how can we speak about agency or politics. A 
way of addressing this anxiety is to consider how a translational politics of identity differs 
from both the abstract universal subject and the collective subject positions in relation to 
knowledge. Rather than assume an easy clasping of the relation between subjects and 
knowledge which gives authority to the identity of the I in the way that it fixes difference, in 
translational terms, it is the subject effects that are of significance. 
"[SJubject effects are produced at the co-inciding points where dis~ursive structures at 
once fail to constitute themselves as absolute totalities and are mterrupted by other 
such structures, points of both overdetermination and underdetermination .... Agency, 
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subjectivity, are the interference pattems,["'] produced in this space of r di al 
. over/under-dete~ination" (~bid.: 106, emphasis original). a c 
There IS a further questIon of the kmds of struggles made possible by thinking of identity in 
translational tenns, and what is the relation of these ~ggles to knowledge which is not 
anchored by stable coherent and satisfactory subjects. The possibility of occupying several 
different subject positions at the intersection of different discourses and in relation to different 
issues renders open the possibility of comprehending knowledge in less totalitarian and more-
contextual ways. As Donna Haraway (1988: 587) writes, "[P]ositioning implies responsibility 
for our enabling practices", and can be the site for operationalising interstitial sociality. This 
requires building solidarities in the face of difference. Translation opens up the possibility of 
ethical struggles which are in-between, in the middle. 10 The identities in translation are not 
those of satisfactory individuals or communities, the identities in translation are always 
already unsatisfactory, mobile and petpetual. The struggle is one of ethical recognition 
through mediated encounters which are never simple or one's own. One way of thinking this 
is to deploy Cindi Katz's (2001: 1230) idea of translocal "countertopographies that link 
different places analytically and thereby enhance struggles in the name of common interests". 
But, as Wendy Lamer (1995: 187) points out, this should lead us to asking the question not 
simply "what is the epistemological basis for theory?", but rather, "what kinds of struggle 
does it make possible"? The answers to this question will be detennined through an ongoing 
and highly politicised process of engagement in which there are ongoing and multiple 
contestations. And this is the way in which one can forge a relation between situated 
knowledges and a translational mode of identity. That is, simply acknowledging multiple 
subject positions with partial perspective is not enough, for as Spivak (1999: 183) cautions, 
"there can be no politics founded on a continuous overdetennined multiplicity of agencies". 
The politics of overdetennination is an aporia, and a translational mode of identity is required 
in order to contextuate the ethics of political engagements. In other words, one does not begin 
from an I that in a context X chooses the political commitment A, but rather that any and 
10 Consider the formulation of the 'middle' provided by Deleuze and Guattari (in Gilbert 2001: 106, 
emphases original [1988: 25]): . 
The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is wh~e things pIck up speed. 
Between things does not designate a localizable relation from one thing to the other and back 
again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal moment that sw~eps one and ~e other. away, 
a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and pIcks u~ speed m the ~ddle .. 
This can be compared with a formulation of the 'middle ground' offered by Lorrame Code (1991.322). 
. . . his' 'al tructures matenal The middle ground is located Within expenences, tones, SOCI s '. . 
. . d t ., th resources and contradIctIOns cIrcumstances. Its occupants are commItte 0 exammmg e .' 
these experiences and circumstances yield. Its openness is a. source of power m which the 
productiveness of an ambiguity that refuses closure can be realIsed. 
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every I experiences its I -ness only in its translation through an undifferentiated continuum of 
contextual politics. 
Further, it is important to note that no instrumental analysis of emancipatory engagement \vill 
be adequate. It is at the end an ethical and unquantifiable c~mmitment which cannot be 
deemed a universal epistemic value for evaluation of theories. One has to do what one can as 
- ~ch as possible in the way that Helene Cbwus said, "maximally... the feminist woman 
becomes part of every struggle, in a certain way" (Spivak 1999: 176, emphasis original). 
An example of ethics which rely upon encountering Others is available in Sara Ahmed (2002) 
where she argues that feminist ethics is not simply for "the other" or the "not yet", but 
involves responding to particular others (where particularity is a mode of encounter), so that 
we "face and face up to 'other others'''. She imagines this as the basis for collective politics 
where collectivity is the collecting together without a common ground (as I asserted before, in 
the foce of difference). Ahmed admits that such a project cannot avoid some agenda setting, 
but if these agendas are set reflexively, are open-ended, and involve responsibility and 
commitment, then collective fonns of struggles can be enabled. Discussing Gayatri Spivak, 
she writes that, "encounters based on a proximity that does not allow merger, benevolence or 
knowledge (in other words, that does not over-come distance or difference) involve work: they 
involve 'painstaking labour"'. The politics of encountering necessitates dialogue as a way of 
feeling difference. The intimacy of the dialogue involves engagements which are both singular 
and collective (as Ahmed puts it, '''this other' brings with her other others"), it involves a 
facing of difference which allows difference to matter -- which allows the encounter itself to 
be different because of the difference. The im/possibility of an ethics of translation (following 
Spivak) at once frames the encounters, and makes it inevitable that they happen. Such a 
rethinking of difference, knowledge, and politics has many resonances. Consider (Ahmed 
2002, last emphasis original): 
Indeed, my focus on the particularity of encounters (and with it, of the relationship 
between the past, present and future within ethics), also suggests an intimacy betw~en 
questions of political economy (of how the world is organised through the ~egulatIon 
of work, bodies and spaces) and questions of ethics (of ways of encountenng others 
that are better). 
I will explore below some of these transpositions in the context of the economic. 
Martin Heidegger writes (1968: 11): "Memory is the gathering and convergence of thought 
th' f upon what everywhere demands to be thought first of all. Memory is the ga enng 0 
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recollection, thinking back". I have argued that the concepts which are most familiar _ 
identity, economic - require the most memory. 
6.3 Identity: Economic:: Culture: Economyll 
6.3.1 Questioning The Framing 
-
The conten~ of economics is supposedly directed by the economy ... I would not wish 
~o ~eny an mfluence of the economy upon economics but this relationship is complex, 
mdirect and even perverse (Ben Fine 1999: 407). 
I do not believe that identity is something which can dress up and work around the category 
'economic' without affecting it - identity, politics and difference will need to be 
acknowledged. This effort will give rise to no formula or universal blueprint. Thus, I'm 
arguing that identity and economics need not be reserved for consideration only in the debates 
around globalisation, which are not engaged at all in mainstream economics or in economic 
theory. We cannot begin from the economic as a hardcore category and consider identity as a 
rather frivolous add-on. 
In contrast to this, I am arguing for the need to juxtapose considerations of identity and the 
economic in a different way so that identity itself becomes politicised as the basis for 
knowledge. This is also a way in which the disciplinary construction and the practical 
application of the category of the economic is interrogated. The ultimate aim is to be able to 
perceive the link between the preservation of structures and structures of knowledge, and to be 
able to think the violence of knowledge. That is, not only are the terms of identity and 
economic politicised and contextualised, but the very separation and validity of these terms is 
questioned. 
I will begin by first pointing out that the separation between identity and economic issues is 
only available to us because culture and economy are seen as separate and separable spheres. 
This will lead me to elaborating the slippage between the three terms: economy, economic, 
and economics. Contrary to general perception, there is no straightforward way of linking 
these terms and a memory of the difference between them is essential in order to write theories 
11 I have written this framing to designate the following - identity is to the economic as culture is to 
economy (A:B: :CD). 
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of the economic in different ways. Next, I will make a case for reconnecting the notions of 
'value' and 'values'. I will start from pointing out that the endeavour of economics requires 
the fixing of value through some assumed invariance which is usually a metaphor of nature or 
society. I will argue that this fixing of value is open to question by reading a nineteenth 
centwy interrogation (by Samuel Bailey 1825) of value as fixed' by political economists. This 
will facilitate my claim that rationality and the economic are not separate considerations but 
, 
that there is no way of being 'irrational' without being also 'uneconomic'. The fixing of value 
_/ 
in translation thus actually fixes values. Finally, I will assess a recent-argument for bringing 
together the realms of culture and economy in terms of 'moral economy'. Like Nussbaum's 
cosmopolitan liberalism, ultimately the notion of moral economy also needs further working 
out by critically linking up the operation and appeal of 'economic logic' with the 'logic of 
economic theories' as they exist in economics. 
It seems to be a common enough belief that identity is a cultural issue, and the category of the 
economic influences cultural issues (via the market, for instance) but does not interact with 
them. 12 That the culture and economy are separate spheres occasionally (or always, depending 
which account one takes) traversed by the commonality of 'the market', but remain otherwise 
alien except along certain determinist lines. But mostly, identity belongs to culture and the 
economic belongs to economy. And since culture and economy are separate, there is no 
reason to connect identity with the economic. Also, any attempted linkages between these 
terms cannot escape the obvious fact that the sphere of the economic has its own particular 
logic. In what follows, I'm going to question everything placed in italics in the paragraph 
above. 
The separation of spheres of the 'cultural' and the 'economic' can be examined in the 
following ways. First, it is important to realise the extent and resilience of this separation. It 
pervades popular culture, academia, disciplines and epistemology. It is not that the separation 
is so obvious that at any and every level of human experience, it is bound to be recognised and 
enforced. Contrary to this, I would argue that it is the assumed belief in the separation of the 
cultural and the economic which allows popular culture, academia, disciplines, and 
epistemology to be distinguished from each other. In other words, the separation of the 
cultural and the economic (see Linda McDowell 2000) plays an important part in structuring 
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what counts as what kind of knowledge and how do we get access to it Th . d...l- . 
. us, m a wessmg 
the separation it is crucial to consider what this separation allows in tenns of knowledge and 
access to it. It allows the modernist rendition of knowledge to function, where the structure of 
knowledge has many windows, some allow access to the cultural? and others to the economic. 
Further, in light of my arguments in chapter three, it might be assumed that the windows 
allowing access to the economic are situated somewhere in the 'tower of science'. In actively 
resisting this characterisation and separation, one is questioning the modernist rendition of 
knowledge which does not allow the spheres of culture and economy to be seen as artificially 
separated, and consequently does not allow them to be identified as only contingent and in 
context. 
Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma (2002) discuss how the category of culture seems to be 
playing catchup to the economic processes that go beyond it. They write that economics as a 
discipline owes its present appeal partly to the sense that it has grasped that it is dynamics of 
circulation that are driving globalisation - and thereby challenging traditional notions of 
language, culture, and nation. Thus, there is a bifurcation between performativity on the one 
hand and circulation and exchange on the other. While the former is seen as a quintessentially 
cultural phenomenon tied to the creation of meaning, the latter is seen simply as processes 
which transmit meanings, but are not constitutive acts in themselves. As a result, in order to 
develop a cultural account of economic processes, we need to rethink circulation as a cultural 
phenomenon (what the authors term 'cultures of circulation') with its own "fonns of 
abstraction, evaluation and constraint". In this endeavour, I would argue, the importance of 
deconstructing economic theory is crucial. For instance, we can point out how not only is 
circulation seen as mere transmission without any cultural constitution, but that the economic 
theory (discipline of economics) which claims to provide an account of that circulation also 
studiously avoids areas "where meaning is itself a socially constructed object of scrutiny" 
(Fine 1999: 419), which includes consumption, globalisation, and so on. In this way, the 
connections between the logic of economic theories and the economic logic can be traced to 
destabilise the separation of identity and the economic, culture and economy. 
To recall the conventional view: identity belongs to culture, and the economic belongs to 
. . b· this In . . g the category economy. My second point relates to a diSCUSSIOn eanng on . exammm 
12 If it was not believed that the economic only influences but does not interact with cul~ is~es, ~n 
we would find analyses not simply of 'the market', but also excavations of the theoretIcal basIS 0 e 
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economic, one cannot emphasise enough the following There is an e 1· 
. normous s Ippage that 
occurs between the terms economics - economlJ - economic This I·S Ii .. ~ _. a s ppage which IS 
unparalleled in any analogous terminology (consider, for instance variations of the social or 
cultural or moral or political). There is, it almost seems, no sufficient reference to adequately 
designate the meanings conveyed by these three terms. This seems to me to be an import~t 
part of the matter. 
Let us begin with the economy. The term carries connotations of careful and prudent 
management in the sense of avoiding excess, and also the contemporary sense of a pre-
existing structure out there which can be represented as the statistical summaries of indicators 
of production and exchange, and as in the wider sense of the bigger construct standing in for 
manufacturing and services and agriculture going on within national borders or international 
aggregates. 13 
The category economic is somewhat more metaphysical, carrying ultimate connotations of 
value (see Scott Meikle 2000). Value itself sits uncomfortably between and across the 
economic and cultural. I will shortly return to this. 
Economics, finally, is a (Western modernist) discipline. 14 And what is more, it is a particular 
modernist rendition of knowledge, based on particular notions of explanatio~ and 
accommodating to changes in the general structure of knowing which were necessitated by 
enlightenment epistemology. When understood as political economy, it seemed to have to do 
with examining production, exchange and distribution. This was somewhat connected to its 
earlier sense of examining the principles of the good life, and had resonance with the prudent 
management aspect of economy or economising. However, these considerations of the good 
life were always tied to the concerns of power, politics, and administration. It always involved 
an important role for representation, since the economy was always within the boundaries of 
the nation-state. How production, exchange, and distribution were understood, how these 
market 
13 Mohammad Maljoo (2002) summarises Timothy Mitchell's paper on the modern idea of the economy 
which is a construct of the middle third of the twentieth century. In 1920s the Palgrave Dictionary of 
Political Economy contained no separate entry for or defInition of the. teITIl 'economy'. "The econ~my 
came into being between the 1930s and the 1950s as the fIeld of operatIon for novel powers ?f pl~mg, 
regulation, statistical enumeration and representation. Through th~e forms of P?li~ICal ratIonality ~d 
practice it became possible to imagine the economy as a self-contamed sphere, distmct from the SOCIaL 
the cultural, and other spheres". See also David Scott (1999: 46-47). . 
14 However this does not mean that the non-West has not been seduced by economICS. , 
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understandings were employed to organise work, reward, and leisure in practice, how would 
these practices be studied, collated and perpetuated - all these are questions that make a 
mockery of the theory praxis divide. But, even more importantly all of these questions were 
not settled as problems of knowledge but fonned a crucial part of the problems of 
administration. 
_/ 
The mathematical fonnulation of these problems of administration as problems of pure 
knowledge, by adopting metaphors from physics from late nineteenth century onwards, was an 
attempt to make invisible the political and administrative function of knowledge in general in 
the face of rescuing moral and epistemological legitimisation for the Western projects of 
imperialism proper. Since, now, it wasn't enough to discuss the problems of political economy 
in tenns of administrative solutions to be worked out at the level of the nation state. This 
enterprise would be helped if knowledge were codified, fonnulated, and interpreted in such a 
way as to obtain 'scientific principles' which could be applied in practice anywhere at any 
time. 
The point in discussing the slippage between economy - economic - economics is this: 
mostly, economics does not represent the economic, the economic does not lie in economy, 
economy is not the practice of economics. Let me explain. 
Economics is a Western European response to the problem of administration which rephrases 
it as a problem of knowledge (the conception of knowledge itself deriving from Enlightenment 
epistemology and its inflections). Economic is a fundamental metaphor which refers to value 
and can take on contextual meanings. The economy is not something studied by economics, 
but a construct for comprehension of administrative organisation in the society. The sense of 
economy as economising links up to the economic. 
And this might explain why attempts to define economics as science don't succeed very 
much. 15 Let me now return to the category economic. While it may sometimes be interpreted 
as that part of one's life which is involved in the economy, ultimately, the category economic 
15 Alfred Marshall defmed economics as "A study of mankind in the ordinary business of life.:.". Lionel 
Robbins defmed economics as "Economics is a science which studies hum~ b~hav~our as a 
th h I . "J b Viller IS SaId to have relationship between ends and scarce means at ave a ternatlve uses. aco. kin 
defmed it as - "Economics is what economists do". For a brief overview and CItes, see Andrew Lar 
(1996). 
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carries within it the connotations of value and worth It may seem obvious b t 't' . 
. , U 1 IS Important 
to point out that the category economic is not parasitic upon economics. In fact, in its 
connotations of value, the economic cuts across culture and economy. 
That is why, the economic can be placed in conversation with identity, and unshackled from 
its narrow conceptualisations in economics. Therefore,. I'm arguing that we need new ways of 
writing the economic which examine its construction and c9JllPrehension as an intrinsic part of 
the social, rather than as a narrow logic of cost and benefit which derives from a particular 
historical and temporal interpretation of casting it as the outcome of translating problems of 
administration into problems of pure knowledge. 
This immediately means two things. First it means a constant endeavour to write the economic 
in different ways, linking it up with the politics of identity. And second, it is equally important 
to continue to point out the disjunction between economic and economics. This task is 
important since it will challenge the exclusive claim of economists upon the category of the 
narrow and universalised economic which is based upon claims to science, of a model of 
individual choice, and a particular version of identity. 
6.3.2 An Example Of Value And Values. 
Let me illustrate my arguments above with an example relating to the question of value and 
values. There is no general agreement on the basis of value amongst the various schools of 
economics. The standard of invariance to designate value is based in metaphors of nature and 
society. In contrast, by admitting the inherently subjective nature of value it becomes aligned 
to admit valuation and values. However, this would not allow universal social science since it 
would mean a coming together of culture and economy in determining the economic. The 
story proceeds in the following stages: 
6.3.2.i Mirowski And The Theories Of Value In Economics. 
Mirowski (1989: 395-400) categorises the different theories of value in rival schools ill 
economics. I shall reiterate his four classes of theories. 
• C'. I . I lic' I onomy neo-Ricardian 
• A substance theory of value: baSIS .lor c aSSlca po ca ec , 
theory, and Marxian economics. This draws upon the substance conceptions of motion 
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• A field theory of value: basis for neoclassical economics. This draws upon mid-
nineteenth century energetics (physics) and field formalism. 
• The social theory of value: basis for locating the invariant in institution of accounting: 
conventions or in the legal defInition of property rights or m~ney itself. ~ 
• The full-scale denial of value: Samuel Bailey (see below). 
Mirowski writes, 
This position argues that no economic phenomenon is conserved- through time and 
th~refor~ sc~entific analysis is impossible. Whatever one might think of the trufu of 
thIS optIon, It should be clear that the nihilism inherent in the programme assures that 
in this instance there can be no legitimate research programme called economics. 
The point is that in order to posit the existence of value, something has to be grounded as the 
invariant or conservation principle. These conservation principles have usually derived from 
natural or scientifIc metaphors, but can also be derived from social invariances. Recall the one 
stable point that Archimedes wanted to move the world, or the cogito of Descartes. 
6.3.2.ii Bailey And His Dissertation On Value. 
The 1825 Critical Dissertation On The Nature, Measures, And Causes O[ Value which 
Mirowski uncharacteristically dismisses as a denial of value, was an attempt to consider the 
nature of value in political economy, especially that of David Ricardo and James Mill. In fact, 
his charge against political economists was not that "they deny the impossibility of an 
invariable measure, but that they maintained, almost without exception, invariableness to be 
necessary to constitute a measure o/value, while I contend that invariableness has nothing to 
do with if' (1826: 15).16 
Value, claimed Bailey, cannot but be relational. He took strong exception to the claims of 
designating value by, for instance, "resolving the effects of time into the expenditure of 
labour" (1825: 219). An example given in Mill's Elements O[Political Economy was taken to 
illustrate the point - Mill had argued, if wine put in the cellar increases in value by one-tenth 
by being kept for one year, one-tenth more of labour may be correctly considered as having 
been expended on it. Bailey argued, "[d]octrines of this kind, which attempt to reduce all 
phenomena to a uniform expression, ought to be rigidly scrutinised" (ibid.: 220). For him, the 
16 This remark is dated 1826 because it is contained in Samuel Bailey's Letter To A Political Ec?nomist 
published in 1826 after the political economist reviewed Bailey's Critical Dissertation which was 
published in 1825. 
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only accumulation having occurred in this case was an arithmetical not an tu l 
, ac a one. And he 
was keen on maintaining the difference. 
Why am I discussing Bailey? Because, in Bailey's difficulties ~th the political economists 
conception of value, one can fmd a basic and continuing difficulty in representations of the 
economIC. -
O . / n a reVIew of the subject it appears, that economists attempt too much. They wish to 
res?lve. all.the causes .ofvalue into one, and thus reduce the science to a simplicity of 
w~lch. It wIl~ not admIt. They overlook the variety of considerations operating on the 
mInd In the Interchange of commodities. These considerations are the causes of value 
and the attempt to propo:tion ~e quantities in which commodities are exchanged fo; 
each other to the degree m whIch one of these considerations exists, must be vain and 
ineffectual. (1825: 231, emphases added) 
And further, 
A false simplification in matters of fact can be of no service, and can only tend to 
perplex the mind of the inquirer by those perversions of language, those distortions of 
expression, and those circuitous expedients of logical ingenuity, which it unavoidably 
engenders (ibid.: 232). 
Bailey's point can be read as a call against fixing the economic too narrowly in political 
economy. Recall: They overlook the variety of considerations operating on the mind in the 
interchange of commodities. He's arguing against political economists picking up the term 
value and flattening out all its dimensions into the one. The economic for him has an 
unavoidably subjective characterisation, something which can vary. Value, for him, does not 
need an invariance. 
In my reading, this sense of value is amenable to admitting the processual considerations of 
valu-ation, and need not necessarily be something that applies only to commodities. 17 Value 
17 In a different way Jean Joseph Goux, following Marx, also argues for perceiving the link between 
value and values in the centrality of time (that is, over time the invariant standard of va~ue such as the 
universal equivalent of money comes to seem timeless). As he writes, ".only a genesIS of values, a 
genesis of the value form, can deconstruct the artifice of their hypostasis" (m Janet Sorensen 1999: 88). 
And further, . 
At the universal equivalent's origin is the basic equation in whic.h one commodity is valued m 
terms of another commodity and that commodity comes over tIme to be regarded as money, 
, . th . al 
the universal equivalent, through social custom and habIt. Though the source of e umv.ers 
equivalent's value is customary practice through time, its identity as a standard deceplIvely 
announces a timeless, placeless value (93). . ed' th 
A continuing artistic comedy of values around the bank note as the measure of money IS enact ill e 
. . 'd d art d has the 
work of 1. S. G Boggs whose art resembles currency notes (but It IS one SI e on paper an . 
words "I promise to promise to promise") but challenges the entire concept of money smce he 
frequently offers it in settlement of an obligation, getting in return 'real' legal currency (see Lawrence 
Weschler 1999). 
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can be aligned to Values - worthy of espousing - and since the sub1ectJ.· di . 
, J ve menSlOn of value 
and values is acknowledged, it allows for admitting the politicised nature f th 
o e contest for 
values. 
If Mirowski finds in Bailey a full-scale denial of value, on the contrary, I find in him an 
affinnation of value. But this is because Mirowski's discussion of value is based upon a 
discussion of research programmes with an agenda to appear scientific, and thus value is based 
upon some metaphorical invariance. On the other hand, my aim discussing the concept of 
value is to acknowledge the insufficient and unidimensional grasp of it in the concept of 
economic shackled to economics. Rather, I would like to conceptualise of the link between 
value and values as an example of the link between identity and the economic. 
Now, I shall complete the story for you. 
6.3.2.iii Review By The Political Economist 
Very few in economics would know Bailey today. A review of his dissertation which appeared 
in The Westminster Review in 1826, and is sometimes attributed to James Mill, was scathing. 
The work is sophistry, metaphysics (and, "[ t]his is not metaphysics; it is jargon", ibid.: 162),18 
a continuous snar~ blundering, lack of knowledge and abundance of conceit, much ado about 
nothing. The reviewer's opinion is along the lines of: We can tell whether the reference to a 
'dog' is to an animal or to a star. Similarly, we can tell when value refers to its technical or 
ordinary sense. Hobbes was profound when he said 'there is nothing relative but terms'. 
In referring to Bailey's discussion about "feelings or states of mind" in relation to the causes 
of value, the reviewer further fmds that "our language-master has puzzled himself through 
several pages" (168) when the answer is simple-
Demand is the cause of value. There is no puzzle about that; ... To call it the Cause, is 
a metaphysical blunder... One number is a measure of another, and one is said to 
measure another exactly when it is the same ... value is value (168-170). 
Although, 
It is curious enough, that the grand cause of the puzzle in regard to value, and .of the 
difficulties in expounding will, motion, space, and time, should ?e ~e same: VlZ. the 
want of distinct names for the relatio, and thefondamentum relatloms (171). 
18 "Metaphysical terms are edge tools, and should not be meddled with by those who are not used to the 
handling of them" (Reviewer, 1826: 162). 
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And fmally, 
... in every departmen~ of literature,. that [~~uch ado about nothing'] is a spirit which 
ought to be repressed, b.ut be~aus~ In Polrtical Economy is peculiarly noxious. While 
the knowledge of the SCIence IS stIll confmed to a comparatively small numbe 't h 
tw rful If' th· , r, 1 as o powe c asses 0 enemIes, e mterested, and the' ignorant; who we dail 
assume to themselves a merit in ~ecrying it (172, emphases added).' y see, 
6.3.2.iv Valuing C!!!iure And Economy. 
I will now link these discussions back to the earlier discussion on separation of the realms of 
culture and economy. Sayer (1999) will be an illustration for this. Sayer calls for putting 
values back into both culture and economy. I agree with his concerns, but, I would argue that 
they are can be expanded on three counts. First, he argues for bringing culture and economy 
closer, rather than emphasising on scrutinising the process by which we have come to see 
them as separate. Second, he argues for a moral economy, and I will aim to illustrate that his 
notion of the moral economy does not radically contest the conventional economy. Third, he 
does not engage with economics (which he presumably sees as a science) but only laments the 
limited concerns of political economy. However, his move is nonetheless a crucial one to 
make. In the light of what I have been arguing in this section, I think that a stronger case can 
be made for the linking up of identity and economic, and for challenging economics. 
Sayer starts by making the point that we live in a highly economised culture which has 
considerably accommodated to division of labour, class, commodification and instrumental 
rationality. While early political economy was bound up with moral and political philosophy, 
increasingly with the development of capitalism people have lost control over their economic 
lives, and the competitive laws of global economy have tended to reduce the purchase of 
normative standpoints on political economy. In many societies, old moral principles are 
declining, and "[t]hese developments also reflect the rise of the (cultural) politics of 
recognition relative to the (economic) politics of distribution" (54). 
In common with many social theorists, Sayer does not discuss economics very much. This is 
problematic because in taking the 'competitive laws of global economy' as insurmountable, so 
much has already been given away. As I have repeatedly emphasised, the heart of the so-
called economic logic is not inaccessible to criticism. Further, the important need is precisely 
to link the cultural politics of recognition with the economic politics of distribution. The 
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economic is, as it were, handed over to economics no questio k d A 
. " . . , s as e. s an example, 
consIder [n]owan econoIDlc VIew of culture is bound to be an instrumental "(60) 
one... . 
N ow consider Sayer's conceptualisation of a moral economy as' a way of understanding both 
culture and economy and the relation between them. "The moral economy embodies norms 
regarding ~he responsibilities an~ ~ghts of indiVid~s and institutions with respect to others 
and regarding the nature and qualloes of goods, set~lces and environment" (68). 
He further writes (69, emphasis added), 
F or our SOCiety the fundamental questions of moral economy might include the 
following. 
• Whose. keeper are we? Who is our keeper? - What are our responsibilities 
towards children, the elderly, the disabled and infinn, to distant Others and future 
generations, and to the environment? 
• What standards of care and provision should we expect to receive, give and 
fund? - what goods should be provided? 
• How should we discharge our responsibilities to Others? - through paying 
taxes to fund transfer payments? through direct unpaid labour? By paying others 
to do the work? 
• How should these responsibilities be allocated between men and women, 
between parents and non-parents, between different age groups, between people 
of different incomes and wealth? 
• What standard of living should people expect? Should there be limits on pay 
and income from capital? 
• To what extent should people be reliant on wages/salaries for their income? 
(How far should income be subject to the 'stark utopia' of the 'self-adjusting' 
market (polanyi, 1957)?) 
• What things should not be commodified? 
It is clear that we need more people to be asking these questions, and that the concept of a 
moral economy is a valuable one. Yet, my argument is that Sayer has not gone far enough. In 
defining the very basis of moral economy in the "responsibilities and rights of individuals and 
institutions", he has converted the political into the juridical and embraced an individual view 
of identity. This links with his earlier perception of the divide between the cultural politics of 
recognition and the economic politics of distribution. 
But, an even more important point is to indicate the limit of his moral economy - "our 
society". The formulation of the moral economy maps quite well on to the formulation of 
Western post-industrial secular capitalist liberal democracies. This becomes limiting when it 
confines moral economy as a social contract to be worked out at the level of each nation state. 
This is problematic because the very working out of the moral economy as a social contract in 
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the nation state of 'our society' could be linked directly to oppression, exploitation or injustice 
elsewhere. A recent example is the political voice in Britain which w s ar . c. 
a gumg .!.or more 
active exportation of anns and weapons to places under the threat of war, because it would 
create jobs and livelihoods at home, and benefit our economy. 
At no point, does Sayer's notion of the moral economy pose any challenge to the 
representative legitimacy of the nation state, or even to the basic capitalist economici'rder 
(with the add-on of social democracy). His notion of the moral economy is like a liberal social 
contract which has to be worked out on an island - which it probably is. If one cannot expect a 
critical social theorist to challenge the grounding legitimacy of the nation state, the 
constitution of the we, and the our society, the appeal of the nation state must be strong 
indeed. 
Further, in thus limiting the terms of his discussion of moral economy, I would argue that he's 
not being humble or speaking only for what he knows, but rather exercising his claim to a 
privilege only available to some. This is the privilege of being able to shut our doors and 
windows, sit down together and decide what would be good for us. It is not available to those 
who have no roof nor structure to commune in this way. Fragile nation states at the mercy of 
the powers from history that be. In our neocolonial world, there are many out in the cold 
usually because their structures were tom down, or because they can never realistically hope 
to have enough to start building. For example, the power asymmetries necessarily mean that a 
US or a UK can agree upon the good and ethical moral economies of their societies (not that 
they do, but they could), and by the same stroke inflict interminable misery on national 
economies dependent on the export of primary produce to the US or the UK. 
But, leave all this aside. Even on the terms of his own moral economy, Sayer does not link the 
preservation of structures with the preservation of structures of knowledge. To wit, he follows 
up his humane list of questions thus (69, emphases added), 
Of course, in a sense many of these are academic questions, for in practice ~e 
arrangements to which they refer depend heavily on the working of the economiC 
system and on convention and power (in the lifeworld as well as systems) rather ~an 
being decided normatively in any considered manner. However, from a ~ormatlve 
point of view - and any critical social science presupposes such a standpomt - they 
are crucial to the any assessment of economy in the broad sense. 
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By saying that these crucial questions are academic Sayer seems to b . th b' 
, e saymg at - aslcallv 
the status quo relies upon the 'working of the economic system' th thin -
among 0 er gs, and as 
critical social theorists we can't really say much about that. 
My illustration is complete, unless va~ue is linked with values, economic is linked with 
identity, the slippage between economics/economy/economic is realised, and economics is 
challenged for its representation of the 'economic system', even well-meaning attempts to 
bring together considerations of culture and of economy will remain fundamentally 
circumscribed. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Interrogating the economic logic based upon one-dimensional value requires challenging more 
thoroughly the construction of the category economic by economics. Towards this end, in the 
thesis, I have compromised the epistemological bases of economics as a science, I have 
discussed the limitations of modernist knowledge in the face of the Other, and argued for 
juxtaposing identity with the economic. 
To sum up, I present a long (because) profound quote from Butler (2000a: 277-278, emphases 
added) who is less intimidated by the economic than Sayer, 
My sense is that our work is commonly motivated by a desire for a more radically 
restructured world, one which would have economic equality and political 
enfranchisement imagined in much more radical ways than they currently are. The 
question, though, that remains to be posed for us, I believe, is how we will make the 
translations between the philosophical commentary on the field of politics and the 
reimagining of political life. This is surely the kind of question which will render 
productive and dynamic the opposition between formalism and historicism, between 
the ostenSibly a priori and the a posteriori. One might reply that any notion of 
economic equality will rely on a more generalised understanding of equality, and that 
that is part of what is interrogated by this kind of work. Or one might reply that any 
notion of a future of radically transfonned economic relations will rely on the notion 
of futurity, and futurity is part of what is being attended to here. But such responses 
go only part of the distance in answering the question that is posed. For what happens 
to the notion of equality when it becomes economic equality? And what happens to the 
notion of the fUture when it becomes an economic fUture? We ought not simply to 
'plug in ' the economic as the particular field whose conditions of possibility can b.e 
thought out on a priori level. It may also be that the very sphere of th.e economIC 
needs to be rethought genealogical/yo Its separation from the cultura~ for ~tance, by 
structuralist legacies within anthropology might need to be rethought ag.~t those 
who claim that the very separation of those spheres is a consequence of capItal Itself 
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In rethinking genealogically the sphere of the economic, we have to also loosen its 
subsumption under the official discourse of economics. This will mean a demonstration of 
economic theories not as reflections of an autonomous economy, but as textual productive 
enterprises which fix values under the supposed invariance 'of value. This inhibits the 
translation of the self into Otherness, and confmes the basis of knowledge to a narrow relation 
between theory and critique.Jhe politicisation of the having of identity is simultaneously a 
questioning of theory's claims to -eXplaining the economic, a recognition of difference as the 
basis for identity, and a call for attending to knowledge production in Other ways. 
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Chapter Seven: Writing Economic Theory AnOther Way 
The classical concept of competence supposes that one can n·g 1 di . kn led (. . . . orous y ssoclate 
ow. ge ill Its act or ill Its positing) from the event that one is dealing with d 
especIally from the ambiguity of written or oral marks let's call them gram h' ~ Ct· Ii th .. op omes. 
ompe ence lillp es .at ~ .meta-discourse IS possible, neutral and univocal with 
regard to a field of obJeCtiV1ty, whether or not it possesses the structure of a text 
Perfo~anc~s ntle~ by this competence must in principle lend themselves to a 
transitIOn With nothmg left over o~ the subject of the corpus that is itself translatable. 
Above ~ll, ~ey sh~uld ~ot essentIally be of narrative type. In principle one doesn 'f 
tell stones In a university; one does history, one recounts in order to know and to 
explain; one speaks about narrations or epic poems, but events and stories must not be 
produced in the name of institutionalizable knowledge (Franson ManjaIi 2001: 118, 
emphases added). 
7.1 A Recap 
In this fmal part, I wish to move forward in the light of the concerns that I have raised 
throughout the thesis. Let me recall the thread of these concerns. To begin with, there was the 
question of how what we think counts as knowledge in a social science is not simply a matter 
of how can we best be scientific about the social realm, but rather a question of excavating 
how the very basis of what it means to be scientific is itself intimately tied to the larger 
tensions in the picture of enlightenment epistemology. In the context of what it means to 
know, an important part is played by the ability to explain, so that, it seems as if explanation 
remains an unchanging anchor of a social science like economics. However, the changing 
nature of what we mean by an explanation as demonstrated in the first part of the thesis, has 
itself been an important trajectory in economics. Further, the mutations of enlightenment 
epistemology in the nineteenth century which coincided with the turn to neoclassical 
economics, also marked the moralisation of objectivity, the mechanisation of science, and the 
aspiration in social sciences like economics to achieve a form of representation which was 
'pure' because it supposedly did not involve any interpretation, for instance the 
mathematisation of the economic discourse. 
One could remain within the ambit of discussing how theories negotiate between the received 
understandings of scientific knowledge and the particularities of the social realm. But this 
would not draw any attention to how what counts as knowledge in social science is not simply 
a problem of knowledge, or science, but also a movement in history, in time and in place. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight that economics as a social science could have aspired to 
universal ideals of knowing only within a modernist comprehension of knowledge as 
characterised by Cartesian subjectivity and taxonomised separability. These terms of 
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supposedly universal knowing are keenly dependent on maintaining a split between science 
and politics, on managing the 'Other' as a limit phenomenon and on a certa' . . 
, ill appreclatIng 
and positive correlation between the status of science and the West. This being the case, 
modernist knowing and being as the foundation of enlightenment epistemological theorising, 
does not simply meet its Other in history and time, but actively needs, seeks, and creates at its 
edges the Other as an irrational and seemingly irrelevant possibility which is actually 
important for its own self coherence. What seem as contestations in this modernist 
epistemological worldview are often actually a play of the'S arne Self. In order to challenge 
this provincialism of supposedly universal knowing, simply taking up a social science like 
economics and critiquing its evolution will not do. What is needed instead is to undermine the 
very separations it relies upon profoundly in order to marshal claims to knowledge. I have 
termed this a particular way of re-membering in presence of the present, a postcolonial 
moment. In order to disrupt the modernist disciplinary logic that relies upon creating 
knowledge based on manufacturing conceptual abstractions and universal ising their essence, 
we need to place difference at the heart of self and identity. I have chosen to mount this 
critique by arguing for a juxtaposition of questions of identity with questions of the economic. 
This leads to a discussion of the essentialist abstract individual model of identity in the 
discourse of economics. A reflection on this view of identity especially as it obtains within 
economics, provides an entry point into critiquing the model of knowledge which relies upon a 
universal subject. One response has been that of standpoint theory, and its political correlate of 
identity politics. However, even this endeavour has its limitations which can be addressed if 
we move to thinking of not simply identity politics, but the politics of identity. Further, where 
identity is discussed in economics, this bringing together is shown to be unsatisfactory. 
Specific examples illustrate the point. As a result, we need to rethink both individual and 
collective ways of considering identity because they remain within what I characterise as a 
concentric mode of identity. The pitfalls of this view are illustrated. In contrast to this, the case 
is made for the thinking of identity in a translational mode. 
Finally, this need to juxtapose identity and the economic requires not only rethinking of 
identity, but also of the economic. This is important because there is a slippage between the 
notions of economy, economic, and economics which has significant implications for the way 
in which culture and economy are understood as separate spheres, with the economy as having 
a universal logic of its own. This is open to question as we realise that the translations between 
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the value and values are only fixed by maintaining as constant and invariant a universal 
metaphor as the standard which designates value. However, any such fixing of value (in 
metaphorical invariance of substance, the formalism, social conventions and so on) is only 
achieved by isolating the economic logic from values which are seen to belong to the cultural 
sphere. Calls to integrate culture and economy in terms such as 'the moral economy' remain 
inadequate. What is needed is to deconstruct the economic itself as an apriori possibility. The 
economic is not something that draws upon a separate understanding of rationality. Within the 
dominant framework, it is important to realise that there is no way of being irrational without 
also being uneconomic. This ability to compare and calculate in connnensurate terms, identify 
invariances, and arrive at the economically rational decision which is overdetermined by 
universal Reason is what allows a particular kind of theorising to be seen as social scientific 
designation of the pre-existing economic, when it is actually a particular fixing of values in 
value. 
In this concluding part 1 will proceed as follows. The rethinking of the economic in relation to 
identity will allow us to write economic theory anOther way, and this will also be a rewriting 
of the conditions of theory itself. Rather than being seen as emanating from a fixed and 
centred self's perception of the world as inevitably determined by history, time, and place, 
theory will be a way of Othering (making Other) knowledge. 'Travelling' in its many senses 
will be not something that threatens theoretical certainties, but is an inextricable part of the 
understanding of theorising and knowledge. The tensions between the general and particular, 
part and the whole, and the self and the Other only achieved legitimacy in the light of the 
aspirations to universal knowing. If the politics of intellectual authority are reoriented to 
contextuality, we will have newer ways of thinking about knowledge and its dissemination. 
7.2 Writing Economic Theory Another Way 
The very first significance of beginning to think about writing economic theory anOther way 
is to finally get over the belief that "1 know the wheel is crooked, but economics is still the 
best game in town" (Robert Solow paraphrased in Melvin Reder 1999: 362). The 
deparochialising of economics is also by the same token an interrogation of the modernist 
rendition of knowledge. The way one would write such theory will be radically different and 
. ' .. f th th . t the writing process the method as strange - for It would mvolve a questIOnmg 0 e eons, ' 
. h' . ed t be at hand The discourse of well as an attempt to generate meanmg from w at IS percelv 0 . 
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economics is a particularly powerful metanarrative (even more so m' tho It' ali 
IS a e caplt st neo-
colonial unipolar world saturated with an often unexamined but accepted economic logic). By 
writing anOther way we can dig into the ways and means by which the foundations of -a 
discipline are laid - and then expose these bases as contingent and particular. This is also an 
exercise in establishing the difference between an impossible universal and general economic 
knowledge (aesthetically aspired for by most practitioners) and an actual process of 
universalisation and generalisation of a particular form of knowledge based on a particularised 
model of human subjectivity - and the havoc this causes in terms of dissonance to those who 
are not adequately imbricated in the belief systems underlying this universalised model of 
knowledge and SUbjectivity. 
Within the context of economics, the questioning of mainstream methods or selection of the 
'economic' domain is at the same time a questioning of its knowledge claims and the 
possibility of their justification. This would place more stress on examining the mechanisms 
which allow such knowledge claims to be uttered as legitimate; laying bare the expectations 
that are associated with the possibility of having made such claims; and unpacking the 
historical investment implicit in such endeavours of knowledge creation and justification. 
It is not just that economic theory can be written another way but that we need to write 
economic theory anOther way. The 'economic' in not everywhere the same its construction, 
motivations, contexts, trajectories, encounters, meanings may be different, contradictory, 
ambiguous - in time and in place. The same is true for economies as complicated contested 
spaces of interaction that function by the logic uniquely their own. Value needs to be 
unshackled from its modernist capitalist annexation. Economics does not have a meaningful 
theory of value, and as I pointed in the previous chapter, the economic logic of the dominant 
neoliberal kind cannot accommodate an ethical concern for the Other. It is incapable of 
meaningfully conceptualising the social, or being transformed through an ethicality for the 
Other which is not-me and never-me - an alterity.l The economic logic is not hospitable to 
such ideas, to postcolonial memory. 
1 It is not surprising that economic logic is incapable of admitting ~lterity, it may even be a fun~tio~ ~f 
logic itself. Just as the truisms of dominant and unchallenged se~-mt~est are s~cured by the SClent1St1~ 
axiomatics of 'economic theory" similarly logic itself has a hentage u: authonty. An?reas Ny~ (1990. 
182) describes this as follows: "the atomized statements tha~ 10~lC reconnects ill Syll0glS~ ~r 
propositional calculi are themselves spoken, but it is by a certam kind of spe~er, a speaker \\ho IS 
alienated from himself, who speaks from no coherent interpersonal expenence, ~om no ~ab~~ 
communal reality. It is no accident that logic flourished when the human commumty had failed . 
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Let me trace some of the contours of writing economic theory in unfamiliar ways. An 
important concern that I have in this regard is that the economic should not be too easily 
available as a category split from the social or the political, and at the same time the dominant 
representations of the category economic which are afforded to us by the so-called 
descriptions or explanations of the economy in economics (conventional 'economic theory' as 
I pointed out in the introduction) need to be challenged. What is the aim of all this? My 
motivation for undertaking this is to stress that - the economic logic as we fmd it in our 
neoliberal age is not impossible to perforate, and that this is a task in which we need to rethink 
the purpose and status of theory, its relation to critique, and the relation of knowledge in 
general to emancipation. How does this translate in relation to economics, its practitioners and 
practice? I argue that an appreciation of the emphases as outlined above require us to start 
from jettisoning the conventional one-way relation between 'theory' and the 'world' in 
economics, where theories can only follow from an external mind-independent world 'out 
there'. Once the focus turns to seeing economic theories as productive enterprises, we can 
understand theories as producing or naming their own real. This opens up several radical 
possibilities - we can visualise a radically different role of critique, consider 
economy/economics as a text, to link the logic of economic theories with an all-pervasive 
economic logic, to think through the theory/praxis problematique which underscores 
enlightenment epistemology, to appreciate the importance of identity re-imagined as 
translational, and to examine the relation between epistemology and emancipation. These 
possibilities underline the centrality of the Other in the writing of more radical theories of the 
economic and encourage changes in pedagogy. These changes entail a contextuaIised 
approach to social political economy and a critical questioning of dominant ways of teaching, 
reading and writing economy/economic/economics in the academy (such as those called for by 
the Post-Autistic Economics movement). 
7.2.1 Theories As Textual Productions 
Theory itself has no con-sequence. It is autosequential ~ather than ~utomatic. Theory 
is the production of theory, lost in its setting to w?rk. It IS al~ay~ Withdra~ from that 
open end as it is from that which it wants to theonze (Gayatn SPIVak 1999. 194). 
Alterity in contrast requires a thinking beyond the self, especially in the Levinasi~ s(Rie~s~ i~"~~an~ 
further thought, demands that thought go further - than it has ever gone or can go c ar 0 en 
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Generally theory is seen as "anything which is, or can be, articulated in the form of a 
statement or set of statements which purport to offer, or which can be taken as offering. an 
explanation of something" (Stephen Gaukroger, in Peter Ekegren 1999: 5). Further, as Sara 
Ahmed (2000: 98) points out, within particular disciplines, 'theory' as a form of naming can 
do a lot of work - it can suggest more difficult, more advanced, and so on. In the ftrst two 
chapters, I examined the competing ways in which theory has historically been characterised 
in economics, it has at different times meant wordy expositions of the classical political 
economists, and the almost wordless and symbol-dominated axiomatics of modem economics. 
Further, theories are seen as serving the purpose of defining, explaining, or predicting an 
economic reality 'out there'. As Erwin Klein (1998: 193-194, emphasis added) puts it: 
A 'real-world economic system' - the mediate referent of a theory, an international, 
national, regional economy; a market; and economic agent, to mention a few - is 
usually a highly complex structure in itself. This complexity is augmented by the fact 
that economic systems are merely relatively autonomous subsystems of larger, 
encompassing, 'real-world systems'. It is the task of the economic theorist 
intellectually to extricate the economic subsystem from the conceptual whole it is 
interwoven with, to reconstrnct it with the necessary details, and to draw a blueprint 
describing the channels which connect the former and the latter ... 
In contrast, thinking of theories as textual productions is an important move for imagining the 
writing of economic theory in other ways. I will first critically discuss the various ways in 
which this endeavour has materialised within economics, and then argue for further 
developments. 
Recognising the textual nature of economy/economic/economics implies being alive to 
processes by which 'economy' is distilled out of 'society' and exploring the boundaries of the 
economic, and its defmitional politics. In the identification of what gets counted as being the 
'economic', controversy is underplayed. This delineation/demarcation of the 'economic' itself 
is an intensely political act, for often privileges accrue to what gets defined as being so. What 
gets counted as economic is what is amenable to the neoclassical economic method (see Julie 
Nelson 1993; Diana Strassmann 1993a, b), and so the "established order tends to produce ... 
the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness" (pierre Bourdieu 1977: 164). We can deconstruct 
the conventional ideas of economy/ics (as objective universal knowledge about an externally 
existing economy/reality), by engaging considerations about the role of the author, the text 
intentionality, language and the effects of power. Such a reading of economic knowledge as 
Emmanuel Levinas 1987: 26). 
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textual production can enable us to see such knowledge claims as contIno 1, I' gen as exc USlOnarv 
stories complicit with power. .. 
Often economists attempting to question the c'a tual truth f 1., C status 0 economic theories 
formulate their arguments by resisting the fact/value distinction adhered to in positive 
economics, and by claiming that economic theories are not simply representations of a reality 
out there, but are stories about the economic realm. This characterisation of economics as 
storytelling is also run together with claims for the 'textuality' of economic theories. As I will 
go on to argue, my aim of looking at theories as textual productions is not limited to or 
necessarily mapped by this way of considering textuality of theories in economics. For 
instance, Benjamin Ward (1972: 179-190) characterised economics as storytelling, defmed as 
"an attempt to give an account of an interrelated set of phenomena in which fact, theory and 
value are all mixed together in the telling". He argued that the standard stories of economics 
convey a picture not explicitly stated but conveyed across by the "selection of topics and 
emphases" (183), such as those fitting a capitalist economy. 
The most famous proponent of the rhetoric approach in econOmICS is DonaldlDeirdre 
McCloskey (1986) who argues that economics as a field of enquiry emphasises facts and logic 
at the expense of metaphor and story. While economists may like to think that they are 
practising science, they need to realise that in their actual workaday practices they constantly 
confront disagreements over values, and practice the rhetorical skills of persuasion to advance 
their cause. But, the biggest problem that I fmd with McCloskey's rhetoric approach is the 
way in which attention to textual detail is invoked as an additional tool that economists can 
employ in their reasoning. Evidence the following argument made by McCloskey and Arjo 
Klamer (1995: 195, emphases added) which is based on the idea that since "knowledge is 
information plus judgement" economists should pay attention to their rhetoric: 
If the economy depends on the faculty of speech, then the economy will ~equire ~e~bal 
interpretation... Economic institutions will look to some de~ee like rehgious 
ceremonies or social gatherings. They will need to be read m terms of human 
intentions and beliefs. An economy that depends on speech is one that can be listened 
to and read, like a text ... But the economist who can adjust will have an addition~l set 
of scientific tools, those of interpretation. One cannot ignore a quarter of. nat.lOnal 
income, the human as against the mechanical part of knowledge. The conclUSIOn IS not 
that the present tools are worthless and should be disca:de~. They are worth a.lot and 
should be kept, for their present uses and for bnngmg meas~ement mto an 
interpretive economics. But if the economy needs sometimes to be dnlled rat~er than 
hammered, or planed rather than sawn, the economist had better have a dnll and a 
plane. 
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This kind of attention to textuality combines arguments for lI'terary an 1 . fl' ·th a YSIS 0 OglC WI a 
surprising inability to see that 'reading the economy as a text' is not simply a matter of using 
another tool, but of recognising that economic theories are textual ideological products which 
function in interested ways. 
In this way, rhetoric is seen as another new method in the armoury of a 'new' but still 
mainstream economics. In suggesting a prescriptive viewing of economics as a contest of 
persuasion and rhetoric, McCloskey also implicitly holds to a 'marketplace of ideas' view 
wherein the approach that is dominant is ostensibly that which could convince the most (see 
Michael Stettler 1995). This is a depoliticised addendum rather than a radical envisioning of 
economics especially when viewed in its failure to address those who want to situate 
economic theories as interested productions of a modernist imperial discipline which crucially 
relies upon its exclusions in order to sustain its claim to knowledge. In my view, it is a 
stylistic, rather than an ethical critique, postmodem though it may be. 
This means that the call for reading theories as textual productions is not simply asking us to 
read the 'texts' of economics, but to read economics as a text. Let me give two more 
examples. Don Lavoie (1991: 2) argues that hermeneutics would apply to economics on "two 
different levels: our understanding of the texts of economics; and our understanding of 'texts' 
of the economy - that is, the price movements, or monetary institutions, or industrial 
organisation of economies, each of which is the meaningful product of human minds". Again, 
Vivienne Brown (1994b) uses the term "reading the economy as a text" while drawing upon 
Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin and, of course, McCloskey (see also Willie Henderson 
1995). She outlines the ways in which we can 'read' the economy: mechanisms that compile 
sift and sort the fragmented text of the economy (such as statistical data and econometric 
techniques) or, the ways in which notions are interpreted in different theoretical approaches 
(for instance the account of competition in Walrasian, Hayekian and Schumpeterian 
approaches). Her critique comes across rather as empirical addendum, that we can 'read' 
things in these other ways. But the political implications of her call for exploring the text of 
the economy as being 'fragmented and multivoiced' is enacted as being simply an addition to 
the methods, rather than any recognition or possibility of the politics of such a move. 
Not all the attention to textuality in economics has been merely stylistic. The concerns of 
power are related to those of textuality in the work of Diana Strassmann (1993a, b, 1994; 
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Strassmann and Livia Polanyi 1995) who highlights the ways in which disciplinary authority 
can mean that the conversation of economics is laden with power imbalances. Her conception 
of economics as storytelling and economists as storytellers crucially draws attention to the 
masculinist nature of the mainstream narratives. When we see knowledge about the economy 
as the result of textual production, several observations are forthcoming. In a story about 
stories, its interesting to ask, what do the stories we tell, tell about us? It is instructive to note 
what is the outside of mainstream stories about the economy: women, non-marketable 
ideas/objects, environment, history, emotions, non reductive, non formalisable, non 
measurable elements of comprehension. The agent (homo economicus) is patterned after an 
individual with the sorts of privileges in society which traditionally accrue to privileged men 
(Paula England 1993; Ulla Grapard 1995, 1996; Gillian Hewitson 1999). Similarly, the notion 
of free choice does not take into account people who do not have free choice: those who are 
forced owing to need, or, those who do not feel at ease with the neoclassical capitalist 
ideology. There is no space for people who socially and representationally (for instance 
through minority stereotyping) fmd themselves at the sites where choices aren't just individual 
or free but governed by others' perception of oneself This story appeals to audiences who see 
their own image in its interstices. For the minority who see themselves in it, it is a powerful 
story. For those who do not recognise themselves in the text, there is the role of holding up the 
institutionalised story as its outside. 
Against this background, one can further argue not simply for questioning the stories that 
economists tell as their value-laden creations but for reading the very construction of entities 
such as economy, or the category economic, or the discipline economics as textual 
productions. A text - not just in terms of a general interpretation of a 'text' which can be 
'read', but a textual productive enterprise. 2 
The practitioners and practices are part of the performance of an enterprise of knowledge 
creation which produces its own Real (the economy) and then claims privileged access to it as 
if it existed already performed. The entity 'economy' or category 'economic' as itself the 
production of the very theories that are supposed to reflect it. And this view of economics as a 
. ,., R 1 2000' 7) emarks' "'Text' is not 
2 What is a text? Consider Geoffrey Bennmgton s (m NIcholas oy e . r . . . 
. .' ., f" t Text ill generalIS any 
quite an extension of a familiar concept but a displacement or remscnptlOn 0 1. . . 
, l' 1 than that) perceptlon IS 
system of marks traces referrals (don't say reference, have a Itt e more sense b'· th th 
' '.. 1 d th world the one as su ~ect, e 0 er a text.. .. There is no essentla1 dIfference between anguage an e , 
as object. There are traces". 
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text (of which economists are themselves a part) helps us to appreciate the very particular 
locatedness of this text. Economics, as a contingent episteme, is an ideological product 
embodying Western enlightenment imperial colonial modernity (see Rajani Kanth 1997a, b). 
By thinking of economics and creating knowledge about the economy as a text, we can 
examine the ways in which economic knowledge is contingent. Following Michael Shapiro's 
(1989b: 13) discussion of a critical political perspective, one could analogously ask: how does 
reading the economy as a text necessarily involve a questioning of the privileged forms of 
representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, 
acts and themes through which the economic world is constituted. 
This questioning of the demarcation of legitimate economic knowledge is a questioning both 
of the arbitrary boundaries of the economic, as well as of the epistemological foundations of 
what counts as knowledge and how can it be accessed. Theories which conventionally explain, 
predict or describe a reality can now be seen as interested productions of reality. Rather than 
re-presenting a pre-given reality, theory produces the very reality it seeks to explain (cf. 
Donald MacKenzie 2002). This performative role of theories enables us to appreciate better 
the intertwined discursive/material in social theory. For instance, economic theories hinging 
on self-interest become a paean for an ontology of hedonistic egoism, creating what they 
name. Also, then we can attend to the manifest 'violence' of economic theories. That is, as I 
have argued in the thesis, the way in which economic theory withholds recognition as 
economic agents for those who do not fit its standard story. Further, it is important to trace the 
link between this epistemic writing out and the historical and cultural conditions of its 
performance. As a response to the political, social, cultural events, economics alternates 
between being the handmaiden of governance, historical facilitator and legitimiser of 
colonialism and neocolonialism, and mathematical representation of 'the economy'. Yet this 
should alert us to the parallels between those epistemically written out of the economic 
theories, and those at the receiving end of the cruelties of economic logic. 
The way one would write anOther economic theories will be radically different. Let me point 
out a contrast between this view of theory as a textual production with the conventional one as 
a collection of causal explanatory variables. 
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Theory has become, partly as a consequence of enlightenment epistemolOln' and the mode . t 0: rrus 
rendition of disciplinary knowledge, the expectation of something which can provide answers. 
These answers, as theorists especially in economics would very well know, are hoped-for 
answers not just to the 'problems of knowledge' (which are themselves constructed in tune 
with the structures of knowledge), but answers to the administration of structures. The trouble 
with this construal of theory in social science as providing answers to the governance of 
society, is that it leaves completely unquestioned and unthought, the very basic concepts 
which spring fully formed and appear to relate to praxis instead. 
Now, against this view of theory which is quite deeply linked to a particular way of thinking 
about causality, contrast theory as an exploration of discontinuous trends that determine so 
that you can't translate easily. This is the view afforded to us by Spivak's (1991: 246) 
understanding of determinant as determination (Bestimmung), 
In fact if you put the three adjectives together, politico, economico or, technologico, 
what you would get is overdetermination ... Overdetermination in the sense of anders 
determiniert rather than just vielfach determiniert,e] not just an arithmetical collection 
of determinants, but determination - to translate Freud's phrase, otherwise. In other 
words discontinuous trends that determine so that you can't translate easily. 
So that we challenge the straightforward simplicities of knowledge as the application of 
theories, theorising as the attribution of causality and the addition of determinants. Rather, the 
boundaries of the knowledge creation process become porous, theorising becomes about 
encountering the discontinuities in an overdetermined world and letting them affect the 
process of theorising itself. Theory is not the collection of determinants, but the exploration of 
(over)determination in the face of multiplicity. As Joan Scott (1988: 33) writes, "[w]e need 
theory that will let us think in terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of unities and 
universals". This does not give us easy answers, but lets difference make a difference to 
theorising. 
While the conventional view of theory will see critique as a matter of pointing out errors, and 
accordingly knowledge as an accumulation on the road to progress, the latter sees a critique 
and theory as inseparably intertwined and often indistinguishable. 
7.2.2 The Altered Role Of Critique 
3 Roughly equivalent to: 'Different' rather than just a 'Multiple' sense of determination. 
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It i~ simply no good moaning unless you can offer something that can be used as a 
spnngboard for others (Partha Dasgupta 1998: 24). 
Seeing theorising as a textual productive enterprise radically alters the way we perceive the 
role of critique. It is important to recall that 'theory and critique' are often characterised, both 
in the mainstream and even in most critical approaches in economics, in a stable way where 
the purpose of the latter is the advancement of the fonner. Better critique leading to better 
theory, an 'eventually we will get there' view. Within this, critique is seen as largely 
atheoretical and not an end in itself. The narrow economics vision of critique as criticism 
never allows much to be questioned (and further critique must provide immediate alternatives 
- something challenged rightly by Strassmann and Livia Polanyi 1995). 
Within the modernist verSIons of knowledge, the pwpose of critique is the unified 
advancement of theory by pointing out its errors or omissions, but this leaves no space for 
challenging the way in which the theoretical terrain is fundamentally constituted. In 
challenging the completeness of theoretical space, critique needs also to replay that space 
differently, to rescue its contours and shake away its certainties. Like Lady Macbeth's 
'damned spot' that would not rub off, history sticks to a postcolonial theory of the economic 
(and of economics - as a contingent episteme whose coming of age seamlessly ties in with the 
post-enlightenment esteem of modernism). 
It is interesting to note that critique can lend itself to different characterisations once we think 
theory Otherwise. Vivian Walsh (2000: 7) writes that a theory is not only black with fact and 
white with convention but also red with values. The threads of a theory are even more tangled 
- with the many colours of implicatedness, involvement and an always already insinuation, an 
engagement that is not prior to a factual world but woven into what it seeks to represent. And 
on this view, critique can be seen as a way of disturbing the status-quo with a particular endls 
in mind (Judith Butler, 2000b); as the basis for an emancipatory politics achieved by 
proceeding to theorise differently, or it can be theory at any given point in time. 
By this last point I mean the following. If we see economics as a particular text rather than an 
objectivist scientistic enterprise, then we can overcome the nostalgia for critique as 
subservient to unified theoretical advancement. Critique functions differently in a textual 
reading and in a purportedly objectivist scientific enterprise. The idea of critical questioning 
and change in science is strongly tied to the notion of accumulation and verification of 
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knowledge. This notion of critique has carried over into econoffil'cs The . h 
. re IS, oweyer, no 
determinate fixing of meaning in a textual reading. It is not an attempt to build a solid mass of 
ever-fixed knowledge but rather constant reinterpretations and renegotiations. In reading 
economic knowledge as a text, we recognise critique as theory at a situated point in time. The 
shifting, slipping, sandly meanings of the economic can be recognised as irremediably 
mediated and contextual. Thus, we can untangle critique from its slavish role at the feet of 
unified theoretical advancement and see it as consisting of multiply erupting strands of theory. 
This might seem strange at first, to consider critique as theol)', especially since a lot of potent 
contemporal)' critique is in some way or the other a rebellion against 'theol)". But, it should 
be remembered that 'theol)" in its grand, unified, solid (neoclassical) sense is not the 
'theoretical' value which critique has traditionally been deemed to lack. So, one is arguing 
both for an unprivileging of the theoretical status and also for the recognition of critique as 
having theoretical value which is not dependent on better theories being developed. 
If there is anything common to the many ways in which we can conceive of critique, it is a 
desire for change, for betterment sometimes (though often admitting a contested notion of 
'betterment'), for including consideration of the 'outside'. The above discussion on the nature 
of critique is relevant because often economists can tend to think of critique as mere criticism. 
I am making the point that there is a difference between the two, that critique is fundamentally 
an ethical epistemological position. This is because it is the recognition of plurality of voices, 
a liberation from the standard narrative, a quest for avoiding theoretical foreclosure. As Jean-
Francois Lyotard argues, a resisting of totality is important - "we have paid a high enough 
price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one" (1984), and we now need to understand the 
burden imposed by "the mortgage of critique and theol)''', where "critique remains within the 
field of the criticised thing and within the paranoiac, dogmatic relation of knowledge" (in 
Jorge Larrain 1994: 106-107 [1974]). 
Considering the emancipatol)' possibilities of critique leads one to interrogate the relationship 
between knowledge and freedom. Conventionally emancipation is deemed to be a matter of 
'the truth shall set you free', a relation where knowledge is redeeming, enabling, enlightening 
and seemingly the more access to a universal store of knowledge one has, the greater are one's 
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chances for freeing oneself from oppression.4 However, if we look in greater detail at this 
story (enlightenment epistemology), we can see why it is problematic. Knowledge is not a 
disinterested factual store of truth, which provides ready-made solutions for combating 
oppression, but is rather best seen as a successive questioning of previous knowledge claims. 
Jane Flax (1992) argues that knowledge is not innocent, but a belief in the innocence of 
knowledge serves many purposes. It allows theorists to overcome the conflicts between 
knowledge and power by inserting the wedge of Reason. It further cements the legitimacy of 
the theorist in gaining privileged access to some Real. It views the Reason-led exercise of 
'proper' knowledge (acquired by scientific means) as benevolent and emancipatory. And 
finally, it absolves the seekers of such transcendent knowledge (in its many forms of God, 
Science, Truth) from accepting responsibility for the ways in which such knowledge can be 
exclusionary, interested, specific and nonfreeing. Universal emancipation if only we had 
enough knowledge is a false promise of Western enlightenment modernity. It is also 
dangerous for it obscures the processual ways in which discourses actually function in creating 
legitimacy. 
The temptation to view knowledge as a disinterested factual store of truth which provides 
ready-made solutions for combating oppressions is revisited throughout the many endeavours 
of critical social theory. Typically, the ability to meaningfully conceptualise emancipation in 
such critical social theory requires the anterior presence of a transcendental subject who acts 
as the marker of knowledge. In order to further utilise such theoretical apparatus, this model of 
subjectivity is then illegitimately universalised. Its illegitimacy is in contrast to a contextualist 
notion of emancipation which is meaningful only within the frame of specific locational 
questions and particular struggles. 
As Ahmed (2000: 102) points out, critique is about recognising that categories are used which 
"may be exclusionary, or even violent, when they are not recognized as categories". All 
"[c]losures are nervous" to an extent, and "[c]ritique in the strong sense, is never done. One 
cannot say it has been achieved" (Spivak 1991: 249). An ethical and emancipatory critical 
political practice would challenge not only the relation between theory and critique but also 
continually enact incursions to explode the theory/praxis problematique - the enlightenment 
epistemological belief in the separation of theory and praxis. 
4 An interesting example of a link between ontology, explanation and.em~c~pation is ~rovided ~Y the 
critical realist accounts, where it is argued that 'explanation is emanclpatIon . See Colher (1994. 169-
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7.2.3 TheorylPraxis Problematique 
[Th~] nice notion of the relationship between theory and practice has caused and . 
causmg a good deal of suffering in the world... the field of work is a broken and ::. 
uneven place .. The conventional hi~hway of a politically correct single issue is merely 
the shortest dIstance between two SignPOSted exits (SpiVak 1999: 197). . 
This theory/praxis (gap) problematique - where theory and praxis are understood in a distinct 
relation - posits theory as promise and the praxis as performance. Such (typical) attributions 
postulate a necessary wedge between the sophisticated theoretical understanding of events 
and atheoretical material brute struggles which can be undertaken following on from such 
theoretical understandings. It relies upon the notion of theory as providing an unmediated 
access to a transcendent (underlying) material reality, and the further possibility of such theory 
to be harnessed for universal good in practice. This is an artificial divide which is useful to 
preserve the notion of 'innocent knowledge' which in practice leads to uninterrogable power. 
On the other hand, the discursive construction of this divide and its resilience draws attention 
to the difficulty of imagining knowledge which is not (as I argued before) a prelude to 
effective intervention in the world, but is itself always-already a form of ethics, politics, 
strategy, subjectivity, Reason and being. Attention to theory should not be construed as the 
giving up of praxis, neither should a focus on praxis be seen as anti-theoretical. As Stuart Hall 
(1988: 69-70) puts it: 
If you ask me what is the object of my work, the object of the work is to always 
reproduce the concrete in thought - not to generate another good theory, but to give 
better-theorized account of concrete historical reality. This is not an anti-theoretical 
stance. I need theory in order to do this. But the goal is to understand the situation you 
started out with better than before. 
One should not underestimate, nor deny the complexity of the theory-praxis problematique 
within the politics of identity. Discussing the relation between deconstruction and activist 
politics, Spivak (1991: 233-234) has the following to say: 
204). 
Grassroots activists (as opposed to urban radicals) in Third World mus~ use what is at 
hand, they cannot sit around and decide which individual rights are natIve. They.ha~e 
to use models that they know, on the field, they have to use mode~s .that are capitalist 
in order to fight the multinationals. In the tribal. moveme~t ~e actiVIsts know that the 
tribals who were considered animals in the fifties and SIXtIes m.ust be e~~uraged to 
establish account in the banks. Of course this is inserting them mto capItalism. They 
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must .be. su~ported when. they try to claim citizen's rights and they know that the 
. , constItutIon ~s not somethmg that fell into tribal law and culture. 
SpIvak s remarks raIse a more nuanced issue in the theory/praxis problematique namely that 
we have to be able to 'talk across worlds'. Richa Nagar (2002) discusses this difficulty of 
combining the languages of theory and praxis. She argues that it is imperative for the theory in 
Western academy to talk across worlds - "worlds that are separated not J·ust sociall y, 
geopolitically and materially, but also in their understandings of what constitutes releyant 
theory and politics" (182). This is not the same as the claim that people who 'do' theory are 
not engaged in political work, or that political activists are not engaged in theory, but that it is 
critical that the languages of knowledge are "accessible and relevant to multiple audiences 
here and there" (184, emphasis in original). I need to clarify this point a little further. By 
saying that the languages of knowledge should be accessible to multiple audiences, one does 
not mean that the printed marks on paper, the terms and concepts used should not push the 
boundaries of thought further, neither does one mean that audiences over 'there' do not want 
theory or are not interested in theorising. In contrast, what has been asserted here is that the 
process of theorising should be committed to an ethical politics which is foundational upon the 
encountering of difference, of others, and of 'other others'. To take an example, the fact that 
this thesis draws upon interdisciplinary vocabularies does not mean that it is rendered 
automatically inaccessible to certain audiences. To think so would be to foreclose the 
possibility of certain engagements with certain audiences. In contrast, talking across the 
worlds implies that the language of knowledge (different from the common understanding of 
language) is one which cannot afford to elide difference. For instance, consider the way in 
which the discourse of economics assumes the 'legitimate' terrain of knowledge and of its 
application. This involves focusing on certain privileged actors who (with access to capital 
and freedom of choice) interact in a certain setting arbitrarily defmed as the economy in ways 
that are limited to a capitalist industrial setting - but this discourse is universalised as the 
theory of economics worldwide. It does not have any space for different audiences who are 
then inserted at odd-points in its fabric. In this case, the language of knowledge is not 
accessible to multiple audiences, the politics of knowledge creation are not ethical. Neither is 
the situation any different when Sayer's moral economy discussions exercise the privileged 
rights to confme the terrain of such theorising to that of the 'West'. Any project of knowledge 
creation must constantly foreground its own positioning in relation to the way in which it has 
fixed difference. On this account, theory and praxis are not straightforwardly separable, they 
reside in the continuum of the encounters through which they are differentiated. Singular 
theorists do not create objective and universalisable knowledge about their subjects of study. 
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To recall Sara Ahmed, ethical projects of various collectivities involving the painstaking 
labour of work are generated through encounters (if it is n t to b . I 
o e stm.p y merger, benevolence 
or knowledge). 5 ' 
A recognition of the constitutive linkages between theory and praxis allow us to further 
explore the relations between epistemology and emancipation in the writing of theory 
Otherwise. 
7.2.4 Emancipation And Epistemology 
I do not ne~ epistemology to justify my. desire, my life, my love. I need politics; I 
~~~ to build a world that does not requrre such justifications (Shane Phelan 1994: 
Most economic understanding would have us believe in a model of the world where human 
beings are the centre6 of the universe and nature7 is at their disposal to produce and consume 
(though in schizoid states) according to their beliefs (preferences) in order to maximise their 
utility under conditions of endless want. Questioning this is to bring about the realisation that 
it is not as if we produce and consume in a silent empty docile world with only identical me-
selves, but that we, our beliefs and our very identities - we ourselves are produced by an 
external world of Others. 
Analysing events at the level of the individuals is mistaken not only because it leaves out the 
diverse social factors operating at supra-individual levels, but because it allows individual 
subjects to be seen as if they pre-exist discourses about subjectivity. Starting from the 
proposition of the pre-formed, knowing and discriminating individual who then proceeds to 
5 It is also important to clarify that the encounters referred to here are not 'fieldwOIk'. To quote from 
Ahmed (2002: 16), 
This work is differentiated from anthropological knowledge: it is not fieldwork. Rather, as a 
form of encounter, it involves getting closer to others in order to occupy or inhabit the distance 
between us. Such encounters must supplement collective activism precisely because they 
prevent 'us' from assuming we can gain 'access' to the difference of those others who are 
positioned differently by the networks and flows of global capitalism. . . 
6 Of course there are many ways in which this idea of the central human being plays out, for It IS never 
just a central human being but a central man, and a central white man - ~s o~er ~ttributes may be 
middle-class, able-bodied, anglo-saxon, protestant, heterosexual and procreatlvely mclmed. . . 
7 The ever-present 'nurturing feminine' outside which is to be 'controlled'. F~r a d~CUSSI0~ of 
ecological and feminist issues in relation to economics, see Sabine O'Hara; Elhe Perkins; Hllkka 
Pietila; Teresa Brennan; Maren Jochimsen and Ulrike Knobloch; Martha MacMahon; Mary Mellor, all 
in Ecological Economics (1997). A contrast can be found in Luca Tacconi (1998). 
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voluntarily undertake transactions or exchanges obscures the fact that this is a very particular 
model of individual SUbjectivity - which needs to be historically, geographically and 
temporally situated to be seen as meaningful. But, taken as the vel)' basis of all other 
economic understanding, it serves to 'write out' the myriad methods of knowledge creation 
that actually make humans into such individual 'subjects'. 
The destabilisation of an essentialist identity does not inaugurate a free-for-all where there are 
no constraints and no choices, rather, thinking emancipation in terms of collective identities 
which are based in the ftrst instance on an ethical primacy of difference, places responsibility 
at the heart of knowinglbeing. The processual nature of achieving while maintaining identities 
as an outcome (rather than an antecedent) of political practice is an invitation to continually 
Other oneself, thus analysing power at the site of knowledge. It emphasises that "the 
constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency ... [it is a] loss of 
epistemological certainty, but this loss of certainty does not necessarily entail political 
nihilism as its result" (Butler 1992: 12, 17). Translational architectures of identity radically 
change the way we think about knowledge and about the self by foregrounding the Other as 
constitutive to identity. 
The ensuing relation between emancipation and epistemology is by no means uncomplicated. 
The narratives of emancipatory claims are painfully contingent and contested, even amongst 
what would seem to be the most innocuously apparent identity groupings of race, class, 
gender. This question of the anxious identities that we inhabit is particularly important for the 
status of epistemology in emancipatory projects (for instance, feminism). The comforting 
certainty of the transcendent subject is replaced with the ever more unstable, fleeting subject 
positions that we come into as both the creators of knowledge about the way we behave and 
(in a typical circular and cumulative causation case) ourselves being created in the image of 
that knowledge. 
The way forward will involve an overcoming of the conventional project of epistemology 
itself. In the words of Lorraine Code (1991: 314), "[a]s long as 'epistemology' bears the stamp 
of the postpositivist, empiricist project of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge and devising strategies to refute skepticism, there can be no feminist 
epistemology". She argues that it is the pivotal ideals of the conventional epistemological 
project - objectivity, impartiality, universality - which will need reconstruction in order to 
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move towards transformative emancipatory pro1ects As dl'SCUSSed l' th . ~. ear ler, ese emancipatorv 
projects cannot be based simply on essentially similarised collective standpoints of th~ 
oppressed. Instead, thinking must proceed in terms of "a co I fi . 
mp ex con guratlon of 
specificities, posi tionality" (ibid.: 317, emphasis original). Responsible critical inquiry \\ill 
involve the painstaking labour of encountering through ethical collectivities in the interests of 
emancipation. This emancipation is not available simply by adding women to be existing 
framework of knowledge, but require a rethinking of those frameworks. "They must transform 
the terms of the discourse, challenge the structures of the epistemological project" (324). In 
what follows, I will explore one of the ways in which theorising as the anchor of knmvledge 
creation can be othered by linking theory to travel. 
7.2.5 Making Theory Hospitable To Travel 
The key to 'where you are' is an amalgam of the emphases conveyed by travel, 
otherness, and being (Spivak 1999: 193). 
Writing theories of the economic should be a self-aware exercise of power and of memory. 
The wodded world is multiple and recognising this does not mean an unconcern for whether 
the subaltern eats (cf. Christine Sylvester 1999). The divide between theory and praxis is 
agonistic, futile and dangerous for it restricts the terms of critique. A 'writing' of 'economic 
theory' needs to proceed from completely unimaginable (and yet much imagined) premises. 
The very conceptualisation of 'knowledge' and what it means to know is to be altered. The 
individual subject transcendental referent that holds together the uber-theory, the urtext of the 
economic, the original map of economics will hang questioned. There is no economic self in 
market economy that economics can divine by models, but is constituted by utterances, 
differently and never alike. It needs to be written in its various presences, in locations and in 
memory (temporal, spatial, geographical, historical, ideological to name some). Liberal 
humanism, global cosmopolitanism, integrative expansive ideas of universal emancipation, the 
general nature of human economic behaviour sharply distinguished from socia~ politica~ 
moral, and cultural will never move beyond the transcendental universal modernist referent 
individual. We are not all part of one big market where we can either enthusiastically embrace 
modernist, capitalist, utilitarian ideas or be labelled primitive, uncivilised, backward, time 
warped savages who cannot understand commerce or science or maths. Representations of 
progress have always relied on such imaginaries, in economics and elsewhere. 
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Writing is difficult. The mark of privileges and the unsaid is not the same as the unwritten - it 
is political and poetic for it constitutes the legitimacy of voice, the transfer and translation of 
value. Writing economic theory anOther way is to question that which we think we know - the 
'economic'. To admit the possibility that we cannot always think out the apriori 'economic', 
that we cannot imagine its negotiations for every other always. And so the whole set of ideas 
that are consonant with this particular way of delineating the economic, cannot be universal 
either. Its basis in individualism, in self-interest, in the calculus of comprehension, in value, in 
ownership, in consumption, in production, in extraction, and in deprivation. How was it that 
this concept became universal and disciplined so that to defy the 'economic logic' you had to 
be a child, a lunatic or a 'primitive' non-European? 
It is not enough to exhaust the ethics of criticality at the door of the present as we find it. 
Questioning the hegemonic conceptualisation of the economic and the disciplinary 
motivations for the science of economics in the present is not enough. Rather, criticality 
demands making contingent the very basis of the present as an originary moment. Thus, when 
we juxtapose the considerations of identity with the economic and question the desire for 
universal knowledge it is not simply a call to write theories of the economic anOther way, but 
significantly, it is a call for re-imagining the writing of theory itself. To borrow Spivak's 
formulation, it is first and foremost important in the context of the expectations of theorising 
to enact the "persistent critique of what one cannot not want" (1991: 248). In other words, to 
question our desire for the adequacy of a theory which can be written without Othering 
oneself. A sense of theory which originates from the foundation of its homing concepts - self, 
discipline, subject, world. 
To take this idea further, I would briefly like to suggest an exploration of 'theory' and 'travel'. 
Within enlightenment epistemology and modernism, theory has functioned as a home on the 
road to knowledge. The writing of theory grounds the certainties of experiencing in stable 
ways. In this formulation, one must always be careful in guarding knowledge against the 
contamination of the strange, the unknown, the inhospitable, the foreign, and the Other. The 
encounter with the Other is always structured in the expectation of cohering the self. One is at 
home in the familiarity of stable foundations. In contrast to this, I am arguing for exploring the 
linkage of theory to travel. 
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To begin with, this will involve getting over the Humean caution against 'trayellers' tales'. 
When David Hume cautioned against 'travellers' tales' (see William Coleman 1995: 67), he 
was immunising knowledge against difference. Travel could lead to 'strange' notions. 
experiences, and convictions, because it makes the familiar unfamiliar. Now, to disrupt the 
universalising certainties of modernist knowledge we need the reverse. There is an urgent 
need to realise that "the world is incorrigibly plural" (Louis MacNiece 1935), but instead of 
distrusting the unfamiliar, this should inaugurate a re-imagining of theorising as a travel to 
Otherness. Theories themselves travel and much travel is theory. 
James Clifford (1986, 1989, 1997) considers the link between travel and theory where he 
writes that theory (from Greek theorein: a practice of travel and observation, a man sent by the 
polis to another city to witness a religious ceremony), is a product of displacement, 
comparison, a certain distance. To theorise, one leaves home. Consider the following (1989, 
emphases added), 
Travel: a figure for different modes of dwelling and displacements, for trajectories 
and identities, for storytelling and theorizing in a postcolonial world of global 
contacts. Travel: a range of practices for situating the selfin a space or spaces grown 
too large, a form of both exploration and discipline .... Theory, a product long 
associated with Western discursive spaces a status that permitted it to speak 
confidently of 'human' history, culture, psyche etc. now is marked by specific 
historical centers and horizons .... Theory is no longer naturally 'at home' in the West 
a powerful place of Knowledge, History, or SCience, a place to collect, sift, translate, 
and generalize. Or, more cautiously, this privileged place is now increasingly 
contested, cut across, by other locations, claims, trajectories of knowledge articulating 
racial, gender, and cultural differences. 
The postcolonial has involved marking 'the West' as a contested site of power, its legitimacy 
to speak under the sign of the human is questioned and its own constitution unravelled. While 
theory at home (in and with the promise of its adequacy) in enlightenment epistemology 
pretended to be the product of an exercise of knowledge in surveying the "assumed 
topography of an already worlded world" (ibid.), we must now learn to recognise theorising as 
worlding the world in and through its travels. 
But if we can see theory as travel, there is also the disciplinary dimension of seeing theories as 
'travelling' through representation, resistance, and institutionalisation. This is Edward Said's 
(1983: 226-247) notion of 'traveling theory', where theory travels from its originating context 
to new ones where its critically appropriated and reinterpreted. Said identifies four stages of 
this travel that theories undertake as follows: one, the departure from the point of origin: two, 
. . te t with its o\\'n passage through different contexts; three, transplantabon mto a new con x 
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conditions of acceptance; and, four, re-emergence of the initial idea transformed by its 
displacement and new uses (ibid.: 226-227).8 As a basic idea, this approach to theorising as 
involving transcontextuality is crucial. 
Thus we see that many productive vistas can be afforded by thinking travel with theory.9 
Theory is not simply the rooted preserve of the powerful, it travels along routes. The concept 
of Routes (the emphasis in identity on the migratory routes of its inhabiting rather than its 
fixed roots, see James Clifford 1997) along which theoretical ideas travel to new contexts is a 
meaningful terrain - a migrant intertextual inbetween hybrid space. A powerful resisting non-
assimilative space that questions the dominant alignment of ideas as natural or normal. A 
catachrestic and detouming10 space. A space for imagining theoretical endeavours that 
challenges the practice of theory itself - its ability to be adequate. Theory not as interpreting 
or explaining but understanding its own conditions of performance and its particular 
arrangements of mediation in making and accessing the world. The relation of theorising to 
travel invites the thinking of location not as a fixed point but as a site for struggle, '''where' 
we are is a matter of dispute" (Ahmed 2000: 98). Further, in order to appreciate the different 
contexts arising from encounters with others, we can imagine a continual translation of 
oneself, a translation which can be conceptualised as a travelling, for instance as in Maria 
Lugones's (1987) concept of world-travelling. 
Adopting the idea of 'travel' as the basis for theorising, interaction, the trajectory of theories, 
and the politics of identity - we can begin to think 'writing' itself as a performance whose 
conditions of possibility in knowledge creation become inextricably ethical. An engaged 
writing that cannot but be political. For writing is a deeply divided and dividing act, subject as 
it is to the politics of elision and ellipsis. The excess of meaning that hides behind the 
silhouette of the alphabet and plays in the silent spaces between animating them with absence. 
8 The example Said gives of a theory which has voyaged thus is Georg Lukacs's theory ofreification. In 
1994, Said wrote "Travelling theory reconsidered" where he revisits it. For a recent ~~agement of both 
these versions of travelling theory in relation to postcolonial approaches to exotICIsm, see Charles 
F orsdick (2002). . . . .' . . 
9 Anne Seller (1994) provides an interesting example of self-refleXive cntIcal ~~g of ,~eonsmg 
through the encounters of travel to unfamiliarity. The answer to her ~rovocatIvely. tItled . Sh~uld .a 
feminist philosopher stay at home?" (about encountering women's studieS at an Ind~an UmversIty) IS 
ultimately, "I think it is not so much a question of whether to stay at home, as of learnmg how to traver 
(247, emphasis added). ,,' tits f the 
10 Detournment is a situationist term which can be understood as ... to arrange dlSpara ~ e emen 0 . 
dominant culture together to form a new work, esp. in a way that reveals the true meanmg and function 
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What writing allows and what it does not let happen. Language, the maker-doer "can only 
indefmitely tend towards justice by acknowledging and practising the violence within it:' 
(Jacques Derrida quoted in Robert Baker 1993:16). Like concurrent prison sentences, histories 
run concurrently (though not parallel), and history one remembers and writes depends on the 
routes one has travelled. 
7.3 Pedagogy Re-Visited: Contextual Social Political Economices 
And what is critical consciousness at bottom if not an unstoppable predilection for 
alternatives (Said 1983: 247). 
Writing theories of the economic anOther way is about exploring the alternatives that Said has 
in mind. But this involves moving beyond the disciplinary enforcements of separable social, 
political, and economic to a contextual social political economy as the basis for theoretical 
praxis. What stands in the way? Consider Spivak again (1991: 242), 
Why do people not talk about it? Well, that has to do with the teaching machine, that 
has do with the institution. I mean the nature of disciplines, the nature of the 
institution, the nature of the teaching machine is basically reactionary, it seems to me. 
lt is placed within individualism and competition, it is placed within the fierce desire 
for allocation and grants, it is placed within the desire to be validated within that story 
and the inertia of the tradition of already-produced knowledge which gives you the job 
satisfaction of being a specialist, the job satisfaction of reproducing yourself among 
your students. This stuff is reactionary so how do you expect such institutions and 
such machines to produce recognition? 
I have now come full circle. From metaphor to metaphor: from the work done by the 'system 
as machine' metaphor of enlightenment epistemology to the work done by the 'teaching 
machine'. The point remains relevant. It is important to critically think the relation between 
the preservation of structures and the preservation of structures of knowledge, taking this also 
as an invitation to think the violence of knowledge. 
We cannot continue to write economic theory as it is written by the mainstream. Indeed, we 
cannot write theory, or even consider knowledge, as based upon the epistemic certainties 
derived from a submerging of difference. The teaching machine maybe one way of practising 
the insurrectional politics of reading and writing economy/economic/economics in Other 
ways. There are some promising signs. Many students and scholars the world over are 
of the original elements. Detoumment as revolutionary activity reverses the systematic fragmentation of 
. li " ("S T "d ) specla sts... orne erms n. . . 
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declaring the cnSlS ill economics with the onset of the Post-Autistic Economics (P AE) 
movement, supported by the 'Cambridge 27 call for opening up economics' and the 'Kansas 
City proposal: an international open letter to all economics departments' (see 
). In the spirit of pluralism, ethical responsibility, and critical thought, 
the call is for rethinking teaching, practice, and ethics in economics. 
In this critical vein, together with poststructuralist feminist and postcolonial themes, we can 
begin to think of contextual social political economic praxis, a non-universalist way of 
creating specific and interested economic knowledges. ll As universally valid theoretical 
frameworks become problematic, a recognition of difference is brought about. Often attempts 
to consider difference see it as 'diversion or division from sameness', as variations on the 
theme, but they don't let difference make a difference. Within a contextual praxis, difference 
is fundamental Otherness and involves considering specific history and context as the starting 
point of the theoretical life-cycle, rather than its culminatory application. By moving 
consciously in the direction of a multidisciplinary praxis we invite the authoring of 
contextualised theories in a framework of methodological pluralism, and this can insurrect 
certain relevant notions in our economic consideration of the world. An attention to contexts 
and praxis of a wider social political economy can also help to accommodate diverse insights. 
What (events, phenomena, behaviour) is currently a paradox or anomaly if viewed in 
economic terms might become more comprehensible when viewed in a theoretical 
constellation of varied motivations including the social or the political. Equally, new and 
locationally relevant issues might come into consideration. This will connect the political and 
the economic; economic knowledge will not be universally valid, and what is considered 
(defined) 'economic' will be understood differently across different contexts. Racial and 
cultural elements can be introduced into the analysis and localised struggles for meaning can 
arbitrate between competing accounts. Such a praxis will still be capable of admitting a 
contested notion of emancipation. Recognising the "contingent foundations,,12 of all 
knowledge about the economy, the way ahead can be negotiated by admitting "strategic 
11 This is in contrast to the standard appeal to generalisable solutions, for examp~e the general 'COlllltry-
assistance strategy' for every poorer nation followed by the World Bank WIth the same .f~ur step 
programme of privatisation, followed by capital market liberalisation, then market based pncmg, and 
'free trade' (see Gregory Palast 2002; Joseph Stiglitz 2002). . . 
12 Butler (1992: 3-21) advocates avoiding gestures of conceptual mastery. T~s IS n~t the adv~t of 
nihilistic relativism but the very precondition of a politically engaged. cntlque. The tas~ IS t? 
interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundations authonses, and what precIsely. It 
excludes or forecloses"; not do away with the category of universali~~ but to "re~~ve the category of Its 
fOlllldationalist weight in order to render it as a site of permanent politlcal contest (7 -8). 
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essentialism",13 by deploying strategically essentialist categories for explicitly (contested) 
emancipatory politics. 
The aesthetic aspirations of conventional theorising especially regarding the need for 
universally valid, objective knowledge lead to a 'violent' (epistemically) and 'oppressive' 
(materially) exercise where sets of people and ideas get 'written out' of the economy. 
Mapping of human interactions is not akin to postulating the ideal gas theory, not the least 
because power is the constant twin to knowledge. It continuously mutates and transfonns, it 
censors and creates. A focus on power as operative in localised settings with a historicised 
present is essential to attempt critical theorising. Examples of such endeavours might include 
examining the complicity between neoliberalism and neocolonialism in specific 
developmental rhetoric such as microcredit, foreign investment and aid; interrogating the role 
of corporatised media in representing and constructing the 'economic' aspect/rationale in 
'social political' issues; and, bringing into relief the disjuncture between economic theory and 
governmental practice on the overdetermined issue of the movement of human beings (the 
'labour' that travels). 14 
Once the legitimacy of theories and theorising is questioned in this manner, the economy isn't 
a single, simple, universal entity that is omnipresent and lends itself to total comprehension. 
The economy itself is recognised as a creative metaphor which needs to be fIlled with 
particular meanings at particular situations. It need not always be defined as that kind of 
theorising which excludes gender, race, class, culture, ecology. The perforated boundaries of 
the economy can then be explored with contextual comprehensions. Theorising 'economices' 
or multiple contextual social political scenarios of the economic is a way of admitting 
possibilities and can also be extremely useful in testing the limits of overdetermination (events 
and processes as the site and result of multitude of determinations) in theory and its 
implications on critical practice. 
13 Adopting and adapting deconstruction specifically for the postcolonial field, Spi~~ adv<><?~tes 
strategic essentialism "a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously VISIble politIcal 
interesf' (Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean 1996: 214). The goal of essential~st cri~i~ue IS no~ the 
exposure of error, but the interrogation of the essentialist terms. "In deconstruc~ve entIcal practIces, 
you have to be aware that you are going to essentialize anyway. So. then strategIcally you can look at 
essentialism, not as descriptions of the way things are, but as somethmg that one must adopt to produce 
a critique of everything" (Spivak 1990: 51). . . 
14 In addition, sociologies and philosophies of economics as a. professl?ll, m both. the West and non-
West, its links to policy making and its status in governmental dIscourse IS also required. 
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7.4 Conclusion: Penpoints On Mirrors 
It was done from a ~e~ire. to live, to m~e l.ife possible, and to rethink the possible as 
such .... although thIS mSIght does not ill Itself constitute a POlitI'cal I +; 
I·, I I" . . revo uuon, no po Itlca revo utlon IS possIble Without a radical shift in one's notion of the ossible 
and the real (Butler 1999: xx-xxiii). p 
Writing theories of the economic in Other ways thus entails new self-reflexive ways of 
theorising, critiquing, practising, reading, and writing the economy/economic/economics 
which are informed by a deconstruction of enlightenment epistemology and modernist 
renditions of knowledge. Identity and economic, culture and economy, value and values, are 
not separations explained by history, rather, history requires their explanation in the modernist 
politics of knowledge. Here are the words of Thomas Babington Macaulay in defence of the 
East India Company in the same year the British parliament voted to end slavery in the British 
West Indies (in Sharpe 1993: 7, emphases added), "It is scarcely possible to calculate the 
benefits which we might derive from the diffusion of European civilization among the vast 
population of the East ... . To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to 
govern savages". 
It is a meaningless reverie to see critique as indulging in endless disputes on solely the 
scientific nature of economics. There never was or will be an 'economic' per se - except in the 
logic of economic theory. And it is for this reason that postcolonial memory has travelled to 
interrogate economic theory. This, I might add, is not a luxurious dalliance but crucial. 
'Something else' leads down a conditioned mental cul-de-sac. We ask what - the story has to 
be told in familiarities. And yet the meeting of ideas can be anOther way of writing theory, as 
contextual social political economic praxes. A focus on power as operative in localised setting 
with a historicised present as crucial to theorising the economic. A self-reflexive critical praxis 
(see Spivak 1993) that seeks to generate meaningful totalities as contingent theoretical 
moments, to enable one to talk (strategically) unambiguously of oppression as well as 
resistance to it. A contextual totality which draws from the intersectionality of social political 
and economic fabric - but not an attempt at master formula or overall answers. When one 
"brings different things together to realise a third, which may have some features of all those 
other elements but is certainly not identical to anyone of them: it becomes a third 
particularity ... " (Ngugi Wa Thiong'O 1998:11-12). No doubt, such engagements upset 
conventional ways of telling accepted stories in economics, let alone face the question, what is 
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economics about? Like the anxieties of the regime in Bertolt Brecht's poem,15 power, eyen as 
disciplinary power seeks to censure the unfamiliar. 
Carry on regardless. The 'wild anthropologists' (as Spivak calls postcolonial peoples) have 
much work to do in making visible the disavowed emancipatory problematics that provide the 
foundations for post-enlightenment imperial modernism. Economics in whose bildungsroman 
one can read chapters on capitalism and imperialism, is a modernist project par excellence, 
locked into its airy metaphors of exchange, choice and agency - yet all in a world of no Other, 
no alterity. Writing economic theory anOther way is an important step in refiguring the altered 
possibilities of knowledge inlof economics. In this difficult engagement, "let a hundred 
flowers bloom and we don't mind even the weeds" (Ranajit Guha in Ella Shohat and Robert 
Stam 1994: 203). Penpoints on mirrors. Shall we? 
15 Some lines from Brecht's "Anxieties of the Regime" (in Wa Thiong'O 1998: 9-10) 
Given the immense powers of the regime 
Its camps and torture cellars 
Its well-fed policemen 
Its intimidated or corrupt judges 
Its card indexes and lists of suspended persons 
Which fill whole buildings to the roof 
One would think they wouldn't have to 
Fear an open word from a simple man ... 
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